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ABSTRACT 
 
 
There are currently no rules in international commercial arbitration law and practice 
assuring the coordination between (partial or final) arbitral awards and/or national 
court judgments rendered in identical or related cases. This lack of coordination is 
unsatisfactory, particularly in light of the ever-growing tendency of parties to submit 
their commercial disputes to international arbitration and the increasing complexity of 
international arbitration. Today, international commercial transactions and the disputes 
to which they give rise regularly involve multiple parties, contracts and issues. As a 
consequence, these disputes (or certain aspects of these disputes) are increasingly tried 
in multiple fora. In such circumstances, difficult issues regarding the res judicata effects 
of prior judgments or awards are likely to arise before international commercial arbitral 
tribunals. 
 
The central hypothesis underlying this research is that transnational principles of res 
judicata should be elaborated for international commercial arbitral tribunals. This 
solution is justified for several reasons. First, it is justified given the differences among 
domestic laws regarding res judicata and the difficulties surrounding the formulation of 
appropriate conflict-of-laws rules. Second, it avoids inappropriate analogies between 
international arbitration proceedings and litigation. Finally, the solution provides 
guidance and ensures a certain degree of fairness, certainty and predictability, which is 
expected by arbitration users.  
 
This PhD thesis seeks to achieve its aims in two stages: Part One examines the doctrine 
of res judicata in litigation, analysing the doctrine as applied in different domestic laws, as 
well as in private and public international law. Part Two will determine whether and to 
what extent the res judicata doctrine may be applied by international commercial arbitral 
tribunals. It will demonstrate that transnational principles of res judicata should be 
elaborated and will seek to formulate such principles. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
The Moving Finger writes; and, having writ, 
Moves on: nor all your Piety nor Wit 
Shall lure it back to cancel half a Line, 
Nor all your Tears wash out a Word of it. 
(Omar Khayyám)  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
We are not final because we are infallible, but 
we are infallible only because we are final. 
(Robert H. Jackson J.) 
1. International arbitration is widely considered to be the principal method of 
dispute resolution for international commercial disputes. Every year international 
arbitration institutions report increasing activity and new arbitration institutions are 
established “to catch this wave of new business”1.  
2. As a consequence of this ever-growing tendency of parties to submit their 
commercial disputes to international arbitral tribunals, international arbitration has also 
become increasingly complex. Today international commercial transactions and the 
disputes to which they give rise regularly involve multiple parties, contracts and issues2. 
One aspect of this growing complexity is the increasing number of multi-fora disputes, 
i.e. disputes which (or aspects of which) are tried in two or more fora3. When disputes 
involve multiple parties, contracts or issues, conflicts concerning the proper forum to 
deal with such disputes are likely to arise. Sometimes it may simply be impossible to 
bring such multiparty, multicontract or multi-issue arbitrations to one single forum. 
                                                 
1 REDFERN/HUNTER/BLACKABY/PARTASIDES, para. 1.01. See also NICHOLAS/LUKER, p. 
6. 
2 On the issue of “multiparty, multicontract and multi-issue” arbitrations see, in particular, HANOTIAU, 
Complex Arbitrations. A growth in multiparty cases has been observed over recent years. For instance, the 
ICC has observed a continuing increase in multiparty cases in 2009, with the number of multiparty cases 
accounting for slightly less than a third of all cases (ICC, 2009 Statistical Report, p. 9). The number of cases 
involving multiple contracts has also increased (see, e.g., WHITESELL/SILVA-ROMERO, p. 7).  
3 SCHNEIDER, p. 101. See also LIATOWITSCH/BERNET, p. 142. 
Introduction 
The Doctrine of Res Judicata Before International Arbitral Tribunals 
 
2 
 
Thus, the same or a related dispute might be brought before an arbitral tribunal and a 
state court or before different arbitral tribunals.  
3. Difficult questions may arise from this situation: if a court renders a decision on 
the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal, would the arbitrators be bound by the prior 
decision or could they decide anew whether they have jurisdiction? If the arbitrators are 
bound by a prior judgment denying arbitral jurisdiction, the parties’ arbitration 
agreement may be frustrated. On the other hand, if the arbitrators are not bound by the 
prior judgment and decide that there is a valid arbitration agreement, parallel court and 
arbitration proceedings on the merits may ensue. This may result in a waste of valuable 
resources and contradictory decisions on the merits. The parallel enforcement in 
different countries of such contradictory decisions may give rise to even further 
problems. To avoid such results, should arbitral tribunals be bound by a prior judgment 
on the merits of the dispute? If so, under which conditions and to what extent? Would 
the answers to the above questions be different if the prior decisions were rendered not 
by a state court but by another (or the same) arbitral tribunal? 
4.  The above questions all concern the finality of judgments and awards; they all 
raise issues of res judicata before an international arbitral tribunal. Arbitrators will find 
little guidance as to how to efficiently resolve these issues in international arbitration 
law and practice in its current state. However, the finality of decisions is fundamental in 
any legal system as it ensures fairness, efficiency, certainty and predictability in the 
dispute resolution process. Adequate solutions for dealing with res judicata issues in 
international arbitration must therefore be found.  
5. The way in which res judicata issues are currently dealt with differs from one 
arbitral tribunal to another. This might create feelings of uncertainty and 
unpredictability among arbitration users which is potentially harmful for international 
arbitration. Parties to arbitration proceedings expect to be treated fairly and equally, 
especially since at the end of the arbitration there will be a final and binding award 
determining their legal rights, and this award will be enforceable virtually worldwide4. 
Pre-established res judicata principles will provide the fairness, certainty and predictability 
                                                 
4 PARK, e.g., para. 7-23 and para. 7-33. 
Introduction  
3 
 
that arbitration users expect. They will give guidance to international arbitrators, 
especially in cases where the participants to the arbitration come from different legal 
backgrounds, have different expectations as to how the proceedings should be 
conducted or have never participated in an international arbitration before.  
6. The central thesis underlying this research is that transnational principles of res 
judicata should be elaborated for international arbitral tribunals. The main difficulty of 
this solution is to determine the content of these principles. However, this solution is 
justified for several reasons. First, it is warranted because of the differences among 
domestic laws regarding res judicata and the difficulties surrounding the formulation of 
appropriate conflict-of-laws rules. As will be discussed in chapter five of this research, 
none of the possible applicable laws, i.e. the law of the place of arbitration, the law of 
the place where the first decision was rendered or the law governing the merits of the 
dispute, appears to have an undisputable interest in governing res judicata before 
international arbitral tribunals. Second, this solution would respect the autonomy of 
international arbitration by avoiding inappropriate analogies with litigation. Finally, this 
solution provides guidance and ensures a certain degree of fairness, certainty and 
predictability.  
Literature review  
7. The subject of res judicata before international arbitral tribunals has been 
discussed in several articles5. In particular, the International Law Association (ILA) has 
worked on the subject.  
8. In 2006 the ILA International Commercial Arbitration Committee adopted six 
recommendations on res judicata for international arbitrators. The recommendations are 
based on two reports on res judicata and arbitration presented at the ILA Berlin 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., BREKOULAKIS, pp. 177 et seq.; BORN, pp. 2879 et seq.; GALLAGHER, pp. 329 et seq.; 
HANOTIAU , Complex Arbitrations, pp. 239 et seq.; HANOTIAU, The Res Judicata Effect of Arbitral Awards, 
pp. 45 et seq. ; HASCHER, pp. 17 et seq.; HOWELL, pp. 153 et seq.; HULBERT, pp. 155 et seq.; 
JARROSSON, L’autorité de la chose jugée des sentences arbitrales; KREHMSLEHNER, pp. 127 et seq.; LOWE, 
pp. 38 et seq.; LOWENFELD, pp. 55 et seq.; MAYER, Litispendance, connexité et chose jugée dans l'arbitrage 
international, pp. 185 et seq. ; PINNA, pp. 697 et seq.; REDONDO, pp. 1131 et seq.; SERAGLINI, pp. 909 
et seq.; SHEPPARD, The Scope and Res Judicata Effect of Arbitral Awards, pp. 263 et seq; SHELL, pp. 623 et 
seq.; SÖDERLUND, pp. 301 et seq.; STIER, pp. 321 et seq.; TRAIN, L’autorité positive da la sentence arbitrale, 
pp. 115 et seq.; VEEDER, pp. 73 et seq. 
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Conference in 2004 and the ILA Toronto Conference in 2006 respectively6.  
9. The Interim Report on res judicata and arbitration begins with a conceptual 
introduction of the doctrine of res judicata followed by a presentation of situations in 
which res judicata issues may arise in international arbitration. The Report then examines 
and compares the doctrine in different domestic laws and international law. The third 
part of the Interim Report briefly analyses the doctrine of res judicata in international 
arbitration law and practice. Finally, in the fourth part of the Report, key issues 
concerning the application of res judicata in arbitration are raised.  
10. The Final Report on res judicata and arbitration explains the scope and 
comments on the recommendations. 
11. The scope of the ILA recommendations is limited. They “concern the effect of 
an international commercial arbitral award upon further or subsequent arbitration 
proceedings between the same parties”7. In particular, they concern the situation where 
res judicata issues arise between different arbitral tribunals, as well as within the same 
arbitration. However, the recommendations do not deal with the relationship between 
state courts and arbitral tribunals and they apply only to international commercial 
arbitration, to the exclusion of international investment arbitration.  
12. The ILA recommendations are transnational in nature and designed for 
international commercial arbitration. Therefore, within their scope, the 
recommendations cover only those aspects of res judicata in international commercial 
arbitration where the Committee considered that transnational rules could be 
developed. Those aspects where the Committee felt that the development of 
transnational rules is premature and reference to conflict rules is more appropriate are 
not covered by the recommendations8.  
13. The ILA reports and recommendations on res judicata and arbitration by no 
means constitute a comprehensive study of the subject of res judicata before 
                                                 
6 ILA, Interim Report; ILA, Final Report. See also SERAGLINI, pp. 909 et seq.; DE LY/SHEPPARD, pp. 1 
et seq.; BENSAUDE, ILA Recommendations, pp. 415 et seq.  
7 ILA, Final Report, para. 9. 
8 See ILA, Final Report, paras 5 et seq. and para. 28. 
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international arbitral tribunals. They leave many important questions unanswered, such 
as the question of the law governing res judicata or the question of the res judciata effect 
of prior court judgments on arbitral proceedings. They have been described as “une 
oeuvre inachevée”9.  
Aim of the thesis 
14. The purpose of this thesis is to investigate whether and how the doctrine of res 
judicata should be applied by arbitral tribunals in their relations with other arbitral 
tribunals or state courts and within the arbitral proceedings pending before them. The 
aim is to demonstrate that res judicata issues in international commercial arbitration 
should not be governed by any particular domestic law designed for the relations 
between domestic courts. The ultimate goal is to identify transnational principles of res 
judicata adapted to the nature of international arbitration. The principles identified in 
this thesis will take the form of guidelines for international arbitrators. Their aim will be 
to incite the creation of a coherent international arbitration practice for matters of res 
judicata.  
Methodology 
15. This thesis will seek to achieve its aim in two stages: part one examines and 
compares the doctrine of res judicata in litigation, and part two deals with the doctrine of 
res judicata in international commercial arbitration. The reasons behind this approach are 
outlined below.  
16. One aim of this thesis is to investigate whether and how the res judicata doctrine 
as developed in litigation should apply in international arbitration. This can only be 
done after examining how the doctrine of res judicata is applied in litigation, in both a 
domestic and international law setting.  
17. Part One commences by determining how the doctrine is applied in domestic 
laws. This is the logical starting point given the fact that the res judicata concept 
                                                 
9 SERAGLINI, p. 917. 
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originally came into being in a domestic setting10. Chapter One examines the 
requirements and effects of a res judicata in different domestic laws. It will reveal 
similarities and differences regarding the res judicata doctrine between domestic laws. 
This will serve the aim of this thesis in several ways. First, it will give a clear 
understanding of the doctrine of res judicata which is at the heart of this thesis. In 
particular, it will clarify the doctrine’s meaning and purpose. Second, it will establish 
that there is no uniform doctrine of res judicata. In the second part of this thesis, this will 
be used as an argument to support the transnational approach toward res judicata and 
against the application of domestic res judicata rules in international commercial 
arbitration. Third, the similarities between domestic res judicata rules indicate the 
existence of some generally accepted principles. This will serve as a source of 
inspiration; it will help determine the content of transnational res judicata principles for 
international commercial arbitration.  
18. The thesis will compare the domestic laws of England, the United States, 
France and Switzerland. These laws were chosen for several reasons: first, they 
constitute major representatives for two of the most important legal families, i.e. the 
common law system on the one hand and the civil law system on the other hand. In 
addition, within the civil law family, France represents the Romanic law system, while 
Switzerland represents the Germanic law system. Second, the legal systems of England, 
the United States, France and Switzerland are all highly developed and are thus 
comparable as between each other. Third, they all enjoy leading positions in the field of 
international arbitration.  
19. After the comparison of domestic laws, Chapter Two will proceed to examine 
the res judicata doctrine in international law. The analysis will cover both private and 
public international law. The aim will be to determine how the domestic law doctrine 
has been introduced and is applied in international law, i.e. outside its original domestic 
law setting. This may serve as an inspiration as to how to introduce the res judicata 
doctrine into international arbitration. It will also help to determine the content of a 
general principle of res judicata in international law. In private international law, attempts 
                                                 
10 SÖDERLUND, p. 302. 
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have been made to harmonise rules of civil procedure, including res judicata. These 
general principles and attempts of harmonisation will be a useful source of inspiration 
for the determination of res judicata principles for international arbitration.  
20. The second part of the thesis will examine whether and how the doctrine 
should apply in international commercial arbitration. Chapter Three will demonstrate 
the existence of res judicata issues in international commercial arbitration by identifying 
situations in which such issues may arise before international commercial arbitral 
tribunals. The purpose is to demonstrate the reality and magnitude of the phenomenon 
of res judicata in international commercial arbitration and to identify the setting in which 
res judicata issues arise before international arbitral tribunals. Chapter Four will then 
discuss the current situation and its consequences to show that the occurrence of res 
judicata issues in international commercial arbitration constitutes a problem that needs 
to be solved. In Chapter Five the thesis will then discuss the proper approach to res 
judicata before international arbitral tribunals. It will demonstrate that transnational 
principles of res judicata should be elaborated. Finally, Chapter Six will seek to formulate 
such principles. 
Scope of the thesis 
21. The thesis will take the perspective of an international commercial arbitral 
tribunal in circumstances where the same dispute or matter has already been decided by 
the same arbitral tribunal or by another arbitral tribunal or state court. Due to the 
limited scope of this research, the thesis will not analyse the perspective of a state court 
confronted with a prior arbitral award. Likewise, this thesis will not cover investment 
arbitration.  
Terminology 
22. As the doctrine of res judicata varies among domestic laws and international law 
in its interpretation and application, so also the terminology may vary from one 
jurisdiction to another. It is therefore essential to clarify the sense in which the term “res 
judicata” will be used in this research. 
23. In this thesis the term “res judicata” will receive a broad meaning, covering all of 
The Doctrine of Res Judicata Before International Arbitral Tribunals 
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the various possible binding effects of a judgment or award on subsequent arbitral 
proceedings11. This means that the term “res judicata” as used in this thesis will cover 
both the conclusive and preclusive effects of a prior judgment or award. In other 
words, this thesis will discuss both the positive effect of res judicata, allowing a claimant 
to rely on a previous decision to further the development of his case, and the negative 
effect of res judicata, allowing the defendant to stop the re-opening of a matter which has 
already been decided in previous proceedings. It also means that the term will cover not 
only the plea of cause of action estoppel (claim preclusion), but also the pleas of issue 
estoppel (issue preclusion) and abuse of process, which are known in some common 
law countries, but are generally unknown in civil law countries. 
24. While it is useful for reasons of simplicity and convenience to use the term “res 
judicata” in this broad sense, it is important to set out the limits of this term and 
distinguish res judicata from similar concepts. The final ILA report distinguishes res 
judicata from  
 the doctrine of stare decisis, i.e. invoking previous decisions rendered 
between different parties as persuasive precedent; 
 correction of prior decisions rendered between the same parties in 
order to have an error in the decision corrected; 
 interpretation of decisions rendered between the same parties in 
order to obtain a clarification of the meaning and scope of such 
decisions; 
 supplementation of decisions rendered between the same parties in 
order to obtain an additional decision regarding claims formulated 
during the proceedings but not dealt with in the decision; 
 revision of decisions rendered between the same parties on the 
basis of facts discovered after the rendering of the decision that 
were unavailable at the time of rendering of the decision and which 
the party invoking the facts was unaware of and could not 
                                                 
11 HARNON, p. 539. 
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reasonably be expected to have been aware of at the time the 
decision was made;  
 remission of arbitral awards rendered between the same parties to 
the arbitral tribunal for reconsideration in order to avoid partial or 
complete setting aside12. 
In addition, it is useful to distinguish res judicata from enforcement which can be 
described as “[t]he act or process of compelling compliance with a law, mandate, 
command, decree, or agreement”13. Res judicata and enforcement are interrelated; they 
are “two sides of the same coin”14. The existence of a judgment that is res judicata is a 
condition precedent to enforcement. This means that a judgment is enforceable only 
against those parties that are bound by the res judicata. This does not mean, however, 
that res judicata and enforceability describe the same effect. Both effects implement the 
authoritative determination of a decision. However, unlike res judicata, the enforcement 
of a judgment usually requires a court order (exequatur)15 that compels compliance with 
the judgment16. 
                                                 
12 ILA, Final Report, para. 16. 
13 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY.  
14 BREKOULAKIS, p. 185. 
15 BREKOULAKIS, p. 185. 
16 On the distinction between res judicata and enforceability see also PERROT/FRICÉRO, para. 6. 
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PART I  
The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Litigation 
Important though the issues may be, how 
extensive so ever the evidence, whatever the 
eagerness for further fray; society says: “We have 
provided courts in which your rival contentions 
have been heard. We have provided a code of law 
by which they have been adjudged. Since judges 
are fallible human beings, we have provided 
appelate courts which do their own fallible best to 
correct errors. But in the end you must accept 
what has been decided. Enough is Enough. And 
the law echoes: res judicata, the matter is 
adjudged”.  
(Lord Simon of Glaisdale) 
25. Literally translated, the Latin term res judicata means “a matter adjudged”. The 
full maxim is res judicata pro veritate accipitur which means “a matter adjudged is taken as 
Part I : The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Litigation 
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truth”17. As noted by Barnett, the doctrine of res judicata is of ancient origin and 
application: recognised by the Roman jurists18, as well as in ancient Hindu texts and 
Greek custom, the doctrine reflects “a wisdom that is for all time”19.  
26. There exists a certain “core of common agreement”20 on the res judicata doctrine. 
The general idea underlying the doctrine is that a particular matter once settled by a 
judgment, decree, award, or other determination, must be regarded as final21; the matter 
cannot be re-litigated again between the persons bound by the decision22. Today, this 
general principle is well established in common law and civil law countries and is 
sometimes considered inherent to all legal systems23. It is widely recognised as a general 
principle of law in the sense of Article 38 (1)(c) of the ICJ Statutes24. 
27. The doctrine of res judicata generally applies only where a given matter falls for 
decision twice within one and the same legal context25. Generally, this means that the 
doctrine applies only where the parties and the questions at issue are identical in the 
prior and subsequent proceedings. Where this is the case a decision that qualifies as a res 
judicata is both conclusive and preclusive in subsequent proceedings. It is conclusive 
because it is final and binding upon the parties. A party may invoke an earlier decision 
in subsequent proceedings to develop its case (positive res judicata effect). It is preclusive 
because it bars the re-litigation of a matter that has already been finally decided in prior 
proceedings (negative res judicata effect)26. 
28. The res judicata doctrine provides for the finality of decisions with the aim to 
avoid lengthy and wasteful repetitions of proceedings leading to legal uncertainty and, 
                                                 
17 SHANY, Competing Jurisdictions, fn 5, p. 22. 
18 On res judicata in Roman Law, see, e.g., HANDLEY, paras 27.01 et seq. 
19 BARNETT, para. 1.12. 
20 SCOBBIE, p. 301.  
21 GALLAGHER, para. 17-11. 
22 HANDLEY, para. 1.01. 
23 SCHREUER/REINISCH, p. 4; BARNETT, para. 1.12; HABSCHEID, L’autorité de la chose jugée en droit 
comparé, p. 179; EL OUALI, p. 73 (“L’autorité de la chose jugée est un principe dont n’importe quelle organisation 
judiciaire, rudimentaire soit-elle, ne peut se passer”); Gates v Mortgage Loan and Insurance Agency, Inc, 200 Ark 276, 
285 (“The doctrine of res judicata is a principle of universal jurisprudence forming part of the legal systems 
of all civilized nations. It may be said to inhere in them all as an obvious rule of expediency and justice”). 
24 CHENG, p. 336; HANOTIAU, Complex Arbitrations, p. 239; REINISCH, p. 44; VULLIEMIN, paras 
412 et seq.    
25 LOWE, p. 40. 
26 ILA, Final Report, para. 15. See also BREKOULAKIS, pp. 183 et seq. 
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perhaps, irreconcilable decisions. This need for finality was pertinently expressed by 
Andrews: 
“Without finality of decision, litigants and indeed the legal 
system as a whole would be exposed to many hazards: that a 
dispute might continue to drag on; greater legal expense and 
delay might result; scarce judge-time might be spent re-hearing 
the matter; inconsistent decisions might follow; litigation would 
cease to be a credible means of settling disputes; the victorious 
party in the first case would be deprived of the legitimate 
expectation that the first action would not be merely a dress 
rehearsal for further contests”27. 
29. The doctrine of res judicata is generally considered to be based on a public and a 
private interest28. The public interest requires that there be an end to litigation to ensure 
general security and public good. It is in the interest of society that the courts work in a 
way that is efficient and economic. As overburdened courts are having difficulty giving 
litigants even one day in court at present, allowing litigants a second day is a luxury that 
cannot be afforded29. Furthermore, the public interest requires the avoidance of 
inconsistent judgments as inconsistencies may undermine the credibility of the courts 
and diminish respect and obedience of court judgments30. It generally does not matter 
whether the decision is correct in law or fact. A competent court has the jurisdiction to 
decide wrongly, as well as correctly, and its decisions are final and binding unless 
corrected on appeal31. 
30. The private interest is to protect the individual. It ensures that no person shall 
be vexed by more than one litigation on the same matter32.  
31. It is difficult to give a general description of the res judicata doctrine that goes 
                                                 
27 ANDREWS, p. 942. 
28 Interest res publicae ut finis litium sit (“it is in the public interest that there should be an end to litigation”) 
and nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa (“no one should be proceeded against twice for the same 
cause”) (ILA, Interim Report, p. 3; ANDREWS, pp. 941 et seq.;  HANDLEY, para. 1.10; VON 
MOSCHZISKER, p. 299). 
29 WRIGHT, p. 721 with reference to National Treasury Employees Union v I.R.S., 765 F.2d 1174, 1176 
(D.C. Cir. 1985). 
30 HARON, pp. 543 et seq.  
31 HANDLEY, para. 1.14; HASCHER, p. 17. According to Lord Goff “res judicata is founded upon the 
public interest in the finality of litigation rather than the achievement of justice as between individual 
litigants” (The Indian Grace [1993] AC 410, 415). 
32 HARON, p. 543. 
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beyond the above. The following two chapters will reveal the differences that exist 
between legal systems with regard to the res judicata doctrine. Chapter one will compare 
the res judicata doctrine in different domestic laws. Chapter two will then examine how 
the res judicata doctrine is applied in international law. 
 14 
 
 CHAPTER 1 
  
 
32. It has been said that “[t]oday, the res judicata doctrines of most Western societies 
are congruent”33. However, while it is certainly true that most domestic res judicata rules 
prevent the same claimant from bringing identical claims against the exact same 
respondent in successive proceedings34, beyond this point there are important 
differences and these differences also exist among domestic laws of Western societies.  
33. This chapter will analyse and compare the res judicata doctrine as applied in 
common and civil law countries, the differences among domestic laws regarding res 
judicata being particularly marked between common law and civil law countries35. 
However, the differences among domestic res judicata laws are by no means limited to 
the common law/civil law divide; they exist amongst civil law countries, as well as 
amongst common law countries. 
34. One aim of this chapter is to introduce different concepts of the res judicata 
doctrine and to convey a deeper understanding of the doctrine in different domestic 
laws. Another aim is to show that there currently is no uniform doctrine of res judicata 
among domestic laws.  
                                                 
33 BAGNER, p. 33.  
34 ILA, Interim Report, p. 3. 
35 BREKOULAKIS, p. 182. 
Chapter 1: The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Domestic Laws 
The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Domestic Laws 
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1. COMMON LAW 
35. The doctrine of res judicata is well established in common law jurisdictions. The 
following analysis will examine the res judicata doctrine first under English law (1.1.) and 
then under US law (1.2).   
1.1. England 
36. In England a decision that qualifies as a res judicata may give rise to a plea of 
cause of action estoppel, issue estoppel, former recovery, or abuse of process. While 
each of these pleas has its own conditions regarding the subject matter that can be 
precluded, they all presuppose a decision that qualifies as res judicata36. In addition, the 
preclusive effects of a res judicata can only be relied upon successfully if the parties or 
privies in the subsequent proceedings are the same as in the proceedings which gave 
rise to the res judicata37.  
37. The following analysis will introduce each of the constituent elements of a res 
judicata (1.1.1.), the effects to which a res judicata may give rise (1.1.2.), and the 
requirement of party identity (1.1.3.).  
1.1.1. Constituent elements of a res judicata 
38. To qualify as a res judicata a decision must be judicial in character and have been 
pronounced by a judicial tribunal with jurisdiction over the parties and the subject 
matter. In addition, the decision must be final and conclusive and on the merits38.  
A judicial decision 
39. A judicial decision for res judicata purposes is a decision which determines a 
question of law, fact or both law and fact39. This can be any judicial adjudication, 
including judgments, orders, decrees, sentences, bankruptcy adjudications, judicial 
                                                 
36 BARNETT, paras 1.14 et seq. 
37 BARNETT, para. 3.01. 
38 HANDLEY, para. 1.01. and paras 2.01 et seq.; BARNETT, para. 1.18. 
39 BARNETT, para. 1.24. 
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declarations and arbitral awards40.  
A judicial tribunal 
40. A judicial tribunal is a tribunal that exercises judicial functions according to the 
law of the country where it is situated, whether this tribunal is permanent or only vested 
with the temporary authority to determine a particular dispute or group of disputes. It is 
irrelevant whether the tribunal is a superior court, a civil or criminal court, or is even 
called a court or a tribunal41.  
A judicial tribunal with jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter  
41. The general rule is that a judicial decision can only become res judicata if it was 
rendered by a tribunal with jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter42. If the 
tribunal exceeds its jurisdiction, either by determining matters outside its jurisdiction or 
by making orders in excess of its powers, its decision, in whole or in part, cannot 
become a res judicata43. However, there is a presumption in favour of the jurisdiction of 
superior courts, who have general jurisdiction. Their decisions are never void for lack of 
jurisdiction44. By contrast, with inferior courts, who have only limited jurisdiction, the 
presumption is the other way45. A judgment pronounced by an inferior court without 
jurisdiction is a nullity whether so declared by a court with appellate or supervisory 
jurisdiction or not46. A party invoking the res judicata effect of a prior judgment must 
                                                 
40 HANDLEY, para. 2.09. 
41 HANDLEY, para. 2.02; BARNETT, para. 1.19. 
42 BARNETT, para. 2.16. 
43 HANDLEY, para. 4.01. 
44 HANDLEY, paras 4.03 and 4.06 with reference to Isaacs v Robertson [1985] AC 97, 102-103; Cameron v 
Cole (1944) 68 CLR 571, 589, 590-91; Strachan v Gleaner Co Ltd [2005] 1 WLR 3204 PC, 3211-3214 (“An 
order of a judge without jurisdiction was obviously vulnerable but it was not wholly without effect. It had 
to be obeyed unless and until it was set aside. The Supreme Court of Jamaica, like the High Court in 
England, was a superior court of unlimited jurisdiction, namely that it had jurisdiction to determine the 
limits of its own jurisdiction. Whenever a judge made an order he must be taken implicitly to have 
decided that he had jurisdiction to make it. If he was wrong, his error could be corrected by the Court of 
Appeal. However, he did not exceed his jurisdiction by making the error, and a judge of a co-ordinate 
jurisdiction did not have the power to correct it. In the instant case, if Walker J had made an error his 
decision could be reversed by the Court of Appeal. However, unless and until reversed, his decision was 
res judicata”). 
45 HANDLEY, para. 4.07.  
46 HANDLEY, para. 20.07. 
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allege and prove that it was within the jurisdiction of the (inferior) court47.  
A final and conclusive decision 
42. To operate as a res judicata a decision must be final and conclusive for the 
purposes of res judicata48. This is the case when the subject matter in question was raised 
and argued before the tribunal such that it cannot be re-opened in that same court by 
further proceedings49. A judgment generally can no longer be altered by the court that 
rendered it when it is perfected by formal entry. At this point it becomes res judicata50. A 
decision that is provisional or subject to revision by the court which pronounced it is 
not final for res judicata purposes51.  
A decision on the merits 
43. Only a decision that was rendered “on the merits” may become res judicata52. 
The meaning of this has been clarified in The Sennar (No. 2) where Lord Diplock said: 
“It is often said that the final judgment [...] must be ‘on the 
merits’. The moral overtones which this expression tends to 
conjure up may make it misleading. What it means in the 
context of judgments delivered by courts of justice is that the 
court has held that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate on an issue 
raised in the cause of action to which the particular set of facts 
gives rise, and that its judgment on that cause of action is one 
that cannot be varied, reopened or set aside by the court that 
delivered it or any other court of co-ordinate jurisdiction 
although it may be subject to appeal to a court of higher 
jurisdiction”53. 
                                                 
47 The same applies to arbitral awards (HANDLEY, para. 4.12, quoting Christopher Brown Ltd v 
Genossenschaft Oesterreichischer Waldbesitzer Holzwirtschaftsbetriebe Registrierte GmbH [1954] 1 QB 8, 12-13).  
48 See HANDLEY, paras 5.01 et seq.; ZUCKERMAN, para. 24.71. 
49 BARNETT, para. 1.30. The test of finality is more stringent in case of former recovery than in case of 
estoppel. In case of cause of action and issue estoppel “it is necessary that the matter should have been 
raised and controverted before the earlier tribunal and shall have been clearly, and finally, decided by it” 
(Eastwood & Holt v Studer (1926) 31 Com Cas 251, 256). In case of former recovery the decision must 
“finally declare or determine the defendant’s liability for an ascertained amount leaving nothing to be 
judicially determined to fix the amount recoverable and render the judgment effective and capable of 
execution” (HANDLEY, para. 5.02). 
50 HANDLEY, para. 5.03. According to BLACKSTONE’S, a judgment in civil proceedings takes effect 
from the day it is given or made (para. 4.2). 
51 Nouvion v Freeman (1889) 15 App Cas 1, HL; Colt Industries Inc v Sarlie (No 2) [1996] 1 WLR 1287, CA.  
52 HANDLEY, para. 6.01. 
53 DSV Silo-und Verwaltungsgesellschaft mbH v Owners of The Sennar and 13 other ships, The Sennar (No. 2) [1985] 
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44. In the same case, Lord Brandon of Oakbrook further stated: 
“Looking at the matter negatively a decision on procedure 
alone is not a decision on the merits. Looking at the matter 
positively a decision on the merits is a decision which 
establishes certain facts proved or not in dispute, states what 
are the relevant principles of law applicable to such facts and 
expresses a conclusion with regard to the effect of applying 
those principles to the factual situation concerned”54.  
45. Accordingly, a decision on the merits generally is a decision that determines the 
parties’ substantive rights. It is a final decision that disposes of the matter, other than 
on purely procedural grounds55. However, in Desert Sun Loan Corp v Hill the Court of 
Appeal held that a decision on a procedural, i.e. a non-substantive issue could also be 
rendered “on the merits” where (i) there was express submission of the procedural or 
jurisdictional issue to the earlier court, (ii) the specific issue had been raised before and 
decided by that court and (iii) caution was exercised in relation to practical 
considerations, such as whether the issue was or should have been fully ventilated 
before the earlier court. The court noted that in practice a decision on procedural and 
non-substantive issues will only rarely be rendered “on the merits” for res judicata 
purposes56.  
46. A decision on the issue of jurisdiction may give rise to issue estoppel57. 
According to Barnett, there is however authority to suggest that dismissals for want of 
jurisdiction are not themselves decisions on the cause of action thus dismissed and 
therefore not “on the merits”58. 
                                                                                                                                         
1 WLR 490, 494. 
54 Ibid., 499. 
55 ZUCKERMAN, para. 24.71. 
56 For examples of decisions that do not meet the “on the merits” requirement, see BARNETT, para. 
2.46. 
57 Desert Sun Loan Corp v Hill [1996] 2 All ER 847, 858, 863 CA; BARNETT, para. 2.46; ZUCKERMAN, 
para. 24.60. See also Carter v Raghib Ahsan [2007] UKHL 51.  
58 BARNETT, para. 2.46. See also HANDLEY, para. 2.15, quoting Upendra Nath Bose v Lall [1940] AIR 
(PC) 222, 225 (“The res judicata here was the lack of jurisdiction [...] not the reason for that decision. A 
Court which declines jurisdiction cannot bind parties by its reasons for declining jurisdiction: such 
reasons are not decisions, and are certainly not decisions by a court of competent jurisdiction. It would 
indeed be strange if on a dispute as to the jurisdiction of a Court to try an issue, that Court by its reasons 
for holding that it had no jurisdiction, could, on the principle of res judicata decide and bind the parties 
upon the very issue it was incompetent to try”). 
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1.1.2.  Effects of a res judicata 
47. The effects associated with the doctrine of res judicata are cause of action 
estoppel, issue estoppel, former recovery and abuse of process. 
48. The first three preclusive pleas are part of the traditional res judicata doctrine 
which requires that the subject matter determined in the earlier decision is identical to 
the subject matter in the subsequent proceedings. While cause of action estoppel and 
issue estoppel both aim to avoid contradiction between the res judicata and the 
subsequent proceedings, former recovery aims to prevent reassertion of the same cause 
of action59.  
49. Abuse of process is also referred to as the extended doctrine of res judicata. It 
applies only in cases where the subject matter in the subsequent proceedings has not 
been rendered res judicata by the earlier proceedings60.  
Cause of action estoppel 
50. A cause of action or claim is “a factual situation, the existence of which entitles 
one person to obtain from the court a remedy against another person”61. It consists of 
“all the facts and circumstances necessary to give rise to a right to relief”62. All claims 
which arise from the same event and rely on the same evidence make up one cause of 
action63.  
51. The term “cause of action estoppel” was coined by Diplock LJ in Thoday v 
Thoday:  
“[cause of action estoppel] is that which prevents a party to an 
action from asserting or denying, as against the other party, the 
existence of a particular cause of action, the non-existence or 
existence of which has been determined by a court of 
competent jurisdiction in previous litigation between the same 
parties. If the cause of action was determined to exist, i.e., 
                                                 
59 HANDLEY, para. 19.01. 
60 HANDLEY, para. 26.01. 
61 BARNETT, para. 4.86.  
62 ILA, Interim Report, p. 7. 
63 ILA, Interim Report, p. 7. 
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judgment was given upon it, it is said to be merged in the 
judgment, or, for those who prefer Latin, transit in rem 
judicatam. If it was determined not to exist, the unsuccessful 
plaintiff can no longer assert that it does; he is estopped per 
rem judicatam”64. 
52. Diplock LJ emphasised the aim to avoid contradiction. A party pleading cause 
of action estoppel alleges that the entire cause of action has already been finally and 
conclusively determined in earlier proceedings. The party must establish that the same 
claim was rendered res judicata by the earlier decision and that it is this res judicata that is 
contradicted in the subsequent proceedings65. 
53. For cause of action estoppel to apply all that is necessary is a final and 
conclusive decision on the merits of the claim rendered between the same parties or 
their privies66. Where these requirements are met, the plea of cause of action estoppel 
provides an absolute bar to re-litigation in respect of all points decided in the earlier 
proceedings, unless it can be shown that the earlier decision was obtained by fraud or 
collusion67.  
Issue estoppel 
54. The plea of issue estoppel prevents the re-litigation of a particular issue of fact 
or law, or of fact and law, which the prior decision necessarily established as the legal 
foundation for its conclusion68. 
                                                 
64 Thoday v Thoday [1964] P 181, 197, CA. 
65 BARNETT, para. 4.18. 
66 BARNETT, para. 1.39. See also North West Water Ltd v Binnie & Partners [1990] 3 All ER 547, 551. 
67 ANDREWS, para. 40.13; ZUCKERMAN, para. 24.65. 
68 HANDLEY, para. 8.01; BARNETT, para. 1.40. See also Arnold v National Westminster Bank plc [1991] 2 
AC 93, 105; Yukos Capital Sarl v OJSC Rosneft Oil Company [2011] EWHC 1461 (Comm) at para. 53 (“The 
issues which are necessary to a decision in a particular case will depend on the matters in issue in that 
case. It cannot be answered in general or abstract terms. One test of whether a finding is fundamental is 
whether the decision could stand without that particular finding […]. If if could not do so then it can be 
said to be fundamental to the decision”); P&O Nedlloyd BV v Arab Metals Co and others [2006] EWCA Civ 
1717 at paras 23-24. For comparison, see also the decision of the High Court of Australia in Blair v Curran 
(1939) 62 CLR 464, 531-533, HCA. In this case, Dixon J said: “[a] judicial determination directly 
involving an issue of fact or of law disposes once and for all of the issue, so that it cannot be raised 
[again] between the same parties. The estoppel covers only those matters which the prior judgment, 
decree or order necessarily established as the legal foundation or justification for its conclusion, whether 
that conclusion is that a money sum be recovered or that the doing of an act be commenced or restrained 
or that rights be declared. The distinction between res judicata and issue estoppel is that in the first the 
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55. Issue estoppel extends only to issues that were actually addressed and 
determined, and only if the issues were necessary and fundamental to the earlier 
decision69. Issues which are merely subsidiary or collateral are not covered by issue 
estoppel70. Further, the issues in the subsequent proceedings must be identical to those 
determined in the earlier decision and that decision must qualify as a res judicata; i.e. it 
must be a final and conclusive decision on a claim71. The parties to the two proceedings 
must be the same or their privies72. However, the causes of action in the two 
proceedings may be entirely different73.  
56. Ordinarily, a particular issue will be rendered res judicata as part of a final 
                                                                                                                                         
very right or cause of action claimed or put in suit has in the former proceedings passed into judgment, 
so that it is merged and has no longer an independent existence, while in the second, for the purpose of 
some other claim or cause of action, a state of fact or law is alleged or denied the existence of which is a 
matter necessarily decided by the prior judgment, decree or order. Nothing but what is legally 
indispensable to the conclusion is thus finally closed or precluded. In matters of fact the issue estoppel is 
confined to those ultimate facts which form the ingredients in the cause of action, that is, the title to the 
right established. Where the conclusion is against the existence of a right or claim which in point of law 
depends upon a number of ingredients or ultimate facts the absence of any one of which would be 
enough to defeat the claim, the estoppel covers only the actual ground upon which the existence of the 
right was negatived. But in neither case is the estoppel confined to the final legal conclusion expressed in 
the judgment, decree or order. In the phraseology of Coleridge J. in R. v. Inhabitants of the Township of 
Hartington Middle Quarter, the judicial determination concludes, not merely as to the point actually 
decided, but as to a matter which it was necessary to decide and which was actually decided as the 
groundwork of the decision itself, though not then directly the point at issue. Matters cardinal to the 
latter claim or contention cannot be raised if to raise them is necessarily to assert that the former decision 
was erroneous. In the phraseology of Lord Shaw, ‘a fact fundamental to the decision arrived at’ in the 
former proceedings and ‘the legal quality of the fact’ must be taken as finally and conclusively established 
(Hoystead v. Commissioner of Taxation). But matters of law or fact which are subsidiary or collateral are 
not covered by the estoppel. Findings, however deliberate and formal, which concern only evidentiary 
facts and not ultimate facts forming the very title to rights give rise to no preclusion. Decisions upon 
matters of law which amount to no more than steps in a process of reasoning tending to establish or 
support the proposition upon which the rights depend do not estop the parties if the same matters of law 
arise in subsequent litigation”. 
69 ZUCKERMAN, para. 24.67. On the issue of whether a determination made in a prior judgment was 
fundamental see also case law cited in fn 68.  
70 Good Challenger Navegante SA v Metalexportimport SA [2003] EWCA Civ 1668. 
71 BARNETT, para. 5.03. 
72 The core requirements for the creation of an issue estoppels were succinctly set out in Lord Brandon 
of Oakbrook’s judgment in The Sennar (No. 2) [1985] 1 WLR 490 (HL) at 499: “in order to create an [issue 
estoppel], three requirements have to be satisfied. The first requirement is that the judgment in the earlier 
action relied on as creating an estoppel must be (a) of a Court of competent jurisdiction, (b) final and 
conclusive and (c) on the merits. The second requirement is that the parties (or privies) in the earlier 
action relied on as creating an estoppel, and those in the later action in which that estoppel is raised as a 
bar, must be the same. The third requirement is that the issue in the later action, in which the estoppel is 
raised as a bar, must be the same issue as that decided by the judgment in the earlier action”. See also 
Yukos Capital Sarl v OJSC Rosneft Oil Company [2011] EWHC 1461 (Comm), paras 42 et seq. 
73 ZUCKERMAN, para. 24.48. 
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decision on a claim74. In Thoday v Thoday Diplock LJ explained: 
“There are many causes of action which can only be 
established by proving that two or more different conditions 
are fulfilled. Such causes of action involve as many separate 
issues between the parties as there are conditions to be fulfilled 
by the plaintiff in order to establish his cause of action; and 
there may be cases where the fulfilment of an identical 
condition is a requirement common to two or more different 
causes of action. If in litigation upon one such cause of action 
any of such separate issues as to whether a particular condition 
has been fulfilled is determined by a court of competent 
jurisdiction, […] neither party can, in subsequent litigation 
between one another upon any cause of action which depends 
upon the fulfilment of the identical condition, assert that the 
condition was fulfilled if the court has in the first litigation 
determined that it was not, or deny that it was fulfilled if the 
court in the first litigation determined that it was”75. 
57. There may be an exception to issue estoppel when the injustice of not allowing 
the matter to be re-litigated outweighs the hardship of the opponent of losing the 
benefit of the earlier findings76. Normally, issue estoppel may be overcome only in two 
types of situations: first, where the party against whom issue estoppel is pleaded shows 
that further material, relevant to the correct determination of an issue in the earlier 
proceedings, has become available to it and that it could not by reasonable diligence 
have adduced this material during the earlier proceedings. Second, where there has been 
a material change in the law since the findings were made77.  
Former recovery 
58. Former recovery prevents a party in whose favour a final decision has been 
rendered from recovering a second decision against the same party based on the same 
cause of action78. The party’s claim or cause of action is extinguished by the first 
                                                 
74 BARNETT, para. 5.04. 
75 Thoday v Thoday [1964] P 181, 197, CA. 
76 See Yukos Capital Sarl v OJSC Rosneft Oil Company [2011] EWHC 1461 (Comm), paras 59 et seq. 
77 ZUCKERMAN, para. 24.69. See also ILA, Interim Report, p. 8; BLACKSTONE’S, para. 4.4; McIlkenny v 
Chief Constable of the West Midlands [1980] 1 QB 283, CA; Arnold v National Westminster Bank plc [1991] 2 AC 
93, [1991] 3 All ER 41, HL. 
78 HANDLEY, para. 19.01. 
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decision79.  
59. Like cause of action estoppel, former recovery presupposes a final and 
conclusive decision on a cause of action. The cause of action and the parties must be 
the same in both proceedings. However, former recovery operates only against the 
party in whose favour relief has been granted by the earlier decision. The successful 
party is precluded from reasserting the same claim against the same party in order to 
obtain further relief. By contrast, cause of action estoppel can be raised by or against 
any party to the prior proceedings, as it does not merely seek to prevent reassertion; it 
has the broader aim of avoiding contradiction of a cause of action that is res judicata80.  
Abuse of process: the rule in Henderson v Henderson 
60. Where the subject matter in controversy has not already been rendered res 
judicata by an earlier decision a party may still prevent litigation of that matter by 
pleading abuse of process.  
61. For abuse of process to be successful it is necessary that the subject matter 
could and should have been rendered res judicata by the earlier decision had the parties, 
with all due diligence, brought the matter before the prior tribunal81. The abuse of 
process doctrine is based on the general rule of public policy according to which a 
claimant must bring forward his entire case in one action82. There must also be an 
additional element, such as dishonesty or unjust harassment83. 
62. The application of the abuse of process doctrine by the courts is discretionary. 
The court has to balance the conflicting interests of the parties and consider the wider 
public interest. The party pleading abuse of process has to convince the court that it 
would be just to deny the opponent the opportunity to raise a subject matter that has 
                                                 
79 HANDLEY, para. 19.02; BARNETT, para. 1.37. 
80 BARNETT, paras 1.41 et seq.; HANDLEY, para. 19.01 (in case of cause of action estoppel “that which 
must not be controverted is a proposition of law or finding of fact. In cases of former recovery what is 
not allowed is a second proceeding for the same relief”). 
81 BARNETT, para. 1.46; ZUCKERMAN, para. 24.78. 
82 ZUCKERMAN, para. 24.80; De Crittenden v Bayliss [2005] EWCA Civ 1425. 
83 See BLACKSTONE’S, para. 33.14.  
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not been determined by a prior decision84. 
63. Abuse of process is also known as the rule in Henderson v Henderson. In this case, 
Vice-Chancellor Wigram said: 
“[…] where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, 
and of adjudication by, a court of competent jurisdiction, the 
court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward 
their whole case, and will not (except under special 
circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same 
subject of litigation in respect of a matter which might have 
been brought forward as part of the subject in contest, but 
which was not brought forward only because they have, from 
negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of 
their case. The plea of res judicata applies, except in special-
case, not only to points upon which the court was actually 
required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a 
judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the 
subject of litigation and which the parties, exercising reasonable 
diligence, might have brought forward at the time”85. 
64. In Barrow v Bankside Members Agency Ltd and another Sir Thomas Bingham MR 
explained the rule in the following terms: 
“It is a rule of public policy based on the desirability, in the 
general interest as well as that of the parties themselves, that 
litigation should not drag on for ever and that a defendant 
should not be oppressed by successive suits when one would 
do. That is the abuse at which the rule is directed”86. 
 
65. In Henderson v Henderson the rule was expressed in terms of res judicata. Today, 
the rule is commonly referred to as the “extended” doctrine of res judicata. It rests upon 
the same considerations as the doctrine of res judicata, namely that there should be an 
end to litigation and that a party should not be vexed twice in the same matter. 
However, since the rule only applies in cases where the subject matter in question has 
not already been rendered res judicata the reference to the res judicata doctrine is 
                                                 
84 ZUCKERMAN, para. 24.59. Courts should remember the words of Lowry CJ: “The entire corpus of 
authority of issue estoppel is based on the theory that it is not an abuse of process to relitigate a point 
where any of the […] requirements of the doctrine is missing” (Shaw v Sloan [1982] NI 393, 397). 
85 Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100, 115. 
86 Barrow v Bankside Members Agency Ltd and another [1996] 1 WLR 257, 260, CA. 
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avoided87. Since the decision of the House of Lords in Johnson v Gore Wood & Co88 the 
rule is associated with the doctrine of abuse of process89 rather than with the doctrine 
of res judicata.  
1.1.3. The same parties 
66. The rules that settle who can take advantage of, or be bound by, a res judicata 
depend on whether the decision relied on is a “judgment in personam” or a “judgment in 
rem”90. Judgments in rem determine the status of a person or thing and operate against 
the whole world. By contrast, judgments in personam determine the rights and liabilities 
as between the parties to the proceedings91. The following analysis only concerns 
judgments in personam.  
67. The res judicata effects of a judgment are limited by the doctrines of privity and 
mutuality. According to the doctrine of privity only the parties or privies to the 
proceedings which gave rise to the res judicata can benefit or be bound by it in 
subsequent proceedings. The parties must be identical in all proceedings or privies to 
the parties in the first proceedings. No third person can rely on the effects of a res 
judicata or be bound by it92. The doctrine of mutuality applies in cases of cause of action 
or issue estoppel and requires that the estoppel is mutual. This means that  
“each party in the subsequent proceedings must have been party 
or privy to the earlier proceedings, and must claim or defend in 
the subsequent proceedings in the same right as they, or those 
to whom they are privy, claimed or defended in the earlier”93.  
                                                 
87 BARNETT, para. 1.46 and paras 6.18 et seq.; ANDREWS, para. 40.34 and para. 40.60.  
88 Johnson v Gore Wood & Co [2002] 2 AC 1. Johnson v Gore Wood & Co approved Bradford & Bingley Building 
Society v Seddon [1999] 1 WLR 1482, CA. See also Sweetman v Nathan [2003] EWCA Civ 1115. 
89 According to the doctrine of abuse of process “subsequent proceedings should be precluded if it is 
necessary for a court to prevent a misuse of its procedure in the face of unfairness to another party, or to 
avoid the risk that the administration of justice might be brought into disrepute among right-thinking 
people. [It] rests upon the inherent power of the court to prevent misuse of its procedure even though a 
party’s conduct may not be inconsistent with the literal application of procedural rules […]. Its 
application is wholly discretionary” (ILA, Interim Report p. 8). 
90 On the new category of judgments in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, see HANDLEY, paras 
9.02 et seq. 
91 BARNETT, para. 3.02. 
92 BARNETT, para. 3.04. 
93 BARNETT, para. 3.05. 
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68. While the doctrine of mutuality has been partially rejected in the United States94 
it remains the rule in England95.  
Parties 
69. The parties to the proceedings are the individuals or entities named on the 
record of the proceedings as litigants96. The parties in the subsequent proceedings must 
claim or defend in the same capacity as in the prior proceedings. A party who litigates in 
a different capacity is in law a separate person and a prior decision does not bind him 
personally or in another capacity97.  
70. In some cases individuals or entities not named as parties on the record of the 
proceedings may still be deemed parties for res judicata purposes. Deemed parties are 
different to privies. While deemed parties are parties in their own right, privies acquire 
privity through the right, title or interest of another party98.  
71. Deemed parties include those who intervene and take active part in the 
proceedings99; third and subsequent parties who become parties to the proceedings 
betweeen the prior parties100; and those who insist on being added as a party and obtain 
an order to this effect101. Furthermore, a court can look behind the record to identify 
the “real” party102. Accordingly, persons who direct another person to pursue litigation 
on their behalf may also be deemed parties. 
Privies 
72. A privy is a person or entity “upon whom all the rights and obligations of any 
                                                 
94 See infra, paras 111 et seq. 
95 Hunter v Chief Constable of the West Midlands [1982] AC 529, HL; cf McIlkenny v Chief Constable of the West 
Midlands [1980] 1 QB 283, CA. See also HANDLEY, para. 9.05. 
96 ILA, Interim Report, p. 9.  
97 HANDLEY, para. 9.22; BARNETT, para. 3.10. 
98 BARNETT, para. 3.18. 
99 By contrast, those who have an interest in the dispute and a right to intervene, but who stand by and 
allow the litigation to be conducted by others, do not become parties. A person must actively intervene 
for the “same party” requirement to be met (See HANDLEY, para. 9.12). 
100 See HANDLEY, para. 9.11. 
101 BARNETT, para. 3.17. 
102 HANDLEY, para. 9.14. For more details on parties to decisions in personam see HANDLEY, paras 
9.01 et seq. 
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legal entity devolve, including the right to the benefit of, or the obligation to be bound 
by, a res judicata”103.  
73. There are three categories of privy: privy in blood, title or interest104. Privies in 
blood include ancestors and heirs. Privies in title include any person who succeeds to 
the rights or liabilities of a party upon death or insolvency105. A privy in interest has 
some kind of interest, legal or beneficial, in the previous litigation or its subject 
matter106. The requirements for privity in interest have been succinctly expressed in the 
following terms:  
“There must be an examination of the parties’ interests, as well 
as the existence of a sufficient degree of identification between 
the parties, before it is just to hold that a decision in respect of 
one party should be binding in proceedings to which another is 
party. Moreover, the interest in the previous litigation or its 
subject matter must be legal or beneficial: a mere curiosity or 
concern in the litigation or some interest in the outcome is not 
sufficient”107.  
74. Privity in interest has been held to exist between a trustee and a beneficiary 
where the trustee sues for the benefit of the beneficiary108. There also is privity in 
interest if a person acts on a decision in litigation and claims under the party entitled to 
it109. By contrast, no privity in interest exists between a licensee and a licensor of 
                                                 
103 BARNETT, para. 3.20. 
104 See, generally, HANDLEY, paras 9.38 et seq. 
105 BARNETT, para. 3.21. 
106 On the notion of privity in interest, see, generally, HANDLEY, paras 9.43 et seq. 
107 BARNETT, para. 3.22. See also Johnson v Gore Wood & Co [2002] 2 AC 1, 32 where Bingham LJ cited a 
statement by Megarry J in Gleeson v J Wippell & Co Ltd [1977] 1 WLR 510, 515: “[I]t seems to me that the 
substratum of the doctrine is that a man ought not to be allowed to litigate a second time what has 
already been decided between himself and the other party to the litigation. This is in the interest both of 
the successful party and of the public. But I cannot see that this provides any basis for a successful 
defendant to say that the successful defence is a bar to the plaintiff suing some third party, or for that 
third party to say that the successful defence prevents the plaintiff from suing him, unless there is a 
sufficient degree of identity between the successful defendant and the third party. I do not say that one 
must be the alter ego of the other: but it does seem to me that, having due regard to the subject matter of 
the dispute, there must be a sufficient degree of identification between the two to make it just to hold 
that the decision to which one was party should be binding in proceedings to which the other is party. It 
is in that sense that I would regard the phrase ‘privity of interest’”. 
108 Churchill & Sim v Goddard [1937] 1 KB 92; Gleeson v J Wippell & Co [1977] 1 WLR 510; Young v Murphy 
[1996] 1 VR 279 CA, 285-87. 
109 BARNETT, para. 3.23. 
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intellectual property rights if sued in separate proceedings by a same claimant110 or 
between a company and their shareholders, even if the shareholders are controlling111. 
Furthermore, persons with separate but identical interests in the same question are not 
privies; members of a class have their own interest and are not privies of each other112. 
75. Some courts have contemplated extending the category of privity of interest113. 
However, it has been strongly suggested that “there is no basis for extending privity of 
interest to include cases where the interest is merely a financial right or interest in the 
previous action”114.  
1.2. United States  
76. In the United States the doctrine of res judicata is generally similar to the doctrine 
in England, albeit that it varies amongst the States115. The following analysis will cover 
the doctrine in federal law and only as regards in personam judgments.  
77. The US Supreme Court embraces the Restatement of the Law (Second) of 
Judgments as stating the basic federal law on res judicata116. In the Restatement (Second) 
the doctrine of res judicata covers both claim and issue preclusion117. Each of these 
concepts in turn is made up of two preclusive effects. Claim preclusion covers merger, 
i.e. the extinguishment of a claim in a judgment rendered in favour of the claimant118, 
and bar, i.e. the extinguishment of a claim in a judgment rendered in favour of the 
                                                 
110 Mecklermedia Corp v DC Congress GmbH [1998] Ch. 40. 
111 Baratok Ltd v Epiette Ltd [1998] 1 BCLC 283, CA. 
112 HANDLEY, para. 9.49. 
113 See, e.g., House of Spring Gardens Ltd v Waite and others [1991] 1 QB 241, CA. In this case, Stuart-Smith LJ 
invoked “justice and common sense” in order to preclude a third defendant who was not a party to the 
prior proceedings from alleging that the earlier decision was obtained by fraud. See also Carl Zeiss (No 2) 
[1967] 1 AC 853, HL. 
114 BARNETT, para. 3.25 with reference to Effem Foods Pty Ltd v Trawl Industries of Australia Pty Ltd (1993) 
43 FCR 510 (Federal Court of Australia).  
115 SHEPPARD, The Scope and Res Judicata Effect of Arbitral Awards, p. 270. 
116 See, e.g., New Hampshire v Maine, 532 US 742, 749-50 (2001); Baker by Thomas v General Motors Corp, 522 
US 222, 234 n. 5 (1998); Migra v Warren City School District Board Of Education et al., 465 US 75, 77 n. 1 
(1984); United States v Mendoza 464 US 154, 158 n. 3 (1984). See also KLEIN/PONOROFF/BORREY, 
p. 844. 
117 ALI, Restatement (Second), Judgments, p. 131. This terminology was adopted by the US Supreme Court in 
Taylor v Sturgell, 553 US 880, 893 (2008). It is important to note that the terminology varies. Some cases 
and commentators refer to claim preclusion as “res judicata” and to issue preclusion as “collateral 
estoppel”. On terminology, see also Alary Corp v Sims (In re Associated Vintage Group), 283 B.R. 549, 554-55 
(Bankr. 9th Cir. 2002). 
118 ALI, Restatement (Second), Judgments, § 18. 
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respondent119. Issue preclusion encompasses both direct and collateral estoppel. In case 
of direct estoppel, the claim in the subsequent proceedings is the same as in the prior 
proceedings. By contrast, in case of collateral estoppel, the claim in the subsequent 
proceedings is different to the claim in the prior proceedings120.  
78. The following analysis will determine the constituent elements of a res judicata 
(1.2.1) and its effects in US federal law (1.2.2.). It will then examine the requirement of 
party identity, including the possibility to extend the res judicata doctrine to third parties 
(1.2.3.).  
1.2.1. Constituent elements of a res judicata 
79. The application of the res judicata doctrine presupposes a valid and final personal 
judgment121.  
A valid judgment 
80. A valid judgement must meet the following requirements: the parties must have 
been given adequate notice of the proceedings and opportunity to be heard, and the 
judgment must have been rendered by a court with territorial and subject matter 
jurisdiction122.  
81. The notice to the parties must be adequate123 and be transmitted in a way that 
“in ordinary circumstances is reasonably certain to convey actual notice to”124 the 
persons concerned or their representative125.  
82. §§ 4 to 10 of the Restatement (Second) cover the territorial jurisdiction 
requirement. Accoring to the Supreme Court’s decisions in International Shoe Co. v 
                                                 
119 ALI, Restatement (Second), Judgments, § 19.  
120 ALI, Restatement (Second), Judgments, p. 131. The term “collateral estoppel” is commonly used in the 
general meaning of “issue preclusion”. See, e.g., MARCUS/REDISH/SHERMAN, p. 948. 
121 ALI, Restatement (Second), Judgments § 17; Moncur v Agricredit Acceptance Co (in re Moncur) 328 B R 183, 
187-88 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 2005). 
122 ALI, Restatement (Second), Judgments, § 1. 
123 ALI, Restatement (Second), Judgments, § 2 (1)(a). 
124 ALI, Restatement (Second), Judgments, p. 35. 
125 ALI, Restatement (Second), Judgments, § 2 (1)(b) and p. 35. 
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Washington126 and Shaffer v Heitner127, it is both sufficient and necessary that there be 
“minimum contacts” between the state where the court is situated and the parties or the 
transaction. However, the observance of the territorial jurisdiction requirement may 
generally be waived by a party128.  
83. The subject matter jurisdiction describes the authority of a court to decide a 
given type of legal controversy129. All courts in the US federal system have limited 
subject matter jurisdiction. It exists only where it is expressly or impliedly consigned to 
them130. An objection to subject matter jurisdiction generally may be taken at any time 
during an action, even on appeal, and may even be taken after the judgment has 
become final. Traditionally, a judgment rendered without subject matter jurisdiction was 
always “void” and could never become res judicata131. Today it is only in exceptional 
circumstances that a lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be invoked after the 
judgment was rendered for the purpose of holding the judgment to be a nullity132. 
A final judgment 
84. According to § 13 of the Restatement (Second), “[t]he rules of res judicata are 
applicable only when a final judgment is rendered”. The Restatement (Second) further 
describes the requirement in the following terms:  
“[…] when res judicata is in question a judgment will ordinarily 
be considered final in respect to a claim (or a separable part of 
a claim […]) if it is not tentative, provisional, or contingent and 
represents the completion of all steps in the adjudication of the 
claim by the court, short of any steps by way of execution or 
enforcement that may be consequent upon the particular kind 
of adjudication. Finality will be lacking if an issue of law or fact 
essential to the adjudication of the claim has been reserved for 
future determination, or if the court has decided that the 
plaintiff should have relief against the defendant of the claim 
but the amount of the damages, or the form or scope of other 
                                                 
126 International Shoe Co. v Washington, 326 US 310, 316 (1945). 
127 Shaffer v Heitner, 433 US 186 (1977); ALI, Restatement (Second), Judgments, p. 57. 
128 See ALI, Restatement (Second), Judgments, pp. 31 et seq. 
129 See ALI, Restatement (Second), Judgments, §§ 11 and 12. 
130 ALI, Restatement (Second), Judgments, p. 108. 
131 ALI, Restatement (Second), Judgments, pp. 116 et seq. 
132 ALI, Restatement (Second), Judgments, p. 32 and pp. 120 et seq. 
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relief, remains to be determined”133. 
85. While the finality test is applied strictly in case of claim preclusion, it is relaxed 
in case of issue preclusion requiring the prior adjudication only to be “sufficiently firm 
to be accorded conclusive effect”134. The issue must have been adequately deliberated 
and the decision on the issue must not be tentative. That the parties were fully heard on 
the issue, that the court supported its decision with a reasoned opinion and that the 
decision was subject to appeal or was in fact reviewed on appeal are factors supporting 
finality for purposes of issue estoppel. The question is whether the decision on a 
particular issue is procedurally definite and not whether the court had doubts in 
reaching its decision135.  
86. For purposes of res judicata a judgment becomes final on the day it is rendered136. 
A judgment on the merits? 
87. Under the first Restatement of the Law of Judgments only a final judgment on 
the merits could give rise to claim preclusion137. The Restatement (Second) no longer 
uses the terminology “on the merits” because of its misleading connotation138.  
88. The modern rule of claim preclusion requires (1) that the claims in both sets of 
proceedings are based on the same transaction; (2) that the procedure in the prior 
proceedings (including the possibility of appeal) did not exclude an opportunity to 
present the matter advanced in the subsequent proceedings; and (3) that the judgment 
was not a dismissal without prejudice139 or was not based on some other ground that 
allows the bringing of a second proceeding. What is essential is not that the first 
                                                 
133 ALI, Restatement (Second), Judgments, pp. 132 et seq. According to the US Supreme Court, a final 
judgment is one that “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute 
the judgment” (Catlin v United States, 324 US 229, 233 (1949)). 
134 ALI, Restatement (Second), Judgments, § 13. 
135 ALI, Restatement (Second), Judgments, p. 136; WRIGHT, p. 725. 
136 ALI, Restatement (Second), Judgments, § 14. See also Coover v Saucon Valley School District et al., 955 F. Supp. 
392, 412 (E.D. Pa. 1997); Smith v Securities & Exch. Commn., 129 F.3d 356, 362 n.7 (6th Cir. 1997) (”The 
fact that Smith has an appeal of that judgment pending does not deprive the judgment of res judicata 
effect”). 
137 ALI, Restatement, Judgments, §§ 41 and 45. 
138 ALI, Restatement (Second), Judgments, p. 161. 
139 In federal courts a dismissal requested by the claimant is ordinarily without prejudice. An involuntary 
dismissal usually operates as a judgment on the merits. In both cases, the court may order otherwise (see 
JAMES Jr./HAZARD Jr./LEUBSDORF, § 11.16, p. 703). 
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judgment determined the merits of the claim after proceedings on the substantive 
issues, but that the parties to the prior proceedings had a fair opportunity to get to the 
proceedings on the merits140.  
89. Decisions on the issue of territorial141 and subject matter jurisdiction142 may 
become res judicata. 
1.2.2. Effects of a res judicata  
90. A party to a prior judgment may raise the pleas of claim preclusion and issue 
preclusion143. Unlike English law, US law does not distinguish a separate plea of abuse 
of process. However, as will be shown, claim preclusion appears to achieve similar 
results, encompassing a certain degree of abuse of process.  
Claim preclusion 
91. Claim preclusion prevents a party from re-litigating a claim or cause of action 
that was, or could have been, determined in prior proceedings by a court of competent 
jurisdiction in a final and valid judgment144.  
                                                 
140 JAMES Jr./HAZARD Jr./LEUBSDORF, § 11.16, p. 702; WRIGHT, p. 723. See also Semtek Int’l Inc. v 
Lockheed Martin Corp. 531 US 497 (2001) for an interpretation of the meaning of “operates as an 
adjudication upon the merits” in Rule 41(b) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. 
141 ALI, Restatement (Second), Judgments, §10 (2) and pp. 103 et seq. 
142 ALI, Restatement (Second), Judgments, §12 and pp. 116 et seq. 
143 Claim and issue preclusion are affirmative defences under Rule 8 (c) Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Both pleas must therefore be raised or risk being waived (Taylor v Sturgell, 553 US 880, 908 (2008)). Some 
courts will however raise res judicata on their own motion. See, e.g., Lacroix et al v Marshall County, Missippi, 
2011 US App LEXIS 2250*13 (“’Generally, res judicata is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded, 
not raised sua sponte.’ There are two exceptions to this general rule. The first, which applies to ‘actions 
[that] were brought before the same court,’ does not apply here. ‘The other exception involves the 
situation in which all relevant data and legal records are before the court and the demands of comity, 
continuity in the law, and essential justice mandate judicial invocation of the principles of res judicata’”); 
Scherer v Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 347 F.3d 394, 398 n.4 (2d Cir. 2003)(“[A] court is free to raise [the 
res judicata] defense sua sponte, even if the parties have seemingly waived it”); O'Connor v Pierson, 568 F.3d 
64, 68 n.2 (2d Cir. 2009)(“[A] court has authority to invoke the doctrine of res judicata on its own 
initiative, even when the defense has been waived"); Salahuddin v Jones, 992 F.2d 447, 449 (2d Cir. 
1993)(“The failure of a defendant to raise res judicata in answer does not deprive a court of the power to 
dismiss a claim on that ground”). 
144 See, e.g., Commissioner v Sunnen, 333 US 591, 597 (1948) (“The rule provides that when a court of 
competent jurisdiction has entered a final judgment on the merits of a cause of action, the parties to the 
suit and their privies are thereafter bound, not only as to every matter which was offered and received to 
sustain the claim or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have 
been offered for that purpose”). See also Allen v McCurry, 449 US 90, 94 (1980); Kremer v Chemical 
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92. Since the adoption of the Restatement (Second), the concept of “claim” is 
defined broadly in terms of “transaction”145. According to § 24 (1) a “claim” for 
purposes of claim preclusion comprises all rights of the claimant to remedies against the 
respondent with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected 
transactions, out of which the action arose146.  
93. There is no precise definition of the term “transaction”. According to the 
Restatement (Second) the term must be interpreted pragmatically, giving attention to 
the facts of the case. The formulation defines a process rather than an absolute 
concept147:  
“What factual grouping constitutes a ‘transaction’, and what 
groupings constitute a ‘series’, are to be determined 
pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as whether 
the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, 
whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their 
treatment as a unit conforms to the parties’ expectations or 
business understanding or usage”148.  
94. The rule in § 24 aims to avoid the “splitting” of a single claim. A claim is 
understood as a logical unit or entity of facts which all describe a certain transaction and 
this unit may not be split. The claimant is precluded from presenting matters related to 
                                                                                                                                         
Construction Corp, 456 US 461, 467 n.6 (1982). Furthermore, see Wolf v Gruntal & Co., Inc., 45 F.3d 524, 
527 (1st Cir. 1995) (“Unlike collateral estoppel (issue preclusion), res judicata (claim preclusion) normally 
bars (i) relitigation of claims actually asserted in a tribunal of competent jurisdiction, […] and (ii) litigation 
of claims that arose from the same set of operative facts and could have been raised in the prior 
proceeding”); Brody v Hankin, 299 F. Supp. 2d 454, 458 (E.D. Pa. 2004)(“Res judicata applies to all claims 
actually brought or which could have been brought in a prior action regardless of whether they were 
asserted or determined in the prior proceeding”). Claim preclusion has been described as a “use it or lose 
it” rule (M&M Stone Co. v Hornberger, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91577*28). 
145 KLEIN/PONOROFF/BORREY, p. 848. 
146 The Ninth Circuit test to determine a “claim” for purposes of the merger and bar doctrines is: (1) 
whether rights or interests established in the prior judgment would be destroyed or impaired by 
prosecution of the second action; (2) whether substantially the same evidence is presented in the two 
actions; (3) whether the two suits involve infringement of the same rights; and (4) whether the two suits 
arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts. The test cannot be applied mechanically and no one 
criterion is dispositive. However, the “most important” criterion is the “transactional nucleus of facts”. 
This requires the pragmatic case-by-case analysis that is central to Restatement (Second), Judgements § 
24. See Alary Corp v Sims (In re Associated Vintage Group), 283 B.R. 549, 557-58 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 2002), with 
reference to Harris v Jacobs, 621 F.2d 341, 343 (9th Cir. 1980); Costantini v Trans World Airlines, 681 F.2d 
1199, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 1982); Robertson v Isomedix, Inc. (In re Int'l Nutronics), 28 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir. 
1994). 
147 WRIGHT, p. 724. 
148 ALI, Restatement (Second), Judgments, § 24 (2). See also Alary Corp v Sims (In re Associated Vintage Group), 
283 B.R. 549, 557-58 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 2002). 
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the same claim or transaction in subsequent proceedings, even though these matters 
were not raised and determined in the prior proceedings149. It is in this respect that 
claim preclusion resembles the English rule in Henderson v Henderson.  
Issue preclusion 
95. Issue preclusion prevents the re-litigation of an issue of fact or law. It may be 
invoked whether or not the claim in the subsequent proceedings is identical to the claim 
in the prior proceedings150. Likewise, it may be invoked by persons who were not 
parties to the prior proceedings151. 
96. Issue preclusion does not rule out inquiry into matters that could have been but 
actually were not raised and determined in prior proceedings. It bars the re-litigation 
only of those issues that were in fact raised and determined in prior proceedings152. 
97. In addition, the re-litigation of an issue of fact or law is only precluded if the 
determination of that issue was essential to the prior judgment. According to the 
Restatement (Second) the appropriate question is whether the issue was recognised by 
the parties and the court as necessary to the first judgment153. 
98. There are several exceptions to the general rule of issue preclusion. They regard 
the quality and circumstances of both proceedings154 and include the inability of one 
party to appeal the first judgment, changes in the legal context, differences in the quality 
or extensiveness of the procedures followed in the two courts, differences in burdens of 
proof, and a lack of an adequate opportunity or incentive to obtain a full and fair 
adjudication in the prior proceedings155.  
1.2.3. The same parties 
99.  While the general rule is that only parties can benefit from or be bound by a res 
                                                 
149 KLEIN/PONOROFF/BORREY, p. 851. 
150 ALI, Restatement (Second), Judgments, § 27. 
151 See infra, paras 111 et seq. 
152 ALI, Restatement (Second), Judgments, p. 256; JAMES Jr./HAZARD Jr/LEUBSDORF, § 11.17, p. 703; 
KLEIN/PONOROFF/BORREY, p. 842. See also Cromwell v County of Sac, 94 US 351, 352 (1876). 
153 ALI, Restatement (Second), Judgments, p. 261. 
154 ILA, Interim Report, p. 12. 
155 See ALI, Restatement (Second), Judgments, § 28. 
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judicata156, in several situations the doctrine of res judicata may also apply to “privies”, i.e. 
persons who were not parties to the proceedings giving rise to the res judicata. The terms 
“privy” or “privity” are ambiguous in US law as they have been variously defined. It is 
for this reason that the Restatement (Second) avoids using them157. They are, 
nonetheless, widely used in case law and by commentators.  
100. The following analysis will determine which persons may be bound by or 
benefit from a judgment in US law. Since the term “privy” is used in US law, it is useful 
to clarify this notion. For reasons of clarity, after introducing the notions of parties and 
privies, this analysis will set out the situations in which, under the Restatement 
(Second), non-parties may be bound by a res judicata. Finally, the doctrine of mutuality as 
applied in US law will be examined.  
Parties 
101.  According to § 34 (1) Restatement (Second) “[a] person who is named as a 
party to an action and subjected to the jurisdiction of the court is a party to the action”. 
Accordingly, parties are those who are named parties and who appear or are validly 
served with process in the proceedings, as well as those who intervene158.  
102. For the doctrine of res judicata to apply a party must claim or defend in the same 
legal capacity in both proceedings159. In addition, the res judicata doctrine applies only to 
determinations reached between parties who stand in an adversarial relation to each 
other. A res judicata generally does not bind co-claimants or co-defendants as against 
each other160. 
103. Sometimes the real parties in interest are not those whose names appear as 
litigants on the record of the proceedings. The persons denominated as parties are 
merely nominal parties. They are usually not bound by the judgment, because their 
                                                 
156 ALI, Restatement (Second), Judgments, § 34 (3); WRIGHT, p. 726. 
157 ALI, Restatement (Second), Judgments, pp. 13 et seq.  
158 JAMES Jr./HAZARD Jr./LEUBSDORF, § 11.7, p. 681. 
159 ALI, Restatement (Second), Judgments, § 36. 
160 JAMES Jr./HAZARD Jr./LEUBSDORF, § 11.7, p. 683. By contrast, in England res judicata may 
operate between defendants (see HANDLEY, paras 9.08 et seq.). 
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names are essentially “irrelevant decoration”161. However, a nominal party may be 
bound by a res judicata if he permitted his name to be used and if this led the opposing 
party to reasonably believe that the nominal party was, in fact, the real party in 
interest162.  
104. Where the named party is merely a nominal party another person is controlling 
the proceedings. As will be seen below, such a person who controls or substantially 
participates in the control of the proceedings is treated as a party163. This rule applies 
only to issue preclusion (not to claim preclusion) because the controlling person is not a 
party and, therefore, by definition asserts or defends a claim other than one he himself 
may have164. 
Privies 
105. The term “privity” expresses the general idea that persons who are not parties 
to proceedings, but who are connected with the proceedings in their interests, may be 
bound by or benefit from a judgment as if they were parties. Under the first 
Restatement of Judgments the word “privy” included non-parties (1) who control the 
proceedings; (2) whose interests are represented by a party to the proceedings; and (3) 
successors in interest to those having derivative claims165. 
106. In modern case law the term “privity” has an extremely flexible meaning166. A 
person is considered “in privity” with a party if the relation between them is such that 
                                                 
161 JAMES Jr./HAZARD Jr./LEUBSDORF, § 11.7, p. 682. 
162 ALI, Restatement (Second), Judgments, p. 371. 
163 ALI, Restatement (Second), Judgments, § 39 and p. 382. See also Montana v United States, 440 US 147 (1979); 
Souffront v La Compagnie Des Sucreries de Porto Rico, 217 US 475 (1910). A person controls proceedings if he 
has an effective choice as to the legal theories and proofs to be advanced on behalf of the party. He must 
also have control over the opportunity to appeal the judgment. It is not sufficient to merely help finance 
the proceedings, to give advice or to appear as amicus curiae (ALI, Restatement (Second), Judgments, p. 384). 
164 ALI, Restatement (Second), Judgments, pp. 383 et seq. 
165 ALI, Restatement, Judgments, p. 389. 
166 Headwaters Inc, Forest Conservation Council v US Forest Service, 382 F.3d 1025, 1030 (9th Cir. 2004); Tahoe-
Sierra Pres. Council Inc., 322 F.3d 1064, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 2003); Akhenaten v Najee, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 
320, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)(“The doctrine of privity [...] is to be applied with flexibility. [...] [T]here is no 
bright line rule as to whether privity exists for res judicata purposes. Rather, a finding of privity [...] 
depends on whether, under the circumstances, the interests of the [defendant] were adequately 
represented [in the earlier action]”(citing Amalgamated Sugar Co. v NL Indus., Inc., 825 F.2d 634, 640 (2d 
Cir. 1987)). 
The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Domestic Laws 
37 
 
the judgment involving the party may justly be conclusive on the non-party167. Federal 
courts have deemed several relationships sufficiently close to justify a finding of 
“privity”: 
“First, a non-party who has succeeded to a party’s interest in 
property is bound by any prior judgment against the party. 
Second, a non-party who controlled the original suit will be 
bound by the resulting judgment. Third, federal courts will 
bind a non-party whose interests were represented adequately 
by a party in the original suit. In addition, ‘privity’ has been 
found where there is a ‘substantial identity’ between the party 
and nonparty, where the nonparty ‘had a significant interest 
and participated in the prior action,’ and where the interests of 
the nonparty and party are ‘so closely aligned as to be virtually 
representative.’ Finally, a relationship of privity can be said to 
exist when there is an ‘express or implied legal relationship by 
which parties to the first suit are accountable to non-parties 
who file a subsequent suit with identical issues’”168. 
Non-parties affected by a res judicata pursuant to the Restatement (Second) 
107. The Restatement (Second) gives three categories of situations in which persons 
who were not parties to the prior proceedings may be affected by the res judicata169. 
These situations resemble the modern, flexible notion of “privity” in US case law. 
108. First, under the Restatement (Second) a non-party may be precluded as to issues 
determined in proceedings between others if he was involved in the proceedings in a 
way that justifies denying him the opportunity to re-litigate the matters determined in 
the judgment. This is the case where the non-party actually controlled the proceedings 
or substantially participated in the control of the proceedings170. This is also the case 
where a non-party agreed (explicitely or impliedly) to be bound by issues determined in 
the proceedings171. It may concern the determination of a claim, including all potential 
                                                 
167 JAMES Jr./HAZARD Jr./LEUBSDORF, § 11.23, p. 714. See also Headwaters Inc, Forest Conservation 
Council v US Forest Service, 382 F.3d 1025, 1030. 
168 Headwaters Inc, Forest Conservation Council v US Forest Service, 382 F.3d 1025, 1030 quoting Tahoe-Sierra 
Pres. Council, 322 F.3d 1064, 1082 and In re Schimmels, 127 F.3d 875, 881 (9th Cir.1997). 
169 See also WRIGHT, p. 727. In Taylor v Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 894-96 (2008) the US Supreme Court 
distinguished six categories of situations where non-parties may be bound by a res judicata. These six 
categories largely correspond the three (more broadly framed) categories in the Restatement (Second).  
170 See supra, paras 104 et seq.  
171 ALI, Restatement (Second), Judgments, § 40. 
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issues therein, or may be limited to issues actually litigated172.  
109. The second category of situations covers non-parties who were represented by a 
party in prior proceedings. Such non-parties are precluded of both claims and issues 
determined in the proceedings173.  
110. Finally, a non-party standing in one of a variety of substantive legal relationships 
with a party may be bound by a judgment affecting that party. Such legal relationships 
also correspond to the modern US notion of “privity”. They may exist, for example, 
between a predecessor and a successor as owner of interests in property174, between a 
bailee and a bailor175 or between an indemnitor and an indemnitee176. 
The doctrine of mutuality 
111. The doctrine of mutuality177 has been partially rejected in US law. While 
mutuality is still a requirement for claim preclusion, it no longer applies in case of issue 
preclusion. This means that a party is precluded from re-litigating an issue in 
subsequent proceedings with another person, even if that person was a complete 
stranger to the prior proceedings178.  
112. US law considers that there is no reason why an issue that was raised and 
determined in prior proceedings should not be treated as settled as against a party or his 
privy, unless he lacked a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior 
proceedings or there are other circumstances that justify affording him an opportunity 
to re-litigate the issue179. However, this rule only precludes the re-litigation of issues that 
the party would have been precluded from re-litigating with an opposing party180.  
113. The rule may be applied defensively or offensively. If applied offensively, it 
                                                 
172 ALI, Restatement (Second), Judgments, p. 390. 
173 ALI, Restatement (Second), Judgments, §§ 41 et seq. 
174 ALI, Restatement (Second), Judgments, Vol. 2, §§ 43 et seq.  
175 ALI, Restatement (Second), Judgments, Vol. 2, § 52. 
176 ALI, Restatement (Second), Judgments, Vol. 2, §§ 57 et seq. 
177 See supra, para. 67. 
178 Parklane Hosiery Co. v Shore, 439 US 322, 327-28 (1979); Cutter v Town of Durham, 411 A.2d 1120, 1121 
(N.H. 1980). 
179 ALI, Restatement (Second), Judgments, §29. 
180 ALI, Restatement (Second), Judgments, p. 292. 
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allows a claimant (who was not a party to the prior proceedings) in subsequent 
proceedings to bring a claim based on issues determined in the prior proceedings and 
the defendant (who was a party to the prior proceedings) will be precluded from re-
litigating such issues181. 
2. CIVIL LAW 
114. The doctrine of res judicata is also firmly established in civil law countries. In 
French and Swiss law a res judicata gives rise only to the single plea of res judicata. As will 
be discussed below, this plea generally does not cover the common law plea of issue 
estoppel or issue preclusion, but applies only to claims. Likewise, there is no plea of 
abuse of process, though civil procedural law may subscribe to a doctrine of abuse of 
rights182.  
115. The doctrine of res judicata will be examined first in French law (2.1.) and then in 
Swiss law (2.2.). 
2.1. France 
116. In France the doctrine of res judicata is referred to as “autorité de chose jugée”. It is 
codified in the Nouveau Code de Procédure Civile (NCPC) and the Code Civil (CC).  
117. “Autorité de chose jugée” must be distinguished from “force de chose jugée”. A 
judgment obtains “autorité de chose jugée” when it is rendered. A judgment obtains “force de 
chose jugée” when no ordinary means of recourse with suspensive effect, such as appeal 
proceedings, can be brought against it. When a judgment is no longer subject to any 
rights of recourse (ordinary or extraordinary) it is traditionally said to be “irrévocable”183. 
118. The following analysis will determine the constituent elements (2.1.1.) and 
effects of a res judicata in French law (2.1.2.). It will then examine the requirements that 
must be met for the res judicata doctrine to apply (2.1.3.). 
                                                 
181 ILA, Interim Report, p. 12. 
182 ILA, Interim Report, p. 14; KREMSLEHNER, p. 139. 
183 PERROT/FRICÉRO, para. 65 ; HÉRON/LE BARS, para. 349, fn 171. 
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2.1.1. Constituent elements of a res judicata 
119. A res judicata is a judgment that determines a legal dispute between parties in a 
way that is final and conclusive. Only the dispositive part of the judgment becomes res 
judicata. 
A judgment 
120. A “judgment” for res judicata purposes may be broadly defined as a judicial 
decision. Any judicial adjudication, including arbitral awards, qualifies as a judgment for 
res judicata purposes. It is of no importance whether the judgment is correct; an error in 
the judgment (even a violation of public policy184) does not prevent it from becoming 
res judicata185. 
A determination of a legal dispute between parties 
121. The doctrine of res judicata applies only to what is called “décisions contentieuses”186. 
The decision must determine a legal dispute between the parties. A decision rendered in 
the absence of a legal dispute does not become res judicata. For instance, this is the case 
when a court renders a “décision gracieuse”187, e.g. when it is asked by a party to authorise a 
certain measure. Such decisions on non-contentious matters do not become res judicata 
and may be rescinded or modified if the circumstances in which they were rendered 
change188.  
A final and conclusive judgment 
122. A judgment is final and conclusive when it disposes of a legal dispute in a way 
that puts an end to the court’s jurisdiction over the dispute189. Such a judgment 
                                                 
184 PERROT/FRICÉRO, Mise à jour, para. 17. 
185 PERROT/FRICÉRO, paras 11 et seq.; HENRY, paras 14 et seq., p. 2088. 
186 See HENRY, paras 1 bis et seq., pp. 2087 et seq. ; PERROT/FRICÉRO, Mise à jour, para. 25. 
187 According to Article 25 NCPC, “[t]he judge rules upon non-contentious matters, in absence of a 
dispute, where an action is referred to him that the law requires, due to the nature of the matter or the 
capacity of the petitioner, that he must examine it”. 
188 PERROT/FRICÉRO, paras 25 et seq.; HENRY, para. 2, p. 2087. Contra: HÉR0N/LE BARS, para. 
352; BRENNER. 
189 See PERROT/FRICÉRO, para. 56. 
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becomes res judicata on the matter it decides from the time of its pronouncement190, 
even though it has not been notified to the parties191. The fact that means of recourse 
may be brought against the judgment has no impact on its res judicata effects; while the 
suspensive effects of appeal proceedings suspend the judgment’s enforceability, they do 
not suspend its res judicata effects192. 
A judgment on the merits 
123. Article 480 NCPC defines a judgment on the merits as “a judgment which 
decides in its operative part the whole or part of the main issue, or one which rules 
upon a procedural plea, a plea seeking a plea of non-admissibility or any other 
interlocutory application”193. Article 480 NCPC provides that such judgments on the 
merits become res judicata with regard to the dispute they determine. It further specifies 
that the “main issue” is the subject matter of the dispute as determined by the 
respective claims of the parties194.  
124. Interlocutory decisions195 (such as the appointment of experts), as well as 
interim orders196 generally do not have res judicata effects “on the main issue”197. This 
means that they may not be relied upon during proceedings on the merits of the 
dispute198. However, they are binding and cannot be reconsidered by the judge who 
rendered them, unless new facts emerge that change the basis on which they were 
rendered199.  
                                                 
190 Article 480 NCPC; PERROT/FRICÉRO, Mise à jour, para. 1-1.  
191 GUINCHARD/FERRAND, para. 226. 
192 GUINCHARD/FERRAND, para. 226. 
193 On the notion of the decision covered by Article 480 NCPC, see HÉRON/LE BARS, para. 343; 
GUINCHARD/FERRAND, para. 218. 
194 See Article 480 NCPC which refers to Article 4 NCPC. According to Article 4 NCPC “[t]he subject-
matter of the dispute is determined by the respective claims of the parties. The originating process and 
the defence submissions define such claims. However, the subject-matter of the dispute may be modified 
by the interlocutory claims where they relate to the initial claims by a sufficient link”.  
195 Article 482 NCPC states: “[t]he judgment which is limited in its holding to giving a direction or a 
provisional order shall not carry, on the main issue, the authority of res judicata”. See also BRENNER. 
196 Article 488 NCPC states: “A summary procedure order will not become, on the main issue, res 
judicata. It may be modified or withdrawn by way of summary procedure only in the event of new 
supervening circumstances”. 
197 ILA, Interim Report, p. 14.  
198 PERROT/FRICÉRO, para. 73. 
199 HANOTIAU, Complex Arbitrations, para. 531. See also GUINCHARD/FERRAND, para. 218. 
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125. Sometimes a provisional decision contains in its dispositif a final determination 
of parts of “the main issue” in dispute200. Such decisions are called “jugements mixtes”. 
The part of the dispositif that contains the determination of the main issue is final and 
conclusive for purposes of res judicata. However, the part of the dispositif that is 
provisional does not become res judicata, but has only the provisional authority given to 
provisional decisions201. 
A judicial tribunal with jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter? 
126. It is generally considered that a judgment may become res judicata even if it was 
rendered by a tribunal lacking jurisdiction; the tribunal creates its own jurisdiction202. 
What this means is that a party contesting the jurisdiction of the tribunal must raise the 
lack of jurisdiction in limine litis; it is not considered ex officio203. If the party does not 
challenge the judgment rendered despite the lack of jurisdicition in appeal proceedings, 
the judgment obtains “force de chose jugée”. The lack of jurisdiction will be covered and 
the parties will have to comply with the judgment204.  
The scope of res judicata 
127. The res judicata effect of a judgment is limited to its operative part, i.e. the 
dispositif205. The reasons underlying the judgment generally do not have res judicata 
effects.  
128. The dispositif of a judgment contains the court’s decision on the matters in 
dispute206. The dispositif becomes res judicata only as regards matters which were distinctly 
raised and determined in adversarial proceedings. No res judicata effect attaches to 
                                                 
200 According to Article 544 (1) NCPC : “Judgments that decide, in their operative part, a part of the 
main issue and give a preparatory inquiry or interim measure may immediately be appealed against in the 
same way as judgments that rule upon the whole of the main issue”. 
201 GUINCHARD/FERRAND, para. 218; HENRY, para. 10, p. 2088. 
202 PERROT/ FRICÉRO, para. 18; GUINCHARD/FERRAND, para. 226; HÉRON/LE BARS, para. 
342; HABSCHEID, L’autorité de la chose jugée en droit comparé, p. 186. 
203 Article 74 NCPC.  
204 HÉRON/LE BARS, para. 342; GUINCHARD/FERRAND, para. 226. 
205 Article 1351CC states in relevant part: “The force of res judicata takes place only with respect to what 
was the subject matter of a judgment”. 
206 Article 455 NCPC states in relevant part: “[The judgment] pronounces the decision in the form of 
operative part”. 
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matters which were not raised during the proceedings, even though the court rendered 
a decision on them. Equally, no res judicata effect attaches to matters which were raised 
during the proceedings but which were not decided in the operative order by the 
court207. 
129. The reasons underlying the judgment generally do not have res judicata effect. 
The reasons may be relied upon to interpret the dispositif and to specify the meaning and 
scope of the court’s judgment, but they do not have res judicata effect.  
130. A distinction has been drawn traditionally between “motifs décisoires” and “motifs 
décisifs”. The term “motifs décisoires” describes reasons which decide parts of the dispute, 
but which are not contained in the dispositif. These “motifs décisoires” do not have res 
judicata effects208. By contrast, the term “motifs décisifs” describes reasons which constitute 
the necessary foundation of the dispositif. In the past, case law granted res judicata 
effects to these “motifs décisifs”. In recent years, however, a stricter approach has been 
followed by courts209 and scholars210 granting res judicata effects only to the dispositif of 
a judgment, to the exclusion of all reasons, whether they are décisoires or décisifs. 
131. By contrast, res judicata effects are generally granted to implicit decisions, i.e. 
decisions on matters which a court had to determine to render the judgment expressly 
stated in the dispositif. Because these decisions are implicitly contained in the 
judgment’s dispositif, they are covered by its res judicata effects211.  
                                                 
207 See PERROT/FRICÉRO, paras 99 et seq. ; PERROT/FRICÉRO, Mise à jour, para. 100. 
208 HÉRON/LE BARS, para. 353. 
209 Cour de cassation, 3 February 2011, X v Y and Z (no. 09-71.179); Cour de cassation, 13 March 2009, 
M. Antoine X v M. Claude Y, no. 08-16.033. See also DESPRÉS, para. 55, pp. 372 et seq.; WEILER, p. 471, 
with reference to case law: Cour de cassation, 7 May 2008, Procédures, July 2008, No. 201; Cour de 
cassation, 13 July 2006, Bull. civ., II, No. 208; Cour de cassation, 22 November 2005, Bull. civ., I, No. 425; 
Cour de cassation, 31 March 2004, Bull. civ., IV, No. 64.   
210 See WEILER, p. 471 with reference to further authorities. According to HÉRON/LE BARS (paras 
354 et seq.) and GUINCHARD/FERRAND (para. 221) reasons forming the necessary foundation of the 
dispositif should have negative res judicata effects. However, they should not have any positive res judicata 
effect. According to HÉRON (paras 2 et seq.), by relying on a prior decision’s reasoning to interpret its 
dispositif and to specify its meaning and scope, courts are really giving res judicata effects to the prior 
decision’s reasons in practice.  
211 PERROT/FRICÉRO, paras 115 et seq.; PERROT/FRICÉRO, Mise à jour, para. 115 ; DESPRÉS, para. 
47, p. 371; HENRY, para. 22, p. 2089. However, it appears that some courts have adopted a strict 
position and no longer give res judicata effects to implicit decisions. See, e.g., Cour d’appel de Paris, 18 
November 2004, S.A. Thalès Air Defense v G.I.E. Euromissile et al, JDI, No. 2 (2005), comment by Alexis 
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2.1.2. Effects of a res judicata  
132. Traditionally, a judgment that qualifies as a res judicata may give rise to preclusive 
and conclusive effects212. First, a judgment that is res judicata precludes either party from 
re-litigating a claim decided in the judgment’s dispositif. This so-called negative effect of 
the res judicata doctrine is unanimously accepted in French law; it is governed by Article 
1351 CC.  
133. The positive res judicata effect is controversial in French law. It provides that the 
prior determination of a particular matter positively imposes itself in subsequent 
proceedings, even though they involve a new claim. If the court in subsequent 
proceedings has to decide an issue that has already been decided in a prior judgment, 
the court is bound by the prior determination and must implement it in its decision213. 
The positive res judicata effect in France is comparable to the common law concept of 
issue estoppel; it is considered that the issues covered by the positive res judicata effect 
will most often be found in the reasoning of a prior decision214.  
134. The positive res judicata effect is rarely dealt with by courts and it is not generally 
accepted by legal commentators. It has been argued that the positive res judicata effect is 
nothing more than a consequence of the negative res judicata effect, i.e. the right to 
invoke a prior decision in subsequent proceedings215. There currently is no provision in 
French law that expressly confirms the positive res judicata effect of judgments. By 
requiring a triple identiy of parties, cause and object, Article 1351 CC only provides for 
the negative res judicata effect216.  
135. However, the positive res judicata effect seems to exist in French law217, e.g. at 
Article 95 NCPC. According to this Article  
                                                                                                                                         
Mourre, pp. 363 et seq. and p. 377. 
212 CLAY, para. 102. 
213 HÉRON/LE BARS, para. 345. 
214 HÉRON/LE BARS, para. 347. It will be seen below that in Switzerland the positive res judicata effect 
is interpreted in a narrower way, covering only decisions included in the dispositif of a prior judgment, to 
the exclusion of any reasoning (see infra, para. 169). 
215 See CLAY, para. 102. 
216 HÉRON/LE BARS, para. 346.  
217 See HÉRON/LE BARS, para. 346. 
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“[w]here the judge, while deciding on the issue of jurisdiction, 
resolves the merits at issue on which depends the jurisdiction, 
his decision will become res judicata in relation to the merits at 
issue”. 
136. Article 95 NCPC clearly embraces the positive res judicata effect. However, the 
Cour de cassation is opposed to a general recognition of the positive res judicata effect. 
By now refusing to afford any res judicata effect to the reasoning of a judgment, the 
Cour de cassation has created a further obstacle to the positive res judicata effect: issues 
decided in the reasoning of a judgment, even if they form the basis of the judgment’s 
dispositif, can no longer operate as a res judicata and positively impose themselves in 
subsequent proceedings218.  
2.1.3. Requirements for the application of the doctrine of res judicata 
137. A judgment may give rise to negative res judicata effects only where the parties, 
cause and object are identical in both proceedings. This triple identity test is contained 
in Article 1351 CC which states in relevant part: 
 “[…] It is necessary that the thing claimed be the same; that 
the claim be based on the same grounds; that the claim be 
between the same parties and brought by them and against 
them in the same capacity”.  
138. If only one of these three elements is not identical, the prior judgment will not 
have negative res judicata effects in subsequent proceedings219.  
139. By contrast, a judgment may have positive res judicata effects even where the 
identity between the prior and subsequent proceedings is only partial: while the parties 
must still be identical, the cause and object in both proceedings may be different220. 
Identity of parties 
140. The res judicata doctrine applies only if the parties are the same and act in the 
same legal capacity in both proceedings221. Consequently, third parties are not bound by 
                                                 
218 HÉRON/LE BARS, para. 346. 
219 PERROT/FRICÉRO, para. 126. 
220 PERROT/FRICÉRO, para. 2; HÉRON/LE BARS, paras 345 et seq. 
221 On the requirement of “same legal capacity” see PERROT/FRICÉRO, paras 145 et seq. 
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the res judicata effects of a judgment222. 
141. The parties are the individuals or entities who appear in the proceedings as 
litigants: those who have initiated the proceedings, who have been called upon to 
defend themselves, or who intervened and took part in the proceedings223. The res 
judicata effect of a judgment does not extend to the representative of the individual or 
entity named as party in proceedings. By contrast, the res judicata effect extends to a 
party’s “ayant cause”, i.e. universal successors, such as in case of legal merger, or 
successors having a specific title, such as an assignee224. 
142. To extend the circle of persons bound by a decision the Cour de cassation has 
developed the concept of “représentation”225. This means that persons who were validly 
represented in the proceedings are treated as parties and are bound by the judgment226. 
The concept of representation has been interpreted widely to include situations where 
the representation was implicit or even purely fictitious227. Representation has been 
admitted where a person has common interests with a party to the proceedings. This is 
the case, for example, for co-debtors who are jointly liable. Each co-debtor is 
considered to represent the interests of the other co-debtors and a decision rendered 
against or in favour of one of them binds or benefits the others228. The same is true for 
creditors who are considered to be represented by their debtors229, or a surety who is 
considered to be represented by the principal debtor230.  
Identity of cause 
143. Article 1351 CC provides that the claims in both proceedings must be based on 
                                                 
222 PERROT/FRICÉRO, para. 148. 
223 PERROT/FRICÉRO, para. 132. 
224 HÉRON/LE BARS, para. 339; ILA, Interim Report p. 16. See also HENRY, paras 48 et seq., p. 2092 ; 
PERROT/FRICÉRO, paras 143 et seq. 
225 See HÉRON/LE BARS, para. 340; PERROT/FRICÉRO, para. 140. 
226 PERROT/FRICÉRO, para. 136. 
227 PERROT/FRICÉRO, para. 140. 
228 PERROT/FRICERO, para. 141; HENRY, para. 50, p. 2092. See also Cour d’Appel de Paris, 10 
March 2005, SA Sucres et Denrées v Société Multitrade Cairo, Rev. arb., No. 2 (2006), pp. 456 et seq.  
229 PERROT/FRICÉRO, para. 142. 
230 PERROT/FRICÉRO, para. 141 (this does not seem to be the case under English law. See 
HANDLEY, para. 9.27). 
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the same grounds. In other words, the causes must be identical231.  
144. The “same cause” requirement has given rise to difficulties in practice, because 
there is no uniform definition of the term “cause”. For some the cause is the legal rule 
or principle on which a party’s claim is based. For others the term describes the set of 
facts supporting a claim, independent of the rule or principle of law invoked by the 
parties, the law being the prerogative of the judge. For still others the term describes 
both the factual and legal basis of the claim232. According to Mayer, the cause 
constitutes an abstract category (“catégorie abstraite”) and must be determined with regard 
to the content of the claim. The cause thus defined extends to other facts and rules 
than those relied upon in the first proceedings, as long as they form part of the same 
category233. 
145. While there is no mention of the term “cause” in the NCPC, it appears that 
under the NCPC the cause is the mere set of facts invoked by the parties in support of 
their claim234. Under the CC, it was considered traditionally that the term “cause” in 
Article 1351 refers to both the factual and legal grounds of a claim235. It is unclear how 
the Cour de cassation defined the cause under Article 1351 CC in the Cesareo case236. It 
has been submitted that the court determined the cause only with regard to the set of 
facts (“la situation globale”) underlying the new claim237. The court held that a claimant 
must invoke all possible legal grounds of his claim when bringing the first action. If the 
claimant fails to do so he may not rely on the “same cause” requirement and the res 
judicata doctrine may bar all subsequent proceedings with regard to a claim arising out of 
the same set of facts238. The Cour de cassation confirmed its decision in Cesareo on two 
                                                 
231 See, generally, PERROT/FRICÉRO, paras 178 et seq. 
232 See PERROT/FRICÉRO, para. 165; MAYER, Réflexions sur l’autorité negative de chose jugée, paras 12 et 
seq. 
233 MAYER, Réflexions sur l’autorité negative de chose jugée, para. 13.  
234 See Articles 6 to 8 NCPC. See also PERROT/FRICÉRO, para. 166; GUINCHARD/FERRAND, 
para. 225. 
235 PERROT/FRICÉRO, para. 166; GUINCHARD/FERRAND, para. 225. 
236 Cour de cassation (assemblée plénière), 7 July 2006, Cesareo v Cesareo (“Gilbert Cesareo ne pouvait être admis 
à contester l’identité de cause des deux demandes en invoquant un fondement juridique qu’il s’était abstenu de soulever en 
temps utile”). 
237 HÉRON/LE BARS, para. 336. 
238 In Cesareo the Cour de cassation had to decide whether two actions brought by the same claimant 
against the same defendant seeking the payment of a certain sum of money for works allegedly done 
without salary were based on the same cause. In the first action the claimant brought a claim for deferred 
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occasions and extended it to defendants239. As will be seen below, the Cour de cassation 
also extended this decision to arbitration240. 
146. The position of the Cour de cassation in Cesareo, precluding parties from raising 
legal grounds which they could have relied upon in the first proceedings but failed to do 
so, echoes the English rule in Henderson v Henderson, as well as the US doctrine of claim 
preclusion.  
Identity of object 
147. Article 1351 CC further requires that “the thing claimed be the same” in both 
proceedings; there must be identity of objects. This requirement has also led to 
difficulties due to uncertainties surrounding the meaning of the term “object”. In 
addition, courts seem to use the term differently, depending on whether they examine 
the scope of a judge’s mandate or the identity of object requirement for res judicata 
purposes241. 
148. Under the NCPC the object of a dispute is determined generally by the parties’ 
claims, defined by the entirety of the parties’ submissions242. Some scholars have 
suggested that the term has no legal connotation, leaving the task of applying the law to 
the judge alone243.  
149. Article 1351 CC uses the term “the thing claimed” instead of the term “object”. 
When examining the identity of object requirement, the courts determine whether the 
parties in both proceedings ask for substantially the same thing and whether they assert 
                                                                                                                                         
wages. When this claim was dismissed the claimant brought an action for unjust enrichment. The court 
held that both claims were based on identical causes because they both requested payment for works 
done withouth salary. See also Rapport Magendie of 24 May 2008, Célérité et qualité de la justice devant la 
Cour d’appel, pp. 45 et seq. 
239 See also HÉRON/LE BARS, para. 335-1 with reference to Cour de cassation, 13 February 2008, M. 
jorge X v société civile immobilière du 24 rue des Petites Ecuries, no. 06-22.093; Cour de cassation, 12 November 
2008, no. 08-10.138. 
240 See infra, paras 383 et seq.  
241 PERROT/FRICÉRO, para. 154. 
242 According to Article 4 NCPC “(1) [t]he subject matter of the dispute [object] is determined by the 
respective claims of the parties. (2) The originating process and the defence submissions define such 
claims. However, the  subject matter of the dispute [object] may be modified by the interlocutory claims 
where they relate to the initial claims by a sufficient link”. See also PERROT/FRICÉRO, para. 154. 
243 See PERROT/FRICÉRO, para. 154. 
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the same rights. There can be identity of the thing claimed only where a party asserts 
the same right over substantially the same thing244.  
150. Finally, courts consider that under Article 1351 CC the term “object” generally 
covers only the final result reached in the dispositif of a decision, to the exclusion of 
decisions on preliminary issues. The res judicata doctrine does not bar a court in 
subsequent proceedings to decide a same issue again where the final thing claimed is 
not identical in both proceedings245. Accordingly, under Article 1351 CC the term 
“thing claimed” is not equivalent to the term “issue”246. While this principle is not 
generally and absolutely recognised in case law247, it stands to confirm that Article 1351 
CC covers only the negative res judicata effect. 
151. In practice it is often difficult to distinguish the requirements of identity of 
cause and identity of the thing claimed under Article 1351 CC. It has therefore been 
suggested to replace these two requirements by a single requirement, that of identity of 
the “question at issue” (“matière litigieuse”)248. However, this suggestion has not yet been 
followed in case law249. It has also been suggested that the Cesareo decision means 
abandoning the traditional triple identity test, essentially depriving the identity of cause 
requirement of its meaning250. 
2.2. Switzerland 
152. In Switzerland res judicata is referred to as “materielle Rechtskraft”, “autorité de chose 
jugée” (or “force de chose jugée au sens matériel”) and “autorità di giudicato”.  
153. As in France, a distinction is drawn between “autorité de chose jugée” and “force de 
chose jugée” (or “force de chose jugée au sens formel”; “formelle Rechtskraft”; “entrata in forza di cosa 
giudicata”). A judgment has “force de chose jugée” when it is “final”, i.e. enforceable. It is no 
longer possible to bring ordinary means of recourse with suspensive effect against the 
                                                 
244 See PERROT/FRICÉRO, paras 154 et seq.; HENRY, para. 24, p. 2089. 
245 See PERROT/FRICÉRO, paras 161 et seq. 
246 PERROT/FRICÉRO, para. 162. 
247 See PERROT/FRICÉRO, para. 163. 
248 See PERROT/FRICÉRO, para. 127. 
249 See PERROT/FRICÉRO, para. 127. 
250 GRANDSARD; HÉRON/LE BARS, para. 336. See also LOQUIN, para. 9; MAYER, Réflexions sur 
l’autorité negative de chose jugée, para. 18. 
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decision251. By contrast, a decision has “autorité de chose jugée” when it is “binding”; the 
decision may not be re-opened in subsequent proceedings between the same parties252. 
While “force de chose jugée” relates to rights of recourse, “autorité de chose jugée” relates to the 
content of a decision. Unlike in France, in Switzerland a decision does not obtain 
“autorité de chose jugée” the moment it is rendered, but when it obtains “force de chose 
jugée”253.  
154. In Switzerland the doctrine of res judicata pertains to procedure254. It is part of 
federal law if the claim is based on federal law255. The res judicata doctrine is not codified 
in federal law, but constitutes unwritten law. It is expressed in the decisions of the Swiss 
Federal Tribunal and legal authorities256.  
155. The following analysis will cover the constituent elements (2.2.1.) and effects of 
a res judicata (2.2.2.), as well as the requirements that must be met for the res judicata 
doctrine to apply in Swiss federal law (2.2.3.). 
2.2.1. Constituent elements of a res judicata 
156. A res judicata is a judgment on the merits that finally determines a legal dispute 
between parties. Only the dispositive part of the judgment becomes res judicata.  
A judgment  
157. Judgments and any other judicial adjudication equivalent to a judgment may 
                                                 
251 WALDER-RICHLI/GROB-ANDERMACHER, para. 1, p. 272 ; BERGER/KELLERHALS, para. 1494, 
p. 427. 
252 SPÜHLER/DOLGE/GEHRI, para. 193, p. 159; HOHL, paras 1264 and 1289 ; 
BERGER/KELLERHALS, para. 1494, p. 427.. 
253 HOHL, para. 1321; HABSCHEID, L’autorité de la chose jugée en droit comparé, p. 188 ; 
STAEHELIN/STAEHELIN/GROLIMUND, para. 9, p. 412. 
254 HABSCHEID, Schweizerisches Zivilprozess- und Gerichtsorganisationsrecht, para. 475; MEIER, p. 239; 
SPÜHLER/DOLGE/GEHRI, paras 196 et seq, p. 160 ; STAEHELIN/STAEHELIN/GROLIMUND, 
para. 8, p. 412; DTF 121 III 474, 477; DTF, République de Pologne v Saar Papier Vertriebs-GMbH et tribunal 
arbitral CCI Zurich, 20 September 2000, consid. 3.a, ASA Bulletin 2001, pp. 487 et seq. 
255 DTF 4C.82/2006, consid. 3.1; DTF 125 III 241, 242; DTF 121 III 474, 476. 
256 The unified Swiss Code of Civil Procedure (SCCP), which entered into force on 1 January 2011 to 
replace the 26 codes of civil procedure of the cantons, does not codify the res judicata doctrine. The 
federal law doctrine will continue to be unwritten law (see the Message of the Swiss Federal Council for 
the Swiss Federal Code of Civil Procedure, 28 June 2006, FF 2006 6841, ad Articles 232 to 236, p. 6953, 
available at www.ofj.admin.ch).   
The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Domestic Laws 
51 
 
become res judicata257. It is of no importance whether the judgment is correct or not258. 
A judgment on the merits 
158. As a general rule, only decisions on the merits can become res judicata259. A 
decision is on the merits when a court renders a decision on the substance of a claim, 
i.e. whether the claim is well-founded or not260. However, the Federal Tribunal has held 
that a decision on the admissibility of a claim may become res judicata261. It is also widely 
considered that a decision is on the merits for purposes of res judicata when a court 
dismisses a claim for lack of evidence or because the claim is not sufficiently 
substantiated262.  
159. Procedural decisions are generally not “on the merits” and, therefore, do not 
become res judicata263. Hence, procedural orders and decisions dealing only with the 
administration of the case do not become res judicata264. 
160.  Likewise, interim and conservatory measures generally do not become res 
judicata. While these measures are provisionally binding on the parties until they are 
rescinded or modified, the judge deciding the merits of the dispute is not bound by 
prior provisional measures265.  
161. It was considered traditionally that judgments rendered in summary proceedings 
have res judicata effect only in subsequent summary proceedings, but not in subsequent 
ordinary proceedings266. However, the new Swiss Code of Civil Procedure provides for 
special summary proceedings in “clear cases” (Article 257 SCCP). Where the facts are 
                                                 
257 HABSCHEID, Schweizerisches Zivilprozess-  und Gerichtsorganisationsrecht, para. 481; VULLIEMIN, para. 
191. For a list of decisions capable of becoming res judicata see MEIER, p. 240. 
258 HABSCHEID, Schweizerisches Zivilprozess-  und Gerichtsorganisationsrecht, para. 501. 
259 DTF 4C.82/2006, consid. 3.3; DTF 121 III 474, 477; HOHL, para. 1317. See also 
STAEHELIN/STAEHELIN/GROLIMUND, paras 10 et seq., pp. 413 et seq. 
260 DTF 4C.82/2006, consid. 3.3. 
261 DTF 115 II 187, consid. 3-a. See also HABSCHEID, Schweizerisches Zivilprozess und 
Gerichtsorganisationsrecht, para. 482.  
262 DTF 115 II 187, consid. 3-b; SPÜHLER/DOLGE/GEHRI, para. 202, p. 161; MEIER, p. 240. 
263 SPÜHLER/DOLGE/GEHRI, para. 205, p. 161. 
264 SPÜHLER/DOLGE/GEHRI, para. 207, p. 162; VULLIEMIN, para. 190.  
265 HOHL, para. 1319; VULLIEMIN, para. 189. 
266 HOHL, para. 1319; SPÜHLER/DOLGE/GEHRI, para. 204, p. 161; HABSCHEID, Schweizerisches 
Zivilprozess und Gerichtsorganisationsrecht, para. 481. 
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not disputed or may be readily established and the legal situation is clear, a claimant will 
have the possibility to obtain a judgment in summary proceedings and this judgment 
will have full res judicata effect267.  
A final and binding decision 
162. To become res judicata a decision must be “binding” (“verbindlich”; “obligatoire”); 
neither the parties nor a court in subsequent proceedings may call the decision into 
question268.  
163. Given that a decision obtains “autorité de chose jugée” only when it has “force de 
chose jugée”, a decision must also be “final” in order to have res judicata effect. As stated 
above, this is the case when it is no longer possible to bring ordinary means of recourse 
with suspensive effect against the decision269. 
A judicial tribunal with jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter? 
164. As in France, it is considered that a decision may become res judicata even if 
rendered by a tribunal lacking jurisdiction270.  
The scope of res judicata 
165. Only the dispositif of a judgment has res judicata effect271; no res judicata effect 
attaches to the reasons underlying the judgment, even if they constitute the necessary 
foundation of the dispositif272.  
166. The reasons may be considered to interpret the meaning and scope of the 
dispositif. In particular, the reasons of a judgment may be examined to determine 
whether the claim in the subsequent proceedings is identical to the claim in the prior 
proceedings273. The reasons may also be examined to determine whether the prior 
                                                 
267 SPÜHLER/DOLGE/GEHRI, para. 204, p. 161. 
268 DTF 4C.314/2004, consid. 11; DTF 4C.82/2006, consid. 3.3; DTF 5C.242/2003, consid. 2.1. 
269 See supra, para. 153. 
270 HABSCHEID, L’autorité de la chose jugée en droit comparé, p. 186; GULDENER, p. 387.  
271 WALDER-RICHLI/GROB-ANDERMACHER, para. 19, p. 275; MEIER, p. 241. 
272 HABSCHEID, Schweizerisches Zivilprozess und Gerichtsorganisationsrecht, para. 489. 
273 DTF 121 III 474, consid. 4-a; DTF 4C.82/2006, consid. 3.3; DTF 4C.314/2004, consid. 1.3. 
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judgment was on the merits or procedural274.  
167. No res judicata effect attaches to the determinations of preliminary issues in the 
prior judgment. Likewise, the res judicata effect of the dispositif does not cover implicit 
decisions275.  
168. Swiss law provides for two exceptions to the general rule that only the dispositif 
of a judgment becomes res judicata276. The first exception applies in case of set-off277. 
The decision on set-off only appears in a judgment’s reasons. However, it is widely 
accepted that the res judicata effect of the dispositif covers the decision on set-off, whether 
the court admits or dismisses the claim for set-off278. The second exception applies 
where the dispositif of a judgment of reference expressly states that the appeal is 
admitted according to the reasons of the judgment. In this case, the reasons have res 
judicata effect and the court to which the case is referred must base its new judgment on 
the reasons of the judgment of reference279. 
2.2.2. Effects of a res judicata  
169. A judgment that has res judicata effect is binding upon the parties and courts in 
subsequent proceedings. Swiss law recognises both a negative and positive res judicata 
effect. This means that the same claim cannot be brought again in subsequent 
proceedings (negative res judicata effect). This includes contradictory claims or claims 
contained in the claim decided in the prior proceedings. It also means that the res 
judicata constitutes the final and binding determination of a preliminary issue in the 
subsequent proceedings. If the court in subsequent proceedings has to decide a 
preliminary issue that has already been decided in the dispositif of a prior judgment, the 
court is bound by the prior judgment and must implement it in its judgment (positive 
                                                 
274 According to the Federal Tribunal, when determining whether a prior judgment is on the merits or 
procedural a court must only consider the contents of the prior judgment. The denomination of the prior 
judgment is of no importance (DTF 4C.82/2006, consid. 3.4; DTF 115 II 187, consid. 3-b). 
275 DTF 121 III 474, 478.  
276 HOHL, paras 1312 et seq. 
277 See WALDER-RICHLI/GROB-ANDERMACHER, paras 23 et seq., pp. 276 et seq. 
278 MEIER, p. 242; HABSCHEID, Schweizerisches Zivilprozess und Gerichtsorganisationsrecht, paras 496 et seq.; 
SPÜHLER/DOLGE/GEHRI, paras 200 et seq., pp. 160 et seq.; GULDENER, p. 369. According to some 
commentators, the court’s decision rejecting the claim for set-off does not become res judicata (see, e.g., 
WALDER-RICHLI/GROB-ANDERMACHER, para. 27, p. 278). 
279 HOHL, para. 1314. 
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res judicata effect)280.  
170. The doctrine of res judicata precludes only the re-litigation of claims and not of 
issues due to the strict limitation of any res judicata effects to the dispositif of the 
judgment.  
2.2.3. Requirements for the application of the doctrine of res judicata  
171. The doctrine of res judicata applies only if the “parties” and the “subject matter 
in dispute” are identical in both proceedings.  
Identity of parties 
172. As a general rule, the res judicata effect of a judgment extends only to the parties 
and their successors, including both universal successors and successors having a 
specific title281. The parties’ respective roles in the proceedings may change. However, 
the parties must stand in an adversarial relation to each other in both proceedings282. 
173. A judgment generally has no res judicata effect for third persons. There are, 
however, exceptions to this rule. One such exception applies in case of 
“Prozessstandschaft”283. In this case, although the person denominated as party conducts 
the proceedings in his own name, he does not act for himself but for a third person. 
The res judicata effect of the judgment extends to the third person although not a party 
to the proceedings284. Another exception applies where persons who were involved in 
the disputed legal relationship - but not in the proceedings - declare in advance that 
they agree to be bound by the judgment285. 
Identity of subject matter in dispute 
174. The doctrine of res judicata applies only if there is identity of the subject matter 
                                                 
280 HOHL, paras 1289 et seq.; HABSCHEID, Schweizerisches Zivilprozess und Gerichtsorganisationsrecht, paras 
485 et seq.; SPÜHLER/DOLGE/GEHRI, paras 194 et seq., p. 159. See also DTF 121 III 474, 478. 
281 STAEHELIN/STAEHELIN/GROLIMUND, para. 15, p. 415. 
282 HABSCHEID, Schweizerisches Zivilprozess und Gerichtsorganisationsrecht, para. 502.  
283 STAEHELIN/STAEHELIN/GROLIMUND, para. 15, p. 415; BERGER/KELLERHALS, para. 1507, 
p. 432. 
284 See HABSCHEID, Schweizerisches Zivilprozess und Gerichtsorganisationsrecht, para. 509. 
285 DTF 89 II 429, 435. 
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in dispute (“Streitgegenstand”; “object du litige”) in the prior and subsequent proceedings286.  
175. There are divergent views as to what constitutes the subject matter of a dispute. 
According to some scholars, the subject matter of a dispute is comprised of the legal 
rule relied upon by a party as the legal basis of the claim. According to others, the 
subject matter of a dispute is defined by the relief sought in the parties’ submissions. 
Still others suggest that the subject matter of a dispute comprises both the parties’ 
claims and the set of facts relied upon in support the claims287.  
176. Since several years the Federal Tribunal follows the view that the subject matter 
in dispute comprises both the parties’ claims and set of facts supporting the claims. In 
addition, the Federal Tribunal held that the the parties’ claims must also be based on 
the same legal grounds (or cause; “Rechtsgrund”)288. It is however unclear what meaning 
the Federal Tribunal attributes to the term “Rechtsgrund”289.  
177. In 2008 the Federal Tribunal seemingly applied a broader definition, defining of 
the notion “subject matter in dispute” only with regard to the facts relied upon in 
support of the claim, without reference to legal grounds: 
“[there is identity of the subject matter in dispute if] in both 
proceedings the parties have submitted the same claim based 
on the same facts […]. The claims have to be substantially the 
same; it is neither necessary nor important that the claims made 
in the submissions are expressed in the same terms in both 
proceedings […]. A new action will have an identical subject 
matter in dispute if the new claim was already contained in the 
claim already decided, if it was simply the opposite of the 
decided claim, or if it arises only as a preliminary matter, 
whereas it constituted the main issue in the first proceedings 
                                                 
286 DTF 4C.314/2004, consid. 1.3; DTF 123 III 16, 18; DTF 121 III 474, 477 ; DTF 125 III 241, 242. 
See also HABSCHEID, Schweizerisches Zivilprozess und Gerichtsorganisationsrecht, para. 492; HOHL, paras 
1298 et seq.  
287 See HABSCHEID, Schweizerisches Zivilprozess und Gerichtsorganisationsrecht, paras 492 et seq.; WALDER-
RICHLI/GROB-ANDERMACHER, paras 46 et seq., pp. 282 et seq.; SPÜHLER/DOLGE/GEHRI, 
paras 1 et seq., pp. 121 et seq. ; MEIER, pp. 200 et seq.  
288 In DTF 123 III 16, 19 the Federal Tribunal held that there is identity of subject matters where the 
same claim, based on the same legal ground and set of facts, is re-submitted to the court for adjudication 
(“Eine abgeurteilte Sache liegt vor, wenn der streitige Anspruch mit einem schon rechtskräftig beurteilten identisch ist. Dies 
trifft zu, falls der Anspruch dem Richter aus demselben Rechtsgrund und gestützt auf denselben Sachverhalt erneut zur 
Beurteilung unterbreitet”). See also MEIER, pp. 201 et seq. 
289 See MEIER, p. 204. 
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[…]. Furthermore, the subject matter in dispute covers all facts 
that were part of the set of facts [in the prior proceedings], 
including all facts that the [first] judge could not have 
considered, either because they were not invoked before him, 
or because they were not raised in a proper and timely fashion, 
or because they were not sufficiently substantiated […]”290. 
178. So far the Federal Tribunal has not suggested that there should also be identity 
of subject matters in dispute where a new claim could and should have been brought in 
the prior proceedings, akin to the decision of the French Cour de cassation in Cesareo. 
However, in 2002 the Federal Tribunal applied a broad definition of “identity of subject 
matters in dispute” with regard to lis pendens. Holding that there is identity of subject 
matter in dispute where two claims are based on the same set of facts, it found that an 
action to determine the non-existence of a right (“action en constat negative”) had the same 
subject matter as an action to establish compensation rights (“action condamnatoire”)291. 
Because the Federal Tribunal so far has not extended this broader definition to res 
judicata, the definition of the term “subject matter in dispute” varies depending on 
whether an issue of lis pendens or res judicata is raised292.  
3. CONCLUSION 
179. The analysis of the laws of England, the United States, France and Switzerland 
shows that the doctrine of res judicata is not applied uniformly in domestic laws. 
Differences exist not only between common law and civil law countries, but also among 
countries belonging to the same legal tradition. While on a general level domestic laws 
on res judicata reveal a common core, as is often the case,“the devil is in the detail”. 
                                                 
290 DTF 5A_337/2008, consid. 4.1. (“Il y a chose jugée sur un même objet quand, dans l'un et l'autre procès, les 
parties ont soumis au juge la même prétention en se fondant sur les mêmes faits [...]. L'identité de l'objet du litige s'entend 
au sens matériel; il n'est cependant pas nécessaire, ni même déterminant, que les conclusions soient formulées de manière 
identique [...]. Le Tribunal Fédéral a admis que, même si elle s'en écarte par son intitulé, une nouvelle conclusion aura un 
objet identique à celle déjà jugée, si elle était déjà contenue dans celle-ci, si elle est simplement son contraire ou si elle ne se 
pose qu'à titre préjudiciel, alors que, dans le premier procès, elle se posait à titre principal [...]. L'identité de l'objet s'étend en 
outre à tous les faits qui font partie du complexe de faits, y compris les faits dont le juge n'a pas pu tenir compte parce qu'ils 
n'ont pas été allégués, qu'ils ne l'ont pas été selon les formes et à temps ou qu'ils n'ont pas été suffisamment motivés [...]”). 
291 DTF 128 III 284, consid. 3b (“Si elles opposent les mêmes parties et portent sur le même complexe de faits, une 
action négatoire et une action condamnatoire doivent ainsi être considérées comme identiques au sens de l'art. 35 LFors. 
[…] [L]a coexistence des deux actions crée un risque de décisions contradictoires. Or, l'art. 35 LFors, qui tend précisément 
à éviter des jugements contradictoires, doit être interprété de manière à écarter un tel risque”). 
292 MEIER, pp. 200 et seq. 
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180. The scope and application of the doctrine of res judicata varies from one country 
to another. The scope of the doctrine is generally wider in common law countries than 
in civil law countries, encompassing issue preclusion in addition to claim preclusion. As 
was stated by Brekoulakis 
“[i]n common law countries, the res judicata doctrine prevents 
the relitigation not only of claims, but also of issues, facual and 
legal, adjudicated in the prior judgment. From this it appears 
that common law countries consider that a judgment 
represents a judicial record of what actually happened with 
regard to the dispute. Res judicata in this sense carries a fact-
finding value. It is considered as a means of evidence, as an 
authoritative determination of the whole “story” of the dispute. 
In contrast, in civil law countries, the res judicata doctrine is 
normally confined to the claims rather than the issues 
determined in a judgment. The prevailing view is to separate res 
judicata from any fact-finding power. A judicial determination is 
regarded as fallible by nature and, in that sense, can only 
determine the legal consequences of what seems to have 
happened rather than determine what actually happened, that 
is, the facts. Parties are thus free to relitigate facts determined 
in a judgment simply because res judicata does not bear any 
evidentiary significance”293. 
181. The wider common law approach appears to be motivated by reasons of 
procedural economy and efficiency and the concern to avoid contradictory decisions294. 
By contrast, the reason underlying the civil law approach is that the importance of a 
legal action and a specific issue figuring in that action could differ widely in relation to 
another legal action; a party might not invest so much effort in one particular issue in 
the first litigation because of the relative insignificance of either the issue or the claim. 
The situation could be radically different in a subsequent action. The granting of res 
judicata effects to a decisions’ reasoning could thus lead to results that were unforeseen 
by the parties295.  
182. In addition, while civil law countries recognise the abuse of rights doctrine, they 
do not distinguish the abuse of process doctrine which, in some common law countries, 
prevents a party from raising a subject matter that was not, but could and should have 
                                                 
293 BREKOULAKIS, pp. 182 et seq.  
294 HÉRON, para. 12. 
295 SÖDERLUND, p. 302 ; MEIER, p. 241 ; HÉRON, para. 13.  
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been brought by that party during prior proceedings296. However, it was seen that in 
recent years, courts in France have given a broader interpretation to the notion of 
identity of disputes. In particular, French courts have applied the res judicata doctrine to 
avoid the litigation of claims arising out of a same set of facts where the claim could 
have been brought in prior proceedings. In Switzerland, a broader definition of the 
subject matter in dispute has been admitted only with respect to lis pendens. 
183. The analysis has shown that the requirements that must be met for the res 
judicata doctrine to apply vary from one jurisdiction to another. Although it is widely 
required that there must be identity of parties and questions at issue, there are several 
differences in the definitions of the notions of “parties”, “question at issue”, or 
“object” and “cause”. These notions are often applied and interpreted differently as 
between domestic laws and even as between courts and scholars. They generally appear 
to be interpreted more broadly in common law jurisdictions where the binding effects 
of a judgment commonly extend to a wider category of persons who are not parties but 
are closely related to the dispute. Likewise, in common law jurisdictions the cause of 
action is interpreted more broadly and pragmatically in light of the entire dispute to 
comprise all claims based on substantially the same facts and evidence, whether or not 
they were brought in prior proceedings297. However, as mentioned in the previous 
paragraph, courts in France seem to now adopt a similar approach.  
184. It was seen that the moment when a judgment becomes res judicata may also 
vary from one country to another. In England a judgment becomes res judicata when 
perfected by formal entry 298. In the US299 and France300 it becomes res judicata when it is 
rendered. In Switzerland a judgment becomes res judicata when it may no longer be 
contested301.  
185. Finally, in Switzerland the doctrine of res judicata is part of procedural public 
                                                 
296 ILA, Interim Report, p. 14; BREKOULAKIS, pp. 182 et seq.  
297 See KREMSLEHNER, pp. 134 et seq. 
298 See supra, para. 42. 
299 See supra, para. 86. 
300 See supra, paras 123 et seq. 
301 See supra, paras 162 et seq. 
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policy and courts must consider res judicata issues ex officio302. While in France the res 
judicata doctrine is not part of public policy, French courts may consider res judicata 
issues ex officio303. By contrast, in England304 and the US305 the doctrine serves only the 
private interest of the parties. Res judicata must generally be raised and pleaded by the 
parties. It is not part of public policy and is deemed to be waived if not raised306.  
186.  The existing differences between domestic laws on res judicata render its 
application in international arbitration problematic. Even if it was admitted that the 
wholesale application of domestic res judicata rules was possible and appropriate to 
coordinate jurisdictions between different arbitral tribunals or between arbitral tribunals 
and state courts, an effective application of domestic res judicata rules in international 
arbitration would require the formulation either of generally accepted res judicata 
principles or of a generally accepted conflict-of-laws rule. Chapter five will discuss the 
appropriateness of these last two approaches in further detail. 
187. With regard to the formulation of generally accepted res judicata principles 
guidance could be sought in international law. It will thus be useful to analyse the res 
judicata doctrine in international law. 
                                                 
302 See, e.g., DTF 4A_490/2009, consid. 2.1; DTF 4P.98/2005, consid. 5.1; DFT 128 III 191, 194; DFT 
127 III 279, 283.  
303 Until 2005 French courts were not allowed to consider the res judicata doctrine ex officio. However, on 1 
January 2005 the décret of 20 August 2004 came into force. This décret modifies Article 125 NCPC; 
French courts may now consider res judicata issues ex officio. The doctrine is no longer considered as 
serving only the private interests of the parties. However, the doctrine of res judicata is generally not 
considered to be part of public policy. See, e.g., JAROSSON, L’autorité de la chose jugée des sentences arbitrales; 
NOURISSAT. 
304 See HANDLEY, paras 18.03 et seq. 
305 ALI, Restatement (Second), Judgments, § 15. 
306 HANOTIAU, L'autorité de la chose jugée des sentences arbitrales, p. 51; ILA, Interim Report, p. 15. 
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188. The problem of multiple proceedings and conflicting judgments is dealt with 
differently depending on whether it arises in a private or public international law setting.  
189. In private international law there have been several attempts to find harmonised 
solutions. In Europe the EC Regulation No. 44/2001 seeks to avoid multiple 
proceedings and conflicting judgments by unifying rules on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments. Globally a similar attempt, albeit much 
more restricted in scope, has been made by the adoption of the Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements. In 2004, ALI and UNIDROIT proposed transnational 
principles of civil procedure. 
190. Neither the EC Regulation No. 44/2001 nor the Convention on Choice of 
Court Agreements refer to the doctrine of res judicata. By contrast, the 
ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure contain a res judicata 
provision. These attempts of harmonisation provide inspiration as to how res judicata 
issues may be dealt with outside the domestic law context and are thus useful for the 
development of res judicata principles for international arbitration.  
191. In public international law the doctrine of res judicata was developed on the basis 
of domestic res judicata rules. Thus, the public international law doctrine of res judicata 
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also constitutes a useful source of inspiration for the development of res judicata 
principles for international arbitration. 
192. The following analysis will examine how the problem of multiple proceedings 
and conflicting judgments is dealt with in private international law (1.). It will then 
analyse how the doctrine of res judicata is currently applied in public international law by 
international courts and tribunals (2.).  
1. PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
193. The EC Regulation No. 44/2001, the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements, and the ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure all 
regulate the relations between domestic courts belonging to different jurisdictions.  
194. One objective of this research is to demonstrate that res judicata issues arising 
before international arbitrators should not be governed by any particular domestic law, 
but by transnational standards. The private international law instruments mentioned 
above constitute attempts to find such standards. This section will examine these 
instruments in the order listed. 
1.1. The EC Regulation No. 44/2001  
195. The EC Regulation No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (JR) aims to 
provide for the free movement of judgments between EU Member States. To achieve 
this aim the Regulation imposes unified rules of conflict of jurisdiction that prescribe 
which Member State has jurisdiction over particular matters. The Regulation futher 
facilitates the recognition and enforcement of judgments rendered in Member States.  
196. Multiple proceedings and conflicting judgments are contrary to the aim of the 
Regulation. Articles 27 and 28 JR seek to prevent that identical or related proceedings 
are brought in parallel before the courts of different Member States. While Article 27 
provides for the application of the lis pendens doctrine307, Article 28 JR concerns related 
                                                 
307 Like the res judicata doctrine, the lis pendens doctrine applies only in case of “proceedings involving the 
same cause of action and between the same parties” (Article 27 (1) JR). 
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actions308.  
197. Articles 27 and 28 seek not only to uphold proper administration of justice and 
economy of procedure, but also to avoid that courts in different Member States render 
irreconcilable judgments. They are designed to preclude, as far as possible and from the 
outset, the possibility of a situation where the recognition of a judgment would be 
refused on the grounds that it is irreconcilable with another judgment309. This ground 
for non-recognition is provided for in Article 34 JR. According to Article 34 (3) and (4), 
a judgment given in a Member State shall not be recognised 
“3. if it is irreconcilable with a judgment given in a dispute 
between the same parties in the Member State in which 
recognition is sought; 
4. if it is irreconcilable with an earlier judgment given in 
another Member State or in a third State involving the same 
cause of action and between the same parties, provided that the 
earlier judgment fulfils the conditions necessary for its 
recognition in the Member State addressed”. 
198. The general idea underlying Article 34 (3) and (4) is to avoid the existence of 
two irreconcilable judgments in one and the same Member State310. According to the 
Report of the Committee of Experts for the Brussels Convention,  
“[t]here can be no doubt that the rule of law in a State would 
be disturbed if it were possible to take advantage of two 
conflicting judgments”311. 
199. Article 34 (3) and (4) JR is of minor practical importance as Articles 27 and 28 
JR are usually sufficient to avoid irreconcilable judgments312. A review of case law has 
shown that Articles 27 and 28 are generally respected and largely prevent conflicting 
                                                 
308 Article 28 (3) JR states: “For the purposes of this Article, actions are deemed to be related where they 
are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of 
irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings”. 
309 ECJ, Maersk Olie & Gas A/S v Firma M de Haan en W de Boer, Case C-39/02, 14 October 2004, ECR 
2004, p. I-09657, para. 31; ECJ, Overseas Union Insurance Ltd and Deutsche Ruck Uk Reinsurance Ltd and Pine 
Top Insurance Company Ltd v New Hampshire Insurance Company, Case C-351/89, 27 June 1991, ECR 1991, p. 
I-03317, para. 16; ECJ, Gubisch Maschinenfabrik KG v Giulio Palumbo, Case 144/86, 8 December 1987, ECR 
1987, p. 04861, para. 8. See also, HESS/PFEIFFER/SCHLOSSER, para. 403.  
310 GAUDEMET-TALLON, para. 419. 
311 JENARD, p. 45. 
312 JENARD, p. 45. 
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judgments. Consequently, Article 34 (3) and (4) JR is applied only rarely313. The ECJ 
had only few occasions to clarify the meaning of Article 27 of the Brussels Convention 
(BC), which is almost identical to Article 34 JR.  
200. In Solo Kleinmotoren GmbH v Bloch, the ECJ held that the term “judgment” must 
be defined pursuant to Article 25 BC (Article 32 JR) according to which  
“‘judgment’ means any judgment given by a court or tribunal 
of a Contracting State, whatever the judgment may be called, 
including a decree, order, decision or writ of execution, as well 
as the determination of costs or expenses by an officer of the 
court”. 
201. In Hoffmann v Krieg, the ECJ held that: 
“[i]n order to ascertain whether the two judgments are 
irreconcilable within the meaning of Article 27 (3), it should be 
examined whether they entail legal consequences that are 
mutually exclusive”314.  
202. The irreconcilability thus lies in the effects of the judgments315.  
203. Article 34 (3) JR does not apply where proceedings are still pending in the 
Member State where recognition is sought316; the judgments must both have been 
rendered. The question which judgment was rendered first is of no importance; the 
judgment rendered in the Member State where recognition is sought always prevails 
over the foreign judgment317.  
204. Two judgments may entail legal consequences that are mutually exclusive and 
thus be irreconcilable within the meaning of Article 34 (3) JR, even though they were 
not rendered on the same subject matter318, and even if the judgment rendered in the 
Member State where recognition is sought concerned a subject matter outside the scope 
                                                 
313 HESS/PFEIFFER/SCHLOSSER, para. 563. 
314 ECJ, Hoffmann v Krieg, Case 145/86, 4 February 1988, ECR 1988, p. 00645, para. 22. 
315 KROPHOLLER, para. 49, pp. 410 et seq. 
316 GAUDEMET-TALLON, para. 420. 
317 KROPHOLLER, para. 54, p. 412. It has been suggested that Article 34 (3) is not in line with Articles 
27 and 28 of the Regulation as it gives preference to a judgment given without respecting the lis pendens of 
the same lawsuit in another Member State (see HESS/PFEIFFER/SCHLOSSER, para. 564). 
318 KROPHOLLER, para. 49, p. 410. 
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of the Regulation319.  
205. By contrast, the two judgments must have been rendered between the same 
parties. The term “same parties” has the same meaning as in Article 27 JR. In Tatry v 
Maciej Rataj, the ECJ held that  
“[…] the question whether the parties are the same cannot 
depend on the procedural position of each of them in the two 
actions, and that the plaintiff in the first action may be the 
defendant in the second”320. 
206. The ECJ further held that the requirement of party identity is met even where 
only some of the parties were identical in both proceedings321. This means that a 
judgment can be refused recognition partially, i.e. to the extent to which the parties to 
both judgments are the same.  
207. Finally, in the Drouot case the ECJ held that parties, although formally not 
identical, may nevertheless be deemed to be the same party if there is such a degree of 
identity between the interests of them that a judgment delivered against one of them 
would have the force of res judicata against the other. In this case the ECJ decided that 
an insurer and its insured may be considered as the same party for the purposes of lis 
pendens  
“where an insurer, by virtue of its right of subrogation, brings 
or defends an action in the name of its insured without the 
latter being in a position to influence the proceedings” 322. 
208. Unlike Article 34 (3), Article 34 (4) requires that the judgments were rendered 
on the same cause of action. The term “cause of action” is the same as in Article 27 JR 
(Article 21 BC). The European notion of “cause of action” is characterised by its broad 
                                                 
319 See ECJ, Hoffmann v Krieg, cited supra, fn 314, para. 17; GAUDEMET-TALLON, para. 420. 
320 ECJ, Tatry v Maciej Rataj, Case C-406/92, 6 December 1994, ECR 1994, p. I-05439, para. 30. 
321 ECJ, Tatry v Maciej Rataj, cited supra, fn 320, paras 33 et seq. 
322 ECJ, Drouot assurances SA v Consolidated metallurgical industries et al., Case C-351/96, 19 May 1998, ECR 
1998, p. I-03075, paras 19 et seq. See also Molnlycke Health Care AB et al v BSN Medical Ltd et al [2009] 
EWHC 3370 (“A mandatory stay of English proceedings pending resolution of foreign proceedings 
under Regulation 44/2001 art. 27 would only arise where the parties were identical and indissociable. 
Where foreign proceedings had been issued against a patentee, but not the exclusive licensee of the 
patent, English proceedings against both of them would not be stayed under art. 27 as the licensee had 
been granted a specific right which was additional to the right which the patentee continued to hold, so 
that its interests were different and the parties were not, accordingly, identical and indissociable”). 
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scope. Two proceedings involve the same cause of action once the same subject matter 
“lies at the heart of the two actions”323. 
209. In Tatry v Maciej Rata the ECJ noted that even though the English version of 
Article 21 BC does not expressly distinguish between the concepts of “object” and 
“cause”, the term “cause of action” should be construed in the same manner as other 
language versions in which that distinction is made. Accordingly, the ECJ held that  
“the ‘cause of action’ comprises the facts and the rule of law 
relied on as the basis of the action”324. 
210. Concerning the object, the ECJ stated that 
“[t]he ‘object of the action’ […] means the end the action has 
in view”325. 
211. Applying this definition of the term “cause of action”, the ECJ concluded that 
an action seeking to have the defendant held liable for causing loss and ordered to pay 
damages has the same cause and object as earlier proceedings brought by that 
defendant seeking a declaration that he is not liable for that loss326. 
212. Under Article 34 (4) JR the conflict between two irreconcilable judgments is 
solved in favour of the “earlier judgment”; only the “earlier judgment” may be 
recognised. The “earlier judgment” within the meaning of Article 34 (4) JR is the 
judgment that was rendered first in time327.  
213. At first glance the EC Regulation No. 44/2001 does not appear to solve the 
problem of duplications of proceedings and conflicting judgments by means of the 
doctrine of res judicata. There is no provision in the Regulation directly and expressly 
precluding a court in a Member State to decide a dispute that has already been decided 
in prior proceedings between the same parties in another Member State. However, an 
argument may be made that it does so implicitly by means of Article 33 (1) JR, which 
                                                 
323 HESS/PFEIFFER/SCHLOSSER, para. 406, quoting ECJ, Gubisch Maschinenfabrik KG./.Giulio 
Palumbo, Case C-144/86, 8 December 1987, ECR 1987, p. 4861, para. 16.  
324 ECJ, Tatry v Maciej Rataj, cited supra, fn 320, para. 38. 
325 ECJ, Tatry v Maciej Rataj, cited supra, fn 320, para. 40. 
326 ECJ, Tatry v Maciej Rataj, cited supra, fn 320, para. 44. 
327 KROPHOLLER, para. 56, p. 413. 
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provides for the automatic recognition of judgments rendered under the Regulation. 
According to Barnett, Article 33 (1) clearly intends to prevent the re-litigation in a 
Member State of a cause of action that has already been finally determined in another 
Member State328. However, the Regulation is silent as to the scope and extent of the 
preclusive effects of judments rendered under the Regulation, as well as to the law 
governing the preclusive effects of a prior judgment in subsequent proceedings.  
214. According to Jenard, a judgment rendered in one Member State must be 
accepted in the recognising Member State with the original preclusive effects it would 
have in the country in which it was rendered329. This was also the approach adopted by 
the ECJ in Hoffmann v Krieg330. Barnett, however, suggests that while the Regulation 
seems to implicitly require the extension of cause of action preclusive effects, the same 
does not hold true with respect to issue preclusion and abuse of process. According to 
Barnett, a court in the recognising state may afford issue preclusive effects to a foreign 
judgment, even if it was rendered in a Member State that does not know the doctrine of 
issue estoppel331. Similarly, with respect to abuse of process, Barnett argues that it is a 
preclusive plea only in the sense that the recognising court exercises its discretion to 
prevent its own process from being abused, thereby precluding the party that invoked 
it. The plea reposes entirely in the discretion of the recognising court332. A recognising 
court, applying its abuse of process doctrine, may preclude a party from raising a 
subject matter which could and should have been raised in earlier proceedings in 
another Member State.  
                                                 
328 BARNETT, para. 9.13. See also ECJ, De Wolf v Cox BV, Case 42/76, 30 November 1976, ECR 1976, 
p. 01759.  
329 JENARD, p. 43 (“Recognition must have the result of conferring judgments the authority and 
effectiveness accorded to them in the State in which they were given”). See also LASOK/STONE, pp. 
289 et seq. 
330 ECJ, Hoffmann v Krieg, Case 145/86, 4 February 1988, 1988 ECR, p. 645 (“A foreign judgment which 
has been recognised by virtue of Article 26 of the Convention must in principle have the same effects in 
the State in which enforcement is sought as it does in the State in which judgment was given”). See also 
ECJ, Amministrazione dell’Economia e delle Finanze and Agenzia delle Entrate v Fallimento Olimpiclub Srl, Case C-
2/08, 3 September 2009, 2009 ECR, p. I-07501 at para. 24 (“In the absence of Community legislation in 
this area, the rules implementing the principle of res judicata are a matter for the national legal order, in 
accordance with the principle of the procedural autonomy of the Member States. However, those rules 
must not be less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence); nor 
may they be framed in such a way as to make it in practice impossible or excessively difficult to exercise 
the rights conferred by Community law (principle of effectiveness))”. 
331 See BARNETT, paras 7.75 et seq.  
332 BARNETT, para. 7.95. 
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1.2. The Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 
215. The Convention on Choice of Court Agreements was adopted by the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law on 30 June 2005333. The Convention has not 
yet entered into force as it has been ratified only by Mexico. However, the Convention 
has been signed by the United States and the European Community. Pursuant to Article 
31 of the Convention, only two ratifications are needed for the Convention to enter 
into force334. 
216. The aim of the Convention is to provide certainty and ensure effectiveness of 
exclusive choice of court agreements. The Convention seeks to ensure that, first, the 
chosen court hears the dispute when proceedings are brought before it; second, any 
other court before which proceedings are brought refuses to hear the dispute; and third, 
the judgment of the chosen court is recognised and enforced335. To achieve its aims, the 
Convention adopts uniform rules on jurisdiction and on recognition and enforcement 
of foreign judgments. 
217. The Convention is of interest for this research as it considers the relationship 
between a court chosen by an exclusive choice of court agreement and a court not 
chosen. This relationship resembles the relationship between an arbitral tribunal 
(chosen by an arbitration agreement) and a state court, i.e. a court not chosen.  
218. The Convention does not expressly adopt the doctrine of res judicata. 
Furthermore, it heavily restricts the application of the lis pendens doctrine. It even 
precludes the chosen court from applying the doctrine of lis pendens to decline 
jurisdiction in favour of a court in another state. The Convention thereby seeks to 
ensure that only the chosen court will decide the dispute covered by the choice of court 
agreement. This is the aim of Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention. According to Article 
5 (1),  
“[t]he court or courts of a Contracting State designated in an 
exclusive choice of court agreement shall have jurisdiction to 
                                                 
333 On the history of this Convention, see, e.g., WAGNER, pp. 102 et seq. 
334 The Convention is available at www.hcch.net. 
335 HARTLEY/DOGAUCHI, para. 1.  
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decide a dispute to which the agreement applies, unless the 
agreement is null and void under the law of that State”. 
219. Article 5 (1) firmly grounds the exclusive jurisdiction of the chosen court. The 
chosen court’s obligation to decide the dispute is corroborated by Article 5 (2), in 
accordance with which 
“[a] court that has jurisdiction under paragraph 1 shall not 
decline to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that the dispute 
should be decided in a court of another State”. 
220. According to the Explanatory Report on the Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements, a court might consider that the dispute should be decided in a court of 
another state on the basis of forum non conveniens or lis pendens. Article 5 (2) of the 
Convention precludes resort to either of these doctrines if the court in whose favour 
the proceedings would be stayed or dismissed is in another state336. This is justified by 
the legitimate expectation of the parties to have the chosen court decide the dispute337. 
221. To avoid parallel proceedings before a chosen court and a court not chosen, 
Article 6 of the Convention obliges any courts not chosen, but nonetheless seised of 
the dispute, to suspend or dismiss proceedings that are covered by an exclusive choice 
of court agreement unless 
“a) the agreement is null and void under the law of the State of 
the chosen court; 
b) a party lacked the capacity to conclude the agreement under 
the law of the State of the court seised; 
c) giving effect to the agreement would lead to a manifest 
injustice or would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of 
the State of the court seised; 
d) for exceptional reasons beyond the control of the parties, 
the agreement cannot reasonably be performed; or 
e) the chosen court has decided not to hear the case”. 
                                                 
336 HARTLEY/DOGAUCHI, paras 132 et seq. The Convention does not prevent a chosen court from 
declining jurisdiction in favour of another court within the same state (Article 5 (3)(b) Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements; KESSEDJIAN, para. 38). 
337 KESSEDJIAN, para. 37. 
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222. Pursuant to Article 6 (a), the court not chosen shall assess the validity of the 
choice of court agreement under the law of the chosen court. Likewise, Article 5 (1) 
provides that the chosen court shall examine whether the choice of court agreement is 
null and void pursuant to its lex fori. Both courts will therefore apply the same law to 
assess the validity of the choice of court agreement. This choice-of-law rule was 
included to ensure uniform results338, which is essential to avoid contradictory decisions 
and to prevent positive and negative conflicts of jurisdiction.  
223. The application of the law of the country of the chosen court appears 
appropriate. It is the law the parties would legitimately expect the chosen court to apply 
to assess the validity of the choice of court agreement. A court not chosen should also 
apply the law of the chosen court. In line with the parties’ legitimate expectations, it has 
to determine whether the choice of court agreement can have effects in the country of 
the chosen court. The court not chosen can only have jurisdiction over the dispute if 
the choice of court agreement proves null and void in the country of the chosen court. 
The reference in the Convention to the law of the country of the chosen court includes 
choice-of-law rules339. This does not seem to cause major problems as both the chosen 
court and the court not chosen will apply the same choice-of-law rules to determine the 
law governing the validity of the choice of court agreement.  
224. Article 6 (b) of the Convention prescribes the court not chosen to examine the 
parties’ capacity to conclude the choice of court agreement in application of its own lex 
fori. While Article 5 (1) does not expressly prescribe the chosen court to examine the 
parties’ capacity to conclude the agreement, it is considered that the provision includes 
lack of capacity since a lack of capacity would render the choice of court agreement null 
and void340. Hence, the chosen court and the court not chosen will both apply their 
own lex fori, including choice-of-law rules341. If these conflict-of-laws rules determine 
different laws to govern the capacity of the parties, the courts will assess the capacity of 
the parties under different laws. There is thus a risk that both courts will reach different 
                                                 
338 BRAND/HERRUP, p. 81. 
339 HARTLEY/DOGAUCHI, para. 125. 
340 HARTLEY/DOGAUCHI, paras 126 and 149. 
341 HARTLEY/DOGAUCHI, para. 150. 
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conclusions on this issue342.  
225. The exceptions in Article 6 (c) and (d) of the Convention may also give rise to 
parallel proceedings. However, the risk of parallel proceedings under these provsions is 
small as these exceptions will only arise rarely in practice343. No problem of parallel 
proceedings can arise under Article 6 (e) as it concerns the case where the chosen court 
has declined to exercise its jurisdiction.  
226. Where Articles 5 and 6 cannot avoid parallel proceedings and where, as a 
consequence, conflicting judgments are rendered, the Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements seeks to prevent the recognition or enforcement of two conflicting 
judgments in a same Contracting State by the same means as EC Regulation No. 
44/2001. According to Article 9 of the Convention: 
“Recognition or enforcement may be refused if –  
[…] 
f) the judgment is inconsistent with a judgment given in the 
requested State in a dispute between the same parties; or 
g) the judgment is inconsistent with an earlier judgment given 
in another State between the same parties on the same cause of 
action, provided that the earlier judgment fulfils the conditions 
necessary for its recognition in the requested State”. 
227. The wording of Article 9 (f) and (g) is similar, but not identical, to Article 34 (3) 
and (4) JR. In particular, Article 9 of the Convention uses the term “inconsistent” 
instead of “irreconcilable”.  
228. The Convention does not define the terms “inconsistent judgments” or 
“another State”. It is not certain whether an application of Article 9 (g) and (f) requires 
two judgments to be merely “conflicting and contradictory” or whether they must be 
“irreconcilable”, i.e. giving rise to mutually exclusive legal consequences344. It is equally 
not certain whether in Article 9 (g) the term “another State” refers solely to another 
                                                 
342 On Article 6 (b), see BRAND/HERRUP, pp. 90 et seq. 
343 KESSEDJIAN, paras 43 et seq. 
344 A distinction between “irreconcilable” and “conflicting and contradictory” is made under the EC 
Regulation No. 44/2001. See ECJ, Tatry v Maciej Rataj, cited supra, fn 320, paras 54 et seq. 
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Non-Contracting State or also to another Contracting State as in Article 34 (4) JR.  
1.3. The ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure 
229. In 2004 the “Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure” were accepted with 
unanimous approval by UNIDROIT and ALI. Their purpose is to contribute to a 
worldwide harmonisation of civil procedure. Bridging the gap between common law 
and civil law traditions and combining the most attractive attributes of both legal 
families, the Principles’ aim is to reduce uncertainties and anxieties related to litigation 
under unfamiliar procedural systems345.  
230. The negotiations of the ALI/UNIDROIT Principles were strongly influenced 
by the advanced development of procedural rules in international and domestic 
arbitration. It is expected that the ALI/UNIDROIT Principles will in turn influence the 
further development and practice of arbitration proceedings346. While the Principles 
were designed to be applied by domestic courts, the Commentary of the preamble of 
the Principles makes clear that the Principles may apply in international arbitration:  
“These Principles are equally applicable to international 
arbitration, except to the extent of being incompatible with 
arbitration proceedings, for example, the Principles related to 
jurisdiction, publicity of proceedings, and appeal”.  
231. Constituting an attempt to harmonise domestic codes of civil procedure, the 
ALI/UNIDROIT Principles are of direct interest to this research. The Principles 
contain a provision on res judicata and this provision could be applied by international 
commercial arbitral tribunals in their relations with other arbitral tribunals or state 
courts. Principles 28.2 and 28.3 provide: 
“28.2 In applying the rules of claim preclusion, the scope of the 
claim or claims decided is determined by reference to the 
claims and defenses in the parties’ pleadings, including 
amendments, and the court’s decision and reasoned 
explanation. 
28.3 The concept of issue preclusion, as to an issue of fact or 
                                                 
345 STÜRNER, p. 204. 
346 STÜRNER, p. 213. 
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application of law to facts, should be applied only to prevent 
substantial injustice”.  
232. Principle 28.2 emphasises the importance of the parties’ pleadings in 
determining the scope of the parties’ claims for the purposes of res judicata. The 
intention of the drafters was to give the parties as much freedom as possible to 
determine the scope of their dispute themselves. The aim was to establish clarity and 
certainty about the scope of earlier disputes and their significance for subsequent 
proceedings in the field of international litigation347.  
233. Principles 28.2 and 28.3 appear to follow the civil law approach to res judicata as 
applied in continental Europe, providing for limited claim preclusion and excluding, in 
principle, issue preclusion. Issue preclusion may be invoked only in exceptional cases 
when the re-litigation of certain factual or legal issues would be clearly abusive348.  
234. The accompanying Commentary refers only to the concept of issue preclusion. 
It states: 
“[…] Under Principle 28.3, issue preclusion might be applied 
when, for example, a party has justifiably relied in its conduct 
on a determination of an issue of law or fact in a previous 
proceeding. A broader scope of issue preclusion is recognized 
in many common-law systems, but the more limited concept in 
Principle 28.3 is derived from the principle of good faith, as it 
is referred to in civil-law systems, or estoppel in pais, as the 
principle is referred to in common-law systems”. 
235. The restrictive approach by the ALI/UNIDROIT Principles towards the 
doctrine of res judicata was explained by Stürner: 
“This sparing solution takes into account that the judges of a 
court recognizing a foreign judgment would need to have 
remarkably good knowledge of foreign law if they had to 
determine the scope of a claim or issue preclusion according to 
the common law model. Such knowledge would generally 
require intensive and expensive expert assessment, which 
nonetheless may not always be available or reliable. All this 
speaks well for a more modest solution casting the formal 
                                                 
347 STÜRNER, p. 250. 
348 STÜRNER, pp. 250 et seq. 
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claims for relief as a relatively clear and uncomplicated 
standard”349. 
2. PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 
236. According to most scholars the doctrine of res judicata constitutes a general 
principle of law, imported into public international law by virtue of Article 38 (1)(c) of 
the ICJ Statute350. This view appears to originate in a statement by Lord Phillimore who, 
during the deliberations of the Advisory Committee of Jurists appointed by the Council 
of the League of Nations in 1920 to prepare the Statute of the PCIJ, pointed out 
“that the general principles […] were these which were 
accepted by all nations in foro domestico, such as certain principles 
of procedure, the principle of good faith, and the principle of 
res judicata, etc.”351. 
237. This opinion was expressly endorsed by Judge Anzilotti in his dissenting 
opinion in the Chorzów Factory (Interpretation) case in 1927: 
“[I]t appears to me that if there be a case in which it is 
legitimate to have recourse, in the absence of conventions and 
custom, to ‘general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations’, mentioned in No. 3 of Article 38 of the Statute, that 
case is assuredly the present one. Not without reason was the 
binding effect of res judicata expressly mentioned by the 
Committee of Jurists entrusted with the preparation of a plan 
for the establishment of a Permanent Court of International 
Justice, amongst the principles included in the above-
mentioned article”352. 
                                                 
349 STÜRNER, p. 251. 
350 SCOBBIE, p. 299; REINISCH, p. 44; CHENG, p. 336; HANOTIAU, Complex Arbitrations, p. 239; 
MOSLER, p. 522; BROWNLIE, p. 18; LAUTERPACHT, pp. 325 et seq.   
351 Citation reported by LAMMERS, p. 59.  
352 PCIJ, Interpretation of Judgments Nos 7 and 8 (The Chorzów Factory), Dissenting Opinion by M. Anzilotti, 
Ser. A., No. 13, p. 27. See also the advisory opinion of the ICJ of 13 July 1954 on The Effect of Awards of 
Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal where the ICJ referred to the res judicata 
doctrine as a “well-established and generally recognized principle of law” (ICJ Reports 1954, p. 53). In 
Waste Management Inc v Mexico (Mexico’s Preliminary Objection), the ICSID tribunal stated: “There is no doubt 
that res judicata is a principle of international law, and even a general principle of law within the meaning 
of Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice” (ILM, Vol. 41 (2002), pp. 1315 et 
seq., para. 39). In the Trail Smelter Arbitration, the arbitral tribunal stated: “[t]hat the sanctity of res judicata 
attaches to a final decision of an international tribunal is an essential and settled rule of international law” 
(Trail Smelter Case, 11 March 1941, RIAA, Vol. 3, p. 1950). In the Laguna del Desierto Arbitration the arbitral 
tribunal noted: “A judgment having the authority of res judicata is judicially binding on the parties to the 
dispute. This is a fundamental principle of the law of nations repeatedly invoked in the jurisprudence, 
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238. In recent years some scholars have referred to the doctrine of res judicata as a 
rule of customary international law353. In any event, either by virtue of customary 
international law or general principle of law, the doctrine of res judicata is a binding rule 
of public international law354. This means that it can be applied by international courts 
and tribunals even in the absence of express treaty language, unless the intent to negate 
the application of the rule is clearly expressed355. The doctrine of res judicata has been 
repeatedly applied by various international courts and tribunals356, including the PCIJ357, 
the ICJ358, the ECJ359 and several international arbitral tribunals applying international 
                                                                                                                                         
which regards the authority of res judicata as a universal and absolute principle of international law” 
(Dispute Concerning the Course of the Frontier Between BP 62 and Mount Fitzroy (Argentina/Chile), 21 October 
1994, ILR, Vol. 113, p. 43).  
353 See SHANY, Competing Jurisdictions, p. 245. See also DODGE, pp. 29 et seq. 
354 SHANY, Competing Jurisdictions, p. 246; ILA, Interim Report, p. 18. 
355 SHANY, Competing Jurisdictions, p. 254. 
356 See in particular SHANY, Competing Jurisdictions, pp. 247 et seq. 
357 See, e.g., PCIJ, The “Société Commerciale de Belgique”, 15 June 1939, Ser. A/B., No. 78, pp. 160 et seq. 
358 See, e.g., ICJ, Case Concerning the Arbitral Award Made by the King of Spain on 23 December 1906 (Honduras 
v Nicaragua), 18 November 1960, ICJ Reports 1960, pp. 192 et seq.; ICJ, The Effect of Awards of 
Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, cited supra, fn 352; ICJ, Request for 
Interpretation of the Judgment of 11 June 1998 in the Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between 
Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v Nigeria), Preliminary Objections, 25 March 1999, ICJ Reports 1999, p. 
39; ICJ, Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v Bahrain), Merits, 
Dissenting Opinion by Judge Torres Bernárdez, 16 March 2001, ICJ Reports 2001, para. 303; ICJ, 
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v 
Serbia and Montenegro), 26 February 2007, available at www.icj-cij.org. 
359 The ECJ has relied upon the doctrine of res judicata to declare actions inadmissible in cases that have 
already been decided in previous judgments although the ECJ’s Rules of Procedure do not expressly refer 
to the doctrine of res judicata. See, e.g., ECJ, Mrs Emilia Gualco (née Barge) v High Authority of the European 
Coal and Steel Community, Case 14/64, 1965 ECR, p. 51; ECJ, Hoogovens Groep v Commission, Cases 172 and 
226/83, 1985 ECR, p. 2831; ECJ, France v Parliament, Cases 358/85 and 51/86, 1988 ECR, p. 4846, 4849-
50. See also ECJ, Jean Reynier and Piero Erba v Commission of the European Economic Community, Cases 79/63 
and 82/63, 9 July 1964, 1964 ECR, p. 00259 (“The force of res judicata prevents rights confirmed by a 
judgment of the Court from being disputed anew. Since the Community is a single entity, it is 
inconceivable that judgment of the court which has the force of res judicata with regard to an institution - 
in this case the Commission – should not have the same force with regard to the Community as a 
whole”); EJC, Rosemarie Kapferer v Schlank & Schick, GMBH, Case C-243/04, 16 March 2006, 2006 ECR, 
p. I-2585, para. 20 (“In that regard, attention should be drawn to the importance, both for the 
Community legal order and national legal systems, of the principle of res judicata. In order to ensure both 
stability of the law and legal relations and the sound administration of justice, it is important that judicial 
decisions which have become definitive after all rights of appeal have been exhausted or after expiry of 
the time-limits provided for in that connection can no longer be called into question”); ECJ, Gerhard 
Köbler v Republik Österreich, Case C-224/01, 30 September 2003, 2003 ECR, p. I-10239, para. 38. On the 
scope of the res judicata effect of ECJ judgments see, e.g., ECJ, Italian Republic v Commission of the European 
Communities, Case C-281/89, 19 February 1991, 1991 ECR, p. I-00347, para. 14 (“It must be observed 
that the principle of res judicata extends only to the matters of fact and law actually or necessarily settled 
by a judicial decision”). On the requirements for the application of the res judicata doctrine see, e.g., ECJ, 
France v Monsanto Company and Commission of the European Communities, Case 248/99P, 8 January 2002, 2002 
ECR, p. I-1, para. 37 (“the objection of res judicata presupposes that the action alleged to be inadmissible 
and the action culminating in the decision having the force of res judicata are between the same parties, 
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law360. 
239. There is an immediate foundation for the doctrine of res judicata in the ICJ 
Statute. Articles 59 and 60 provide: 
“Article 59  
The decision of the Court has no binding force except between 
the parties and in respect of that particular case.  
Article 60 
The judgment is final and without appeal. In the event of 
dispute as to the meaning or scope of the judgment, the Court 
shall construe it upon the request of any party”.  
240. Articles 59 and 60 are supplemented by Article 94 (2) of the Rules of the ICJ 
according to which 
“[t]he judgment shall be read at a public sitting of the Court 
and shall become binding on the parties on the day of the 
reading”. 
241. These provisions cover the generally acknowledged characteristics and effects 
of a res judicata. Article 59 expresses the relative authority of a judicial decision, 
extending only to the parties to the dispute. Article 60 determines the force or formal 
value of the res judicata, i.e. the particular effectiveness attached to it as definitive and not 
subject to review361.  
242. Other international instruments, such as the Statutes of the ITLOS or the 
ECHR, also contain similar provisions on res judicata362.  
                                                                                                                                         
have the same subject matter and are based on the same cause of action”). See also NOURISSAT; 
REILING, p. 136; LASOK, pp. 219 et seq. 
360 See, e.g., PCA, Pious Fund of the California (United States v Mexico), 14 October 1902, The Hague Court 
Reports, p. 5; PCA,Trail Smelter Case, cited supra, fn 352; PCA, Laguna del Desierto Arbitration, cited supra, fn 
352; Waste Management Inc v Mexico (Mexico’s Preliminary Objection), cited supra, fn 352; Amco Asia Corp v 
Indonesia (Resubmission: Jurisdiction), cited supra, fn 352.  
361 COUVREUR, p. 100; ROSENNE, Vol. 3, para. III.391, p. 1599. 
362 Article 33 of the ITLOS Statute: “(1) The decision of the Tribunal is final and shall be complied with 
by all the parties to the dispute. (2) The decision shall have no binding force except between the parties in 
respect of that particular dispute. (3) In the event of dispute as to the meaning or scope of the decision, 
the Tribunal shall construe it upon the request of any party”. Article 35 (2)(b) of the ECHR (“the 
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243. The res judicata provisions contained in international instruments have been 
interpreted and supplemented by international courts and tribunals drawing on general 
international law363.  
244. The public international law doctrine of res judicata is generally similar to the 
doctrine in domestic laws. Therefore, the following analysis will begin by introducing 
the constituent elements of a res judicata in public international law (2.1.), and then 
examine the effects of a res judicata (2.2.). Finally, the requirements that must be met for 
the res judicata doctrine to apply will be determined (2.3.). The analysis’ main focus will 
be on the systems of the PCIJ and the ICJ364. 
2.1. Constituent Elements of a Res Judicata 
245. A res judicata in public international law is a final judgment rendered by an 
international court or tribunal of judicial nature and of competent jurisdiction.  
A judgment 
246. Article 60 of the ICJ Statute provides that judgments of the ICJ are final and 
without appeal. A judgment within the meaning of Article 60 is a decision that brings 
the dispute to an end. It is the last formal step in the resolution of the dispute before 
the ICJ365. 
247. By contrast, Article 59 of the ICJ Statute uses the word “decision” instead of 
                                                                                                                                         
[European] Court [of Human Rights] shall not deal with any application submitted under Article 34 that 
[…] is substantially the same as a matter that has already been examined by the Court or has already been 
submitted to another procedure or international investigation or settlement and contains no relevant new 
information”); Article 46 (1) of the ECHR: “The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final 
judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties” (on the res judicata effect of judgments of the 
European Court of Human Rights see, e.g., FRICÉRO). For further examples see BROWN, p. 154, fn 4. 
363 As regards Articles 59 and 60 of the ICJ Statute, see SCOBBIE, p. 304. See also the dissenting opinion 
of Judge Anzilotti in the Chorzów Factory (Interpretation) case, cited supra, fn 352. Judge Anzilotti clearly 
based his interpretation of Articles 59 and 60 on general principles, referring to “a well-known principle” 
(p. 25) and “a generally accepted rule which is derived from the very conception of res judicata” (p. 26). 
Judge Anzilotti further expressly stated that he “relied upon principles obtaining in civil procedure” as 
Article 59 “clearly refers to a traditional and generally accepted theory in regard to the material limits of 
res judicata”(p. 27). 
364 For cases in which other permanent international courts and tribunals addressed the issue of res 
judicata, see SHANY, Competing Jurisdictions, pp. 251 et seq.  
365 ROSENNE, Vol. 3, para. III.391, p. 1598. 
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“judgment”. These words have the same meaning for the purposes of res judicata366; 
“judgments” and “decisions” within the meaning of Articles 59 and 60 may become res 
judicata.  
248. Any judgment of the ICJ, independently of its nature, may become res judicata367. 
This includes purely declaratory judgments368. 
249. By contrast, orders or advisory opinions may not become res judicata. Article 48 
of the ICJ Statute gives the Court the general power to make orders for the conduct of 
the case369. In the Free Zones case, the PCIJ held: 
“[…] in contradistinction to judgments […], orders made by 
the Court […] have no ‘binding’ force (Article 59 of the 
Statute) or ‘final’ effect (Article 60 of the Statute) in deciding 
the dispute brought by the Parties before the Court”370. 
250. The PCIJ’s ruling in the Free Zones case must however be limited to 
interlocutory decisions other than provisional measures rendered pursuant to Article 41 
of the ICJ Statute. This means that only interlocutory decisions made to regulate the 
conduct of the parties during the proceedings lack binding force and final effect.  
251. In the LaGrand judgment the ICJ unambiguously stated that “orders on 
provisional measures under Article 41 have binding effect”371. The ICJ President 
Gilbert Guillaume corroborated the Court’s ruling in his speech to the General 
Assembly when presenting the ICJ report 2000/2001:  
                                                 
366 ROSENNE, Vol. 3, para. III.391, p. 1603. 
367 BRANT, p. 68. 
368 See PCIJ, Case Concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (the Merits), Ser. A, No. 7, p. 19. 
See also PCIJ, Interpretation of Judgments Nos 7 and 8 (The Chorzów Factory), cited supra, fn 352, p. 20 (“[…] 
the intention of [a declaratory judgment] is to ensure recognition of a situation at law, once and for all 
and with binding force as between the Parties; so that the legal position thus established cannot again be 
called in question in so far as the legal effects ensuing there from are concerned”); ICJ, Case concerning the 
Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, 2 December 1963, 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ben a Don, ICJ Reports 1963, p. 196 (“[A declaratory judgment] puts a 
final end to the dispute with force of res judicata; it is binding on the Parties, which can never again raise 
the same question before the Court”).  
369 Article 48 ICJ Statute provides: “The Court shall make orders for the conduct of the case, shall decide 
the form and time in which each party must conclude its arguments, and make all arrangements 
connected with the taking of evidence”. 
370 PCIJ, Case of the Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, 1929 PCIJ, Ser. A, No. 22. p. 13. 
371 ICJ, LaGrand Case (Germany v United States of America), 27 June 2001, ICJ Reports 2001, para. 109. 
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“[F]or the first time in its history, the Court took the 
opportunity to give a clear ruling on the effect of provisional 
measures […] pursuant to Article 41 of its Statute. […] Thus 
there is no longer any room for doubt: the provisional 
measures indicated as a matter of urgency by the Court for the 
purpose of safeguarding the rights of the parties are binding on 
them”372.  
252. Advisory opinions do not qualify as res judicata373. However, they have been 
invoked in subsequent cases where the same point has arisen for decision374. In the 
Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Merits) case375 the PCIJ had to consider the 
weight to be given to the advisory opinion concerning German Settlers in Poland376. In the 
preliminary objections phase of the South West Africa cases377 the ICJ had to consider the 
effect of the advisory opinion concerning the International Status of South West Africa378.  
A judicial court or tribunal 
253. To qualify as a res judicata a judgment must be rendered by a judicial court or 
tribunal. This follows from the ICJ’s advisory opinion on the Effects of Awards of 
Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal. The ICJ had to decide 
whether the UN General Assembly is bound by an award of compensation made by the 
UN Administrative Tribunal. The ICJ held that because the functions of the UN 
Administrative Tribunal were of judicial and not advisory nature, its judgments were res 
judicata379.  
 
                                                 
372 Speech by President Gilbert Guillaume, 30 October 2001, A/56/PV.32, pp. 6 et seq.  
373 ICJ, Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, Advisory Opinion, 30 March 1950, 
ICJ Reports 1950, p. 71 (“The Court’s reply is only of an advisory character: as such, it has no binding 
force”); BRANT, pp. 41 and 69; SCHULTE, pp. 14 et seq. 
374 SCOBBIE, p. 312. See also GRISEL, pp. 143 et seq. 
375 Cited supra, fn 368. 
376 Certain Questions Relating to Settlers of German Origin in the Territory ceded by Germany to Poland, Advisory 
Opinion, 10 September 1923, PCIJ, Ser. B, No. 6. 
377 ICJ, South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia and Liberia v South Africa), Preliminary Objections, 21 
December 1962, 1962 ICJ Reports, p. 319. 
378 ICJ, International Status of South West Africa, Advisory Opinion, 11 July 1950, 1950 ICJ Reports, p. 128. 
379 ICJ, Advisory Opinion on The Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative 
Tribunal, cited supra, fn 368, p. 53 (“According to a well-established and generally recognized principle of 
law, a judgment rendered by such a judicial body is res judicata and has binding force between the parties 
to the dispute”).  
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A tribunal of competent jurisdiction  
254. Only a judgment rendered by a competent tribunal may become res judicata380, as 
a lack or excess of competence are causes of nullity of a final judgment381.  
255. International courts and tribunals generally have jurisdiction only over matters 
submitted to them for decision by the parties382. In the advisory opinion concerning the 
Polish Postal Service in Danzig, the PCIJ had to decide whether there was already in force 
between the parties a binding decision that restricted the Polish postal service to 
operations within its premises located at “Heveliusplatz” and confined the use of the 
Polish postal service to Polish authorities and offices. The PCIJ held that there was no 
such prior binding decision because the issues in question had not been submitted to 
the High Commissioner, who had rendered the prior decision, and the instruments on 
which the jurisdiction of the High Commissioner was based gave him no authority to 
render a final and binding decision on matters not submitted to him383.  
A final decision  
256. To become res judicata a judgment must be final and without appeal384. The 
matter must be “finally disposed of for good”385. The judgment becomes res judicata on 
the day of the public reading386. 
A judgment on the merits?  
257. The res judicata effect of a judgment is not strictly limited to judgments which 
finally determine the merits of a claim after proceedings on the substantive issues of the 
dispute. However, a judgment that does not deal with the merits of the claim does not 
become res judicata as to those merits387. By contrast, if a tribunal, when deciding on its 
                                                 
380 CHENG, p. 337. 
381 CHENG, p. 357. 
382 BRANT, pp. 130 and 133. 
383 PCIJ, Polish Postal Service in Danzig, Advisory Opinion, 16 May 1925, Ser. B, No. 11, p. 26. 
384 Article 60 ICJ Statute. 
385 ICJ, Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company, Ltd. (New Application) (Belgium v Spain)(Preliminary 
Objections), 1964 ICJ Reports, p. 20. 
386 Article 94 (2) ICJ Rules. 
387 In the Trail Smelter Arbitration the arbitral tribunal held: “[…] a decision merely denying jurisdiction can 
never constitute res judicata as regards the merits of the case at issue” (cited supra, fn 352, p. 1953). 
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jurisdiction, is required to determine an issue touching on the merits, the tribunal’s 
determination of this issue will be held to be res judicata as between the parties in 
ensuing proceedings on the merits388.  
258. The decision by which an international court or tribunal accepts its jurisdiction 
is final and binding and acquires the force of res judicata389. This was decided by the ICJ 
in the Corfu Channel (Compensation) case where it held: 
“[T]he Albanian Government disputed the jurisdiction of the 
Court with regard to the assessment of damages. The Court 
may confine itself to stating that this jurisdiction was 
established by its Judgment of April 9th, 1949; that, in 
accordance with the Statute (Article 60) […] that Judgment is 
final and without appeal, and that therefore the matter is res 
judicata”390. 
259. This was confirmed by the ICJ in the case concerning the Application of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina 
v Serbia and Montenegro): 
“The Court will however observe that the decision on 
questions of jurisdiction, pursuant to Article 36, paragraph 6, 
of the Statute, is given by judgment, and Article 60 of the 
Statute provides that ‘[t]he judgment is final and without 
appeal’, without distinguishing between judgments on 
jurisdiction and admissibility, and judgments on the merits”391. 
260. A decision by which an international court or tribunal merely denies its 
jurisdiction does not become res judicata in the sense that the same dispute may be 
presented before another tribunal which may have jurisdiction392. 
The scope of res judicata  
261. The question arises as to whether the res judicata effect of a judgment in public 
                                                 
388 HANOTIAU, Complex Arbitrations, para. 520. 
389 ROSENNE, Vol. 2, para. II.214, p. 804. 
390 ICJ, The Corfu Channel Case (Compensation) (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v 
People's Republic of Albania), 15 December 1949, 1949 ICJ Reports, p. 248. 
391 ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro), 26 February 2007, para. 117, pp. 44 et seq.   
392 CHENG, pp. 337 et seq.  
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international law extends only to its dispositif or also to some of its reasons. In Amco 
Asia Corp v Indonesia (Resubmission: Jurisdiction), the tribunal held: 
“It is by no means clear that the basic trend in international law 
is to accept reasoning […] as part of what constitutes res 
judicata. 
[…] 
So far as international law practice is concerned, authors have 
not been able to show a clear trend towards the acceptance of 
reasons as res judicata”393. 
262. In his dissenting opinion in the Chorzów Factory (Interpretation) case Judge 
Anzilotti contended that only the dispositif of a judgment becomes res judicata. Reasons 
may be relied upon only to interpret the dispositif and to specify the meaning and scope 
of the court’s decision:  
“[I]t is certain that the binding effect attaches only to the 
operative part of the judgment and not to the statement of 
reasons.  
The grounds of a judgment are simply logical arguments, the 
aim of which is to lead up to the formulation of what the law is 
in the case in question. And for this purpose there is no need 
to distinguish between essential and non-essential grounds, a 
more or less arbitrary distinction which rests on no solid basis 
and which can only be regarded as an inaccurate way of 
expressing the different degree of importance which the 
various grounds of a judgment may possess for the 
interpretation of its operative part. 
When I say that only the terms of a judgment are binding, I do 
not mean that only what is actually written in the operative part 
constitutes the Court’s decision. On the contrary, it is certain 
that it is almost always necessary to refer to the statement of 
reasons to understand clearly the operative part and above all 
to ascertain the causa petendi. But, at all events, it is the operative 
part which contains the Court’s binding decision and which, 
consequently, may form the subject of a request for an 
interpretation”394. 
                                                 
393 Amco Asia Corp v Indonesia (Resubmission: Jurisdiction), ILM, Vol. 27 (1988), pp. 1281 et seq., paras 32 and 
38. 
394 PCIJ, Interpretation of Judgments Nos 7 and 8 (The Chorzów Factory), Dissenting Opinion by M. Anzilotti, 
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263. However, in recent years a wider approach appears to be preferred, attributing 
res judicata effects to reasons which constitute the necessary foundation of the 
dispositif395. In the Channel Arbitration between the United Kingdom and France, the 
PCA held: 
“The Court of Arbitration considered it to be well settled that 
in international proceedings the authority of res judicata, that is 
the binding force of the decision, attaches in principle only to 
the provisions of its dispositif and not to its reasoning. In the 
opinion of the Court, it is equally clear that, having regard to 
the close links that exist between the reasoning of a decision 
and the provisions of its dispositif, recourse may in principle be 
had to the reasoning in order to elucidate the meaning and 
scope of the dispositif. [….] Furthermore, if findings in the 
reasoning constitute a condition essential to the decision in the 
dispositif, these findings are to be considered as included 
                                                                                                                                         
cited supra, fn 352, p. 24. 
395 See BOWETT, pp. 577 et seq.; EL OUALI, pp. 74 et seq.; ILA, Interim Report p. 22; CHENG, pp. 348 et 
seq.; SCHREUER/REINISCH, paras 67 et seq.; BRANT, p. 172; SHANY, Competing Jurisdictions, p. 28 
with reference to ECJ, Italian Republic v Commission of the European Communities, Case C-281/89, 19 February 
1991, 1991, ECR, p. I-347, para. 14; ECJ, Lenz v Commission, Case C-277/95, 28 November 1996, 1996 
ECR, p. I-6109, 6125; ECJ, Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV v Commission, Cases T-305-07, 313-16, 318, 
325, 328-29 and 335/94, 1999 ECR, p. II-931, 972; ECJ, Asteris v Commission, Cases 97, 99, 193 and 
215/86, 1988 ECR, p. 2181, 2208. See also ICJ, Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v Colombia), 
Application by Honduras for Permission to Intervene, 4 May 2011, paras 66-70. This case involved a 
dispute between Nicaragua and Colombia consisting of “a group of related legal issues subsisting” 
between the two States “concerning title to territory and maritime delimination” in the western 
Carribean. On 10 June 2010, Honduras filed an application for permission to intervene in the case. The 
question arose whether Honduras had an interest of a legal nature which could be affected by the Court’s 
decision in the main proceedings between Nicaragua and Colombia. To answer this question, the Court 
had to determine whether and to what extent the prior “2007 Judgment” rendered by the ICJ in the 
Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras had already finally determined certain 
rights of Honduras with respect to the “delimitation area” in the Carribean Sea now in dispute between 
Nicaragua and Colombia. According to Nicaragua, the res judicata effect of the 2007 Judgment prevented 
Honduras from intervening in the proceedings between Nicaragua and Colombia. In particular, 
Honduras was precluded from reopening, under the cover of the intervention, delimitation issues already 
decided by the 2007 Judgment. Honduras argued that the 2007 Judgment had not finally determined the 
entire Carribean Sea boundary between Nicaragua and Honduras and there still existed some issues to be 
resolved with respect to the respective rights of Honduras, Colombia and Nicaragua in the area. In 
particular, the determinations made in the reasoning of the 2007 Judgment were not covered by that 
Judgment’s res judicata effect, which attaches only to its dispositif. Even though the ICJ does not state so 
in express terms, it appears to suggest that reasons which constitute “an essential step leading to the 
dispositif of [the] judgment” are covered by the judgment’s res judicata effect. The ICJ confirmed that a 
judgment’s operative part “indisputably has the force of res judicata”. It then added that the reasoning in 
question in the 2007 Judgment “was an essential step leading to the dispositif of that Judgment”and 
“[w]ithout such reasoning, it may be difficult to understand why the Court did not firx an endpoint in its 
decision. With this reasoning, the decision made by the Court in its 2007 Judgment leaves no room for 
any alternative interpretation”. See also ICSID, RSM Production Corporation and others v. Grenada, cited infra, 
fn 408, para. 7.1.2., where the tribunal held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel is now established as a 
general principle of law applicable by international courts and tribunals. 
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amongst the points settled with binding force in the 
decision”396. 
264. While the PCA first affirmed the rule that res judicata effects attach only to a 
decision’s dispositif, it clearly confered res judicata effect to reasons which are essential 
to the decision’s dispositif. It must be added, however, that the dispositif in question 
was essentially a list of coordinates defining the boundary. The dispositif merely spelt 
out the principles of law which constituted the true res judicata and which were 
contained in the reasoning of the PCA397. 
265. In the Channel Arbitration the PCA also held that in case of contradiction 
between reasons constituting the necessary foundation of the dispositif and the 
dispositif itself, the statement that expresses best the arbitral tribunal’s intention must 
prevail398. This further confirms the allegation that reasons which are the necessary 
foundation of a decision may have res judicata effect399.  
266. The Iran-US Claims Tribunal seems to have gone even further, holding that a 
decision’s reasons have res judicata effect not only where they form the necessary 
foundation of the dispositif, but also where “those reasons are relevant to the actual 
decision on the question at issue”400.  
2.2. Effects of a Res Judicata 
267. In the Société Commerciale de Belgique case the PCIJ said : 
“Recognition of an award as res judicata means nothing else than 
recognition of the fact that the terms of that award are 
                                                 
396 PCA, Case Concerning the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the French Republic (Interpretation of the Decision of 30 June 1977), 14 March 1978, RIAA, 
Vol. 18, para. 28, p. 295. This is also in line with the decision of the Franco-Venezuelan Mixed Claims 
Commission (1902) in Company General of the Orinoco Case, 10 RIAA, p. 276 (“Every matter and point 
distinctly in issue in said cause, and which was directly based upon and determined in said decree, and 
which was its ground and basis, is concluded by the judgment”).  
397 BOWETT, p. 578. 
398 PCA, Case Concerning the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the French Republic (Interpretation of the Decision of 30 June 1977), cited supra, fn 396, para. 
36, p. 299. 
399 See ZOLLER, p. 344 ; BRANT, pp. 129 and 175. 
400 Iran-US Claims Tribunal, Partial Award No. 601-A3/A8/A9/A14/B61-FT Full Tribunal, 17 July 
2009, para. 115. 
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definitive and obligatory”401. 
268. From this it has been inferred that a res judicata in public international law has 
both a negative and a positive effect. The negative effect is that which is res judicata is 
definitive. The judgment is final and the same matter may not be disputed again 
between the same parties402. The positive effect is that which is res judicata is obligatory. 
The judgment is binding upon the parties and they must execute it as it stands403.  
269. The precise preclusive nature of decisions rendered by international courts and 
tribunals is not clear404. It is accepted that the public international law doctrine of res 
judicata applies only with regard to issues that were actually determined by the 
international court or tribunal. No preclusive effect attaches to issues raised in the 
proceedings but glossed over by the decision405. It is also clear that the public 
international law doctrine of res judicata prevents the re-litigation of claims. It is unclear, 
however, whether the doctrine also prevents the relitigation of issues. International 
courts and tribunals ordinarily do not deal with issue preclusion explicitly, using only 
the terminology of res judicata406.  
270. However, it appears now widely accepted that findings contained in the 
reasoning and constituting the necessary foundation of a judgment have res judicata 
effects407. It may therefore be argued that issue preclusion exists in public international 
law to the extent that the res judicata effect of a judgment includes reasons408.  
                                                 
401 See PCIJ, Société Commerciale de Belgique, 15 June 1939, cited supra, fn 357, p. 175. 
402 CHENG, p. 337; HANOTIAU, Complex Arbitrations, para. 516. 
403 PCIJ, Société Commerciale de Belgique, 15 June 1939, cited supra, fn 357, p. 176. See also REINISCH, p. 
45. 
404 SHANY, Competing Jurisdictions, p. 253. 
405 SHANY, Competing Jurisdictions, pp. 27 et seq. 
406 According to LOWE, while only using the terminology of res judicata, it seems that international courts 
and tribunals also apply issue preclusion principles to final determinations of fact and law by previous 
tribunals (p. 32). 
407 See supra, paras 261 et seq. 
408 In December 2010, the ICSID Tribunal in RSM Production Corporation and others v Grenada held that “[i]t 
is also not disputed that the doctrine of collateral estoppel is now well established as a general principle 
of law applicable in the international courts and tribunals such as this one” (ICSID Case No. ARB/10/6, 
Award, 10 December 2010, para. 7.1.2.). It is difficult to subscribe to this statement. In support of this 
statement, the ICSID Tribunal referred to paragraph 30 of Amco Asia Corp. v Republic of Indonesia 
(Resubmission: Jurisdiction), where the tribunal cited the following passage from the Company General of the 
Orinoco Case: “The general principle announced in numerous cases is that a right, question or fact distinctly 
put in issue and distinctly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction as a ground for recovery, cannot be 
The Doctrine of Res Judicata in International Law 
85 
 
271. Finally, according to ILA, international law recognises a doctrine of abuse of 
process, but it is extremely rarely applied409. 
2.3. Requirements for the Application of the Doctrine of Res Judicata 
272. In public international law the doctrine of res judicata applies only where there is 
identity of parties and questions at issue410. The requirement of identity of the question 
at issue has sometimes been subdivided into the object and the cause of the claim411. In 
the Chorzów Factory (Interpretation) case, Judge Anzilotti, interpreting Article 59 of the ICJ 
Statute, said: 
“[W]e have here the three traditional elements for 
identification, persona, petitum, causa petenti, for it is clear that 
‘that particular case’ (le cas qui a été decidé) covers both the object 
and the grounds of the claim”412.  
273. The tribunal in the Trail Smelter Arbitration held: 
“There is no doubt that in the present case, there is res judicata. 
The three traditional elements for identification: parties, object 
and cause are the same”413. 
274. Accordingly, the application of the res judicata doctrine requires the triple identity 
of parties, object and cause414. In addition, both proceedings must be conducted before 
                                                                                                                                         
disputed” (Hague Court Reports (1916), 226; RIAA, Vol. X, p. 276). The French-Venezuelan 
Commission itself quoted this passage from the US Supreme Court’s Decision in Southern Pacific Railroad 
Co. v US (168 Sup. Gt. Rep., 1) (also referred to by the ICSID Tribunal). However, as was seen above, in 
paragraphs 32 and 38 of Amco Asia Corp. v Republic of Indonesia (Resubmission: Jurisdiction) the tribunal 
expressly held that it is by no means an accepted principle of international law that the res judicata effect of 
a judgment extends to its reasons (see supra, para. 261). See also GALLAGHER, para. 17-15. 
409 ILA, Interim Report, p. 22. 
410 In the Matter of the S. S. Newchwang (UK v US), Claim No. 21, 9 December 1921, AJIL (1922), Vol. 16, 
p. 324 (“It is a well established rule of law that the doctrine of res judicata applies only where there is 
identity of the parties and of the question at issue”). In the Pious Fund case, the PCA applied the doctrine 
of res judicata because there was “not only identity of parties to the suit, but also identity subject matter” 
(PCA, Pious Fund of the California (United States v Mexico), 14 October 1902, cited supra, fn 360, p. 5). See 
also ICSID, Compañia de Aguas del Aconquija SA and Vivendi Universal SA v Argentine Republic, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, 14 November 2005, para. 72. 
411 Instead of these two sub-categories, Shany suggests that a clearer description would be that “identity 
of issues” is met if the competing claims address the same fact pattern (transaction) and the same legal 
claims (SHANY, Competing Jurisdictions, p. 25).  
412 PCIJ, Interpretation of Judgments Nos 7 and 8 (The Chorzów Factory), Dissenting Opinion by M. Anzilotti, 
cited surpa, fn 352, p. 23.  
413 Trail Smelter Case, cited supra, fn 352, p. 1952. 
414 BROWN, p. 155.  
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international courts or tribunals: the doctrine of res judicata applies only between courts 
and tribunals belonging to the same legal order415.  
Identity of parties 
275. Article 59 of the ICJ Statute expressly provides that “[t]he decision of the Court 
has no binding force except between the parties […]”416. Likewise, the identity of 
parties requirement is clearly stated in almost all of the international precedents417.  
276. The question whether there is identity of parties ultimately depends on the 
degree of formality applied in ascertaining “identity”418. While some international courts 
and tribunals have applied a strict “formal identity” standard419, others have applied the 
more flexible standard of “essentially the same parties”420.  
277. The identity of parties requirement may lead to difficult questions in cases of 
arbitrations involving a state on one side and a private party on the other side. The 
question may arise whether the holding company of an investor operating through 
various subsidiaries is identical with its other corporate manifestations. It may be 
questioned whether a legally separate entity of a corporate group may be regarded as an 
identical party or at least sufficiently closely related for the application of the res judicata 
doctrine421.  
278. In the CME v Czech Republic case, the arbitral tribunal had to decide whether an 
earlier award rendered between Ronald Lauder and the Czech Republic constituted a res 
                                                 
415 With regard to the requirements for the application of the issue preclusion doctrine the tribunal in 
RSM Production Corporation and others v Grenada held that “a finding concerning a right, question or fact may 
not be re-litigated (and, thus, is binding on a subsequent tribunal), if, in a prior proceeding: (a) it was 
distinctly put in issue; (b) the court or tribunal actually decided it; and (c) the resolution of the question 
was necessary to resolving the claims before that court or tribunal” (ICSID, RSM Production Corporation 
and others v. Grenada, cited supra, fn 407, para. 7.1.1). While the parties must be identical in both 
proceedings, the cause and object may be different.  
416 See also Article 33 (2) ITLOS Statute; EL OUALI, p. 83 with reference to other international 
instruments. 
417 CHENG, p. 340; REINISCH, p. 55. 
418 SHANY, Regulating Jurisdictional Relations, p. 133.  
419 See, e.g., CME v Czech Republic, infra paras 278 et seq. 
420 See, e.g., ECHR, Cereceda Martin v Spain, Case 16358/90, 12 October 1992, DR Vol. 73, pp. 120 et seq. 
For more detail on the identity of parties requirement in public international law, see SHANY, Regulating 
Jurisdictional Relations, pp. 133 et seq.; SHANY, Similarity in the Eye of the Beholder, pp. 128 et seq. 
421 REINISCH, pp. 55 et seq. 
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judicata in the dispute before it. The tribunal held that this was not the case, inter alia, 
because the claimants in each arbitration were different, even though Mr Lauder was 
the controlling shareholder of CME. The tribunal stated in relevant terms: 
“Only in exceptional cases, in particular in competition law, 
have tribunals or law courts accepted a concept of a ‘single 
economic entity’, which allows discounting of the separate legal 
existences of the shareholder and the company, mostly, to 
allow the joining of a parent of a subsidiary to an arbitration. 
Also a ‘company group’ theory is not generally accepted in 
international arbitration (although promoted by prominent 
authorities) and there are no precedents of which this Tribunal 
is aware for its general acceptance. In this arbitration the 
situation is even less compelling. Mr. Lauder, although 
apparently controlling CME Media Ltd., the Claimant’s 
ultimate parent company, is not the majority shareholder of the 
company and the cause of action in each proceeding was based 
on different bilateral investment treaties. This conclusion 
accords with established international law” 422. 
279. The tribunal in the CME v Czech Republic case applied a formalistic approach, 
relying on the formal distinction between the controlling shareholder and the controlled 
company. The same approach was followed by the Svea Court of Appeal, the Swedish 
court where the partial award rendered in the same case on 13 September 2001 was 
challenged423. 
280. ICSID tribunals have on occasions followed an economic approach with regard 
to jurisdiction. They take a “realistic attitude”424 when identifying the party on the 
investor’s side. They look for the actual foreign investor and are unimpressed by the 
fact that the consent agreement only names a subsidiary425. It has been argued that if 
such an economic approach is accepted for jurisdictional purposes it should also apply 
for purposes of res judicata to avoid that individual companies of a corporate group 
(constituting a single economic entity) avail themselves of the possibility to endlessly re-
                                                 
422 UNCITRAL, CME Czech Republic BV v The Czech Republic, Final Award, 14 March 2003, paras 435 et 
seq. 
423 Svea Court of Appeal, 15 May 2003, The Czech Republic v CME Czech Republic BV, Case No. T 8735-01, 
pp. 97 et seq. (“Identity between a minority shareholder, albeit a controlling one, and the actual company 
cannot, in the Court of Appeal’s opinion, be deemed to exist in a case such as the instant one. This 
assessment would apply even if one were to allow a broad determination of the concept of identity”). 
424 SCHREUER, ad Article 25, para. 329. 
425 Ibid; REINISCH, pp. 57 et seq. 
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litigate the same dispute under the disguise of separate legal identities426. 
Identity of object  
281. The identity of objects requirement relates to the remedies sought. The same 
type of relief must be sought in both proceedings427. 
282. International courts and tribunals have sometimes applied the broader standard 
of substantial identity of objects. In the Chen (No. 2) case, the ILOAT held that a claim 
relating to premature retirement was precluded by the res judicata doctrine because in an 
earlier judgment the tribunal had dismissed the claimant’s claim against the refusal of 
the WHO to renew his contract and the subsequent application was substantially the 
same428.  
283. A broad approach has also sometimes been applied by arbitral tribunals to 
avoid “claim splitting”429. In these cases claimants were barred from raising closely 
related claims in subsequent proceedings that they could have raised in a prior 
proceeding430.  
284. In the Delgado case before the US-Spanish Claims Commission, a first claim was 
brought for damages against Spain for seizure of property in Cuba. This claim was 
denied by an umpire in 1876. Subsequently, another claim was brought by the same 
claimant for the value of the property seized. The umpire dismissed the claim on 
grounds of res judicata holding: 
“[e]ven if the claimant did not at the time of the former case 
ask indemnity of the commission for the value of the lands, the 
                                                 
426 REINISCH, p. 59; ILA, Interim Report, p. 21. 
427 REINISCH, p. 62; BRANT, p. 117. See also ICSID, Helnan International Hotels A/S v The Arab Republic 
of Egypt, Award of 3 July 2008, paras 128-130. In this case, the tribunal compared the claimant’s prayers 
for relief submitted in the “Cairo Arbitration” and the ICSID arbitration. It then held: “The comparison 
of the respective claims and counterclaims in each of the proceedings shows that even if the subject 
matter of the disputes is the same, i.e. the Management Contract, the relief sought is not identical, 
although it is globally aiming at the same result: allowing HELNAN to continue to be in charge of the 
management of the Shepard Hotel, obliging the owner of the Hotel to renovate it and obtaining 
compensation for alleged damages”.  
428 ILOAT, Chen (No. 2), Judgment No. 547 (1983)(reported by REINISCH, p. 64). 
429 See REINISCH, pp. 62 et seq. 
430 DODGE, p. 366. 
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claimant had the same power to do so as other claimants in 
other cases where it has been done, and he can not have relief 
by a new claim before a new Umpire”431. 
285. In the Machado case, the first claim was brought for damages arising from the 
seizure of a house. In the second claim, the restoration of the house, as well as rent and 
damages for its detention, were claimed. The umpire before whom the second claim 
was brought dismissed it regarding both claims as identical: 
“that the questions whether this claim No. 129 is a new one, or 
the same as No. 3 does not depend upon whether the items 
included be the same in both cases, but that the test is whether 
both claims are founded on the same injury, that the only injury 
on which claim No. 129 is founded is the seizure of a certain 
house; that this same injury was alleged as one of the 
foundations for claim No. 3, and that in consequence claim 
No. 129, as being part of an old claim, can not be presented as 
a new claim under a new number”432. 
286. In both cases the US-Spanish Claims Commission followed a broad approach 
regarding the identity of object. The Commission regarded the entire claim as settled by 
the first proceedings without regard as to whether the various and separate items 
contained in the claim have all been presented or not433. 
Identity of cause 
287. The cause is the legal foundation relied upon by the claimant in support of a 
claim. There is identity of cause if the same rights and legal arguments are relied upon 
in both proceedings434. To determine the cause of a claim one has to ask “why” the 
claimant is asking for the relief sought435. 
288. In theory, proceedings brought under formally different legal grounds are 
considered to be based on different causes for the purposes of res judicata436. 
Accordingly, res judicata would not apply where the same claimant seeks the same relief 
                                                 
431 Delgado Case (1881), reported in BASSETT MOORE, p. 2199.  
432 Machado Case (1880), reported in BASSETT MOORE, p. 2194. 
433 CHENG, p. 344. 
434 REINISCH, p. 62. 
435 BRANT, pp. 117 et seq. 
436 ILA, Interim Report, p. 20; BEN HAMIDA, para. 85. 
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against the same respondent, basing its claim in one case on customary international law 
and, in the other case, on a treaty provision. It would also not apply if a same party 
based identical claims on provisions contained in different treaties.  
289. Such a strict application of the identity of cause requirement has been criticised 
as it may lead to the duplication of proceedings which in reality are substantively 
identical437. It would appear artificial to consider two legal grounds which contain the 
same legal rule as different causes for the purposes of res judicata438. It appears more 
appropriate to look at the specific rules relied upon and to examine how far they are 
substantively identical439. If the same rule is reflected in different legal instruments, 
identity of the cause should be admitted440.  
290. This approach has some foundation in international practice. In the Southern 
Bluefin Tuna case an arbitral tribunal under UNCLOS had to decide whether a dispute 
about Japanese fishing practices was to be settled under the 1993 Convention for the 
Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT) or under UNCLOS. The tribunal 
decided that the dispute was to be settled under the CCSBT and declined jurisdiction. 
The tribunal also pronounced itself on the question of the identity of the dispute over 
fishing practices, which can be viewed under the rules of the CCSBT and UNCLOS: 
“[T]he Parties to this dispute […] are the same Parties 
grappling not with two separate disputes but with what in fact 
is a single dispute arising under both Conventions. To find 
that, in this case, there is a dispute actually arising under 
UNCLOS which is distinct from the dispute that arose under 
the CCSBT would be artificial”441.  
291.  The tribunal considered that there was only one dispute despite the fact that it 
was based on two different treaties. The tribunal reached this decision even though the 
treaties in question were fairly different; they related, however, to the same factual 
                                                 
437 See, e.g., REINISCH, pp. 64 et seq.; BEN HAMIDA, paras 84 et seq. 
438 REINISCH, p. 64. 
439 REINISCH, p. 71. 
440 REINISCH, pp. 64 et seq. 
441 Southern Bluefin Tuna case (Australia and New Zealand v Japan), Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 
4 August 2000, ILM, Vol. 39 (2000), pp. 1359 et seq., para. 54.  
The Doctrine of Res Judicata in International Law 
91 
 
background442. 
292. Other international tribunals have followed a stricter approach. In the Mox Plant 
case between the United Kingdom and Ireland, the ITLOS held: 
“the application of international rules on interpretation of 
treaties to identical or similar provisions of different treaties 
may not yield the same results, having regard to, inter alia, 
differences in the respective contexts, objects and purposes, 
subsequent practice of parties and travaux préparatoires”443. 
293. This statement of the ITLOS supports the strict approach which considers 
claims brought under different legal grounds to be based on different causes444. It was 
relied upon by the arbitral tribunal in the CME case in support of its decision that 
claims brought under separate BITs, concerning the same alleged acts of expropriation, 
constitute different causes for purposes of res judicata445. The tribunal in the CME case 
stated: 
“The two arbitrations are based on differing bilateral 
investment treaties, which grant comparable investment 
protection, which, however, is not identical. […] Because the 
two bilateral investment treaties create rights that are not in all 
respects exactly the same, different claims are necessarily 
formulated”446. 
Identiy of facts? 
294. Although, in theory, the test of identity of questions at issue remains limited to 
identity of object and cause, in practice, the identiy of the set of facts underlying a claim 
plays an important role; there appears to be a tendency to focus on the facts underlying 
                                                 
442 See REINISCH, pp. 66 et seq. 
443 ITLOS, The Mox Plant Case (Ireland v United Kingdom), Request for Provisional Measures, Order of 3 
December 2001, para. 51. 
444 Contra: REINISCH, pp. 68 et seq.  
445 See also ICSID, Helnan International Hotels A/S v The Arab Republic of Egypt, Award of 3 July 2008, para. 
130. The tribunal held that there was no identity of causes of action: while the relief sought in the prior 
“Egyptian Arbitration” was based on a contract, the relief sought in the ICSID arbitration was based on a 
treaty.  
446 UNCITRAL, CME Czech Republic BV v The Czech Republic, Final Award, 14 March 2003, paras 432 et 
seq. 
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the claims in order to determine whether two disputes are identical or not447.  
Identity of legal order 
295. The doctrine of res judicata generally applies only between international courts 
and tribunals, i.e. between tribunals operating within the same legal order448. The same 
legal order comprises international law. It is understood broadly and includes tribunals 
established under treaties and mixed arbitral tribunals adjudicating disputes between 
private parties and states449.  
296. It is generally considered that a domestic judgment cannot constitute a res 
judicata in relation to international courts and tribunals.450 This is because disputes 
brought before tribunals from different legal orders are generally not of the required 
degree of similarity for the doctrine of res judicata to apply451. However, more recently it 
has been argued that the doctrine of res judicata could apply between domestic courts 
and international courts and tribunals. First, if the regulated interactions are not 
organised in a hierarchical manner and, second, if the judicial bodies involved in 
                                                 
447 See in particular REINISCH, pp. 70 et seq. 
448 See generally REINISCH, pp. 51 et seq. See also arbitral award rendered in Affaire des Chemins de fer de 
Bužau-Nehoiasi (Germany v Romania), 7 July 1939, RIAA, Vol. III, p. 1836 (“En général, les décisions 
nationales et internationales se meuvent dans les sphères différentes. Au regard des Etats étrangers, les décisions des 
tribunaux nationaux sont moins des jugements que de simples manifestations de l’activité étatique, pareilles dans leur 
principe à celles de tout autre organ de l’Etat. C’est dans l’ordre interne seulement que l’autorité de la chose jugée par un 
tribunal national trouve son application”). See also ICSID, Helnan International Hotels A/S v The Arab Republic of 
Egypt, Award of 3 July 2008. In this case, the ICSID tribunal had to determine whether and to what 
extent a national award rendered in Cairo under Egyptian law (namely on contract claims) could operate 
as a res judicata in the ICSID proceedings on treaty claims. In other words, the question was whether a 
“national res judicata may be relied upon in [...] international proceedings and, if so, to what extent” (para. 
123). The tribunal held that national courts or private arbitral tribunals, on the one hand, and 
international courts or tribunals, on the other hand, are not part of the same legal order. As a 
consequence, “a decision by a national court or a private arbitral tribunal cannot be opposed as res judicata 
to the admissibility of an action filed with an international arbitral tribunal [...]. On the other hand, an 
international tribunal must accept the res judicata effect of a decision made by a national court within the 
legal order where it belongs”. Accordingly, in the opinion of the ICSID tribunal, a national court decision 
or arbitral award on contract claims cannot operate as a res judicata to bar the jurisdiction of an ICSID 
tribunal on treaty claims, because these decisions are not part of the same legal order. However, the 
national decision has res judicata effects within its own national legal order. Therefore, the ICSID tribunal, 
when applying the law of this national legal order (here Egyptian law), must respect the res judicata effect 
of the national decision with regard to final determinations on the relevant national law. 
449 ILA, Interim Report, p. 19. 
450 SHANY, Competing Jurisdictions, p. 254; SHANY, Regulating Jurisdictional Relations, pp. 160 et seq.; 
BROWNLIE, pp. 50 et seq.; PCIJ, Case Concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (the Merits), 
cited supra, fn 368, p. 20. 
451 SHANY, Regulating Jurisdictional Relations, p. 3. See also, BROWNLIE, p. 50. See also ICSID, Helnan 
International Hotels A/S v The Arab Republic of Egypt, Award of 3 July 2008, para. 124. 
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jurisdictional interactions are authorised to apply the doctrine of res judicata either with 
direct reliance on international law or on domestic law rules that mirror international 
law in their substance452. This will be discussed in further detail below with regard to the 
relations between international arbitral tribunals and domestic courts453.  
3. CONCLUSION 
297.  The above analysis has shown how the doctrine of res judicata as developed in 
domestic laws has been transposed to international law.  
298. In private international law, the EC Regulation No. 44/2001 and the Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements do not contain express provisions on res 
judicata454. However, an attempt to develop a transnational res judicata doctrine has been 
made by the ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure. These 
principles provide for the application of the doctrine of res judicata as developed mainly 
in civil law countries455.  
299. In public international law, the doctrine of res judicata resembles the doctrine in 
domestic laws. The res judicata doctrine was introduced into public international law by 
operation of Article 38 (1)(c) of the ICJ Statute, i.e. as a principle accepted by all nations 
in foro domestico. This suggests that there is a generally accepted concept of res judicata in 
domestic laws. However, as was seen in the first chapter of this research, important 
differences exist among domestic laws, particularly regarding the effects attached to a 
decision that is res judicata and the requirements that must be met in order for the res 
judicata doctrine to apply. These differences among domestic laws surface in public 
international law. Although the doctrine is well established in public international law, 
uncertainties exist, particularly in those areas where there are divergences among 
domestic laws. Different international courts and tribunals have applied different 
standards to assess the identity between two disputes. Likewise, it is unclear to what 
extent the doctrine of res judicata covers issue preclusion in addition to claim preclusion.  
                                                 
452 See SHANY, Regulating Jurisdictional Relations, pp. 125 et seq. 
453 See infra, paras 583 et seq. 
454 See supra, paras 195 et seq. 
455 See supra, paras 231 et seq. 
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300. The application of the doctrine of res judicata by international courts and 
tribunals has been sporadic and not always consistent456. While this may be explained by 
the uncertainties surrounding res judicata in international law, it also appears to denote a 
certain readiness on the part of some international courts to depart from strict res 
judicata rules as developed and applied in the domestic context. International courts 
seem to be more willing to apply a flexible approach. As will be discussed in further 
detail below, such a readiness to depart from strict domestic res judicata rules in favour 
of more flexible rules, can also be observed in international arbitration case law457.   
On the basis of the above findings it is now necessary to investigate whether and how 
the doctrine of res judicata as developed in the context of litigation may or should be 
applied in international commercial arbitration. 
                                                 
456 SHANY, Competing Jurisdictions, pp. 253 et seq. 
457 See infra, paras 435 et seq. 
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PART II 
 
The Doctrine of Res Judicata in International 
Commercial Arbitration  
Si l’ordre est le plaisir de la raison, le 
désordre est le délice de l’imagination. 
 (Paul Claudel) 
301. Would it be advisable for international arbitral tribunals to apply domestic res 
judicata rules developed for litigation? Should they apply the res judicata rules of a 
particular domestic law and, if so, which one? Or should they apply a transnational res 
judicata doctrine, detached from any particular domestic law? Alternatively, arbitral 
tribunals could be given the authority to deal with res judicata issues as they deem 
appropriate in the circumstances of each particular case and any problems of conflicting 
judgments or awards could then be dealt with at the recognition and enforcement stage.  
302. These are some of the questions that will be dealt with in this part of the 
research. It will be necessary to answer these questions in order to achieve the aim of 
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this part, which is to determine how arbitral tribunals should deal with res judicata issues.  
303. Before attempting to propose any answers to the above questions, it is 
necessary to identify the problem. Adequate solutions may only be found once it has 
been established that res judicata constitutes a problem in international commercial 
arbitration and once the characteristics of this problem have been identified. Chapter 
Three will identify situations in which res judicata issues may arise before international 
commercial arbitral tribunals. Chapter Four will then investigate how res judicata issues 
are currently dealt with in international arbitration law and practice; it will demonstrate 
that the current way of dealing with these issues is unsatisfactory and may lead to 
important problems.  
304. After the existence and characteristics of the problem have been established it 
will be possible to investigate how arbitral tribunals should deal with res judicata issues. 
Chapter Five will determine the appropriate approach to the problem of res judicata in 
international commercial arbitration. It will examine whether arbitral tribunals should 
apply the litigation concept of res judicata as applied by domestic and international courts 
and tribunals. The chapter will investigate whether, and to what extent, an analogy 
between litigation and international arbitration is possible and appropriate for purposes 
of res judicata. Finally, Chapter Six will suggest solutions to the problem of res judicata in 
international commercial arbitration. 
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 CHAPTER 3 
 
305. This chapter will determine situations in which res judicata issues arise before 
arbitral tribunals. The aim is to determine the reality and magnitude of the phenomenon 
of res judicata in international arbitration. In particular, the aim is to establish that res 
judicata issues may frequently arise before international arbitral tribunals in various 
situations. Due to the growing importance and complexity of international arbitration it 
is to be expected that the occurrence of res judicata issues in international arbitration 
practice will further increase. The phenomenon of res judicata in international arbitration 
therefore is not of merely academic interest. To the contrary, it constitutes a real 
problem that remains largely unsolved and this research may thus contribute to finding 
solutions to this problem. 
306. ILA’s Interim Report on res judicata and arbitration stated that issues of res 
judicata arise before international arbitral tribunals in a myriad of different situations. 
These situations may be sorted into four categories, based on the nature of the court or 
tribunal having rendered the first final and binding decision. According to the report, 
issues of res judicata arise (i) between arbitral tribunals and state courts; (ii) between 
different arbitral tribunals; (iii) within a same arbitration proceeding between a partial 
and a final award; and (iv) between supra-national courts or tribunals and arbitral 
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tribunals458. The fourth category concerns mostly investment protection treaty cases459. 
Since the scope of this research is limited to international commercial arbitration, the 
following analysis will only cover the first three categories.  
307. In this chapter the term “issues of res judicata” will be used to generally describe 
situations in which a particular issue or dispute which has already been determined in 
prior court or arbitration proceedings, or within the same arbitration proceedings, arises 
again before an international arbitral tribunal. The term will refer to situations where a 
party might want to rely upon a prior award or judgment arguing that the arbitral 
tribunal is bound by the prior determination of a particular issue or dispute.  
1. ISSUES OF RES JUDICATA BETWEEN ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS AND STATE COURTS 
308. In international arbitration issues of res judicata perhaps arise most commonly 
between state courts and arbitral tribunals460. However, in practice it should be rare that 
an arbitral tribunal is faced with the question of the res judicata effect of a prior 
judgment rendered on precisely the same facts and cause of action and between the 
same parties. This is because the substantive issues before the arbitral tribunal will 
usually be covered by the parties’ arbitration agreement and therefore will not 
previously have arisen before a national court461. Where arbitral tribunals are faced with 
a res judicata issue it is usually with respect to prior findings of facts or determinations of 
particular issues forming part of a larger whole. Thus, in most cases what is called upon 
                                                 
458 ILA, Interim Report, pp. 3 et seq.; See also SHEPPARD, The Scope and Res Judicata Effect of Arbitral Awards, 
p. 274; CRIVELLARO, p. 86; MAYER, Litispendance, connexité et chose jugée dans l'arbitrage international, pp. 
195 et seq.  
459 See in particular SHEPPARD, Res judicata and estoppel, p. 221. Outside the scope of investment 
protection treaty cases, international commercial arbitral tribunals may have to consider the res judicata 
effect of prior judgements of the ECJ and the ECHR.  
460 ILA, Interim Report, p. 4; SHEPPARD, The Scope and Res Judicata Effect of Arbitral Awards, p. 275; 
CRIVELLARO, p. 86. 
461 BORN, p. 2916. However, such a situation may arise, for instance, where a party brings proceedings 
on the merits before a state court in order to frustrate the arbitration or to maximise its chances of 
success. A party may file proceedings on the merits before a state court in a favourable jurisdiction to 
attempt to ensure that an award will not be enforceable in that state. The party having initiated the court 
proceedings may rely before the arbitral tribunal on the binding force of the state court’s decision over 
the entire dispute (ILA, Interim Report, p. 4; HOBÉR, p. 243). It is also possible to imagine that the parties 
conclude an arbitration agreement after the resolution of the dispute by a state court. It should be 
considered, however, that the parties waive their right to invoke the res judicata effect of the prior 
judgment in the subsequent arbitration proceedings (LANDOLT, p. 245; MAYER, Litispendance, connexité 
et chose jugée dans l'arbitrage international, p. 195, fn 26). 
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to decide overlaps to a certain degree with what has already been decided in a prior 
award or judgment462. 
309. Res judicata situations may typically arise where a state court has rendered a prior 
decision regarding the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction. State courts and arbitral tribunals 
will usually closely examine their jurisdiction and scrutinize the validity of a potential 
arbitration agreement, the real will of the parties and the coverage of the agreement463. 
While in most cases the state court and arbitral tribunal will probably reach the same 
conclusion, in some cases the question will arise whether the arbitral tribunal is bound 
by the court’s prior determinations regarding the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal464.   
310. Res judicata situations also commonly arise where a state court has rendered a 
prior decision on interim measures465 as state courts and arbitral tribunals usually have 
concurrent jurisdiction with regard to interim measures466. Such a res judicata issue arose 
in ICC Case No. 4126 of 1984 and in A v Z, Order No. 5 of 2 April 2002. In both cases 
the arbitral tribunal had to decide whether a party could seek interim relief in the 
arbitration despite the fact that an identical or similar request for relief had previously 
                                                 
462 LANDOLT, pp. 242 et seq. 
463 SCHULZ, p. 4. 
464 See, e.g., CRCICA Case No. 67/1995. In this case, the dispute arose out of a contract between A and 
B and contained an arbitration agreement providing for CRCICA arbitration. A obtained a judgment 
from the courts in Egypt holding that the contract in dispute was one of agency and that, according to 
Egyptian law, such disputes are not arbitrable. When B initiated CRCICA arbitration proceedings, A 
raised lack of jurisdiction arguing that the judgment of the Egyptian courts operated as a res judicata in the 
arbitration. See also Deutsche Schachtbau- und Tiefbohrgesellschaft mbH v Ras Al Khaimah National Oil Co and 
another appeal [1987] 2 All ER 769. In this case, a dispute arose out of an oil exploration agreement 
concluded between Deutsche Schachtbau- und Tiefbohrgesellschaft mbH (DST) and Ras Al Khaimah 
National Oil Co (Raknoc). In March 1979, DST initiated ICC arbitration proceedings in Geneva based 
on the arbitration agreement contained in the oil exploration agreement. In April 1979 Raknoc instituted 
proceedings in the court of R’as Al Khaimah for the rescission of the agreement on the ground that it 
had been obtained by misrepresentation and also for damages. Conflicting decisions ensued from the 
arbitration and court proceedings: DST succeeded in the arbitration and Raknoc succeeded in the 
litigation. See also Fomento de Construcciones y Contratas SA v Colon Container Terminal SA (DTF 127 III 279). 
Parallel proceedings were brought before the courts in Panama and before an ICC arbitral tribunal in 
Geneva. The question was whether Colon Container Terminal SA (CCT) had accepted the jurisdiction of 
the Panamanian courts by not raising lack of jurisdiction based on an arbitration agreement on time. The 
arbitral tribunal ruled that it had jurisdiction over the dispute. However, two months after the award was 
rendered, the Supreme Court of Panama decided that CCT had raised lack of jurisdiction too late and 
that the Panamanian courts therefore had jurisdiction to hear the dispute. The Fomento case illustrates the 
situation where an arbitral tribunal and a state court both render conflicting decisions on jurisdiction over 
an identical dispute. If both proceedings continue parallely, issues of res judicata may arise before the 
arbitral tribunal. See also ICC Case No. 6363, 1991; ICC Case No. 6535, 1992.  
465 LANDOLT, p. 243. 
466 See in particular YEŞILIRMAK, paras 3-20 et seq. See also POUDRET/BESSON, paras 611 et seq.  
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been denied by a state court 
311. Other situations where there can be overlap between the prior determinations 
of a court and an arbitral tribunal involve the positive res judicata effect and issue 
estoppel. These situations arise typically where a state court has decided a certain issue, 
either as a preliminary or a principal issue, and the same issue is later raised again 
between the same parties before an arbitral tribunal. The question is whether the 
arbitral tribunal is bound by the court’s prior determinations and should integrate them 
in its award467.  
312. Similar questions arise in complex disputes involving multiple parties or 
contracts468. The possible preclusive effects of a prior judgment on subsequent 
arbitration proceedings in such a situation were discussed in ICC Case No. 6363. In this 
case, a first contract was concluded in 1978 between A and B. This contract contained 
an arbitration clause providing for ICC arbitration in Zurich. A second contract was 
concluded in 1980 between A and C. In the 1980 contract A assigned its rights and 
obligations towards B to C, including A’s right to receive royalties from B. When B 
refused to pay royalties, C initiated court proceedings against B. After the state court 
dismissed C’s claim, A initiated ICC arbitration proceedings against B claiming payment 
of unpaid royalties. B invoked the res judicata effect of the prior court decision. The 
arbitral tribunal had to decide whether the prior judgment rendered between C and B 
could operate as a res judicata in arbitration proceedings between A and B, what the 
content of this res judicata was and against whom it applied469.  
                                                 
467 MAYER, Litispendance, connexité et chose jugée dans l'arbitrage international, p. 197 et seq. 
468 See RIVKIN, p. 270; HOBÉR, pp. 248 et seq; CRIVELLARO, p. 81; SCHNEIDER, pp. 102 et seq. 
469 See also ICC Case No. 9787, 1998. In this case the possible impact of a parallel court proceeding on 
arbitration proceedings was discussed. A buyer, a Chinese manufacturer, entered into a series of contracts 
with a seller, a US company. When disputes arose, the buyer initiated an ICC arbitration claiming 
damages. The seller counterclaimed for payment. After the initiation of the ICC arbitration, buyer’s 
counsel initiated court proceedings in the US against seller’s counsel. Neither buyer nor seller were 
parties in the US court proceedings. Nevertheless, seller raised lack of jurisdiction before the arbitral 
tribunal on the ground that the arbitration and court proceedings were congruent, i.e. that both the US 
court and the arbitral tribunal would be required to rule upon the same issues of fact and law. The 
arbitral tribunal had to determine whether the US court proceedings affected the jurisdiction of the 
arbitral tribunal under the parties’ arbitration agreement. 
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2. ISSUES OF RES JUDICATA BETWEEN DIFFERENT ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS 
313. The situation where res judicata issues arise between two arbitral tribunals 
resembles the situation where an arbitral tribunal has to determine the res judicata effects 
of a prior judgment: most situations will involve a certain overlap with issues now 
before the arbitral tribunal and issues previously decided by another arbitral tribunal470.  
314. As before, this overlap may concern the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction. The 
arbitral tribunals will scrutinize the validity and coverage of the arbitration agreement, 
as well as the intention of the parties. In most cases the tribunals will agree that only 
one of the clauses is valid (e.g. because it has been superseded by the other, more recent 
one471) or covers the dispute at issue472. It seems that the intention of the parties, as 
interpreted by the tribunals, generally is a strong (and often sufficient) guideline for the 
tribunals. It is only in rare cases that both tribunals will interpret two agreements to 
cover the same subject matter between the same parties and both tribunals will assume 
that the clause conferring jurisdiction on it does prevail over the other clause473. In such 
a situation the question arises whether an arbitral tribunal is bound by the prior 
determinations regarding jurisdiction of another tribunal.  
                                                 
470 KREMSLEHNER, pp. 142 and 151-52. Issues of res judicata have arisen between two different arbitral 
tribunals on several occasions. The underlying facts of these arbitrations are not always reported with 
sufficient detail, making it not always possible to determine under which category of situations these 
awards may fall. See, e.g., ICC Case No. 6233, 1992 (claimant entered into several contracts with 
respondent. These contracts gave rise to two ICC arbitrations, one resulting in an award condemning 
respondent to pay certain sums to claimant, and another condemning claimant to pay certain amounts to 
respondent. Claimant requested a newly composed arbitral tribunal to interpret the two awards. Before 
the newly constituted arbitral tribunal the respondent invoked the res judicata effect of the prior awards); 
ICC Case No. 5901, 1989, award reported by HASCHER, p. 19 (res judicata issues arose between two 
awards rendered by a first arbitral tribunal with seat in Switzerland and by a second arbitral tribunal with 
seat in France). 
471 See, e.g., the underlying dispute in Arthur Andersen Business Unit Member Firms v Andersen Consulting 
Business Unit Member Firms. Different standard contracts concluded between the various entities of 
Andersen contained contradictory arbitration agreements. Parallel ICC and ad hoc arbitration proceedings 
were initiated based on these conflicting agreements. The Swiss Federal Tribunal put an end to the 
debate on the tribunals’ jurisdiction by upholding the ICC tribunal’s decision according to which the 
most recent arbitration agreement would govern all disputes (DTF, 8 December 1999, ASA Bulletin, Vol. 
18, No. 3 (2000), pp. 546 et seq.).  
472 According to MAYER, arbitral tribunals generally do not like to question the awards of other tribunals 
(Litispendance, connexité et chose jugée dans l'arbitrage international, p. 196, fn 29). 
473 SCHULZ, pp. 4 et seq. (on the comparable situation opposing a court chosen by an exclusive choice of 
court agreement and an abitral tribunal). 
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315. This question arose in ICC Case No. 3383 of 1979474, a case in which the parties 
initiated different arbitrations based on different arbitration agreements in order to 
arbitrate a dispute arising out of the same legal relationship. The Belgian party initiated 
arbitration proceedings based on an ICC arbitration clause. The Iranian party objected 
to the jurisdiction of the ICC tribunal on the grounds that the ICC rules of arbitration 
were contrary to applicable Iranian law. During the first hearing the parties concluded a 
new arbitration agreement renouncing to ICC arbitration and constituting an ad hoc 
arbitral tribunal which had to render an arbitral award within three months. When the 
ad hoc tribunal decided to prolong its mandate, the Iranian party refused to continue to 
participate in the arbitration arguing that the arbitral tribunal had no power to prolong 
its mandate without the formal agreement of the parties. After the ad hoc tribunal 
decided that it did not have the power to continue the arbitration, the Belgian party 
initiated new ICC proceedings based on the original ICC arbitration agreement. The 
new ICC tribunal had to decide whether it was bound by the prior award of the ad hoc 
tribunal. In particular, it had to decide whether the prior award had finally determined 
that there was a valid arbitration agreement providing for ad hoc arbitration, thereby 
excluding the existence of a valid ICC arbitration agreement475.  
316. Res judicata issues can also arise in situations involving the positive res judicata 
effect and issue estoppel. This may happen if one party brings new arbitration 
proceedings on the grounds that a prior award did not exhaust all the differences 
existing between the parties476. In PT Asuransi Jasa Indonesia (Persero) v Dexia Bank SA477, 
Persero brought two subsequent SIAC arbitration proceedings in relation with an 
                                                 
474 See also ICC Case No. 5423, 1987 (an arbitral tribunal with seat in Paris had to decide on the validity 
of an arbitration agreement. The tribunal held that the agreement was null and void, but only with regard 
to ICC arbitration. An arbitral tribunal subsequently seised of the dispute might have to decide if and to 
what extent it is bound by the prior ICC award on the partial nullity of the arbitration agreement).  
475 Similarly, res judicata issues may arise where the same parties initiate different arbitrations based on 
different arbitration agreements in order to arbitrate disputes arising out of a closely related legal 
relationship. Such situations may arise in disputes involving multiple contracts relating to the same 
business or project, such as distribution contracts and ensuing sales relationships (ILA, Interim Report, pp. 
3 et seq.). It has not infrequently happened that different arbitration clauses, in particular with different 
places of arbitration, were inserted in successive contracts related to the same construction project 
(SCHNEIDER, p. 102). 
476 ILA, Interim Report, p. 4; SHEPPARD, The Scope and Res Judicata Effect of Arbitral Awards, p. 274. See also 
MERKIN, para. 18.129.  
477 High Court, 20 October 2005, PT Asuransi Jasa Indonesia (Persero) v Dexia Bank SA [2006] 1 SLR 197; 
Court of Appeal, 1 December 2006, PT Asuransi Jasa Indonesia (Persero) v Dexia Bank SA [2007] 1 SLR 597. 
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almost identical dispute. In the second arbitration, Persero raised an issue which had 
not been covered in the first arbitration. The second arbitral tribunal held that Persero 
was estopped from raising the issue in the second arbitration because it could and 
should have raised it in the first arbitration. In response, Persero brought an action 
before the courts of Singapore requesting the setting aside of the second SIAC award 
on the grounds that the second arbitral tribunal had made findings inconsistent with the 
first award. Persero argued that the second SIAC tribunal was bound by the findings in 
the prior SIAC award. Thus, the question before the Singapore courts was whether the 
first SIAC award gave rise to issue estoppel in the second SIAC proceedings478.  
317. Similarly, res judicata issues involving the positive res judicata effect and issue 
estoppel may arise between two different arbitral tribunals where an amendment to a 
claim or a counterclaim cannot be brought before the constituted arbitral tribunal, e.g. 
because of late filing, and must hence be brought in parallel arbitration proceedings479.  
318. Likewise, the parties may sometimes have to bring more than one arbitration in 
relation with the same factual situation. For instance, under some insurance policies, 
claims against the same insurance company under different policies must be brought 
before different arbitral tribunals480. In Aegis v European Re481 Aegis initiated two separate 
arbitrations against European Re based on the same arbitration agreement. The 
arbitrations concerned two separate disputes arising under the same reinsurance 
contract and out of the same underlying facts. Both disputes concerned European Re’s 
obligation to indemnify Aegis. European Re won the first arbitration and sought to rely 
upon the first award in the second arbitration, raising a plea of issue estoppel.  
319. Res judicata issues may arise between two different arbitral tribunals in case of 
disputes involving multiple parties, e.g. disputes involving an employer, a contractor and 
a subcontractor. An employer may wish to initiate an arbitration against a contractor for 
                                                 
478 See also the situation underlying Cour de cassation, 28 May 2008, Sté G. et A. Distribution SARL v Sté 
Prodim SAS, Rev. arb., No. 3 (2008), pp. 461 et seq.; Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, Case No. A33, 
Award of 9 September 2004. 
479 ILA, Interim Report, p. 4; SHEPPARD, The Scope and Res Judicata Effect of Arbitral Awards, p. 274. 
480 Ibid. 
481 Associated Electric and Gas Insurance Services Ltd (Aegis) v European Reinsurance Company of Zurich (European 
Re) [2003] 1 WLR 1041. 
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the faulty performance of one of the subcontractors. The contractor in turn may wish 
to commence an arbitration against the subcontractor relying on the back-to-back 
liability of the subcontractor under the agreement with the contractor482. Chain sales 
contracts also typically involve multiple parties and may give rise to related disputes 
being brought before different arbitral tribunals483.  
320. A question of issue estoppel between two awards rendered in different 
arbitrations between different parties arose in Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada et al v The 
Lincoln National Life Insurance Co.484. The English Court of Appeal had to decide whether 
an award between A and B may give rise to issue estoppel in a subsequent, separate 
arbitration on a related dispute between B and C. The claimant in the second 
arbitration, C, contended that the first arbitral tribunal had finally determined the 
position between A and B and that B could not go back on this position as against C in 
the second arbitration. The second arbitral tribunal, however, had decided to depart 
from the prior determinations of the first arbitral tribunal. The Court of Appeal had to 
decide whether the second arbitral tribunal was free to do so485. 
                                                 
482 HOBÉR, p. 248. See also Chamber of National and International Arbitration of Milan, Case No. 
1491, 20 July 1992. In this case a dispute arose out of a subcontract concluded between a subcontractor 
and a main contractor. Following the embargo against Iraq, the main contractor terminated the 
subcontract. The subcontractor initiated arbitration proceedings against the main contractor. The 
question arose whether the arbitrator was prevented from deciding on the effects of the embargo on the 
main contract, due to the fact that the arbitrator had no jurisdiction over the main contract. The 
arbitrator held that, although it had no jurisdiction over the main contract, it could rule on the effects of 
the embargo on the main contract as a preliminary issue. The arbitrator also stated that a different arbitral 
tribunal seised of the dispute relating to the main contract could reconsider and reach a different 
conclusion on the issue of the effects of the embargo on the main contract. 
483 See, e.g., ICC Case Nos 2745 and 2762, 1977. See also HANOTIAU, Complex Arbitrations, para. 547. 
484 Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, American Phoenix Life and Reassurance Co., Phoenix Home Life Mutual 
Insurance Co. v The Lincoln National Life Insurance Co., [2005] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 606. 
485 See also ICC Case No. 7061, 1997; ICC Case No. 8023, 1995, award reported by HASCHER, p. 21; 
ICC Case No. 7438, 1994, award reported by HASCHER, pp. 19 and 22. Concerning sports arbitration, 
see CAS, Dieter Baumann v International Olympic Committee (IOC), National Olympic Committee of Germany and 
International amateur Athletic Federation (IAAF). Baumann brought CAS proceedings requesting the CAS to 
(i) set aside a prior IAAF decision banning Baumann for a period of two years; (ii) set aside a prior IOC 
decision revoking Baumann’s accreditation; (iii) determine that Baumann would be eligible to compete in 
the Sydney Olympic Games. Before the CAS, the IAAF raised lack of jurisdiction arguing that its 
arbitration panel had already issued a final and binding determination of the dispute. The CAS had to 
decide whether the IAAF decision was binding on Baumann who had not been a party in the IAAF 
proceedings. 
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3. ISSUES OF RES JUDICATA BEFORE THE SAME ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL 
321.  Issues of res judicata may also arise within one and the same arbitration, e.g. 
between partial and final awards. The question whether the arbitral tribunal is bound by 
its prior partial award might prove problematic if new evidence comes to light 
questioning the correctness of some findings contained in the prior partial award486.  
322. The question of the res judicata effect of a prior partial award on issues to be 
decided at a later stage of the arbitration proceedings arose in several arbitrations, e.g. in 
ICC Case No. 3267 of 1984487. A dispute arose out of a construction subcontract 
concluded between a Mexican construction company and a Belgian company. During 
the first few months of performance under the contract the Mexican company failed to 
meet various milestones and the Belgian company made deductions from instalment 
payments. After both companies gave notice of termination of the contract, the 
Mexican company initiated arbitration proceedings against the Belgian company. A 
fundamental issue in this arbitration was to determine which of the two notices of 
termination was effective. A partial award was rendered in favour of the Mexican 
company. In the ensuing arbitration proceedings the arbitral tribunal had to decide if 
and to what extent it was bound by its prior partial award.  
323. A res judicata issue may also arise where an arbitral tribunal is requested to 
reconsider or interpret its prior partial or final award. The res judicata doctrine will 
impose limits on the arbitral tribunal’s power to reconsider or interpret its prior 
awards488.  
4. CONCLUSION 
324. The above analysis clearly establishes that issues of res judicata arise in 
international commercial arbitration; it shows that the phenomenon of res judicata before 
                                                 
486 ILA, Interim Report, p. 3; MAYER, Litispendance, connexité et chose jugée dans l'arbitrage international, p. 200. 
487 See also ICC Case No. 2858, 1996, award reported by HASCHER, p. 30; UNCITRAL, Antoine Biloune 
and Marine Drive Complex Ltd v Ghana Investments Centre and the Government of Ghana; UNCITRAL, Wintershall 
AG, International Ocean Resources Inc, Veba Oel AG, Deutsche Schachtbau- und Tiefbohrbesellschaft mbH, 
Gulfstream Resources Canada Ltd v The Government of Qatar. 
488 See, e.g., UNCITRAL, Antoine Biloune and Marine Drive Complex Ltd v Ghana Investments Centre and the 
Government of Ghana; UNCITRAL, Wintershall AG, International Ocean Resources Inc, Veba Oel AG, Deutsche 
Schachtbau- und Tiefbohrbesellschaft mbH, Gulfstream Resources Canada Ltd v The Government of Qatar. 
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international arbitral tribunals is real.  
325. As was seen, international arbitral tribunals may have to deal with issues of res 
judicata in different situations. While it appears that arbitrators most often have to 
decide on the res judicata effect of a prior court decision, res judicata issues may also arise 
between arbitral awards rendered by the same or a different arbitral tribunal. 
Furthermore, it was seen that within each of the delineated categories res judicata issues 
may arise within a variety of different situations.  
326. This chapter has shown that res judicata issues have arisen in numerous 
arbitrations. Many more cases exist. Due to the growing complexity of international 
disputes it is to be expected that the number of multiple proceedings will further 
increase in the future. Because of the proliferation of multiple proceedings and an 
increasing bifurcation of arbitration proceedings, the number of cases in which 
arbitrators will have to deal with res judicata issues will also increase. 
327. On the basis of this conclusion it is now necessary to examine whether the 
occurrence of res judicata issues before arbitral tribunals constitutes a problem. For this 
it is necessary to examine how res judicata issues are currently dealt with in international 
commercial arbitration law and practice and whether there is a need to elaborate 
additional rules or guidelines to deal with the phenomenon of res judicata in international 
commercial arbitration. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
328. Issues of res judicata arise in international commercial arbitration in a multitude 
of different situations. So what? The question arises whether the occurrence of res 
judicata issues in international arbitration constitutes a problem that needs to be dealt 
with. This question in turn raises three sub-questions: 
- What are the possible consequences of the occurrence of res judicata issues in 
international commercial arbitration? Expressed differently, what interests are at 
stake?  
- How are res judicata issues currently dealt with in international arbitration law and 
practice?  
- Is the way in which arbitral tribunals currently deal with res judicata issues 
satisfactory?  
329. The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that the phenomenon of res judicata in 
international commercial arbitration constitutes a problem. This chapter will seek to 
achieve its aim by answering the three questions raised above in the order listed. The 
conclusion will make clear that the way in which res judicata issues are currently dealt 
with is unsatisfactory.  
Chapter 4 : Res Judicata in International Commercial Arbitration – A Problem 
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1. INTERESTS AT STAKE DUE TO THE OCCURRENCE OF RES JUDICATA ISSUES IN 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION  
330. In its 2003 resolution concerning the use of the doctrine of forum non conveniens 
and anti-suit injunctions, the Institut de Droit International stated that “[p]arallel 
litigation in more than one country between the same, or related, parties in relation to 
the same, or related, issues should be discouraged”489 as it “may lead to injustice, delay, 
increased expense, and inconsistent decisions”490. As will be seen below, the same holds 
true for successive duplicative proceedings. Repetitions of proceedings may entail 
various negative consequences not only for the parties, but also for the international 
arbitration process as a whole.   
Waste of resources 
331. Duplicative proceedings draw heavily on judicial resources. The parties are 
required to invest considerable amounts of time, money and efforts in proceedings 
which they already went through491. Similarly, although the arbitrators will of course be 
remunerated for their task, they are nevertheless required to unnecessarily invest time 
and efforts in determining already settled issues492. Hence, the accepted principles of 
judicial efficiency and procedural economy are put into question.  
Undue burden on the winning party in the first proceedings 
332. Duplicative proceedings also put an additional burden on the party who 
prevailed in the first proceedings and who is unwillingly exposed to successive 
arbitration proceedings. The losing party in the first proceedings might try to re-litigate 
the same dispute before an international arbitral tribunal. Such a repetition of 
proceedings seems inherently unfair and runs contrary to the established principle of ne 
bis in idem according to which a party should not have to defend itself twice for the same 
action. It would expose the party who prevailed in the first proceedings to major 
                                                 
489 IDI, Forum non conveniens and anti-suit injunctions, para. 3, p. 2. 
490 IDI, Forum non conveniens and anti-suit injunctions, para. d, p. 1. 
491 SHANY, Competing Jurisdictions, p. 155 and p. 164. See also A v Z, Order No. 5, 2 April 2002, pp. 815 et 
seq. 
492 SHANY, Competing Jurisdictions, p. 156. 
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inconveniences, such as having to preserve evidence for an indefinite period of time493. 
Such a scenario would put the important principles of procedural fairness and legal 
certainty at stake494.  
Risk of inconsistent decisions 
333. The duplication of proceedings creates a risk of inconsistent decisions. It has 
been submitted that the coexistence of inconsistent decisions “could seriously 
undermine the very existence of the arbitral process”495.  
334. The coexistence of multiple and possibly inconsistent decisions carries with it 
various negative consequences:  
- It undermines the finality of decisions. If parties can repeatedly re-litigate a same 
dispute, the dispute might remain unresolved indefinitely; the parties will have no 
incentive to comply with any decision rendered496. The very purpose of the 
adjudication system to finally determine the legal rights between the parties and put 
an end to the dispute would be put into question.  
- The occurrence of inconsistent decisions undermines fairness, frustrating the 
parties’ legitimate expectation that identical cases will be treated alike. It has been 
submitted that, in as much as justice requires that like cases be treated alike, the 
occurrence of inconsistent decisions violates the parties’ right to justice and 
threatens the Rule of Law itself497.  
- The credibility of both the prior and the subsequent proceedings are undermined. 
The rendering of inconsistent decisions may give the impression that the 
application of the law is not objective and dependent on the strength of the legal 
argument but rather subjective and dependent on the identity of the judges or 
                                                 
493 SHANY, Competing Jurisdictions, p. 164; HARNON, p. 545; VESTAL, p. 34. 
494 HOBÉR, p. 247. 
495 GALLAGHER, para. 17-1. 
496 SHANY, Competing Jurisdictions, p. 164. See also RIVKIN, p. 271. 
497 LOWE, pp. 47 et seq. 
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arbitrators498. 
- The effectiveness of both proceedings is put into question499. In particular, the 
rendering of inconsistent decisions may weaken the effectiveness of the second 
arbitration because the courts of the seat of the arbitration could set aside the award 
on the grounds that it is inconsistent with another decision previously rendered, 
recognised or recognisable in the same state500. It may also be difficult or even 
impossible for the parties to obtain the enforcement of an award that is inconsistent 
with another decision in the enforcement state501. Even if enforcement is obtained, 
the parallel enforcement of inconsistent decisions in different countries is equally 
unsatisfactory. In such situations, the parties’ dispute cannot be said to have been 
effectively resolved.  
- The rendering of inconsistent decisions undermines legal certainty and 
predictability. The parties should be able to expect as much predictability and 
certainty as possible, given that, at the end of the proceedings, there will be a final 
and binding decision determining their legal rights. 
- Finally, the ability of the law to provide effective guidance and the process of 
developing clear normative standards are also at stake502. 
335. Accordingly, inconsistent decisions rendered by international arbitral tribunals 
put into question the predictability, certainty, effectiveness, credibility and fairness of 
international arbitration. A high degree of uncertainty as to the direction of arbitration 
case law might undermine the parties’ confidence in international arbitration and 
discourage them from referring disputes to arbitration503. After the rendering of two 
conflicting awards in the CME and Lauder arbitrations, counsel for the Czech Republic 
described the situation as “absolutely ludicrous, and highly regrettable for the fact that it 
                                                 
498 SHANY, Competing Jurisdictions, p. 285. 
499 SHANY, Competing Jurisdictions, p. 124. 
500 HANOTIAU, Complex Arbitrations, para. 543. 
501 In Fomento de Construcciones y Contratas SA v Colon Container Terminal SA the Swiss Federal Tribunal held 
that the coexistence of two contradictory decisions rendered with regard to the same dispute and 
between the same parties would violate public policy (DTF 127 III 279, consid. 2b).  
502 SHANY, Competing Jurisdictions, p. 117. 
503 SHANY, Competing Jurisdictions, p. 124. 
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makes the law look so stupid”. He added: “It makes one appreciate how uncertain the 
arbitral process is. You have to conlude that arbitration is too hazardous – you must go 
to a national court [where] […] you can get mistakes corrected by an appeal”504. It must 
be noted that counsel for the Czech Republic had rejected five alternative offers from 
the claimant to consolidate the two arbitration proceedings and thereby avoid the risk 
of inconsistent awards. The words of counsel for the Czech Republic are nevertheless 
alarming and raise great concern for the reputation of the international arbitration 
process505.  
336. The existence of inconsistencies may be beneficial to adjudication systems in 
general and international arbitration in particular as inconsistencies may promote the 
development of the law in the long run. It has been argued that inconsistent legal 
pronounciations bring controversial questions to the front and encourage debate and 
brainstorming which might spur legislation on the matter. After a certain while of 
debating, the inconsistencies get narrowed down and a solution emerges that might 
become jurisprudence constante. Furthermore, inconsistencies encourage cross-fertilisation 
and might compel judicial bodies to improve their methods of operation and quality of 
work in order to attract more business506. 
337. However, the arguments against inconsistent decisions seem to outweigh the 
arguments in favour of inconsistent decisions, in particular in res judicata situations stricto 
senso where a same matter, arising out of the same set of facts has already been decided 
between the same parties in prior proceedings507. In the long run inconsistencies cannot 
be tolerated as the parties could otherwise lose confidence in the adjudication system 
and avoid using it. Furthermore, while arbitral tribunals are certainly involved in the 
academic process of developing international arbitration law, the arbitrators’ primary 
task is not an academic one, but a practical one. Their task is to resolve a given dispute 
fairly and efficiently. The parties are seeking the resolution of a particular dispute. They 
are not looking for an opportunity to contribute, at their own expense, to the 
                                                 
504 Quotes reported in BROWER/BROWER II/SHARPE, p. 428.  
505 BROWER/BROWER II/SHARPE, p. 428. 
506 On this “progress through catastrophe” argument, see SHANY, Competing Jurisdictions, pp. 122 et seq.  
507 SHANY, Competing Jurisdictions, p. 124. 
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development of the law508. Nor do they owe a duty to the arbitration community or are 
required “to help make the world a better place”509.  
338. The interests at stake due to the occurrence of res judicata issues before 
international arbitral tribunals are of major importance. They must be safeguarded in 
order for international arbitration to preserve its legitimacy and reputation as an 
effective adjudication system.  
2. HOW ARE RES JUDICATA ISSUES CURRENTLY DEALT WITH IN INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE? 
339. Before attempting to find solutions to the problem of res judicata before arbitral 
tribunals, it is important to examine the current state of law and practice. The dual 
objective of this analysis is to determine not only what is provided for, but also the 
limits and gaps of international arbitration law and practice with respect to res judicata. 
The outcome of this investigation will determine the starting point and delineate the 
search for possible solutions.  
340. The following analysis will first examine how res judicata issues are currently 
dealt with in international commercial arbitration law (2.1.). It will then investigate how 
the law is applied and supplemented by international commercial arbitration practice 
(2.2.).  
2.1. International Commercial Arbitration Law 
341. International commercial arbitration law comprises various rules from different 
sources, namely domestic arbitration laws, arbitration rules of arbitration institutions 
and international arbitration conventions. In addition to this “hard law”, it is worth 
mentioning arbitration “soft law”, i.e. non-binding professional guidelines, which may 
have considerable persuasive authority. The following analysis will examine these 
sources in the order mentioned to determine whether and to what extent they deal with 
                                                 
508 REDFERN/HUNTER/BLACKABY/PARTASIDES, para. 1-113. 
509 Remark made on 18 November 2008 by Prof Radicati di Brozolo in the OGEMID email discussion 
entitled “Thoughts on an Arbitration Database” (available at www.transnational-dispute-
management.com).  
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res judicata issues arising before international arbitral tribunals. 
2.1.1. Domestic Arbitration Laws 
342. Domestic arbitration laws frequently state the general principle that arbitral 
awards have res judicata effects. This principle is today generally accepted through all 
common and civil law jurisdictions510. However, as will be seen below, domestic 
arbitration laws usually do not go beyond affirming this general principle.  
343. The res judicata effect of awards is provided for expressly in the arbitration laws 
of some civil law countries, e.g. France511, Belgium512, the Netherlands513, Austria514 and 
Spain515. In Germany, the arbitration law provides that arbitral awards have the same 
effect between the parties as a final and binding court decision516, and in Switzerland an 
award is final from the time when it is notified517.  
344. While in common law countries arbitration laws may not always provide 
expressly for the res judicata effect of arbitral awards, it will be seen below that in 
England and the United States awards are generally considered to have res judicata 
effect518. The courts in India, Australia and New Zealand have also confirmed that 
awards have res judicata effect519.  
345. The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration also 
considers arbitral awards to have res judicata effect by providing that awards shall be 
recognised as binding.  
346. The following analysis will examine in more detail the arbitration laws of 
                                                 
510 SHEPPARD, The Scope and Res Judicata Effect of Arbitral Awards, p. 275; HANOTIAU, Complex 
Arbitrations, para. 538; RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, pp. 787 et seq. See also LEW/MISTELIS/KRÖLL, 
paras 24-1 et seq. 
511 Article 1476 NCPC (Article 1484 Decree 2011-48). 
512 Article 1703 (1) Judicial Code. 
513 Article 1059 Netherlands Arbitration Act 1986.  
514 Article 607 Austrian Arbitration Act 2006. 
515 Article 43 Spanish Arbitration Act 2003. 
516 Article 1055 ZPO. A similar provision is contained in Article 31 of the Brazilian Arbitration Law 
9.307 of 1996. 
517 Article 190 (1) PILA. 
518 BORN, pp. 2895 and 2904 et seq.; COE, p. 299.  
519 ILA, Interim Report, p. 11. 
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England (2.1.1.1.), the United States (2.1.1.2.), France (2.1.1.3.) Switzerland (2.1.1.4.), as 
well as the UNCITRAL Model Law (2.1.1.5.). 
2.1.1.1. England 
347. In England it has long been established that the doctrine of res judicata applies to 
arbitral awards520. It has been held since at least 1783 that awards can justify a plea of 
cause of action and issue estoppel521.  
348. The English Arbitration Act 1996 does not contain a provision providing that 
awards have res judicata effects just like court judgments522. However, Section 58 (1) of 
the English Arbitration Act 1996 provides that awards are final and binding: 
“Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, an award made by the 
tribunal pursuant to an arbitration agreement is final and 
binding both on the parties and on any persons claiming 
through or under them”. 
349. English courts have since long held that awards are final and binding on the 
parties and operate in the same way between them as court judgments523. It is 
considered that the traditional doctrine of res judicata applies to arbitration as it does to 
litigation524. There must be a final award on the merits pronounced by a tribunal of 
competent jurisdiction. In addition, the award must be rendered or recognised in 
England525.  
350. Like a judgment, an award extinguishes an earlier cause of action. The 
extinguished claim is merged into the award and the winning party’s rights are replaced 
by the right to seek enforcement of the award526. Either party is thus prevented from 
                                                 
520 BEELEY/SERIKI, p. 111. 
521 ILA, Interim Report, p. 10 with reference to Doe d Davy v Haddon (1783) 3 Doug KB 310. See also 
Cummings v Heard (1869) LR 4 QB 669, 672.  
522 SCHLOSSER, Arbitral Tribunals or State Courts – Who Must Defer to Whom?, p. 21; BORN, p. 2904. 
523 MERKIN, para. 18.128 with reference to Pitcher v Rigby (1821) 9 Price 79; Imperial Gas Light & Coke Co 
v Broadbent (1859) 7 HL Cas 600; Caledonian Railway Co v Turcan [1898] AC 256. 
524 JOSEPH, para. 15-70; HANOTIAU Complex Arbitrations, para. 540. See also Lord Denning M R in 
Fidelitas Shipping Co. Ltd. v V/O Exportchleb [1966] 1 QB 630, 641(“Like principles [i.e. cause of action and 
issue estoppel] apply to arbitration”). 
525 ILA, Interim Report, p. 10. 
526 MERKIN, para. 18.128; BORN, p. 2905 with reference to FJ Bloemen Pty Ltd v Council of the City of Gold 
Coast [1973] AC 115, PC.  
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pursuing the decided claim again at a later stage of the arbitration or in new 
proceedings527. The parties cannot assert or deny the existence or non-existence of the 
claim in subsequent proceedings528. 
351. English courts apply the doctrine of cause of action estoppel narrowly. They 
apply it only where the same claim (requiring the same elements of proof) is applied to 
the same facts and where the same time period is involved529. Cause of action estoppel 
applies only to claims actually referred to arbitration; the orginal cause of action remains 
in existence with regard to all matters excluded from a prior arbitral tribunal’s 
jurisdiction530. In addition, declaratory awards do not extinguish the original cause of 
action and do not confer any right of enforcement on the winning party. If the losing 
party does not comply with the award, the winning party will have to bring separate 
judicial proceedings on the original cause of action, relying on the award as conclusive 
evidence of his right531.  
352. An award may give rise to issue estoppel in subsequent proceedings. The award 
is binding with respect to issues that were necessarily resolved by the award; the parties 
cannot contradict the earlier findings of the tribunal on these issues in subsequent 
proceedings532. The applicability of the traditional doctrine of issue estoppel to awards 
was confirmed by Diplock LJ in Fidelitas Shipping Co. Ltd. v V/O Exportchleb:  
“Issue estoppel applies to arbitration as it does to litigation. 
The parties having chosen the tribunal to determine the 
disputes between them as to their legal rights and duties are 
bound by the determination by that tribunal of any issue which 
is relevant to the decision of any dispute referred to that 
                                                 
527 SUTTON/GILL, para. 6-176 with reference to Westland Helicopters Ltd v Al- Hejailan [2004] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 523; Fidelitas Shipping Co. Ltd. v V/O Exportchleb [1965] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 223, CA; Siporex Trade SA v 
Comdel Commodities Ltd [1986] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 428; Noble Assurance Co. v Gerling-Konzern General Insurance Co 
[2007] EWHC 253. See also MUSTILL/BOYD, p. 409 and MUSTILL/BOYD, Companion, paras 409-
414, p. 209.  
528 SUTTON/GILL, para. 6-176; MUSTILL/BOYD, p. 409 and MUSTILL/BOYD, Companion, paras 
409-414, p. 209. 
529 BORN, pp. 2905 et seq. with reference to Henry Boot Constr. Ltd v Alstom Combined Cycles Ltd [2005] 
EWCA Civ. 814, CA; Soteriou v Ultrachem [2004] All ER (D) 278 (Apr.) (QB). 
530 MERKIN, para. 18.129; SUTTON/GILL, para. 6-177. 
531 MERKIN, para. 18.130; SUTTON/GILL, para. 6-177. 
532 MERKIN, para. 18.132; SUTTON/GILL, para. 6-176; MUSTILL/BOYD, p. 413 and 
MUSTILL/BOYD, Companion, paras 409-414, p. 209.  
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tribunal”533. 
353. The doctrine of issue estoppel is subject to exceptions. If it is shown by 
subsequent legal developments in other cases that the award was wrong as a matter of 
law, the award will not give rise to issue estoppel. However, the award will remain final 
and binding between the parties with regard to the dispute referred534.  
354. The question whether the rule in Henderson v Henderson applies to awards is 
controversial. According to Mustill and Boyd  
“[…] it is doubtful whether the rule in Henderson v Henderson 
applies to issues which are outside the scope of the matters 
referred to the arbitrator even though they fall within the terms 
of the arbitration agreement”535.  
355. According to Veeder the rule in Henderson v Henderson should not apply to 
awards in England because it would be illogical to consider the absence of a decision 
and reasons in a first award as a ground for refusing new arguments in subsequent 
proceedings536.  
356. However, several commentators have suggested that the rule in Henderson v 
Henderson may apply to awards under English law537.  
357. English courts have not so far considered whether the rule in Henderson v 
Henderson applies to arbitral awards. In Aegis v European Re the Privy Council held that it 
“may fall on the other side of the line”538, but utlimately did not decide the matter as the 
                                                 
533 Fidelitas Shipping Co. Ltd. v V/O Exportchleb [1966] 1 QB 630, 644. See also People’s Insurance Company of 
China, Hebei Branch; China National Feeding Stuff Import/Export Corporation v Vysanthi Shipping Co. Ltd. (The 
“Joanna v”) [2003] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 617, 628; Associated Electric and Gas Insurance Services Ltd v European 
Reinsurance Co of Zurich [2003] 1 WLR 1041, 1049 (“The [first] award has conferred upon [European Re] a 
right which is enforceable by later pleading an issue estoppel. It is a species of the enforcement of the 
rights given by the [first] award just as much as would be a cause of action estoppel”); Svenska Petroleum 
Exploration AB v Government of the Republic of Lithuania and another (No 2) [2006] EWCA Civ 1529.  
534 MERKIN, para. 18.132. 
535 MUSTILL/BOYD, p. 413 and MUSTILL/BOYD, Companion, paras 409-414, p. 209. 
536 VEEDER, p. 75. See also BARNETT, pp. 225 et seq.; ILA, Interim Report, p. 11.  
537 See, e.g., SUTTON/GILL, para. 6-176 with reference to, inter alia, Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 
100; Fidelitas Shipping Co. Ltd. v V/O Exportchleb [1965] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 223, CA and Arnold v National 
Westminster Bank [1991] 3 All E R 41, fn 56 and 57; MERKIN, para. 18.132. 
538 Para. 16. 
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question was irrelevant to its decision539.  
358. As a general rule, under English law awards take effect from the date upon 
which they are made540. Awards are generally only effective with regard to the parties 
and any persons claiming through or under them541. This is the case even if the parties 
to the arbitration have agreed that the award should bind third parties542. However, a 
third party may agree to be bound by an award543. 
359. In Sun Life Assurance Co of Canada v The Lincoln National Life Insurance Co the 
question arose whether an award may be conclusive as between a party to the award 
and a third party who seeks to rely on it544. The Court of Appeal confirmed the 
applicability of the mutuality doctrine: under English law a party may not rely in 
subsequent proceedings on a prior award to which it was not a party545. 
2.1.1.2. United States 
360. In the United States there is no federal statute providing for any res judicata 
effect of awards. The FAA does not even state that awards are binding upon the 
parties. However, both claim and issue preclusion are generally considered to apply with 
respect to awards546.  
361. Awards have res judicata effects before and after they have been confirmed by a 
court547. If an award is confirmed by a court under the FAA it becomes a judgment of 
the court and acquires the same preclusive effects as any other civil judgment of a US 
federal district court. Such a judgment is also entitled to recognition and preclusive 
                                                 
539 Associated Electric and Gas Insurance Services Ltd v European Reinsurance Company of Zurich [2003] 1 WLR 
1041, 1050. 
540 SUTTON/GILL, para. 6-164. 
541 Section 58 (1) EAA 1996. See also Gbangbola v Smith and Sherriff Ltd [1998] 3 All ER 730, 738 (“That 
finding is by virtue of section 58(1) of the Arbitration Act final and binding on the parties if not 
challenged (and it has not been) and it is binding on the arbitrator as much as the parties”). 
542 TWEEDDALE/TWEEDDALE, para. 30.18; HARRIS/PLANTEROSE/TECKS, p. 280. 
543 SUTTON/GILL, para.6-183.  
544 See BEELEY/SERIKI, pp. 111 et seq. 
545 Sun Life Assurance Co of Canada v The Lincoln National Life Insurance Co [2005] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 606, 630-31. 
546 BORN, p. 2895; COE, p. 299; LOWENFELD, p. 56; HANOTIAU, Complex Arbitrations, para. 540; 
SHELL, pp. 640 et seq.; ILA, Interim Report, p. 12.  
547 BORN, p. 2895; SHELL, pp. 642 et seq.  
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effects in other states under the federal Full Faith and Credit Statute548. This means that 
a judicially confirmed award is res judicata to the same extent in all states of the United 
States549.  
362. Unconfirmed awards are not covered by the federal Full Faith and Credit 
provisions, which deal with the preclusive effects of federal judgments, or by general 
rules of preclusion applicable to court judgments550. In McDonald v City of West Branch 
the US Supreme Court decided that federal courts are not required by statute to give res 
judicata effects to an unconfirmed award. It also stated that any rule of preclusion for 
unconfirmed awards is necessarily judicially-fashioned551.  
363. The starting point for such judicially-fashioned preclusion rules for arbitral 
awards has been US res judicata standards developed for judgments552. This is reflected in 
the Restatement of the Law (Second) of Judgments which states in § 84 (1): 
“[…] a valid and final award by arbitration has the same effects 
under the rules of res judicata, subject to the same exceptions 
and qualifications, as a judgment of a court”.  
364. The application of judicially-fashioned preclusion rules to awards appears widely 
established in the case law of US courts553. US courts generally apply the traditional 
doctrines of claim and issue preclusion in cases where a party attempts to re-litigate a 
claim or issue already determined in a prior arbitral award554. It has however been 
observed that this practice is “less the result of any principled analysis of arbitral 
                                                 
548 BORN, pp. 2895-96; SHELL, p. 643. See 28 USC §1738 (1964) (“Such Acts, records and judicial 
proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every court 
within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of 
such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken”); Article VI, Section 1 US Constitution 
(“Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of 
every other state”); ALI, Restatement (Second), Judgments, § 18, pp. 155-56. 
549 Magnolia Petroleum Co. v Hunt, 320 US 430, 438 (1943)(“From the beginning this Court [the US 
Supreme Court] has held that these provisions [Article VI, Section 1 US Constitution and 28 USC §1738] 
have made that which has been adjudicated in one state res judicata to the same extent in every other”). 
550 BORN, p. 2896. 
551 McDonald v City of West Branch, 466 US 284, 288 (1984).  
552 BORN, p. 2897. 
553 See BORN, p. 2897 with reference to, inter alia, MACTEC Inc. v Gorelick, 427 F.3d 821, 831 (10th Cir. 
2005); Greenblatt v Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 763 F.2d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 1985). See also Manion v 
Nagin, 394 F.3d 1062, 1067 (8th Cir. 2005)(“An arbitration award counts as a final judgment for collateral 
estoppels”); HULBERT, pp. 174 et seq.   
554 See BORN, pp. 2897-98; SHELL, pp. 640 et seq. 
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preclusion than of the largely irreflective extension of judicially fashioned preclusion 
doctrine to the arbitral context”555. 
365. US courts have consistently held that a claim previously decided in an award 
cannot be re-litigated between the same parties. Furthermore, most US courts have held 
that the doctrine of claim preclusion bars the re-litigation of claims that were not but 
could and should have been brought in the prior arbitration proceedings556. According 
to the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, if awards “were not treated as the 
equivalent of a judicial adjudication for purposes of claim preclusion, the obligation to 
arbitrate would be practically illusory”557. 
366. § 84 of the Restatement (Second) contains exceptions to the general 
applicability of the doctrine of claim preclusion to awards. According to § 84 (2)  
“[a]n award by arbitration with respect to a claim does not 
preclude relitigation of the same or a related claim based on the 
same transaction if a scheme of remedies permits assertion of 
the second claim notwithstanding the award regarding the first 
claim”.  
367. This means that where Congress has guaranteed a judicial right of action for a 
federal claim arbitral awards may not give rise to claim preclusion558.  
368. § 84 (4) provides that 
“[i]f the terms of an agreement to arbitrate limit the binding 
effect of the award in another adjudication or arbitration 
                                                 
555 SANDERS, p. 102. See also SHELL, pp. 658 et seq. (“The review of cases […] demonstrates that the 
courts have widely applied traditional res judicata and collateral estoppel doctrine to cases in which 
preclusion is asserted on the basis of a prior arbitration award. On the basis of traditional preclusion 
analysis, courts frequently bar relitigation of both claims and issues previously adjudicated in arbitration. 
However, courts rarely justify their decision to allow such preclusion. Many opinions imply simply that it 
is ‘fair’ to limit a litigant to one full hearing on a matter. In essence, the courts seem to feel that 
arbitration is sufficiently like litigation to apply the same rules of preclusion to both types of 
proceedings”).  
556 See BORN, pp. 2897-2898 with reference to Lewis v Circuit City Stores, Inc., 500 F.3d 1140, 1147 (10th 
Cir. 2007); Sanders v Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Auth., 819 F.2d 1151, 1157 (D.C. Cir. 1987); 
Norris v Grosvenor Mktg Ltd, 803 F.2d 1281, 1286 (2d Cir. 1986); Rudell v Comprehensive Accounting Corp., 802 
F.2d 926 (7th Cir. 1986); Schattner v Girard, Inc., 668 F.2d 1366, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Sue Klau Enter. Inc. v 
Am. Fidelity Fire Ins., Co., 551 F.2d 882 (1st Cir. 1977).  
557 ALI, Restatement (Second), Judgments, § 84, p. 288. 
558 BORN, p. 2898. 
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proceeding, the extent to which the award has conclusive effect 
is determined in accordance with that limitation”. 
369. Accordingly, if the parties exclude the application of the doctrine of claim 
preclusion in their arbitration agreement, such agreement will be respected and the 
award will not operate as a res judicata in subsequent proceedings559.  
370. The traditional doctrine of issue preclusion generally also applies to awards560. 
According to the Restatement (Second) of Judgments 
“[…] there is good reason to treat the determination of the 
issues in an arbitration proceeding as conclusive in a 
subsequent proceeding, just as determinations of a court would 
be so treated. When arbitration affords opportunity for 
presentation of evidence and argument substantially similar in 
form and scope to judicial proceedings, the award should have 
the same effect on issues necessarily determined as a judgment 
has”561. 
371. US courts have applied the doctrine of issue preclusion to arbitral awards in 
cases where the same issue necessary to a dispute’s outcome was already raised and 
decided in prior arbitration proceedings and where the party against whom issue 
preclusion is raised had a full and fair opportunity to arbitrate the issue in the 
arbitration proceedings562.  
                                                 
559 BORN, p. 2899. 
560 ALI, Restatement (Second), Judgments, § 84 (1); BORN, p. 2899. Contra: SANDERS, pp. 101 et seq. 
561 ALI, Restatement (Second), Judgments, § 84, pp. 289 et seq. 
562 BORN, p. 2899 with reference to, inter alia, Sheinfeld v Leeds, 201 Fed.Appx. 998, 999-1000 (5th Cir. 
2006); Jacobson v Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 111 F.3d 261, 267-68 (2d Cir. 1997); Pryner v Tractor Supply Co., 109 
F.3d 354, 361 (7th Cir. 1997); Norris v Grosvenor Mktg Ltd, 803 F.2d 1281, 1286-87 (2d Cir. 1986); Barnes v 
Oody, 514 F.Supp. 23 (E.D. Tenn. 1981); Maidman v O'Brien, 473 F.Supp. 25 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). See also B-S 
Steel Of Kansas, Inc. v Texas Industries, Inc., 439 F.3d 653, 662-667 (10th Cir. 2006). See also F. Hoffmann-La 
Roche Ltd. v Qiagen Gaithersburg, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 318, 328-329 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). In this case, the 
District Court for the Southern Distict of New York was seized of an action to vacate an arbitral award 
on the ground that the arbitral tribunal had manifestly disregarded the law, namely by disregarding the 
collateral estoppel effects of a prior ICDR award. The Court held that “an arbitration decision may effect 
collateral estoppel in a later litigation or arbitration if the proponent can show 'with clarity and certainty' 
that the same issues were resolved. [...] A party is collaterally estopped if ‘(1) the identical issue was raised 
in a previous proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated and decided in the previous proceeding; (3) 
the party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue; and (4) the resolution of the issue was 
necessary to support a valid and final judgment on the merits.” The Court further held that if the arbitral 
tribunal had simply ignored the prior ICDR award or even questioned that award’s conclusions, the 
Court would have serious reservations about the validity of the award in question. However, there is no 
manifest disregard of the law where the arbitral tribunal had simply erred in its collateral estoppel 
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372. It has been submitted that the doctrine of issue preclusion is more difficult to 
apply to awards than the doctrine of claim preclusion. It has been argued that because 
arbitrators frequently do not explain the basis of their decision it is difficult for a court 
subsequently seised to determine which issues the arbitrators had to resolve to make 
their award563. However, most US courts have rejected the argument that procedural 
differences between arbitration and litigation prevent the application of issue preclusion 
rules to arbitral awards564.  
373. There are several exceptions to the general applicability of issue preclusion rules 
to awards. § 84 (3) of the Restatement (Second) provides:  
“A determination of an issue in arbitration does not preclude 
relitigation of that issue if: 
(a) According preclusive effect to a determination of 
the issue would be incompatible with a legal policy 
or contractual provision that the tribunal in which 
the issue subsequently arises be free to make an 
independent determination of the issue in 
question, or with a purpose of the arbitration 
agreement that the arbitration be specifically 
expeditious; or 
(b) The procedure leading to the award lacked the 
elements of adjudicatory procedure prescribed in 
§ 83 (2)”. 
374. Furthermore, the Restatement states several circumstances that justify not 
giving issue-preclusive effects to awards. For instance, the doctrine of issue preclusion 
should not apply to an award where the arbitration procedure was very informal565. 
Likewise, issue preclusion may be inappropriate with respect to issues of law in cases 
where arbitrators are allowed to apply principles of law other than those that would be 
                                                                                                                                         
analysis, namely where the arbitrators had recognized the appropriate governing standard but then 
erroneously apply that standard to the facts before them. 
563 SHELL, pp. 650 et seq. See also Universal Am. Barge Corp v J-Chem, Inc., 946 F.2d 1131 (5th Cir. 1991). 
564 See BORN, pp. 2899-2900 with reference to In re Khaligh, 506 F.3d 956, 957 (9th Cir. 2007); In re 
Khaligh, 338 B.R. 817, 828-32 (9th Cir. BAP 2006); I. Appel Corp. v Katz, 1999 WL 287370 (S.D.N.Y. 
1999); Sullivan v Am. Airlines, Inc., 613 F.Supp. 226, 230-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Kamakazi Music Corp. v 
Robbins Music Corp., 534 F.Supp. 69, 80-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Barnes v Oody, 514 F.Supp. 23, 24-25 (E.D. 
Tenn. 1981); U.S. Plywood Corp. v Hudson Lumber Co., 127 F.Supp. 489, 494-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). 
565 ALI, Restatement (Second), Judgments, § 84, p. 289. 
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applied by a court adjudicating the same dispute566. Furthermore, in accordance with § 
84 (4), if the parties provide in their arbitration agreement that the award shall not give 
rise to issue preclusion such an agreement will be upheld by the courts567.  
375. In addition, some US courts have refused to give issue-preclusive effects to 
prior awards where the award was either unreasoned or did not clearly dispose of the 
factual or legal issues568. Further, where non-arbitrable claims are involved, the US 
Supreme Court has held in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v Byrd that “it is far from certain 
that arbitration proceedings will have any preclusive effect on the litigation of 
nonarbitrable federal claims”569. The Supreme Court further held that federal courts 
have the discretion to protect federal interests by determining the preclusive effects to 
be given to an award, including denying any preclusive effects to an award570.  
376. The Restatement specifies that an award may have preclusive effects in 
subsequent proceedings only if the award has become final. Whether an award is final 
shall be determined in accordance with § 13 of the Restatement containing the finality 
requirements for judgments571. An award that has been set aside or does not meet the 
requirements for recognition is not final for purposes of res judicata572. 
377. Finally, as a general rule awards have claim preclusive effects only as to the 
parties to the arbitration proceedings or their privies. By contrast, US courts have 
applied the doctrine of issue preclusion to awards also in situations where only the party 
against whom issue preclusion is raised was a party, or in privity with a party, to the 
prior arbitration573. However, it has been submitted that even though the offensive 
                                                 
566 ALI, Restatement (Second), Judgments, § 84, p. 291. 
567 See BORN, p. 2900. 
568 BORN, p. 2900. 
569 Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v Byrd, 470 US 213, 223 (1985). 
570 Ibid. See also LOWENFELD, pp. 59 et seq. Given the diminished role of non-arbitrability of claims in 
US arbitration law the scope of this exception is small. 
571 ALI, Restatement (Second), Judgments, § 84, p. 290. 
572 BORN, p. 2901. 
573 Witkowski v Welch, 173 F.3d 192 (3d Cir. 1999); Ritchie v Landau, 475 F.2d 151, 155-156 (2d Cir. 1973). 
In Steelmet, Inc. v Caribe Towing Corp. the court admitted the general applicability of “offensive collateral 
estoppel” to awards (“Offensive use of collateral estoppel is no longer prohibited”). However, the court 
ultimately denied the application of offensive collateral estoppel on the ground that the burden of proof 
was allocated differently in the two proceedings (747 F.2d 689, 694 (C.A. Fla. 1984)). See also SHELL, p. 
653. 
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application of issue preclusion to arbitral awards is permitted, US courts are reluctant to 
extend the preclusive effects of an award beyond the parties to the arbitration 
proceedings574. 
2.1.1.3. France575 
378. Article 1476 NCPC provides that an “arbitral award has force of res judicata 
with regard to the dispute it decides at the moment it is rendered”576. As per Article 1500 
NCPC577, Article 1476 NCPC applies to “arbitral awards rendered abroad or in 
international arbitration”.  
379. As the wording of Article 1476 NCPC is similar to the wording of Article 480 
NCPC578, it may be argued that the res judicata doctrine applies to awards in essentially 
the same way as it applies to judgments579. The applicability of the res judicata doctrine to 
awards appears to be subject to the same triple identity test580 and awards are generally 
afforded the same preclusive effects as judgments581. In a decision rendered by the 
                                                 
574 BORN, p. 2901 citing Vandenberg v Superior Court, 982 P.2d 229, 239 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1999). The 
California Supreme Court refused to apply offensive collateral estoppel. However, the court admitted 
that “[t]he predominant view is that unless the arbitral parties agreed otherwise, a judicially confirmed 
private arbitration award will have collateral estoppel effect, even in favor of nonparties to the arbitration, 
if the arbitrator actually and necessarily decided the issue sought to be foreclosed and the party against 
whom estoppel is invoked had full incentive and opportunity to litigate the matter”. See also In re 
Neopharm, Inc. Securities Litigation, 2007 WL 625533, at *6 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (“Ultimately, the court has 
discretion in determining whether to apply offensive collateral estoppel, especially based on an 
unconfirmed arbitration decision”); Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v Cunningham Lindsey Claims Management, Inc., 
2005 WL 1522783, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (“Furthermore, plaintiff hopes to use the Phase II award to 
make an argument for non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel. And while an arbitration decision's 
preclusive effect may be employed in this manner […], it is significant to note that such a use of collateral 
estoppel is markedly more difficult to invoke than other applications of the doctrine”). 
575 On 14 January 2011 the new French arbitration law (décret no 2011-48 du 13 janvier 2011 
portant réforme de l’arbitrage) was published. The Decree will not enter into force until 1 May 2011 and will 
not contain any substantial changes with regard to res judicata. While this research was conducted under 
the NCPC of 1981, reference will be made in footnotes to the new provisions in the Decree. 
576 Article 1484 Decree 2011-48. 
577 Article 1506 Decree 2011-48. 
578 Article 480 NCPC states in relevant part: “The judgment which decides in its holdings all or part of 
the main issue […] shall from the time of its pronouncement, become res judicata with regard to the 
dispute which it determines”. 
579 According to JARROSSON (L’autorité de la chose jugée des sentences arbitrales), even if the wording of 
Articles 1476 and 480 NCPC is similar and even if in practice awards generally have the same preclusive 
effects as judgments, “chose arbitrée” and “chose jugée” are not identical; the “chose arbitrée” of awards 
presents several particularities relating to the consensual nature of arbitration, the lack of formality in 
arbitration, and to the fact that awards are not attached to a particular legal order. 
580 JARROSSON, L’autorité de la chose jugée des sentences arbitrales. 
581 JARROSSON, L’autorité de la chose jugée des sentences arbitrales; BORN, p. 2907. 
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Tribunal de grande instance of Chaumont and confirmed by the Cour d’appel of Dijon, 
it was held that  
“An arbitral award is without any doubt a judicial act which is 
rendered by a private judge to whom the parties have 
submitted their dispute by mutual agreement and which is 
given by national law the same effects as a court judgment”582.  
380. Article 1476 NCPC does not define the term “award” and, hence, does not 
specify the type of award that may become res judicata. The general rule is that all 
decisions that can be properly qualified as awards may become res judicata583. Awards are 
final decisions of arbitrators on all or part of the dispute submitted to them, whether 
they concern the merits of the dispute, jurisdiction, or a procedural issue leading them 
to end the proceedings584. Provisional or preliminary awards do not become res 
judicata585.  
381. The general rule is that the res judicata effect of an award extends only to its 
dispositif586. However, unlike Article 480 NCPC, Article 1476 NCPC does not provide 
that the dispute is determined in the dispositif of the award. Likewise, Article 1471 
NCPC587 does not require that the award pronounces the arbitrators’ decision in the 
                                                 
582 Tribunal de grande instance de Chaumont, 31 January 2002/Cour d’appel de Dijon, 23 April 2002, 
JDI, Vol. 2 (2003), pp. 459 et seq. (original French version). 
583 JARROSSON, L’autorité de la chose jugée des sentences arbitrales. 
584 FOUCHARD/GAILLARD/GOLDMAN, para. 1353; JARROSSON, L’autorité de la chose jugée des 
sentences arbitrales, with reference to case law under fn 62.  
585 HASCHER, p. 28; SHEPPARD, The Scope and Res Judicata Effect of Arbitral Awards, p. 279; Cour d’appel 
de Paris, 29 April 2003, Société nationale des pétroles du Congo v Société Total Fina Elf E&P Congo, JDI, Vol. 2 
(2004), pp. 511 et seq. The Cour d’appel held that the ICC pre-arbitral referee procedure does not qualify 
as an arbitration procedure. Provisional measures issued by a pre-arbitral referee are of contractual nature 
and only have “autorité de la chose convenue”. See also Cour de cassation, 28 October 1987, SARL Bureau 
Qualitas et Conte v Viet et Boudy, Rev. arb., No. 1 (1988), pp. 149 et seq. The court held that the res judicata 
effect of an award may not extend to issues decided in the award, and even the dispositif, that do not relate 
to the dispute between the parties. The res judicata effect of an award does not cover the amount of the 
arbitrators’ fees fixed in the award, because it is not part of the subject matter in dispute between the 
parties. See also S.A.J. & P. Avax v Société Tecnimont SPA AS, Reims Cour d’Appel, Case No. 10/02888, 2 
November 2011. The Cour d’Appel of Reims held that a decision by the ICC dismissing a request for 
challenging the chairman of an arbitral tribunal is an administrative decision without res judicata. In 
addition, the Court held that a challenge of an arbitrator before an arbitration institution and the review 
of an award before a supervisory court in annulment proceedings do not have the same object.  
586 See, e.g., Cour de cassation, 26 January 2011, L'Institut national de la santé et de la recherche médicale 
(INSERM) v Fondation Letten F. Saugstad, no. 09-10.198; Cour d’appel de Paris, 28 February 2008, Société 
Liv Hidravlika DOO c SA Diebolt, Rev. arb., No. 4 (2008), pp. 712 et seq. See also JARROSSON, L’autorité 
de la chose jugée des sentences arbitrales. 
587 Article 1482 Decree 2011-48. 
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form of a dispositif. Hence, awards need not necessarily contain a dispositif. Accordingly, 
the Cour de cassation has held that res judicata effects should be given to the arbitral 
tribunal’s determinations, even if formally contained in the reasoning of the award, 
where the tribunal, after having analysed a given issue, has clearly rendered a decision 
on the issue588.  
382. French law grants awards substantially the same preclusive effects as judgments. 
With regard to the negative res judicata effect, it is clear that a valid award bars 
subsequent proceedings against the same opponent seeking the resolution of the same 
dispute based on the same grounds589.  
383. Awards seem to bar subsequent proceedings between the same parties even 
with regard to issues that were not, but could and should have been brought in the first 
arbitration590. This is suggested by the decision of the Courd d’appel of Paris in SA 
Thalès Air Défense v GIE Euromissile591. The Cour d’appel held that considerations of 
procedural good faith and honesty may bar a party from raising issues in subsequent 
arbitration proceedings that were not, but could and should have been raised in the first 
arbitration proceeding. Akin to the English rule in Henderson v Henderson, the Cour 
d’appel did not found this principle on res judicata but on good faith and honesty in 
proceedings592.  
384. In line with the decision in Thalès, the Cour de cassation confirmed that the 
principle of concentration of claims should apply in international arbitration. It thereby 
extended its jurisprudence in Cesareo to international arbitration. In Sté G. et A. 
                                                 
588 Cour de cassation, 25 March 1999, Acquier v Faure, Rev. arb., No. 2 (1999), pp. 311 et seq. See also Cour 
d’appel de Pau (Ch. 2, sect. 1), 22 February 2011, Société Carrefour proximité France v SARL Falco et fils (Rev. 
Arb., No. 1 (2011), p. 288) (“Il en résulte que l’autorité de la chose jugée ne se concentre pas dans le dispositif de la 
sentence mais que partie du dispositif peut être disséminé dans les motifs. En matière arbitrale, il convient de retenir une 
conception large de l’autorité de la chose jugée”). 
589 Cour d’appel de Paris, 18 December 1985, X v A et autres, Rev. arb., No. 2 (1988), p. 330. 
590 See JARROSSON, L’autorité de la chose jugée des sentences arbitrales. 
591 Cour d’appel de Paris, 18 November 2004, SA Thalès Air Défense v GIE Euromissile, Rev. arb., No. 3 
(2005), pp. 751 et seq. 
592 See Rev. arb., No. 3 (2005), p. 533 (“Considérant que si la loyauté et la bonne foi procédurale dans l’arbitrage 
international imposent bien aux parties de faire connaître leurs demandes le plus tôt possible, et notamment au stade de 
l’acte de mission où sont récapitulées les prétentions sur lesquelles portera l’instruction de manière à éviter qu’une demande 
qui aurait pu et dû être soulevée ne le soit par la suite dans un but dilatoire ou par simple negligence, la question de la 
sanction de cette obligation de concentrer les demandes dans la même instance se pose pour un second procès au fond devant 
l’arbitre [...]”).  
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Distribution SARL v Sté Prodim SAS the Cour de cassation, based this time on res judicata, 
held that a claimant must present all his claims arising out of the same set of facts when 
bringing an action593. While this decision concerned a domestic arbitration, the same 
solution should apply in an international arbitration pursuant to Article 1500 NCPC.  
385. With regard to the positive res judicata effect of awards, it is considered that a 
party may invoke a prior award in subsequent court or arbitration proceedings and 
request that the determinations of the prior award be implemented in the decision of 
the second court or arbitral tribunal594.  
386. Awards become res judicata the moment they are rendered. However, French law 
has yet to define when an international award is ‘rendered’595. If the award is set aside or 
refused recognition or enforcement the award cannot have res judicata effects in 
France596.  
387. Article 1476 NCPC is mandatory as it concerns the functioning of the French 
judicial system. Hence, the parties may not exclude the res judicata effect of awards 
under French arbitration law597.  
388. Awards rendered in violation of the doctrine of res judicata may be challenged on 
various grounds under Article 1502 NCPC598: 
389. Parties may invoke Article 1502 (1) NCPC claiming that the arbitrators 
                                                 
593 Cour de cassation, 28 May 2008, Sté G. et A. Distribution SARL v Sté Prodim SAS, Rev. arb., No. 3 
(2008), pp. 461 et seq. The Cour d’appel de Paris confirmed this decision in Cour d’appel de Paris, 18 
March 2010, Société Prodim S.A.S v Société G et A Distribution, Rev. arb., No. 2 (2010), pp. 345 et seq. See also 
Cour d’appel de Pau, 22 February 2011, Société Carrefour proximité France v SARL Falco et fils (Rev. Arb., 
No. 1 (2011), p. 287) (“l’appelante ne peut ignorer qu’il incombe au demandeur de presenter dans la meme instance 
toutes les demandes fondées sur la meme cause et qu’il ne peut invoquer dans une instance postérieure un fondement juridique 
qu’il s’était abstenu de soulever en temps utile”). 
594 TRAIN, L’autorité positive da la sentence arbitrale, p. 115. JARROSSON, L’autorité de la chose jugée des 
sentences arbitrales ; PINNA, para. 7.   
595 BENSAUDE, French Code of Civil Procedure, p. 892. 
596 DELVOLÉ/POINTIN/ROUCHE, para 341; FOUCHARD/GAILLARD/GOLDMAN, para. 
1419; ROBERT, para. 316. Tribunal de commerce de Nanterre, 5 September 2001, Société Technip France v 
Société Banque extérieure d’Algérie et autres, Rev. arb., No. 2 (2002), pp. 455 et seq. 
597 FOUCHARD/GAILLARD/GOLDMAN, para. 1419. 
598 See HASCHER, pp. 28 et seq.; JARROSSON, L’autorité de la chose jugée des sentences arbitrales. See also 
PINNA, paras 41 et seq.  
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rendered an award in the absence of an arbitration agreement599. Because an arbitral 
tribunal is rendered functus officio once the award is rendered, the tribunal lacks 
jurisdiction to reconsider a same dispute. If the tribunal reconsiders the same dispute in 
violation of res judicata, it acts without jurisdictional basis and the award may be 
challenged600.  
390. The parties may rely on Article 1502 (3) NCPC claiming that the arbitral 
tribunal did not render its award in accordance with the mandate conferred upon it601. 
The arbitrators violate their mandate if they reconsider a matter that has already been 
settled in a prior award602 or judgment603.  
391. The parties may invoke Article 1502 (4) NCPC claiming that the arbitral 
tribunal violated their right to be heard in contradictory proceedings604. This may be the 
case where an arbitral tribunal refuses to decide a matter or accept new evidence on the 
grounds that the matter was already finally decided, if that matter was not distinctly 
raised and determined in the prior proceedings605.  
392. Finally, the parties may invoke Article 1502 (5) NCPC claiming that an award 
rendered in violation of the doctrine of res judicata is contrary to public policy606. In 
France a mere violation of the doctrine of res judicata generally is not contrary to public 
policy607. For there to be a violation of public policy, an award must be irreconcilable 
                                                 
599 Article 1520 (1) Decree 2011-48 now allows setting aside of the award if the tribunal “has mistakenly 
declared itself to have or not to have jurisdiction”. 
600 Cour d’appel de Paris, 25 June 1982, Société Grainex v Société Cargill, Rev. arb., No. 3 (1983), pp. 344-45. 
The arbitral tribunal was entitled to accept jurisdiction to reconsider the dispute because the arbitration 
agreement reserved the right of the parties to resubmit their dispute to arbitration.  
601 Article 1520 (3) Decree 2011-48. 
602 See, e.g., Cour d’appel de Paris, 2 April 1998, Société Technip v Société Asmidal, Rev. arb., No. 4 (1999), pp. 
821 et seq. The court held that the arbitrators had simply clarified the terms of their prior partial award by 
designating the issues already decided and the issues not yet decided. In doing so, the arbitrators had not 
exceeded their mandate (see extract reported by HASCHER, fn 44); Cour d’appel de Paris, 16 February 
1995, Alama El Radi Khalil Ali Darwish v Société Huure Oy, Rev. arb. (1996), p. 128. (see extract reported by 
HASCHER, fn 45). 
603 See HASCHER, p. 29 with reference to Cour d’appel de Paris, 29 April 1986, Polyfrance Imma v 
Sporprom Service BV; Cour d’appel de Paris, 16 April 1996, Gallay v Fabricated Metal, Rev. arb., No. 4 (2001), 
pp. 805 et seq.  
604 Article 1520 (4) Decree 2011-48. 
605 HASCHER, p. 29 with reference to Cour d’appel of Paris, 12 January 1996, Gouvernement de l’Etat du 
Qatar v Crighton Ltd, Rev. arb., No. 3 (1996), pp. 428 et seq.  
606 Article 1520 (5) Decree 2011-48. 
607 See, e.g., JAROSSON, L’autorité de la chose jugée des sentences arbitrales; HASCHER, p. 29 with reference to 
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with another award or judgment608.  
2.1.1.4. Switzerland 
393. In Switzerland international arbitration is functionally equivalent to litigation, 
provided it meets certain minimum procedural requirements609. Awards are judicial acts 
and have res judicata effect. Article 190 (1) PILA provides that an “award is final from 
the time when it is communicated” to the parties610. Finality here is equivalent to res 
judicata effect611.  
394. While Swiss law does not define the term “award”, it is generally considered 
that awards are judicial acts that definitely decide a substantive or jurisdictional 
controversy. The notion of “award” generally covers full final awards which dispose of 
the claim in full, as well as partial final awards in which the arbitral tribunal definitely 
decides a quantitatively limited part of the claim, the remainder being the object of a 
subsequent award612. It is not clear whether the notion also covers interim or 
preliminary awards613. While interim awards determine a specific procedural or 
substantive issue, they do not constitute final decisions on a formal request. They 
determine a preliminary substantive question (e.g. the validity of a contract leaving the 
issue of termination to a later decision) or a procedural exception (e.g. on jurisdiction or 
the defence of res judicata) on the way to the final decision614. It is clear that mere 
                                                                                                                                         
case law in fn 56. 
608 JARROSSON, L’autorité de la chose jugée des sentences arbitrales with reference to Cour d’appel de Paris, 10 
March 2005, SA Sucres et denrées v Scté Multitrade Cairo, Rev. arb. (2006), p. 458. See also Cour d’appel de 
Paris, 11 May 2006, Groupe Antoine Tabet v Républic du Congo, Rev. arb. (2007), p. 101. The court confirmed 
that the contradiction of decisions amounts to a violation of public policy, whether the contradiction 
occurs between awards rendered by different arbitral tribunals or between awards rendered within the 
same arbitration; Cour d’appel de Paris, 9 September 2010, Marriott v Jnah development, Les Cahiers de 
l’Arbitrage, Vol. 4 (2010), pp. 1171 et seq.  
609 BERTI/SCHNYDER, ad Art. 190 PILA, para. 2, p. 571.  
610 According to case law and unanimous legal doctrine, the term “final“ in Article 190 (1) PILA implies 
that an award is both enforceable and has res judicata effects by operation of law (See, e.g., 
BERGER/KELLERHALS, para. 1494a, p. 427; POUDRET/BESSON, para. 853, p. 795; DTF 117 Ia 166, c.5a). 
611 BUCHER/TSCHANZ, para. 264; VON SEGESSER/SCHRAMM, p. 955. 
612 WIRTH, ad Art. 188 PILA, para. 6, p. 534; LALIVE/POUDRET/REYMOND, ad Art. 188, paras 3-
4, pp. 405-6. 
613 Pro: WIRTH, ad Art. 189, para. 2, p. 546; BUCHER/TSCHANZ, para. 255. See also 
FOUCHARD/GAILLARD/GOLDMAN, para. 1357. 
614 WIRTH, ad Art. 188, paras 7 and 10, pp. 535 and 536; LIEBSCHER, p. 136. On the distinction 
between full final, final partial and interim awards see also KAUFMANN-KOHLER/RIGOZZI, paras 
671a et seq.; MÜLLER, pp. 210 et seq.; LALIVE/POUDRET/REYMOND, ad Art. 188, paras 3 et seq., pp. 
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procedural orders and decisions relating exclusively to provisional or conservatory 
measures are not awards615.  
395. The distinction between final and interim awards is essential. All final awards, 
but only these, become res judicata pursuant to Article 190 (1) PILA616. Hence, only full 
final and partial final awards may become res judicata, to the exclusion of interim 
awards617. Interim awards do not obtain res judicata effects, but they are binding on the 
arbitral tribunal during the further course of the proceedings618. It is widely accepted 
that procedural orders and provisional or conservatory measures do not have any res 
judicata effect619.  
396. Awards on jurisdiction may be final if the arbitral tribunal decides that it lacks 
jurisdiction620. Such negative awards on jurisdiction may have res judicata effect621. By 
contrast, an award by which an arbitral tribunal accepts jurisdiction over at least some 
aspects of the dispute is considered an interim award622. This means that it does not 
have res judicata effect, but is binding on the arbitral tribunal in the ongoing conduct of 
the arbitration623. However, positive awards on jurisdiction can (and must) be 
                                                                                                                                         
405 et seq.; POUDRET/BESSON, para. 731. Partial and interim awards may be challenged directly on the 
grounds of irregular composition of the arbitral tribunal and lack of jurisdiction (Article 190 (2)(a) and (b) 
PILA). A challenge on other grounds may only be made if the award causes irreparable detriment to the 
party concerned (DTF 116 II 80; DTF 115 II 288 ; LIEBSCHER, p. 136). 
615 BUCHER/TSCHANZ, para. 255; BESSON, Swiss Rules of International Arbitration, ad Art. 32, para. 14, 
p. 286. However, in one case the Federal Tribunal accepted to deal with a challenge of a decision 
whereby the arbitral tribunal decided on its competence to repeat parts of the proceedings as one of the 
arbitrators had been replaced. The Federal Tribunal thus treated the decision as an award (DTF, 14 June 
1990, ASA Bulletin, Vol. 12, No. 2 (1994), p. 226). 
616 BERGER/KELLERHALS, paras 1500 et seq; MÜLLER, p. 222; DTF 128 III 191, 194. 
617 DTF 4A_458/2009, 10 June 2010, ASA Bulletin, Vol. 3 (2010), p. 520. The Federal Tribunal 
confirmed that partial awards bind the arbitral tribunal who has rendered them, as well as the parties to 
the extent that they have not challenged the partial awards. See also KAUFMANN-
KOHLER/RIGOZZI, paras 694c et seq. 
618 DTF 128 III 191. See also BERGER/KELLERHALS, para. 1503; CORBOZ, p. 19; WIRTH, ad Art. 
188, paras 22-23, p. 540; BERTI/SCHNYDER, ad Art. 190 PILA, paras 20 and 23, p. 574; MÜLLER, p. 
212; BESSON, Swiss Rules of International Arbitration, ad Art. 32, para. 18, p. 287; SHEPPARD, The Scope 
and Res Judicata Effect of Arbitral Awards, p. 279. 
619 POUDRET/BESSON, para. 728; OETIKER, ad Art. 26, para. 30, p. 239; 
BERGER/KELLERHALS, para. 1505. 
620 BESSON, Swiss Rules of International Arbitration, ad Art. 32, para. 9, p. 285; 
LALIVE/POUDRET/REYMOND, ad Art. 188, para. 4, p. 406 ; MÜLLER, p. 229. 
621 BUCHER/TSCHANZ, para. 276. 
622 BESSON, Swiss Rules of International Arbitration, ad Art. 32, para. 9, p. 285; GIRSBERGER/VOSER, 
para. 962. 
623 POUDRET/BESSON, para. 728 and para. 731.  
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challenged immediately before the Federal Tribunal624. For this reason they are treated 
like a final award. Unlike other interim awards, a positive award on jurisdiction that was 
not challenged or was upheld by the Federal Tribunal has conclusive and preclusive 
effects, akin to res judicata effects625.  
397. Awards have res judicata effect the moment they are notified to the parties626. 
This res judicata effect becomes absolute if the parties do not bring annulment 
proceedings in a timely manner or if the annulment action is dismissed. The award loses 
its res judicata effects if the award is set aside627.  
398. In Switzerland awards have the same res judicata effects as judgments628. The 
positive res judicata effect commands that final determinations made in the dispositif of 
the award are binding in subsequent court or arbitration proceedings between the same 
parties or their successors. The negative res judicata effect bars subsequent proceedings 
in the identical matter629. If an identical action is nevertheless brought within 
Switzerland, such action would be met by a res judicata defence which must be 
considered ex officio. Granting this defence would not entail a lack of jurisdiction of the 
second court or arbitral tribunal, but would lead to the inadmissibility of the new 
proceedings630.  
399. The res judicata effect of an award is limited to its dispositif. However, the reasons 
may be taken into account to determine the exact sense, nature and scope of the 
award’s dispositif631. 
400. An arbitral tribunal sitting in Switzerland violates procedural public policy if it 
                                                 
624 KAUFMANN-KOHLER/RIGOZZI, para. 671e. 
625 BERGER/KELLERHALS, para. 655. See also PFISTERER/SCHNYDER, p. 48. 
626 Article 190 (1) PILA; BERGER/KELLERHALS, para. 1499; GIRSBERGER/VOSER, para. 1022. 
627 BERTI/SCHNYDER, ad Art. 190 PILA, para. 8, p. 572. 
628 WALTER/BOSCH/BRÖNNIMANN, ad Art. 187-Art. 190 (1), p. 204; BERGER/KELLERHALS, 
para. 1511. 
629 BERTI/SCHNYDER, ad Art. 190 PILA, paras 9-10, p. 572. 
630 DTF, 20 September 2000, République de Pologne v Saar Papier Vertriebs-GmbH et tribunal arbitral CCI 
Zurich, ASA Bulletin 2001, pp. 487 et seq., consid. 3b; BERTI/SCHNYDER, ad Art. 190 PILA, para. 12, 
p. 573 ; MÜLLER, p. 194. See however DTF 127 III 279 (consid. 2b) where the Federal Tribunal stated 
that the granting of a res judicata defence entails the lack of jurisdiction of the second judge (“quant à 
l’autorité de la chose jugée, ce principe interdit au juge de connaître d’une cause qui a déjà été définitivement tranchée; ce 
mécanisme exclut définitivement la compétence du second juge“). 
631 DTF 128 III 191, consid. 4a; MÜLLER, p. 222. 
Res Judicata in International Commercial Arbitration - A Problem 
131 
 
renders an award without taking into account the res judicata effect of a prior award or 
judgment between the same parties, or if it departs in its final award from the findings 
expressed in a previous partial award deciding a preliminary issue on the merits632.  
401. Since the res judicata defence may only entail the inadmissibility of new 
proceedings and not a lack of jurisdiction of the new tribunal, an arbitral tribunal that 
admits its jurisdiction despite the existence of a prior award or judgment in an identical 
matter does not violate Article 190 (2)(b) PILA according to which an award may be set 
aside “where the arbitral tribunal has wrongly declared itself to have […] jurisdiction”. 
In such a situation the only possible ground for setting aside the award is a violation of 
public policy pursuant to Article 190 (2)(e) PILA633.  
402. An arbitral tribunal violates the doctrine of res judicata if it reconsiders its award 
when responding to a request for correction or interpretation of the award. It has been 
submitted that in such a situation the tribunal exceeds its jurisdiction and a party can 
request the annulment of the interpretation or correction pursuant to Article 190 (2)(b) 
PILA634.  
403. Finally, while the prevailing view in Switzerland is that the question of the res 
judicata effect of awards is a procedural question, the preclusive effects of a foreign 
award in Switzerland are not determined exclusively by Swiss law. A foreign award has 
the effects which it would have under the law of the country where it was rendered, but 
it may not have further preclusive effects than an award rendered in Switzerland635.  
2.1.1.5. UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 
404. The UNCITRAL Model Law adopts the general principle that awards have res 
judicata effect between the parties. Article 35 (1) ML states that “[a]n arbitral award, 
irrespective of the country in which it was made, shall be recognized as binding […]”. 
                                                 
632 DTF 4A_490/2009, consid. 2.1; DTF 4P.4/2007, consid. 5.1; DTF 127 III 279, consid. 2b ; DTF 128 
III 191, consid. 4a; MÜLLER, pp. 211 et seq. and pp. 303 et seq.; POUDRET/BESSON, para. 816. 
633 DTF, 20 September 2000, République de Pologne v Saar Papier Vertriebs-GmbH et tribunal arbitral CCI 
Zurich, consid. 3b (cited supra, fn 630). 
634 VEIT, ad Art. 35/36, para. 18, p. 314. 
635 PATOCCHI/JERMINI, ad Art. 194 PILA, para. 136, pp. 673 et seq. See also 
STAEHELIN/STAEHELIN/GROLIMUND, para. 24, p. 420. 
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The travaux préparatoires specify that the phrase “shall be recognized as binding” refers 
to the res judicata effect of awards.  
405. The Model Law leaves many questions open with regard to the res judicata effect 
of awards. The requirements that must be met for an award to become res judicata, and 
the extent of the preclusive effects of an award that is res judicata are not specified by 
either the text of the Model Law or the travavaux préparatoires. There is no indication as 
to whether the res judicata effect of an award is limited to its dispositif or may extend to 
some of its reasoning.  
406. During the elaboration of the Model Law several attempts were made to further 
define the phrase “shall be recognized as binding”. Several proposals were made to 
indicate the exact point of time from which an award is binding. The Commission 
ultimately followed a suggestion made by the Soviet Union regarding the point of time 
when foreign awards become binding636 stating that 
“[a]s regards foreign arbitral awards, that question would have 
to be answered, in conformity with the rule laid down in article 
36(1)(a)(v), by the law of the State in which, or under the law 
of which, the award was made”637.  
407. The question of when a domestic award, i.e. an award made in the country 
where recognition or enforcement is sought, becomes binding was debated by the 
Commission in connection with Article 31 ML which concerns the form and contents 
of an award. Three possible dates were suggested: (i) the date the award was made; (ii) 
the date the award was received by either the party against whom it was being invoked 
or the last party to receive notification, or (iii) the date the period for setting aside the 
award expired638. Because no agreement could be reached, no provision specifying the 
date when an award becomes final was ultimately included. 
                                                 
636 See Sixth Secretariat Note, analytical compilation of government comments, A/CN.9/263 (19 March 
1985), reported in HOLTZMANN/NEUHAUS, para. 2, p. 1037. 
637 Commission Report, A/40/17 (21 August 1985), reported in HOLTZMANN/NEUHAUS, para. 312, 
p. 1051. 
638 HOLTZMANN/NEUHAUS, ad Article 31, para. 35, p. 842. See also Commission Report, A/40/17 
(21 August 1985), reported in HOLTZMANN/NEUHAUS, para. 256, p. 865. For the discussion, see 
Summary Record, A/CN.9/SR.328-.329,.333, reported in HOLTZMANN/NEUHAUS, paras 25 et seq., 
pp. 857 et seq. 
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408. For the same reason the Model Law does not contain any definition of the term 
“award” for the purposes of Article 35 (1) or otherwise. Both the Working Group and 
the Commission considered including a general definition of the term “award” in 
Article 2 ML. However, no agreement on an acceptable general definition could be 
reached. The Working Group considered the following proposal: 
“‘award’ means a final award which disposes of all issues 
submitted to the arbitral tribunal and any other decision of the 
arbitral tribunal which finally determine[s] any question of 
substance or the question of its competence or any other 
question of procedure but, in the latter case, only if the arbitral 
tribunal terms its decision an award”639. 
409. While there was wide support for the first part of the definition (up to the word 
“substance”) serious concerns were expressed with regard to the second part, in 
particular the part concerning decisions on questions of procedure. Ultimately, the 
Working Group decided not to include a definition in the Model Law and invited the 
Commission to consider the matter. The Commission also left the term undefined640.  
2.1.2. Institutional Arbitration Rules 
410. Many institutional arbitration rules provide that awards are “final and binding” 
on the parties. For example, Article 34 (2) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules states 
that 
“[a]ll awards shall be made in writing and shall be final and 
binding on the parties. The parties shall carry out all awards 
without delay”641. 
411. Article 26 (9) of the LCIA Rules contains a similar rule. Article 26 (7) further 
specifies that the arbitral tribunal has the power to “make separate awards on different 
issues at different times” and that such awards “have the same status and effect as any 
other award made by the Arbitral Tribunal”. 
                                                 
639 Fifth Working Group Report, A/CN.9/246 (6 March 1984), reported in 
HOLTZMANN/NEUHAUS, para. 192, pp. 164-65. 
640 HOLTZMANN/NEUHAUS, ad Article 2, pp. 153-54. 
641 An almost identical provision is contained in the ICDR International Dispute Resolution Procedures 
(Article 27 (1)), the CRCICA Arbitration Rules (Article 32 (2)), the SIAC Arbitration Rules (Article 28.9), 
the SCC Rules (Article 40) and the Swiss Rules of International Arbitration (Article 32 (2)). See also 
Article 43 (8) of the CIETAC Arbitration Rules. 
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412. Variations of the phrase “final and binding” exist in other institutional rules. 
For example, according to Article 64 (b) of the WIPO Arbitration Rules an award is 
“effective and binding” on the parties.  
413. Some institutional rules use only the word “binding”. For instance, Article 28 
(6) of the ICC Rules of Arbitration states that “[e]ach award shall be binding on the 
parties”642.  
414. Finally, Article 37 of the Rules of the International Commercial Arbitration 
Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation states that 
“[t]he arbitral proceedings shall be terminated with the making of a final award”. 
415. While all of these provisions confirm the positive res judicata effect of awards, 
they do not give any guidance with respect to the awards’ negative res judicata effect643. 
However, it has been suggested that by agreeing to arbitration pursuant to such 
institutional arbitration rules, the parties accept the negative res judicata effect of any 
valid award644.  
416. Some rules state the date when an award becomes res judicata645. There appear to 
be no provisions making any further specifications with regard to the res judicata effects 
of awards; there are no institutional arbitration rules providing any guidance as to how 
arbitral tribunals should deal with res judicata issues, save for general rules prescribing 
arbitral tribunals to act within the boundaries of their jurisdiction and in accordance 
with the applicable law646.  
417. The extent of the res judicata effect of awards rendered pursuant to the above 
institutional rules is not clear. It is not clear whether the res judicata effect of such awards 
is limited to the award’s dispositif. Many institutional arbitration rules prescribe that an 
                                                 
642 See also Article 51 NAI Arbitration Rules. 
643 SHEPPARD, The Scope and Res Judicata Effect of Arbitral Awards, p. 277. 
644 ILA, Interim Report, p. 23.  
645 Articles 51 NAI Arbitration Rules and Article 40 SCC Arbitration Rules provide that an award is 
binding from the day it is rendered. According to Article 64 (b) of the WIPO Arbitration Rules an award 
is binding as from the date it is communicated by the Centre. 
646 ILA, Interim Report, p. 23; SHEPPARD, The Scope and Res Judicata Effect of Arbitral Awards, p. 277. 
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award shall state the reasons upon which it is based647. It has been submitted that with 
regard to awards rendered under such institutional rules, the reasons necessary to the 
award’s dispositif should be covered by its res judicata effect. Further, it has been 
suggested that future versions of these rules could expressly implement the doctrine of 
issue estoppel by prescribing that the parties are presumed to have agreed to be bound 
in subsequent proceedings by the reasons which form the necessary basis of the dispositif 
648.  
2.1.3. International Commercial Arbitration Conventions 
418. There are several international conventions on international commercial 
arbitration, most importantly the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards which is one of the most widely accepted 
international conventions. Given its importance, the primary focus of the following 
analysis will be on the New York Convention.  
2.1.3.1. 1958 New York Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
419. Article III of the New York Convention prescribes that “[e]ach Contracting 
State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding […]”. This simply confirms the general 
principle that arbitral awards have res judicata effect. However, the New York 
Convention does not provide a definition of the types of awards that must be 
recognised as binding. Furthermore, Article III does not expressly prescribe any 
particular rules of res judicata.  
420. According to Born, the New York Convention must be understood as 
prescribing international standards that ensure the binding character of awards and that 
preclude national courts from denying res judicata effects to arbitral awards649. In 
                                                 
647 See, e.g., Article 25 (2) ICC Arbitration Rules ; Article 34 (3) UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules; Article 27 
(2) ICDR International Dispute Resolution Procedures; Article 26 (1) LCIA Arbitration Rules; Article 32 
(3) CRCICA Rules; Article 36 (1) SCC Arbitration Rules; Article 32 (3) Swiss Rules. 
648 VEEDER, pp. 78 et seq.; ILA, Interim Report, p. 23.  
649 BORN, p. 2890 (“Where the parties have agreed to resolution of their disputes in a single, centralized 
forum, specifically to avoid the costs and delays of multiplicitous litigations in national courts, the 
Convention’s requirement that Contracting States recognize such agreements, and the resulting awards, 
implies even broader principles of preclusion than national court judgments which rest on a structural 
premise of multiple possible forums and proceedings. The precise contours of the international 
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particular, Article III “provides for a broad, constitutional statement of principle that 
must be elaborated by national courts and arbitral tribunals”650. It requests Contracting 
States to afford at least the same, and arguably even greater, res judicata effects to awards 
as granted to judgments651.  
421. Born submits that Article III NYC should provide for a broad res judicata 
doctrine, akin to the doctrine known in common law jurisdictions. The res judicata effect 
of the award should cover all claims arising out of a dispute, wheter or not they were 
asserted during the arbitration proceeding. All claims that were within the scope of the 
arbitration agreement and that were related to the claims asserted in the arbitration 
should be covered by the res judicata effect of the award652.  
422. While it should generally be possible to interpret Article III NYC in the way 
suggested by Born, it remains that the wording of the Convention does not prescribe 
any particular rules of preclusion for international arbitral awards. Furthermore, it is 
widely considered that the New York Convention does not apply (at least directly) to 
arbitral tribunals653. Even if its provisions must be considered by arbitral tribunals, the 
Convention still does not give any guidance to arbitral tribunals as to how to deal with 
res judicata issues, except for requiring them to respect the binding effect of prior 
awards. Moreover, the Convention does not address the question of the binding effect 
of prior judgments in arbitral proceedings.  
2.1.3.2. Other multilateral international commercial arbitration conventions 
423. The 1961 European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration does 
not contain any rule providing for the binding effect of awards. This might be explained 
                                                                                                                                         
preclusion rules applicable in particular cases is to be developed by national courts in light of general 
principles of international law and in light of the parties’ expectations. Fundamental to this analysis, 
however, is the obligation to treat arbitral awards no less favorably, insofar as preclusive effects are 
concerned, than national court judgments and to give effect to the terms and objectives of the parties’ 
agreement to arbitrate”). 
650 BORN, p. 2891. 
651 BORN, p. 2892. 
652 BORN, pp. 2892 et seq. According to BÖRNER (p. 115), Article III may provide for collateral 
estoppel (“[…] an arbitral award may be seen as having res judicata effect on third parties that seek to 
relitigate the issue resolved by the tribunal, at least until one of the parties to the award succeeds in 
having the award judicially modified”). 
653 See POUDRET/BESSON, para. 185.  
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by the fact that the Convention only sought to supplement the New York 
Convention654. 
424. The 1975 Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration 
affords awards the same effects as judgments. Article 4 states that 
“[a]n arbitral decision or award that is not appealable under the 
applicable law or procedural rules shall have the force of a final 
judicial judgment”. 
425. Similarly, Article 25 of the OHADA Treaty on the Harmonisation of Business 
Law in Africa provides: 
“Award pronounced in compliance with the stipulations 
provided herein shall have final and conclusive authorities in 
the territory of each Contracting State as judgments delivered 
by their national courts”655. 
426. Finally, the 1987 Amman Arab Convention on Commercial Arbitration does 
not contain any rule concerning the binding effects of arbitral awards. It only states that 
the Supreme Court of each contracting State must give leave to enforce to awards of 
the arbitral tribunal656. 
2.1.4. International Arbitration “Soft Law”: The ILA Reports and 
Recommendations on Res Judicata and Arbitration 
427. As was seen above, based on two reports, in 2006 the ILA adopted six 
recommendations on res judicata for international arbitrators657. While it is not yet 
possible to determine the extend to which the reports and recommendations will 
establish themselves to supplement existing international arbitration “hard law”, it has 
been noted that they have been well received by arbitrators as a useful guide to assist 
them in addressing res judicata issues. They have been considered in a number of recent 
and ongoing cases658. The ILA reports and recommendations will be discussed in 
                                                 
654 LEW/MISTELIS/KRÖLL, paras 26-23. 
655 See also Article 23 of the 1999 OHADA Uniform Act on Arbitration (“As soon as the award is made, 
the dispute so settled is res judicata”). 
656 Article 35.  
657 See supra, paras 7 et seq. 
658 DE LY/SHEPPARD, p. 2. 
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further detail in Chapters Five and Six below. 
2.1.5. Conclusion 
428. As the above review has shown, none of the provisions in domestic arbitration 
laws, institutional arbitration rules and international arbitration conventions goes 
beyond stating the general principle that awards are binding upon the parties.  
429. Domestic arbitration laws generally do not specify either the requirements that 
must be met for an award to become res judicata or the specific effects of an award that 
is res judicata. National courts in common law and civil law jurisdictions seem to 
consider awards as equivalent to judgments with respect to res judicata659 and generally 
apply very similar res judicata rules to awards as those applied to judgments. As a 
consequence, the doctrine of res judicata as applied to awards varies from country to 
country.  
430. National arbitration laws and courts have devoted only little attention to the 
role of international arbitration conventions, in particular the New York Convention, or 
other sources of international arbitration law in determining res judicata rules for 
awards660. Res judicata rules for awards are almost entirely built on domestic litigation 
rules. While this is understandable, it is surprising given the fact that awards are today 
rendered and recognised according to international standards661. It is interesting to note 
that the transposition of domestic litigation rules to awards does not appear to have 
been the result of a thorough analysis of arbitral preclusion. It is often done without 
examining whether, and to what extent, the analogy between litigation and arbitration is 
appropriate662.  
                                                 
659 SHANY, Competing Jurisdictions, p. 166. 
660 BORN, p. 2888. 
661 BREKOULAKIS, p. 207. 
662 See supra para. 364. See also BORN, p. 2916. But see the Fomento decision of the Swiss Federal 
Tribunal. The court first stated the litigation rules of res judicata and lis pendens and then examined whether 
different rules should apply where the second court seised is an arbitral tribunal with seat in Switzerland. 
The Federal Tribunal acknowledged that, given the private nature of arbitration, arbitral tribunals should 
not always be treated in the same way as state courts. However, it held that since awards may be enforced 
in the same way as judgments there is a same interest to avoid inconsistent decisions within a same 
jurisdiction. Further, arbitral tribunals may not invoke their particular nature to avoid applying res judicata 
rules. The court concluded that an arbitral tribunal with seat in Switzerland must apply the same rules as a 
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431. The analysis of institutional arbitration rules and arbitration conventions has 
shown that none of these international instruments give any particular guidance to 
arbitral tribunals as to how to deal with res judicata issues arising before them. 
432. Arbitral tribunals faced with res judicata issues must answer several important 
questions663. For instance: 
- Which law governs res judicata in international arbitration proceedings? 
- Which requirements must be met for the res judicata doctrine to apply and how must 
these requirements be interpreted?  
- Which type of decision may operate as res judicata in subsequent arbitration 
proceedings?  
- Is it necessary to determine whether a prior foreign judgment or award may be 
recognised or enforced at the place of arbitration?  
- To what extent should reasons be given res judicata effect?  
- Should a party be precluded from raising issues that were not, but could and should 
have been brought in the prior proceedings? 
- Even if a prior award or judgment meets all the requirements for having res judicata 
effect, are there any exceptional circumstances preventing the application of res 
judicata?  
- What effects may be given to a prior award or judgment that does not have res 
judicata effect?  
433. International arbitration law does not give answers to any of these questions. 
Domestic rules of res judicata designed for litigation are the most detailed set of rules. 
Extended to awards they provide answers to some of the questions raised above. 
However, the appropriateness of applying domestic litigation rules of res judicata in 
                                                                                                                                         
Swiss court placed in the same situation (DTF 127 III 279, consid. 2c). 
663 See SHEPPARD, Res judicata and estoppel, pp. 229 et seq. See also ILA, Interim Report, pp. 25 et seq. 
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international arbitration is uncertain. This question will be examined in the following 
chapter of this research. 
434. The question that arises now is how arbitral tribunals currently deal with res 
judicata issues in the absence of any particular rules provided by international arbitration 
law. It is necessary to examine arbitration case law to look for an established arbitration 
practice or trend among arbitral tribunals that might fill some of the gaps left open by 
international arbitration law.  
2.2. International Commercial Arbitration Practice 
435. There are only a few published awards in which the res judicata effects of a prior 
judgment or award were considered by an arbitral tribunal. On several occasions only 
extracts of the award were published making it impossible to define the precise 
situation in which the res judicata issue arose or to draw meaningful conclusions as to 
how the arbitral tribunal dealt with the res judicata issue. From the review of arbitration 
case law it did not emerge that arbitrators make a distinction as to whether a prior 
decision was a judgment or an award. By contrast, arbitrators seem to treat judgments 
and awards alike for purposes of res judicata. For this reason, the analysis below will not 
draw this distinction. 
436. The general result of the review of arbitration case law is that no established 
practice or trend may be discerned from publicly available awards with respect to most 
res judicata questions. Like international arbitration law, arbitration practice does not go 
much further than affirming the general principle that awards have res judicata effects. 
This principle is well-established in practice. It also appears well-established that the 
doctrine of res judicata applies only where the triple identity test is met. However, there 
is disagreement on how to interpret the notions of parties, cause and object.  
437. Some of the most relevant awards with regard to res judicata will be examined 
below. This will show that different arbitral tribunals have dealt with res judicata issues 
differently; proposing different solutions to identical problems.  
438. First, the review will investigate which law or rules of law arbitral tribunals have 
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applied to res judicata issues (2.2.1.). It will then look at the requirements that have to be 
met for arbitral tribunals to apply the doctrine of res judicata (2.2.2.). Third, it will 
investigate whether arbitral tribunals have afforded prior decisions broad or narrow res 
judicata effects, including whether arbitral tribunals have given res judicata effects only to 
a prior decision’s dispositif or also to its reasoning (2.2.3.). Fourth, the analysis will 
investigate whether there are circumstances in which arbitral tribunals have refused to 
apply the res judicata doctrine, even though the requirements for its application were met 
(2.2.4.). Finally, it will determine whether and to what extent arbitral tribunals have 
granted preclusive effects to prior judgments or awards although they did not qualify as 
res judicata (2.2.5.).  
2.2.1. Which law governs res judicata issues in arbitration proceedings? 
439. No clear choice-of-law rule has crystallised from international arbitration 
practice. Surprisingly, arbitral tribunals have afforded the question of the proper law 
governing res judicata relatively little consideration. If the tribunal determined a particular 
law or rules of law to govern res judicata, it rarely explained the reasons behind its 
choice-of-law664.  
440. Most arbitral tribunals applied domestic res judicata rules designed for litigation 
to determine the effects of a prior award or judgment. This is consistent with the 
origins of preclusion rules in domestic litigation and the application of domestic 
preclusion rules to awards by state courts665. In most cases, the domestic law applied 
was the law of the place of arbitration666. However, the tribunals rarely explained why 
                                                 
664 In this sense, see also MAYER, Litispendance, connexité et chose jugée dans l'arbitrage international, p. 188. 
665 BORN, p. 2917. It may also be explained by international arbitrators’ reluctance to adopt more 
innovative solutions (such as the reference to transnational law) whenever they are able to motivate their 
decisions in more traditional terms, which seem more likely to ensure the awards’ enforceability (see 
LALIVE, Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy, paras 100b et seq.). 
666 HASCHER, p. 18. See also ICC Case Nos 2745 and 2762, 1977 (The arbitral tribunal applied the 
“French and Belgian notion of res judicata”. The seat of the arbitration was in France. The first award had 
also been rendered in France. The arbitral tribunal specified that this choice-of-law was independant of 
the law governing the merits, which was Belgian law. It seems that the tribunal determined French law to 
govern res judicata as the law of the seat of the arbitration. The tribunal noted that the parties had 
submitted their dispute to arbitration in France and to French procedural law. It is important to note that 
in 1977, when the second arbitration took place, in the absence of an express choice of law it was 
presumed that by choosing France as the arbitral seat the parties also impliedly chose French procedural 
law. This presumption was abandoned with the law reform of 1981); ICC Case No. 3540, 1988 (reported 
by HASCHER, p. 18)(After stating that res judicata issues are matters of procedure, the arbitral tribunal 
The Doctrine of Res Judicata Before International Arbitral Tribunals 
 
142 
 
they considered the domestic litigation rules of the place of arbitration to be 
applicable667. Arbitral tribunals sometimes invoked the traditional rationale that res 
judicata must be characterised as procedural and, therefore, be governed by the law of 
the seat668.  
441. Frequently, the law of the place of arbitration was also the law of the country 
where the first decision was rendered669, the law governing the merits or the law relied 
upon by the parties670. In these cases, it is often impossible to ascertain in which quality 
the particular law was applied, or whether the tribunal intended to apply one particular 
law or several different laws cumulatively. In ICC Case No. 7438 of 1994 the arbitral 
tribunal sitting in Zurich applied the procedural law of the canton of Zurich. The sole 
arbitrator based its choice-of-law on three considerations. First, the arbitration clause 
provided for arbitration in Zurich. Second, the agreement concerning the place of 
arbitration was confirmed in the terms of reference. Third, the seat of the first arbitral 
tribunal was also in Zurich and the first award was rendered in this city. According to 
Hascher, the arbitrator’s reasoning leads to believe that he intended to apply the law of 
the place of arbitration and the law of the place where the first award was rendered 
                                                                                                                                         
applied the law of civil procedure of the canton of Geneva, because there were no res judicata rules 
provided for in neither the ICC Rules nor the Swiss Concordat on arbitration); ICC Case No. 5901, 1989 
(reported by HASCHER, p. 19 and GRIGERA NAÓN, pp. 168 et seq.)(The arbitral tribunal first stated 
that res judicata was a question of procedure and that before a state court the applicable conflict-of-laws 
rule would normally designate the lex fori to govern res judicata issues. The arbitral tribunal then admitted 
that arbitral tribunals do not have a lex fori. Nevertheless, the tribunal applied French law to res judicata 
because it was the law of the seat of arbitration and the award might be challenged before the French 
courts. The tribunal added that “it is obviously natural to look to the laws of France, particularly since the 
law of arbitration of France makes specific reference to the ‘res judicata’ effects or ‘autorité de la chose jugée’ 
of arbitration awards”); ICC Case No. 7438, 1994 (reported by HASCHER, p. 19); ICC Case No. 8023, 
1995 (reported by HASCHER, pp. 21-22)(The arbitral tribunal applied French law which was the law of 
the seat of arbitration, the law governing the merits and the law relied upon by the parties); CRCICA 
Case No. 67/1995) (The arbitral tribunal applied the law of the respondent’s state, i.e. Egyptian law, to res 
judicata. Egypt was the place of arbitration and the place where the first judgment was rendered. In 
addition, Egyptian law governed the merits. All three arbitrators were of Egyptian nationality); ICC Case 
10574, 2000 (reported by GRIGERA NAÓN, p. 171)(The arbitral tribunal sitting in London looked 
exclusively at section 32 of the 1982 English Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act to determine if it 
would grant res judicata effects to a US federal court judgment). 
667 HASCHER, p. 19. 
668 See, e.g. ICC Case No. 3540, 1988; ICC Case No. 5901, 1989. See also ILA, Interim Report, pp. 14 and 
26. 
669 See, e.g., ICC Case Nos 2745 and 2762, 1977; ICC Case No. 7438, 1994; CRCICA Case No. 67/1995. 
670 ICC Case No. 8023, 1995; CRCICA Case No. 67/1995.  
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cumulatively671.  
442. In some cases, the arbitral tribunal applied the law governing the merits or the 
law relied upon by the parties to res judicata. However, where the law governing the 
merits was applied to res judicata issues, it is again difficult to ascertain in which quality 
that law was applied. Indeed, in those cases, either the arbitral seat was also located in 
the country the law of which had been chosen to govern the merits, or the parties had 
relied on the law governing the merits in support of their submissions on res judicata672. 
443. The tribunals sometimes reverted to the false conflict technique, demonstrating 
that their conclusions regarding res judicata would have been the same in application of a 
different legal source. In ICC Case No. 5901 of 1989, the tribunal decided that French 
law, i.e. the law of the seat of the arbitration, should govern the question whether and to 
what extent a prior Swiss award may have res judicata and collateral estoppel effects in a 
subsequent arbitration with seat in France. The arbitral tribunal added that French res 
judicata rules were entirely consistent with Swiss res judicata rules673 and international 
arbitral precedents applying both civil and common law provisions.  
444. Some arbitral tribunals tried to avoid the strict application of domestic res 
judicata rules, seemingly taking into account the autonomous nature of international 
arbitration. In ICC Case No. 13509 of 2006 the arbitral tribunal, sitting in Paris, held 
that it had great freedom in determing the law governing res judicata. French law would 
merely constitute a source of inspiration, without being binding upon the tribunal, even 
though the seat of the arbitration was in France, the first award was rendered in France, 
the law governing the merits in both arbitrations was French law and both parties to the 
arbitration relied on French law with regard to res judicata. The tribunal noted that, in 
                                                 
671 HASCHER, p. 19. 
672 HASCHER, p. 20. See also ICC Case No. 6293, 1990 (reported by HASCHER, p. 20)(The arbitral 
tribunal referred to Article 28 (6) of the ICC Arbitration Rules but its reasoning is based almost 
exclusively on New York State law which was the law governing the merits and the only law relied upon 
by the parties); ICC Case No. 10027, 2000 (reported by HASCHER, p. 20)(The parties agreed that res 
judicata should be governed by the law governing the merits, which was New York law. The arbitral 
tribunal therefore had to apply the law governing the merits, although it considered res judicata to be a 
matter of procedure rather than substance. In the present case, New York law governed both the merits 
and the procedure. Hence, the question whether res judicata is a matter of procedure or substance was of 
no practical importance). 
673 Swiss law was the law of the place where the first award was rendered and the law governing one of 
the disputed contracts. 
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these circumstances, it would be appropriate to look at French rules of res judicata, 
always pointing out that it was not bound by French law on res judicata674. The tribunal, 
whose reasoning was based essentially on French law, eventually rejected the res judicata 
argument on the grounds that the requirements for res judicata were not met. 
Furthermore, the tribunal, who was authorised to rule as amiable compositeur, specified 
that its decision was fair and just675.  
445. Some arbitral tribunals based their solution entirely on international arbitration 
law. In ICC Case No. 3383 of 1979, when deciding whether the prior award had finally 
determined that there was a valid agreement providing for ad hoc arbitration, the ICC 
tribunal did not specify the law governing res judicata, nor did it base its reasoning on 
any particular legal basis. Instead, the tribunal based its reasoning entirely on the 
premise that prior awards must be considered final and binding in subsequent arbitral 
proceedings, unless successfully challenged before the competent domestic courts. The 
tribunal granted the prior ad hoc award absolute res judicata effects:  
“[…] it is obviously not for this arbitrator to operate as an 
appeal body over the decisions of other arbitral tribunals – 
including those preceding the final award on the merits – 
which, by definition, are rendered in last instance. Considering, 
therefore, that where the parties have the power […] to 
challenge before the competent authorities arbitral awards 
which they consider to be flawed, it is not within the powers of 
another arbitrator to put such awards in question. It is 
therefore for this arbitrator to simply take notice of the 
decisions rendered by the ad hoc arbitral tribunal […] in 
particular the decision in which the arbitral tribunal declared 
itself competent and accepted the mission conferred upon it by 
the parties pursuant to the arbitration agreement […]”676. 
446. Accordingly, the tribunal held that arbitral tribunals are bound by prior awards, 
                                                 
674 ICC Case No. 13509, 2006, p. 1205. 
675 See also ICC Case No. 8023, 1995 (reported by HASCHER, pp. 21 et seq.); ICC Case No. 6293, 1990 
(The tribunal referred to Article 28 (6) of the ICC Arbitration Rules which, according to the tribunal, 
expressed the general principle that arbitral awards have res judicata effect). In Wintershall AG et al v The 
Government of Qatar the tribunal referred to Article 1059 of the Netherlands Arbitration Act 1986 to 
ascertain that partial final awards have res judicata effect. It then cited the claimant’s submissions according 
to which the “principle of res judicata prevents the re-opening of necessarily decided points […]” (para. 
83).  
676 ICC Case No. 3383, 1979, p. 396.  
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so long as their validity was not challenged before the supervisory courts. It held further 
that the ad hoc tribunal was validly constituted by its own decision to accept jurisdiction 
and concluded that 
“[…] the constitution of this new arbitral tribunal, expressly 
independent of the ICC Court of Arbitration, is sufficient in 
itself to permit the conclusion that the original arbitration 
agreement providing for ICC arbitration was modified”677. 
447. The tribunal corroborated this conclusion by stressing that the modification of 
the original arbitration agreement in favour of ad hoc arbitration was “above all” the 
result of the “common intention” of the parties which was unambigiously expressed in 
the new agreement in which the parties expressly renounced ICC arbitration. The 
tribunal therefore underlined that the conclusion to grant absolute res judicata effect to 
the prior ad hoc award was in line with the parties’ arbitration agreement678. 
448. The readiness on the part of arbitral tribunals to depart from a mechanical 
application of domestic res judicata rules is further illustrated by ICC Case No. 4126 of 
1984. In this case the arbitral tribunal was requested to issue interim relief similar to 
that which a state court had previously refused to grant. The tribunal first held that the 
parties in the court proceedings were not identical to the parties in the arbitration. 
Nevertheless, the tribunal held that 
“[…] it is nonetheless the case that the object of the request 
now advanced before the arbitral tribunal is essentially identical 
to that judged in that procedure. […] [The party to both 
procedures is, therefore,] bound by the decision of the Court 
of Appeal […]”679.  
                                                 
677 Ibid. 
678 See also ICC Case No. 6233, 1992 (reported by HASCHER, p. 21). The arbitral tribunal seemingly 
relied on the autonomous nature of international arbitration when dealing with res judicata. Concerning 
the law governing the interpretation of prior awards the tribunal held that, even though the seat of the 
arbitration was in Abidjan, “in light of the autonomy of the arbitral clause”, it would not be appropriate 
to apply the provisions of the code of civil procedure of the Ivory Coast, which only dealt with the 
interpretation of judgments, but not awards. It further held that “[t]he arbitral tribunal is of the opinion 
that arbitral tribunals, and not State courts, have jurisdiction to interpret arbitral awards. This power is 
based on the arbitral clause itself, the purpose of which is to bar the jurisdiction of State courts; nothing 
authorizes the limitation of the effects of the arbitral clause when the subject of the dispute is the 
interpretation of the award rendered on the basis of this clause” (para. 6).  
679 ICC Case No. 4126, 1984 (English translation quoted by SCHWARTZ, p. 57. See also BORN, p. 
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449. The tribunal further reasoned that, even if the party identity requirement was 
not met and, hence, a strict rule of ne bis in idem could not apply,  
“the rules of good procedural order in an important number of 
countries including those of the European Communities do 
not prevent any less a party to an arbitration from availing 
itself, for a request that is essentially identical and again 
presented as a request for interim relief […], of the successive 
possibilities offered by state jurisdictions […] without there 
being an objective change in circumstances”680.  
450. Finally, in some cases the arbitral tribunal appears to base its conclusions on 
general res judicata principles detached from any particular legal system681.  
451. It has been said that arbitral tribunals - “as law and practice stand today” – must 
apply the law of the place of arbitration to res judicata issues682. However, there does not 
appear to be an established practice among arbitral tribunals to apply the law of the 
place of arbitration. National arbitration laws are virtually silent with regard to res 
judicata. While it is true that arbitral tribunals have frequently applied the domestic res 
judicata rules of the place of arbitration, several tribunals have applied different laws or 
rules of law. Furthermore, most arbitral tribunals that have applied res judicata rules of 
the place of arbitration have done so without justifying this choice-of-law. Moreover, 
the rationale of some tribunals to apply domestic res judicata rules of the arbitral seat on 
the basis that res judicata is a procedural matter to be governed by the law of the forum 
is flawed. It disregards today’s general understanding that international arbitral tribunals 
have no lex fori. Modern arbitration laws have generally abandoned the presumption 
                                                                                                                                         
2918).  
680 Ibid. See also ICC Case No. 3267, 1984, p. 89 (“[T]he binding effect of its first award is not limited to 
the contents of the order thereof adjudicating or dismissing certain claims, but that it extends to the legal 
reasons that were necessary for such order, i.e. to the ratio decidendi of such award. Irrespective from the 
academic views that may be entertained on the extent of the principle of res judicata on the reasons of a 
decision, it would be unfair to both parties to depart in a final award from the views held in the previous 
award, to the extent they were necessary for the disposition of certain issues”). 
681 See, e.g., ICC Case No. 6363, 1991 (The arbitral tribunal was silent as to the question of the law 
governing res judicata. It appears that the tribunal applied general res judicata principles, in particular the 
triple identity test). See also CAS, Dieter Baumann v International Olympic Committee (IOC), National Olympic 
Committee of Germany and International amateur Athletic Federation (IAAF), pp. 633 et seq. The CAS Panel did 
not specifically determine the law governing res judicata. However, the Panel stated that it would 
determine the dispute, inter alia, pursuant to “general principles of law and the rules of law, the 
application of which it deems appropriate”. 
682 SHEPPARD, Res Judicata and Estoppel, p. 231.  
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that, in the absence of a choice by the parties regarding procedure, the domestic 
procedural law of the country of the arbitral seat should apply683.  
452. It has also been submitted that there is a tendency on the part of arbitral 
tribunals to avoid an unduly mechanical application of domestic preclusion rules and to 
adopt instead pragmatic approaches that further the objectives of the parties’ arbitration 
agreement. It was said that these tribunals are formulating “sui generis international 
preclusion principles”684 which respect the presumptive desire of the parties to resolve 
all of their disputes in a single, centralised proceeding685. It is possible to observe a 
readiness among arbitral tribunals to depart from a mechanical application of domestic 
preclusion rules in favour of more international rules, in particular in recent years. Such 
readiness to adopt a more pragmatic and flexible approach has already been observed in 
public international law686. However, the review of arbitral case law has shown a great 
diversity in the laws and principles applied to res judicata with many tribunals relying on 
domestic res judicata rules designed for judgments. It remains to be seen whether the 
trend towards flexible and pragmatic international arbitration res judicata principles will 
furher establish itself in the future.  
2.2.2. Which res judicata requirements must be met before international arbitral 
tribunals?  
453. While some arbitral tribunals applied the applicable res judicata requirements in 
the same way as state courts687, many tribunals interpreted the requirements in a more 
flexible and pragmatic way, taking into consideration the circumstances of the particular 
case.  
454. Order No. 5 of 2 April 2002 constitutes an example for both a strict application 
of domestic res judicata rules and an attempt to find a pragmatic solution to safeguard 
                                                 
683 See also infra, paras 522 et seq. 
684 BORN, p. 2918. 
685 BORN, p. 2919. 
686 See supra, para. 300. 
687 See, e.g., CRCICA Case No. 67/1995 (The arbitral tribunal closely followed Egyptian law and 
determined that the prior judgment could not operate as a res judicata in the subsequent arbitration 
because the court who rendered the judgement did not have jurisdiction to make the ruling pursuant to 
Article 203/5 of the Egyptian Law of Civil and Commercial Procedures). 
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the interets at stake. The ICC tribunal with seat in Geneva stated expressly that it would 
apply the same test with respect to res judicata as a Swiss court. It held that 
“[…] it is settled law by now that an arbitral tribunal sitting in 
an international arbitration in Switzerland must apply the same 
rules as would a Swiss court in matters of res judicata”688. 
455. The tribunal was compelled to follow this approach by the Federal Tribunal’s 
ruling in the Fomento decision, which the tribunal considered to be “in and of itself 
debatable”689. The tribunal held that because the requirements under Swiss law were not 
met the res judicata doctrine did not apply and could not prevent the claimant from 
requesting the tribunal to grant the same interim relief as the one previously denied by a 
New York court. Nevertheless, the tribunal denied the claimant’s request based on the 
principles of judicial efficiency and procedural economy, as well as a lack of sufficient 
protective interest of the claimant. The tribunal reasoned that 
“[i]t is not opportune to allow an applicant to repeat, against 
the will of the opposing party, costly and time consuming 
proceedings which the parties already went through before 
another judicial body. There is no sufficient protective interest 
[…] on the part of the applicant if the request is the same, the 
facts and evidence relied upon are essentially the same, the legal 
tests to be applied in deciding the matter are the same, and the 
principles of due process were observed in the first 
proceedings. Under these circumstances, it cannot be 
reasonably asked either from the arbitrators or from the 
applicant’s opponent to go through the same matter again. The 
wish of the applicant to obtain a more favorable ruling, 
understandable as it is, can by itself not constitute a sufficient 
protective interest”690.  
456. It is often considered a requirement for the application of the res judicata 
doctrine that the prior judgment or award will be entitled to recognition in the country 
of the place of arbitration691. While arbitral tribunals seem ready to assess the 
“recognisability” of prior judgments, they appear reluctant to pronounce themselves on 
the validity of prior awards. In Order No. 5 the tribunal rejected the res judicata defense 
                                                 
688 Order No. 5, 2 April 2002, p. 815. 
689 Ibid. 
690 Order No. 5, 2 April 2002, pp. 815 et seq. 
691 SHEPPARD, Res Judicata and Estoppel, p. 232. 
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on the grounds that the prior judgment of the New York court could not be recognised 
in Switzerland692. By contrast, in ICC Case No. 3383 of 1979 the tribunal refused to 
pronounce itself on the validity of a prior award which had not been challenged before 
the supevisory courts. In the commentary accompanying this award it was contended 
that the second arbitral tribunal has no power to examine whether the first award would 
be capable of recognition in the country of the place of arbitration, since this would 
allow the second tribunal to rule on the first tribunal’s jurisdiction and on the regularity 
of the first arbitration proceedings, which would be outside the second tribunal’s 
jurisdiction 693.   
457. In most cases, the arbitral tribunals did not examine whether a prior award or 
judgment would be recognised in the country of the arbitral seat or elsewhere. Most 
tribunals merely determined whether there was identity of parties, cause and object in 
both proceedings694. In the majority of the examined awards, the tribunals who applied 
domestic res judicata rules did not refer to any legal authorities or case law, in some cases 
even legislation, defining and specifying the meaning of the triple identity test under the 
relevant domestic law. Rather, they interpreted the notions of parties, cause and object 
in a more pragmatic and intuitive way, which they considered to be appropriate in the 
case at hand695. As a result, in some cases the tribunals applied the res judicata 
requirements in a way that did not entirely correspond to the requirements under the 
relevant domestic law696. Accordingly, while there appears to be a general understanding 
in international arbitration practice as to the applicability of the triple identity test, there 
is no generally accepted way of applying and interpreting the triple identity test. 
                                                 
692 See also ICC Case Nos 2475 & 2767, 1977. The arbitral tribunal decided that a prior judgment of the 
Brussels Court of Appeal should operate as a res judicata in the arbitration because it was covered by the 
1968 Brussels Convention which required all its Contracting States to recognise judgments rendered in 
any of the other Contracting States. The tribunal held that since the courts of the parties’ countries of 
origin would be bound by the judgement, the parties should not be allowed to avoid the judgment in the 
arbitration. 
693 ICC Case No. 3383, 1979, p. 398.  
694 See, e.g., CRCICA Case No. 67/1995; ICC Case No. 6363, 1991 (“Where there is, cumulatively, 
identity as regards parties, subject matter of the dispute petitum, and causa petendi, between a prior 
judgment and a new claim, the new claim is barred by the principle of res judicata. […] A discrepancy 
between any one of the elements of a current claim and a past judgment comprising a res judicata is 
enough to defeat a defense based on res judicata”); ICC Case No. 4126, 1984; ICC Case No. 7438, 1994; 
ICC Case No. 6293, 1990. 
695 HASCHER, p. 24. 
696 See HASCHER, pp. 21 and 24. 
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458. ICC Case No. 6293 of 1990 illustrates this flexible approach. The tribunal 
applied New York law to res judicata. However, the tribunal specified that whatever the 
requirements under New York law, the doctrine of res judicata seeks to prevent the 
reconsideration between the same parties of a controversy that has already been 
decided in a final and binding judgment or award. According to the tribunal, the 
doctrine of res judicata applies if a claim is essentially identical to a claim previously 
decided, whatever the requirements under the applicable law. The tribunal thereby 
appeared to apply the triple identity test as a generally accepted principle which applies 
independently of the applicable law697.  
459. Concerning in particular the requirement of party identity, the more flexible 
approach is illustrated by ICC Case No. 8023 of 1995 where the arbitral tribunal held 
that the parties were bound by a prior award, even though they were not strictly 
identical to the parties in the first arbitration. The arbitral tribunal had determined 
French law to govern res judicata pursuant to which the doctrine generally applies only 
where the parties in both proceedings are identical and act in the same legal capacity698.  
460. Arbitral tribunals have not given much consideration to the identity of cause 
and object requirements699.  
                                                 
697 See also CAS, Dieter Baumann v International Olympic Committee (IOC) et al, where the arbitral tribunal 
applied the doctrine of res judicata, including the triple identity test, as a general principle of law.  
698 See also ICC Case No. 4126, 1984 (The arbitral tribunal considered a party to be “bound” by a prior 
award to which it was not a party on the ground that the new request was “essentially identical” to that 
decided in the prior procedure); ICC Case No. 6363, 1991 (The tribunal examined the party identity 
requirment under both a strict and a flexible standard. The respondent argued that a prior decision was 
binding on both of its opponents in the arbitration, i.e. claimant and ME company on whose behalf 
claimant acted. The claimant argued that it was not bound by the prior decision because it was not a party 
to the prior proceedings. The tribunal rejected the respondent’s argument based on res judicata on the 
ground that there was no party identity. Applying first a strict test, it held that claimant, who was not a 
party to the prior proceedings, was “in law and fact” a separate person from ME company, who was a 
named party to the prior proceedings. The tribunal, applying a more flexible standard, then held that 
claimant’s involvement alongside ME company in the prior proceedings was not sufficient to make 
claimant a party to the prior decision).  
699 See, e.g., ICC Case No. 9800, 2000; ICC Case No. 7438, 1994 (reported by HASCHER, pp. 19 et seq.). 
According to Hascher (p. 22), rather than a question of res judicata, the problem in ICC Case No. 7438 
concerned the question of the rational link between the successive claims, one of which being accessory 
to the other. On the subject matter identity requirement, see also CAS, Dieter Baumann v International 
Olympic Committee (IOC) et al. The CAS held that the primary issue before it was whether the removal of 
Baumann’s accreditation to compete in the Olympic Games in Sydney by the IOC was well-founded or 
not. It decided that the subject matter was not the same as in the prior proceedings before the IAAF 
Arbitration Panel, in which the IAAF placed a two-year ban from competition on Baumann. See also 
Res Judicata in International Commercial Arbitration - A Problem 
151 
 
461. Concerning the doctrine of issue preclusion, the AAA tribunal in the arbitration 
between Smithkline Beecham Biologicals SA (Smithkline) and Biogen Inc (Biogen) 
applied a test based on international arbitration law to determine that the issues before 
it were not identical to the issues determined in a prior UNCITRAL arbitration. The 
disputes before the AAA and UNCITRAL tribunals arose out of two license 
agreements. The first license agreement granted Smithkline a license for the United 
States (the “US License”). The second agreement granted a license for the rest of the 
world, apart from Japan (the “International License”). The International License 
provided for UNCITRAL Arbitration in London. The US License provided for AAA 
arbitration in New York.  
462. Smithkline commenced arbitration proceedings against Biogen in London for 
the International License. The London tribunal rendered an award in favour of 
Smithkline in 1992. In 1993 Smithkline submitted the same claim in AAA arbitration 
proceedings in New York with respect to the US License. After the London award was 
affirmed on appeal, Smithkline invoked the doctrine of collateral estoppel in the AAA 
arbitration.  
463. The AAA tribunal rejected Smithkline’s collateral estoppel plea holding that the 
issues in question were not identical to the issues determined in the prior UNCITRAL 
award because 
“[t]he Parties have entered into two different agreements [...] 
containing two different arbitration clauses, providing for 
arbitration in two different forums relating to two different sets 
of rights”700.  
464. The tribunal added that the UNCITRAL tribunal could not have rendered a 
decision on the US License since it did not have jurisdiction over the US license 
agreement. After a full hearing on the merits, the AAA tribunal ruled in Biogen’s 
favour.  
465. A similar approach was followed in ICC Case No. 7061 of 1997. The case 
                                                                                                                                         
Case No. A33 before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal.   
700 See Smithkline Beecham Biologicals, S.A. v Biogen, Inc., 1996 WL 209897 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)*7. 
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involved four separate arbitration proceedings arising from a same project. One central 
issue in each arbitration was the existence of deceit at the time the agreements were 
concluded. The claimant raised a plea of issue estoppel, relying on a prior award 
rendered in one of the other arbitrations, in which the tribunal had recognised the 
existence of deceit, had declared the contract at issue void and ordered respondent to 
pay damages to claimant. The arbitral tribunal clearly adapted the “issue estoppel” test 
to the international arbitration context. As reported by Hanotiau, it rejected the plea of 
issue estoppel on the grounds that 
“[…] the parties were not the same in the two cases; that the 
arbitration in question took place on the basis of a different 
supply contract and arbitration agreement, albeit with the seat 
of arbitration in the same city; that the applicable law was also 
different, and that it could not be assumed that the same 
evidence was equally available to both arbitral tribunals”701. 
466.  Finally, some arbitral tribunals considered the type of decision that may 
become res judicata. While it appears to be well-established that prior judgments and 
awards (including partial awards) on the merits may operate as res judicata in subsequent 
arbitration proceedings, the situation is not clear with respect to prior decisions on 
jurisdiction and decisions granting or refusing interim relief in aid of arbitration 
proceedings.  
467. Arbitral tribunals are divided on the question whether prior decisions on 
jurisdiction are binding on the tribunal. In ICC Case No. 3383 of 1979 the tribunal 
afforded absolute res judicata effects to a prior award on juridiction702.  
468. By contrast, in several cases where arbitral tribunals were confronted with anti-
arbitration injunctions issued by a state court, the tribunals refused to consider 
themselves bound by the prior jurisdictional determinations of the courts, situated both 
in and outside the country of the place of arbitration. The arbitral tribunals generally 
held that prior determinations by a court relating to the jurisdiction of the arbitral 
                                                 
701 See HANOTIAU, Complex Arbitration, para. 551.  
702 See supra, paras 445 et seq. See also ICC Case 6535, 1992, pp. 495-500. 
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tribunal could not have any effect on the arbitration proceedings703.  
469. Concerning provisional measures, it is not clear whether arbitral tribunals will 
always afford res judicata effects to a prior court decision granting or denying interim 
relief. Only few published awards deal with this question. In ICC Case No. 4126 of 
1984 the arbitral tribunal seemed to be of the opinion that prior interim measures may 
generally have res judicata effects in subsequent arbitration proceedings. The tribunal 
decided that the party whose request for interim relief was previously denied by a state 
court could not bring an essentially identical request again before the arbitral tribunal, 
because it was “bound” by the prior court decision704.  
470. In Order No. 5 of 2 April 2002 the tribunal was more cautious. It held that the 
principles of judicial efficiency and procedural economy prevented a party from 
requesting the arbitral tribunal to grant the same interim relief as the one previously 
denied by a state court. However, it expressed doubts as to whether the doctrine of res 
judicata applies to provisional measures as a matter of principle705. Since the 
requirements for res judicata were not met, the question was left open.  
471. For the sake of completeness it may be mentioned that it has been held that 
only final decisions may operate as res judicata, to the exclusion of preliminary decisions. 
This was held in ICC Case No. 3267 of 1984 in the context of a prior partial award 
rendered in the same arbitral proceedings. The arbitrator refused to extend the res 
                                                 
703 See, BORN, p. 2926 with reference to unidentified ICC Case, reported in DERAINS/SCHWARTZ, 
para. 155, p. 106; ICC Case No. 10623, 2001; ICC Case No. 5294, 1988; ICC Case No. 4862, 1986, pp. 
508-09. Outside the context of anti-arbitration injunctions, see also The Republic of Kazakhstan v Istil Group 
Inc (No. 3) [2007] EWHC 2729 (Comm). A LCIA tribunal sitting in London accepted jurisdiction over a 
dispute despite a prior judgment of the Paris Commercial Court in which the court established that there 
was no applicable arbitration agreement. Given the sovereign immunity of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
before the French courts, the Paris court directed the parties to litigate in Kazakhstan. Disregarding this 
ruling, Istil commenced LCIA proceedings in London and the tribunal accepted jurisdiction. The tribunal 
proceeded to make an award on liability and ordered Kazakhstan to pay a certain amount of money to 
Istil. This award on liability was set aside by the English Commercial Court, inter alia, on the ground that 
it violated the doctrine of issue estoppel. The LCIA tribunal was bound by the final decision of the Paris 
court in which it had finally established that there was no valid arbitration agreement ([2006] EWHC 448 
(Comm)). Istil sought to pursue the LCIA arbitration on the ground that the first partial award on 
jurisdiction was still effective and not affected by the annulment of the award on liability. The High 
Court disagreed and granted an anti-arbitration injunction restraining Istil from pursuing the LCIA 
arbitration. 
704 See supra, paras 448 et seq. 
705 Order No. 5, 2 April 2002, p. 815 (“Whatever the correct legal position on the question of res judicata 
[…] of provisional remedies in international matters […]”). 
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judicata effects of the prior partial award to preliminary issues holding in relevant part: 
“[…] the arbitral tribunal made clear in other parts of its first 
award that the views expressed therein on certain other aspects 
of the case were of a prelimnary nature only and without 
prejudice to its final decision. On such aspects, the arbitral 
tribunal holds itself entirely free to adopt other views with the 
benefit of further evidence and investigations”706. 
2.2.3. To what extent have international arbitral tribunals afforded res judicata 
effects to prior decisions?  
472. With respect to the scope of res judicata, arbitral tribunals generally appear to 
apply the relevant law in the same way as courts. Arbitral tribunals who applied 
domestic laws generally applied the law strictly, usually without reference to any 
domestic legal authorities, case law or legislation. Accordingly, the scope of the res 
judicata effects afforded to prior judgments and awards varies depending on the 
domestic law applied by the arbitral tribunals. While some tribunals granted broad res 
judicata effects, including to reasons, others strictly limited the res judicata effects to the 
prior decision’s dispositif.  
473. No particular international arbitration practice with respect to the scope of res 
judicata emerges from arbitration case law. There does not appear to be a tendency to 
adopt a more flexible and pragmatic approach, as was observed with respect to the 
requirements for res judicata.  
474. The issue of the scope of the res judicata effects of a prior award was addressed 
in ICC Case Nos 2745 & 2762 of 1977. A first arbitral tribunal with seat in France had 
ordered a German company to pay damages to a Belgian company on the grounds that 
there was no case of force majeure. The second arbitral tribunal, who also had its seat in 
France, applied the French and Belgian notion of res judicata to determine the res judicata 
effects of the prior award. It held that those reasons which constitute the necessary 
foundation of the dispositif are covered by the res judicata effect of the decision. Since the 
finding of the first tribunal that there was no force majeure was essential for its decision 
on damages, it was res judicata and the existence of force majeure could therefore not be 
                                                 
706 See supra, para. 322. 
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argued again before the second tribunal.  
475. The tribunal in ICC Case No. 8023 of 1995 also applied French law and held 
that res judicata covers not only the dispositif of the first award, but also those reasons that 
form the dispositif’s necessary foundation. The tribunal held further that the res judicata 
effects of the first award attached not only to necessary reasons expressly pronounced 
in clear and unambiguous terms, but also to findings necessarily implied in the first 
award. By contrast, the tribunal ruled that it was not precluded by the doctrine of res 
judicata from deciding issues that were no determined, expressly or impliedly, in the first 
award707. 
476. In ICC Case No. 7438 of 1994 the arbitral tribunal applied the procedural law 
of the canton of Zurich. The arbitrator strictly adhered to the rule that the res judicata 
effect of a decision attaches only to its dispositif, to the exclusion of reasons. In 
conformity with Swiss law, the arbitrator referred to the reasoning only to determine 
the meaning and scope of the dispositif of the first award708.  
477. There are few awards in which arbitral tribunals applied the extended doctrine 
of res judicata and have afforded res judicata effects to issues that were not, but could and 
should have been decided in the first proceedings. One example is the second SIAC 
award between Dexia Bank and Persero. As was seen earlier, in the second SIAC 
arbitration Persero raised an issue which had not been covered in the first arbitration. 
The second SIAC tribunal denied jurisdiction over the merits of the dispute. Relying on 
the rule in Henderson v Henderson, the tribunal held that the second SIAC arbitration 
constituted a misuse of process since Persero could and should have raised the issue in 
the first SIAC arbitration709.  
                                                 
707 See HASCHER, pp. 23-24. 
708 See HASCHER, p. 23. 
709 See supra, para. 316. See also unidentified ICC case reported in ILA, Interim Report, p. 25. At issue was 
the res judicata effect of a prior ICC award before another ICC tribunal. According to ILA, “[…] a 
tribunal sitting in France but applying New York law found that the claimant should have asserted its 
present claim by way of counterclaim or defence in earlier ICC proceedings and that having had a full 
and fair opportunity to do so and, not having done so, was now barred from bringing a second action 
seeking relief inconsistent with the earlier award”. The tribunal applied the US dcotrine of claim 
preclusion which prevents the re-litigation in subsequent proceedings of matters which were not but 
could and should have been brought in the earlier proceedings. See however the second award underlying 
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478. It is useful to draw the attention to one example where a flexible and pragmatic 
approach was adopted with respect to the scope of res judicata. In ICC Case No. 3267 
the sole arbitrator had to determine the res judicata effects of his prior partial award. The 
arbitrator granted res judicata effects to the reasons constituting the necessary foundation 
of the dispositif on the grounds that it would be unfair to the parties to depart in a final 
award from such determinations made in the prior partial award. The arbitrator, who 
was authorised by the parties to decide as amiable compositeur, departed from Swiss law, 
which was the law of the place of arbitration and according to which the res judicata 
effect of a decision is striclty limited to the dispositif. The tribunal did so “irrespective 
from the academic views” held on this issue710.  
2.2.4. In what circumstances have international arbitral tribunals denied res 
judicata effects to prior decisions that were res judicata? 
479. The question arises whether there are any circumstances under which arbitral 
tribunals have denied res judicata effects to a prior award or judgment, even though all 
requirements for the application of the res judicata doctrine were met.  
480. While there are only few published awards addressing this issue, it appears that 
arbitral tribunals acknowledge that fraud may constitute an exception to res judicata. In 
Antoine Biloune and Marine Drive Complex Ltd (MDCL) v Ghana Investments Centre (GIC) and 
the Government of Ghana, the UNCITRAL tribunal first rendered a partial award holding 
that it had jurisdiction over the dispute and declaring that the Government of Ghana 
had expropriated MDCL’s assets and Mr. Biloune’s interst in MDCL. The tribunal then 
rendered a final award on damages and costs. The respondents requested the tribunal to 
reconsider its prior partial award.  
481. The tribunal declared that the partial award was final and binding on the parties. 
However, applying customary principles of international law, the tribunal held that it 
                                                                                                                                         
the decision of the Cour d’appel de Paris in Marriott v Jnah (reported in Cahiers de l’arbitrage, Vol. 4 
(2010), p. 1172), where the arbitral tribunal stated that there is no legal principle similar to the English 
rule in Henderson v Henderson in international arbitration (“[il n’y a pas] de théorie juridique applicable en 
matière d’arbitrage international qui soit similaire à la théorie anglaise Henderson c/Henderson, laquelle imposerait à 
JNAH de brûler toutes ses munitions dans une meme procedure d’arbitrage”). 
710 Relevant passages of the award are cited supra, fn 680. 
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would exceptionally reconsider its prior partial award if it was shown by credible 
evidence that the tribunal had been the victim of fraud and that its determinations in 
the previous award were based on false testimony. The tribunal held in relevant part: 
“Nevertheless, a court or Tribunal, including this international 
arbitral Tribunal, has an inherent power to take cognisance of 
credible evidence, timely placed before it, that its previous 
determinations were the product of false testimony, forged 
documents or other egregious ‘fraud on the tribunal’ […]. 
Certainly if such corruption or fraud in the evidence would 
justify an international or a national court in voiding or refusing 
to enforce the award, the Tribunal also, so long as it still has 
jurisdiction over the dispute, can take necessary corrective 
action […]. The present Tribunal would not hesitate to 
reconsider and modify its earlier award were it shown by 
credible evidence that it had been the victim of fraud and that 
its determinations in the previous award were the product of 
false testimony”711. 
2.2.5. What effects have international arbitral tribunals afforded to prior 
decisions that were not res judicata? 
482. There are several published awards in which arbitral tribunals have given some 
effects to a prior decision, even though it did not qualify as res judicata. This was done 
typically in situations where the prior decision involved a case that was not identical, but 
closely connected to the case before the arbitral tribunal. The effects given to such prior 
decisions varied among arbitral tribunals. While some tribunals considered themselves 
bound by a prior decision that was not res judicata, others were more cautious holding 
that they would take the prior decision into consideration.  
483. As was seen above, in ICC Case No. 4126 of 1984 the tribunal refused to grant 
a request for interim relief that had previously been denied by a state court. Because the 
object of both proceedings was “essentially identical” and because there was no change 
in circumstances, the tribunal concluded that the party to both procedures was bound 
by the prior court decision. The tribunal based its decision on the principle of good 
                                                 
711 Award cited supra, fn 487, paras 33-34. See also Cour d’appel de Paris, 17 June 2010, SARL African 
Petroleum Consultants (APC) v Société Nationale de Raffinage (SONARA), Rev. Arb., No. 3 (2010), pp. 671 et 
seq.; Cour de Cassation, Fougerolle v Procofrance, 25 May 1992, Rev. Arb. (1993), p. 91. 
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procedural order instead of the doctrine of res judicata712. This decision was endorsed by 
the ICC tribunal in Order No. 5 of 2 April 2002. Because the judgment on interim relief 
could not be recognised in Switzerland it could not operate as a res judicata in the ICC 
arbitration. Nevertheless, the ICC Tribunal refused to reconsider the claimant’s request 
for interim relief for reasons of judicial efficiency and procedural economy713. 
484. In ICC Case No. 6363 of 1991 the arbitral tribunal was slightly more cautious. 
It concluded that a prior court judgment could not operate as a res judicata in the ICC 
arbitration, because there was no identity of parties. Nevertheless, the arbitral tribunal 
held that it could not ignore the prior judgment holding in relevant part:  
“A discrepancy between any one of the elements of a current 
claim and a past judgment comprising a res judicata [i.e. identity 
of parties, cause and subject matter] is enough to defeat a 
defense based on res judicata. Enough has been said to show 
that the [court] decision is res judicata between [C] and [B], but 
not as between [A] and [B]. This does not mean that the 
Decision can be ignored. Parts of it represent an authoritative 
ruling on the position of [C] country law on certain matters 
that may be relevant in this case”714. 
485. In ICC Case No. 7061 the tribunal reached a similar result. The tribunal held 
that it was not bound by the prior award because the parties were not identical in the 
two proceedings. In addition, the prior arbitration had taken place on the basis of a 
different contract and arbitration agreement, the applicable law was different and the 
evidence available to both tribunals was also different. The tribunal concluded:  
“This arbitration tribunal is not bound by the X award; nor are 
the parties to these arbitration proceedings. There can be no 
issue estoppel. Nonetheless, it provides a helpful analysis of the 
common factual background to this dispute. Accordingly, we 
have borne its findings and conclusions in mind, whilst taking 
care to reach our own conclusions on the materials submitted 
by these parties in these proceedings” 715.  
486. Likewise, the AAA tribunal in the arbitration between Smithkline and Biogen 
                                                 
712 See supra, paras 448 et seq. 
713 See supra, paras 454 et seq. 
714 ICC Case No. 6363, 1991, para. 43. 
715 Case reported by HANOTIAU, Complex Arbitration, para. 551. 
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rejected Smithkline’s collateral estoppel plea. However, the AAA tribunal decided to 
admit the prior UNCITRAL award as evidence:  
“The issues submitted in the present arbitration are not 
precluded by the prior arbitral decision and judgment referred 
to above. […] Nevertheless, we will allow into evidence in the 
instant matter the UK arbitral decision, the ensuing 
judgment(s) and the evidentiary submissions made in those 
proceedings, for such persuasive value as they may have”716.  
487. The awards examined above show that arbitral tribunals have afforded some 
effects to prior decisions that were not res judicata, if the case in which the prior decision 
was rendered was closely connected to the case before the arbitral tribunal. The above 
survey has also shown that the effects afforded to the prior decisions varied in their 
intensity. While some arbitral tribunals considered themselves bound by a prior 
decision, others would only take the prior decision into consideration. The survey could 
not establish that the intensity of the effects attached to the prior decision was 
proportional to the closeness of the link between the prior and subsequent proceedings. 
The arbitrators appeared to grant the effects they considered appropriate in the 
circumstances of the case.  
2.2.6. Conclusion  
488. In light of the above findings it may be concluded that only a few established 
principles emerge from international commercial arbitration practice with respect to res 
judicata. These principles may be summarised as follows: 
- Prior final judgments and awards (including partial awards) rendered on the merits 
may operate as res judicata in subsequent arbitral proceedings; 
- The doctrine of res judicata generally applies only if there is identity of parties, cause 
and object in both proceedings;  
- An arbitral tribunal may reconsider a prior decision, even though it qualifies as res 
judicata, if the prior decision was obtained by fraud; 
                                                 
716 See Smithkline Beecham Biologicals, S.A. v Biogen, Inc., 1996 WL 209897 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)*7 et seq. 
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- Where a prior decision does not qualify as res judicata, an arbitral tribunal seised 
subsequently of a closely related case may grant such effects to the prior decision as 
it deems appropriate in the circumstances of the case.  
489. In addition, the review of arbitration case law has shown that there appears to 
be a tendency among arbitral tribunals to apply and interpret the triple identity test in 
an intuitive, pragmatic and flexible way.  
490. Apart from the above, there appears to be no established practice with respect 
to res judicata in international commercial arbitration practice. In particular: 
491. No clear choice-of-law rule concerning the law governing res judicata before 
international arbitral tribunals emerges from case law. Arbitral tribunals apply a variety 
of different laws or rules of law to res judicata, ranging from different domestic laws to 
general principles of law, oftentimes without substantiating the choice-of-law; 
492. There are no established rules among arbitral tribunals with respect to res judicata 
requirements. There appears to be no generally accepted standard for the application or 
interpretation of the triple identity test; 
493. There is no established practice among arbitral tribunals on the question of the 
binding effect of prior awards or judgments on jurisdiction; 
494. There appears to be no established rule on the question whether prior decisions 
on interim relief may operate as res judicata;  
495. There is no particular rule with regard to the scope of the res judicata effects to 
be afforded to prior decisions, with arbitral tribunals typically following the provisions 
of the law or rules of law determined to govern res judicata. 
496. Accordingly, save for the few exceptions listed above, no clear res judicata rules 
emerge from international commercial arbitration practice to fill the multiple gaps left 
open by international commercial arbitration law.  
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3. CONCLUSION 
497. The first part of this chapter has shown that the occurrence of res judicata issues 
puts several important interests in question and may potentially harm the very existence 
of the arbitral process. As was shown in a study into corporate attitudes and practices 
towards international arbitration, conducted in 2006 by PriceWaterhouseCoopers and 
the School of International Arbitration at Queen Mary and Westfield College, the 
enforceability of awards is ranked as the top reason by major international corporations 
for choosing international arbitration. The expense and length of time to resolve 
disputes were determined to be the most commonly cited disadvantages of international 
arbitration717. The rendering by arbitral tribunals of awards inconsistent with prior 
decisions may frustrate the enforceability of the awards. Furthermore, the unnecessary 
duplication of proceedings may make the dispute resolution process longer and more 
costly for the parties. This could dissuade parties from submitting their disputes to 
international arbitration.  
498. International commercial arbitration law and practice, in their current state, do 
not deal with the problem of res judicata satisfactorily. According to Sheppard “res 
judicata in the context of international arbitration is presently in a no man’s land, with 
considerable uncertainty as to its appropriate application”718. The findings made in this 
chapter confirm this observation.  
499. International commercial arbitration “hard law” does not give any guidance to 
international arbitral tribunals on how to deal with res judicata issues. National courts 
generally extend traditional litigation rules of res judicata to international arbitration 
without examining whether this is desirable.  
500. Likewise, international arbitral tribunals typically look at domestic litigation 
rules to govern res judicata issues. Hence, the effects of national court judgments in 
subsequent arbitral proceedings depend on different and sometimes conflicting 
                                                 
717 PWC/SIA, pp. 6 et seq. Other top reasons for choosing international arbitration to resolve disputes 
were the flexibility of procedure, the privacy the process provides and the parties’ ability to select the 
arbitrators. 
718 SHEPPARD, The Scope and Res Judicata Effect of Arbitral Awards, p. 265. 
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regulations of different national jurisdictions. The same holds true for arbitral awards 
because awards are commonly treated like judgments with respect to their res judicata 
effects719. Arbitral tribunals frequently apply the domestic law of the arbitral seat to 
determine the effects of an award. While this approach is consistent with the traditional 
rationale followed by some state courts that res judicata issues are matters of procedure 
and should therefore be governed by the lex fori, it is not the appropriate approach for 
arbitral tribunals. Whatever the domestic law applied, as will be discussed in Chapter 
Five below, it is doubtful whether a wholesale transposition of domestic preclusion 
rules to international arbitration is desirable.  
501. The review of arbitration case law has shown that, absent a clear and well-
established choice-of-law rule, arbitral tribunals apply a variety of different laws or rules 
of law to res judicata issues. There are also no clear and generally-accepted rules with 
respect to many issues, such as the requirements for and the scope of res judicata.  
502. In summary, the way in which res judicata issues are currently dealt with in 
international commercial arbitration varies not only among legal systems, but also 
among arbitral tribunals. This lack of uniformity contradicts the parties’ intention when 
choosing international arbitration to establish a single and uniform international dispute 
resolution mechanism that will lead to a final and binding award, which will be 
enforceable in most countries. The lack of uniformity leads to uncertainty, as well as 
unfair and unpredictable results, depending on where the losing party seeks to re-litigate 
the dispute. The disappointed party could attempt to re-litigate the dispute in whatever 
forum it can find that has the least effective preclusion rules and the widest jurisdiction 
rules720. This result would be unsatisfactory, not only for the parties, but for the 
international arbitration process as a whole.  
503. Based on the above, it can be concluded that the occurrence of res judicata issues 
before international arbitral tribunals constitutes a serious problem that is currently not 
dealt with satisfactorily. There is thus a need to find appropriate solutions for this 
problem.  
                                                 
719 BREKOULAKIS, p. 205. 
720 BORN, pp. 2912 et seq. 
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504. It has been said that the most challenging issue is not to recognise that there is a 
problem, but rather to find ways (if any) open to international arbitral tribunals for 
dealing with the problem and which do not at the same time conflict with other 
fundamental principles of international commercial arbitration721. The challenge of the 
remaining chapters will be to find and formulate such ways. 
 
                                                 
721 HOBÉR, p. 244. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Chapter 5 : Search for an Appropriate Approach 
Search for an Appropriate Approach  
505. The search for a solution to the problem of res judicata in international 
arbitration must begin with the determination of an appropriate approach. This chapter 
will begin by discussing different possible approaches to res judicata before international 
arbitral tribunals (1.). The second part of the chapter will then explain why the problem 
of res judicata should be dealt with by transnational res judicata principles (2.).  
1. POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO RES JUDICATA BEFORE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL 
TRIBUNALS 
506. An introductory remark should be made as to why the res judicata doctrine 
should apply at all in international arbitration. It has been said that the doctrine of res 
judicata is “one of the most sophisticated, technical and overregulated doctrines in 
national civil procedure”722. However, an important feature of international arbitration 
is the large autonomy granted to parties and arbitrators. The adoption of res judicata 
principles could put this flexibility at risk and make the arbitral process more similar to 
litigation, which is precisely what the parties seek to avoid by concluding an arbitration 
agreement. This could hold true not only for binding rules, but also for non-binding 
guidelines which are sometimes so widely and rigorously applied by arbitrators as if they 
were binding723. For years, several prominent international arbitration authorities have 
warned against a worrying trend to imitate the technicality and formality of domestic 
court proceedings724. 
                                                 
722 BREKOULAKIS, p. 182. 
723 See PARK, paras 7-4 et seq. 
724 See, e.g., LALIVE (Nouveaux regards, p. 13) according to whom international arbitration suffers from 
Search for an Appropriate Approach 
165 
 
507. It has been said that adopting detailed res judicata rules in international 
arbitration would go against the modern trend of not imposing any procedural 
constraints on international arbitrators, but to let them conduct the arbitration in a way 
they deem appropriate in the circumstances of the particular case725. Based on 
considerations of mutual respect and comity, arbitral tribunals could be allowed to 
decide whether and to what extent they are bound by prior judgments or awards in the 
circumstances of each case. Any inconsistent decisions rendered in this process could 
be dealt with in annulment or recognition and enforcement proceedings, thereby 
avoiding that two contradictory decisions are recognised or enforced within a same 
country.  
508. Such “ad hoc solutions”, however, do not appear appropriate726. In the absence 
of pre-established rules or practices with respect to res judicata there is great uncertainty 
and unpredictability for arbitration users. Because the parties’ rights and obligations will 
be determined by a final and binding award, they will expect to be treated fairly and 
equally. They will also expect that the arbitration is conducted according to the “regular 
way to do things”727. Because the concept of res judicata, albeit differing in important 
aspects from one country to another, exists today in all jurisdictions and is even 
recognised as either a rule of customary international law or a general principle of 
law728, parties will likely expect arbitrators to apply this doctrine where certain 
requirements are met. This is also in line with international arbitration law and practice. 
It is generally considered that res judicata rules apply in arbitration proceedings, even 
though there is great disagreement as to how they should be applied. 
509. Dealing with the problem of contradictory decisions only at the annulment or 
recognition and enforcement level is problematic. This would lead to wasteful 
                                                                                                                                         
excessif “juridicisation” or “processualisation”; OPPETIT (Philosophie de l’arbitrage commercial international, p. 
818) uses the term “juridictionnalisation” to describe the phenomenon of arbitration proceedings becoming 
more cumbersome and formalistic; FOUCHARD, L’arbitrage commercial international, para. 258 (“N’est-il pas 
cependant paradoxal que l’arbitrage, qui se veut un mode souple, non formaliste, de règlement des litiges en vienne à s’aligner 
sur la procédure judiciaire au point d’adopter ses dispositions les plus draconiennes ? La crainte de procédés dilatoires ne 
devrait pas pousser trop loin la réglementation arbitrale, au point de la rendre aussi difficile à supporter que les procédures 
juridictionnelles”). See also PARK, para. 7-18. 
725 MAYER, Litispendance, connexité et chose jugée dans l'arbitrage international, p. 190.  
726 PARK, para. 7-46. 
727 PARK, e.g., para. 7-23 and para. 7-33. 
728 See supra, paras 236 et seq. 
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arbitration proceedings. It would only be feasible if there were efficient mechanisms to 
avoid parallel proceedings between arbitral tribunals and state courts, as well as between 
different arbitral tribunals. However, practice shows with enough frequency that 
duplicate proceedings for the same or similar matters can be brought before different 
arbitral tribunals or before an arbitral tribunal and a state court. Unlike under the 
system of the EC Regulation No. 44/2001, rules on lis pendens and related actions 
cannot resolve the problem of parallel proceedings in the “decentralised and non-
hierarchic field”729 of international arbitration730. The consolidation and joinder of 
related arbitration and court proceedings, as well as related arbitration proceedings, can 
usually only be achieved with the consent of all parties involved, even though the 
current trend is that consent may be either expressed or implied731. 
510. Res judicata guidelines should be elaborated for international arbitral tribunals. 
Such guidelines would have the benefit of pre-establishing a protocol before the 
                                                 
729 HOBÉR, p. 243.  
730 LEW, Parallel proceedings in international arbitration, p. 311; MAYER, Litispendance, connexité et chose jugée 
dans l'arbitrage international, pp. 191 et seq.; HOBÉR, p. 253; RIVKIN, p. 295. See also the ILA Reports and 
Recommendations on lis pendens and arbitration which strongly endorse the principle of compétence-
compétence and generally recommend arbitral tribunals seised of a dispute to proceed with the 
arbitration if they consider themselves to be prima facie competent, regardless of any other pending court 
or arbitration proceedings involving the same (or substantially the same) parties and questions at issue. 
As noted by ILA, however, in some circumstances, such as related proceedings where there is a common 
issue but not identical parties, it might be right as a matter of justice and case management for arbitral 
tribunals to suspend their proceedings pending the outcome of the other proceedings (DE 
LY/SHEPPARD, p. 2).  
731 KAUFMANN-KOHLER/BOISSON DE CHAZOURNES/BONNIN/MBENGUE, p. 59; 
CREMADES/MADALENA, p. 532. See also CRIVELLARO, p. 82 ; HOBÉR, pp. 254 et seq. ; 
RIVKIN, p. 290 ; LEW, Parallel proceedings in international arbitration, p. 310; ROUGHTON, p. 2. See also 
Cour d’appel of Paris, 16 November 2006, Société Empresa de Telecomunicaciones de Cuba SA v SA Telefonica 
Antillana et SNC Banco Nacional de Commercio Exterior, Rev. arb., No. 1 (2008), pp. 109 et seq. (An award 
rendered in Paris was annulled because the arbitral tribunal consolidated two related arbitration 
proceedings between the same parties, but based on different contracts containing different arbitration 
clauses, without the consent of the parties). Consolidation provisions in international arbitration 
instruments are rare. Under Article 41 NAI Arbitration Rules and Article 22.1 (h) LCIA Arbitration Rules 
a third party may be joined in the arbitration as a party only if it agrees to be joined. Pursuant to Article 
1126 (2) NAFTA – Chapter 11, where a tribunal is satisfied that different claims have a question of law 
or fact in common, the tribunal may, in the interests of fair and efficient resolution of the claims, and 
after hearing the disputing parties, order consolidation and assume jurisdiction over all or some of the 
claims, hearing all of them together. This provision allows for consolidation upon request by a disputing 
party and not ex officio. See also Article 11 of the new Swiss Rules of International Arbitration of June 
2012. The Court, respectively the arbitral tribunal, has authority to decide the question of consolidation 
and joinder, after consulting the parties and taking into consideration the circumstances of the case; See 
also Articles 7 to 10 of the new ICC Rules.  
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proceedings begin732, thereby providing the certainty and predictability that arbitration 
users expect. They can provide guidance on “repeat-offender trouble spots”733, such as 
res judicata, without imposing unduly rigid rules on all aspects of the arbitral process. 
Adopting guidelines, instead of binding rules, would have the additional benefit of not 
disturbing the endorsement by arbitration institutions and national arbitration laws of 
procedural flexibility and party autonomy734. In addition, the adoption of binding res 
judicata rules for international arbitration appears premature. Guidelines may help incite 
the creation of a coherent international arbitration practice.  
511. As was seen in Chapters Three and Four, the res judicata issues arising before 
international arbitral tribunals are generally similar to the issues arising in litigation. The 
occurrence of res judicata issues in international arbitration raises similar policy 
considerations as in litigation. Furthermore, awards are generally considerd to be 
functionally equivalent to judgments and are afforded essentially the same res judicata 
effects as judgments under different domestic laws735. Thus, it appears appropriate to 
look at domestic litigation rules of res judicata as a source of inspiration. The degree to 
which it will be adequate to build on domestic res judicata rules will be discussed below. 
512. The following analysis will discuss three possible approaches to res judicata 
before international arbitral tribunals, namely the conflict-of-laws approach (1.1.), the 
comparative law approach (1.2.) and the transnational approach (1.3.).  
1.1. Conflict-of-laws Approach 
513. Because the doctrine of res judicata varies considerably among jurisdictions the 
question of the proper law governing res judicata in arbitration is clearly posed: which 
law will provide the criteria to verify that a prior award or judgment qualifies as a res 
judicata? Which law will determine the res judicata effects of the prior award or judgment 
in the arbitration proceedings? According to which law will the arbitrators assess 
                                                 
732 PARK, para. 7-38. 
733 PARK, para. 7-31.  
734 See PARK, paras 7-22 et seq. According to Park, this homage to flexibility and party autonomy 
constitutes a marketing tool for arbitral institutions. 
735 See supra, paras 342 et seq. On the comparison of arbitral awards and judgments, see also CLAY, paras 
97 et seq. 
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whether there is identiy of parties, cause and object in both proceedings? The conflict-
of-laws approach consists in defining clear and generally accepted conflicts-of-law rules 
allowing arbitrators to determine the law or laws governing res judicata. As discussed 
below, the conflict-of-laws approach is difficult and ultimately inappropriate to address 
the problem of res judicata before international arbitral tribunals. 
514. The determination of conflict-of-laws rules will depend on the characterisation 
of res judicata as being of substantive or procedural nature. While there is wide support 
for the view that the doctrine of res judicata belongs to procedural law736, the question 
remains controversial737. It appears that in England738 and the United States739 the 
doctrine of res judicata is part of substantive law. By contrast, in Switzerland res judicata 
pertains to procedure740. In France the question is controversial. It has been suggested 
that in a purely domestic context the negative res judicata effect pertains to procedure. 
However, the positive res judicata effect pertains to the merits741.  
515. The ILA recommendations follow this French approach. According to 
Recommendation No. 5, the award’s conclusive effects pertain more to the merits of 
the dispute on which a successful claimant may build further arbitration proceedings. 
By contrast, the award’s preclusive effects pertain more to procedure742.  
                                                 
736 See HABSCHEID, L’autorité de la chose jugée en droit comparé, pp. 180 et seq.; ILA, Interim Report, p. 26; 
SHEPPARD, Res Judicata and Estoppel, p. 229; SHEPPARD, The Scope and Res Judicata Effect of Arbitral 
Awards, p. 283 ; KREMSLEHNER, p. 134. 
737 See MAYER, Litispendance, connexité et chose jugée dans l'arbitrage international p. 187; HASCHER, p. 20.  
738 See HANDLEY, paras 1.07 et seq. See also Associated Electric and Gas Insurance Services Ltd v European 
Reinsurance Co of Zurich [2003] 1 WLR 1041 PC, 1048 (“The [first] award has conferred upon them a right 
which is enforceable by later pleading an issue estoppel. It is a species of the enforcement of the rights 
given by the [first] award just as much as would be a cause of action estoppel. It is true that estoppels can 
be described as rules of evidence or as rules of public policy […] but that is to look at how estoppels are 
given effect to, not at what is the nature of the private law right which the estoppel recognises and 
protects”).  
739 See WONG, p. 69 with reference to National Union Fire Ins. Co. v Belco Petroleum Corp., 88 F.3d 129, 
135-36 (2d Cir. 1996)(“[A] claim of prelcusion is a legal defense to [the substantive claim]. As such, it is 
itself a component of the dispute on the merits. […] It is as much related to the merits as such 
affirmative defenses as a time limit in the arbitration agreement or laches”). See also Chiron Corp. v Ortho 
Diagnostic System, Inc., 207 F.3d 1126, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000)(“As with other affirmative defenses such as 
laches and statute of limitations, we agree with the Second Circuit that a res judicata defense is a 
‘component’ of the merits of the dispute and is thus an arbitrable issue”). 
740 See supra, paras 154 and 403. 
741 See JurisClasseur Droit international, Fasc. 57-10 , paras 71 et seq. ; JurisClasseur Droit international, 
Fasc. 582-30, paras 14 et seq.  
742 ILA, Final Report, para. 66.  
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516. The view that a decision’s conclusive effect pertains to the merits is justified by 
the consideration that a final judicial decision creates a new substantive legal 
relationship between the parties. The court or tribunal subsequently seised has to apply 
the earlier decision in the resolution of the dispute before it, akin to applying the law 
governing the merits. The prior decision is viewed as constituting a presumption of the 
truth with regard to the merits of the case to be determined in the new proceedings743. 
By contrast, a decision’s preclusive effect pertains purely to procedure because the 
objective is to put an end to a dispute and to avoid the unnecessary and wasteful 
duplication of proceedings744. It is the result of the mere existence of the prior decision 
and the interdiction imposed on the state to re-open the matter745.  
517. In our opinion, both the positive and negative res judicata effects of a decision 
should pertain to procedure because they are fundamentally identical in nature. Their 
objective is the same, i.e. to prevent the re-opening of a matter already decided in prior 
proceedings746. Both the negative and positive res judicata effects of a prior decision bar 
(at least partially) a subsequent court or tribunal from exercising its jurisdiction over the 
dispute747. What is different is the degree of “identicalness” of the subject matter in 
dispute in the proceedings. The negative res judicata effect prevents the re-opening of an 
entire claim in subsequent proceedings involving the same claim. By contrast, the 
positive res judicata effect prevents the reconsideration of an issue in subsequent 
proceedings involving a new claim748. The subsequent court or tribunal is bound by a 
prior decision, not because it creates a new substantive legal relationship between the 
parties, but because of the procedural obligation imposed by res judicata749. 
518. The question of the proper characterisation of res judicata as pertaining to 
procedure or substance remains controversial. At this point, it may be left open. For the 
reasons discussed below, the question of res judicata in international arbitration should 
                                                 
743 JurisClasseur Droit international, Fasc. 582-30, para. 14; HABSCHEID, L’autorité de la chose jugée en droit 
comparé, p. 181. 
744 JurisClasseur Droit international, Fasc. 582-30, para. 30. 
745 MAYER, Réflexion sur l’autorité négative de chose jugée, para. 7 with reference to BINDING, p. 326. 
746 HÉRON/LE BARS, para. 345. See also CLAY, para. 103; HABSCHEID, L’autorité de la chose jugée en 
droit comparé, p.184. Contra : MAYER, Litispendance, connexité et chose jugée dans l'arbitrage international, p. 197. 
747 See HABSCHEID, L’autorité de la chose jugée en droit comparé, pp. 184 et seq. ; CLAY, para. 104. 
748 HÉRON/LE BARS, para. 345. 
749 HABSCHEID, L’autorité de la chose jugée en droit comparé, p. 182. 
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be governed by transnational principles, rather than any particular domestic law750. 
Therefore, like in public international law, the question of classification does not arise. 
The question will however re-surface in the discussion of the legal basis on which 
international arbitrators may apply transnational res judicata principles751. 
519. Independently of any classification of res judicata, the final ILA report 
determined that the possible laws to govern res judicata in arbitration proceedings are the 
law of the place of arbitration of the tribunal before whom the issue of res judicata arises, 
the law of the place where the first award (or judgment) was rendered and the law 
governing the contract752. There is disagreement as to which one of these laws should 
govern res judicata753. It can also be argued that the law of the arbitral seat and the law of 
the country where the first decision was rendered should apply cumulatively754.  
520. Another important question concerns the identity of the law that is designated 
by the conflict-of-laws rule. Where the first decision was an award, the question arises 
whether the law of the place of the first arbitration should be understood as the 
national arbitration law of the first arbitral seat or the law governing the first arbitral 
procedure if it is different755. The law governing the contract will generally designate the 
law governing the merits. However, it could also designate the law governing the 
arbitration agreement756. 
521. None of the laws that could possibly govern res judicata issues before 
international arbitral tribunals has a clear and undisputable interest in being applied757. 
Even the clear designation of a particular national arbitration law would be of little help 
                                                 
750 See HASCHER, pp. 25 et seq. See also ICC 9800, 2000, p. 667. The commentary to ICC 98000 refers 
toICC 12226, 2004 (“le principe [de l’autorité de la chose jugée] apparient à l’ordre juridique international. Il s’impose 
d’abord pour des motifs évidents de sécurité et d’économie. Lorsqu’une autorité compétente, qu’il s’agisse d’un juge ou d’un 
arbitre, a tranché définitivement une difficulté opposant deux parties, la décision qui est prise a pleine force juridique : ‘le 
droit est dit’”). 
751 See infra, paras 618 et seq. 
752 ILA, Final Report, para. 27. See also HASCHER, pp. 18 et seq. 
753 MAYER, Litispendance, connexité et chose jugée dans l'arbitrage international, p. 187; SERAGLINI, para. 5, p. 
913. 
754 See SHEPPARD, Res Judicata and Estoppel, pp. 229 et seq.; BORN, p. 2910. See also VEEDER, p. 74. 
755 MAYER, Litispendance, connexité et chose jugée dans l'arbitrage international, p. 187. See also SERAGLINI, 
para. 5. 
756 SERAGLINI, para. 5. 
757 Ibid. See also ILA, Final Report, para. 28. 
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since national arbitration laws generally give no guidance as to how to deal with res 
judicata issues758. As was seen in the previous chapter, in the absence of res judicata rules 
in international arbitration law, arbitral tribunals often applied domestic res judicata rules 
designed for litigation.  
522.  The application of the domestic res judicata rules of the arbitral seat disregards 
the general rule that international arbitral tribunals have no lex fori. It is generally 
considered that an arbitral tribunal does not have the same relation to the arbitral seat 
as a state court to its legal system759. Commenting on the inappropriateness of applying 
the procedural law of the arbitral seat, Judge Lagergren made the following observation:  
“One remarkable feature of [arbitration] […] was that 
according to some systems of law the arbitrators were expected 
to apply as the law of the arbitration procedure the law of the 
place where the arbitration was held. In modern conditions of 
international business […], this often meant little more than 
hearings in an hotel room in a city which was convenient and 
accessible to all parties and witnesses: in such circumstances, 
the law of that place was surely of little relevance”760. 
523. The domestic procedural laws, substantive laws and conflict-of-laws rules of the 
place of arbitration do not apply in the same way in international arbitration 
proceedings as they do in court proceedings held within the country of the arbitral 
seat761. Consequently, the domestic res judicata rules of the place of arbitration should 
not merely be transposed to arbitral proceedings seated there762.  
524. As a matter of principle, the wholesale application by arbitral tribunals of the 
                                                 
758 See supra, paras 341 et seq. See also MAYER, Litispendance, connexité et chose jugée dans l'arbitrage 
international, pp. 186 et seq. 
759 BORN, p. 2911. See also the discussion on the autonomy of international commercial arbitration, 
infra, paras 546 et seq. 
760 Extract reported by GAILLARD, Aspects philosophiques, pp. 147 et seq. 
761 On the autonomous determination by international arbitral tribunals of the applicable law, 
independent of the law of the place of arbitration, see, e.g., GOLDMAN, pp. 347 et seq. See also LALIVE, 
Les règles de conflit de lois, pp. 155 et seq.; RACINE, paras 16 et seq.; GAILLARD, Aspects philosophiques, pp. 
158 et seq.  
762 BORN, p. 2911. See also BREKOULAKIS, p. 207 (“An international arbitration, by definition, has 
no national forum. Thus, the arbitration award is not the product of a particular national legal system, 
and, in any case, the seat of arbitration bears no relation to the effect of an arbitral award”); HULBERT, 
p. 193. 
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domestic res judicata rules of any particular country seems inappropriate763. This is due to 
several differences between international commercial arbitration and domestic litigation. 
Domestic res judicata rules do not take into consideration the nature and objectives of 
international arbitration764. This point will be discussed further in the second part of this 
chapter765. 
1.2. Comparative Law Approach 
525. A second possible approach consists in comparing different national laws to 
determine generally accepted res judicata principles common to a majority of states. In 
the absence of specific res judicata rules in national arbitration laws, these general res 
judicata principles would be derived from domestic litigation laws766.  
526. The application of general res judicata principles derived from domestic litigation 
laws seems a priori appropriate in international commercial arbitration to govern the 
legal relationships between parties from different countries and legal backgrounds, as 
the parties will be familiar with these principles767. Based on the transnational or “inter-
cultural”768 nature of the international arbitration community, it was said that general 
principles of law derived from comparative domestic law are predestined to apply in 
international commercial arbitrations769. In addition, where the parties have not chosen 
a law to govern res judicata, they will be less surprised by the application of general res 
judicata principles than by the application of a particular domestic law that they did not 
choose and that might not be in conformity with what is widely accepted770.  
527. However, it will be difficult to determine general res judicata principles that go 
beyond the common core delineated in the above research771. The scope of general res 
judicata principles common to most jurisdictions would therefore be narrow. To find 
answers to more detailed res judicata questions, international arbitrators would have to 
                                                 
763 ILA, Final Report, para. 25. 
764 BORN, p. 2917. 
765 See infra, paras 536 et seq. 
766 See MAYER, Litispendance, connexité et chose jugée dans l'arbitrage international, pp. 188 et seq. 
767 VIRALLY, p. 384. 
768 JARROSSON, La notion d’arbitrage, para. 1. 
769 VIRALLY, p. 384. 
770 GAILLARD, Aspects philosophiques, p. 113. 
771 See supra, paras 26 et seq. 
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revert to a particular domestic law and, as a matter of consequence, to the conflict-of-
laws approach.  
528. Furthermore, even if possible, the appropriateness of the wholesale 
transposition of a general res judicata doctrine developed for domestic litigation to 
international arbitral proceedings appears doubtful. Such a “legal transplant”772 could be 
a simple way to solve the problem of res judicata in international arbitration. However, 
international commercial arbitration may not be similar enough to domestic litigation 
with respect to res judicata to successfully transplant domestic res judicata rules as such 
into the international commercial arbitration body773. This will be discussed in the 
second part of this chapter.  
1.3. Transnational Approach 
529. A third possibility is to formulate autonomous res judicata principles that are 
better adapted to the particularities of international commercial arbitration than 
domestic rules created for litigation. This approach would seek to provide a uniform set 
of res judicata principles detached from any particular domestic law and taking into 
consideration the nature and objectives of international commercial arbitration. This 
approach may best be described as the “transnational approach”774. 
530. The main difficulty of the transnational approach is to determine the sources 
and content of such res judicata principles. However, there are several advantages to this 
                                                 
772 WATSON, p. 21. 
773 MAYER, Litispendance, connexité et chose jugée dans l'arbitrage international, p. 189. 
774 There are many different definitions of the notion of “transnational law”. A review of these 
definitions would be outside the scope of this research. Suffice it to say that according to a broad 
definition of transnational law it is a “hybrid body of private and public, domestic and international law” 
(blurring of categories) created by private and public actors (blurring of roles of actors) in a process of 
cross-fertilization among different national legal systems and international law (blurring of 
sources)(SCHULTZ, Transnational Legality, with reference, inter alia, to KOH, Transnational Public Law 
Litigation, p. 2349; KOH, Why Transnational Law Matters, p. 745; JESSUP, p. 2.). Acoording to a narrower 
(systemic) understanding transnational law is made of autonomous legal systems beyond the state which 
can be reduced neither to a domestic legal system nor to international law as a legal system (autonomy 
being always relative, never absolute, and therefore admitting the possibility of collaborations with other 
legal systems, for instance with regard to enforcement by national courts)(SCHULTZ, Transnational 
Legality, with reference to SCHULTZ, Some Critical Comments on the Juridicity of the Lex Mercatoria; 
SCHULTZ, eBay; OST/VAN DE KERCHOVE. See also MAYER (L’autonomie de l’arbitre, para. 71) 
according to whom the notion of “transnational law” covers “toutes les versions proposées d’un tiers ordre 
juridicque, coexistant avec les orders juridiques étatiques et avec le droit international “). 
The Doctrine of Res Judicata Before International Arbitral Tribunals 
174 
 
approach. First, it would avoid the difficult conflict-of-laws approach. Second, it would 
avoid the application of a particular domestic law that might be unfamiliar to the parties 
and the arbitrators. Third, the transnational approach would avoid inappropriate 
analogies between international arbitration and litigation. It would respect the nature 
and objectives of international arbitration, as well as the legitimate expectations of the 
parties with respect to the arbitration process. Fourth, the transnational approach 
would provide guidance to arbitral tribunals. It would ensure more consistent solutions 
to res judicata which, in turn, would ensure a greater degree of efficiency, fairness, 
certainty and predictability of the arbitration process. The adoption of the transnational 
approach has been widely supported by prominent authorities in the field of 
international arbitration775.  
531. ILA decided to adopt a mixed model under which transnational rules on certain 
aspects of res judicata would be formulated and remaining issues referred to domestic 
laws under acceptable conflict-of-laws rules. According to ILA, at present, the 
development of transnational rules is not feasible for all aspects of res judicata. For some 
aspects, such as the definition of awards that qualify as res judicata or the extension of res 
judicata effects to third parties in application of a more lenient “identity of parties” 
standard776, the development of transnational rules is premature and, hence, reference 
to conflict-of-laws rules is more appropriate777.  
532. However, ILA considers the adoption of uniform transnational res judicata rules 
to be generally preferable over the application of domestic laws. Whereever feasible, 
uniform transnational rules should be adopted, as this will by-pass the difficult conflict-
of-laws approach. Furthermore, transnational rules generally provide more satisfactory 
answers assuring procedural efficiency and finality than answers provided by domestic 
law778. This is due to the differences between international commercial arbitration and 
                                                 
775 See, e.g., HASCHER, pp. 25 et seq. ; MAYER, Litispendance, connexité et chose jugée dans l'arbitrage 
international, pp. 190 et seq.; SERAGLINI, para. 8; JAROSSON, L’autorité de chose jugée des sentences arbitrales, 
para. B.1.a; BORN, pp. 2889 et seq. and p. 2917; SHEPPARD, The Scope and Res Judicata Effect of Arbitral 
Awards, p. 283. See also BREKOULAKIS, pp. 205 et seq.; STIER, pp. 325 et seq. 
776 For a list of issues in relation to which ILA refrained from formulating transnational rules, see ILA, 
Final Report, para. 7. 
777 ILA, Final Report, para. 5. 
778 ILA, Final Report, para. 27. 
Search for an Appropriate Approach 
175 
 
domestic litigation, as well as to the international character of arbitration. While 
domestic notions of res judicata are valid in a domestic setting, they are hardly 
appropriate in an international context779.  
533. Based on the above, it is submitted that the transnational approach to res judicata 
before international arbitral tribunals should be adopted. Before formulating any 
transnational res judicata principles, it is necessary to further substantiate this conclusion 
and to determine the exact modalities for this approach.  
2. THE APPROPRIATE APPROACH: TRANSNATIONAL RES JUDICATA PRINCIPLES FOR 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 
534. Protagonists of the transnational approach often submit that the application of 
domestic res judicata rules is inappropriate because of the “differences between 
international commercial arbitration and domestic court dispute settlement, as well as 
[…] the international character of arbitration”780; because of the limited analogy 
between the position of the judge and the position of the arbitrator781; or because 
“national preclusion rules are designed for national court proceedings, and do not 
necessarily take into account the nature and objectives of the arbitral process”782 and 
arbitral tribunals are “not properly assimilated to the status of a national court at the 
arbitral seat”783. In short, it is considered that the differences between international 
arbitration and domestic litigation render the application of domestic res judicata rules in 
arbitration proceedings inappropriate. Transnational res judicata principles that consider 
the particularities and objectives of international commercial arbitration must be 
formulated.  
535. The following analysis will investigate whether, and to what extent, an analogy 
between international arbitration and domestic litigation is possible for res judicata 
purposes (2.1.). This will enable us to corroborate the conclusion that transnational res 
judicata rules are needed for international arbitration and to determine the sources of 
                                                 
779 ILA, Final Report, para. 25. 
780 ILA, Final Report, para. 25. See also BRINER, p. 5. 
781 MAYER, Litispendance, connexité et chose jugée dans l'arbitrage international, p. 189. 
782 BORN, p. 2917. 
783 Ibid. 
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these rules (2.2.).  
2.1. Analogy between International Commercial Arbitration and Domestic 
Litigation for Res Judicata Purposes 
536. The question whether, and to what extent, international arbitration can be 
equated to domestic litigation with respect to res judicata requires some introductory 
remarks on international arbitration (2.1.1.). After looking at some of the fundamental 
features of international arbitration, the extent (or limits) of a possible analogy between 
international arbitration and domestic litigation will become clear (2.1.2.).  
2.1.1. What is international arbitration?  
537. There is no legal (or even generally accepted784) definition of arbitration785. 
According to Jarrosson,  
“[a]rbitration is the institution by which a third party decides 
on a dispute between two or more parties by exercising the 
jurisdictional mandate conferred upon him by the latter”786.  
538. Similarily, according to Poudret and Besson, 
“arbitration is a contractual form of dispute resolution 
exercised by individuals, appointed directly or indirectly by the 
parties, and vested with the power to adjudicate the dispute in 
place of state courts by rendering a decision having effects 
analoguous to those of a judgment”787.  
539. There are no fundamental divergences between the various definitions given by 
other legal authors and, in particular, there is no definition which is peculiar to any 
given country788. 
540. The resemblances between international arbitration and domestic litigation are 
apparent. A third party, the arbitrator, decides a dispute between two or more parties by 
                                                 
784 KAUFMANN-KOHLER/RIGOZZI, para. 20. 
785 JARROSSON, La notion d’arbitrage, para. 779.  
786 JARROSSON, La notion d’arbitrage, para. 785 (English translation in POUDRET/BESSON, para. 2). 
See also FOUCHARD/GAILLARD/GOLDMAN, para. 7; OPPETIT, Sur le concept d’arbitrage, pp. 229 et 
seq. 
787 POUDRET/BESSON, para. 3. See also HUYS/KEUTGEN, para. 23; VAN DEN BERG, p. 44. 
788 POUDRET/BESSON, para. 2. See also JARROSSON, La notion d’arbitrage, para. 780. 
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a decision that is res judicata. This arbitrator is essentially a judge789. Arbitrators and 
judges are identical in their status, even though the arbitrator acts in a private capacity, 
was chosen by the parties and has a temporary mandate. The arbitrator is a private, 
chosen and temporary judge, but nevertheless a judge “à part entière”790.  
541. The same holds true for the arbitrator’s and judge’s mandate. Their mandates 
are not merely analoguous, but “profoundly identical”791. The mandates only differ with 
respect to their sources. The fact that the arbitrators’ mandate is based directly on the 
parties’ arbitration agreement does not alter the conclusion that arbitrators exercise the 
same jurisdictional mandate as judges792. Likewise, both judgments and awards share the 
same purpose to finally resolve a given dispute between the parties793. As a matter of 
consequence (it would seem) national laws generally afford awards res judicata effects 
analoguous to those of judgments794. Whether, and to what extent, this is appropriate 
will be determined later in this research. For now, suffice it to say that the recognition 
by national laws of the res judicata effects of awards is evidence that international 
arbitration is generally considered as functionally equivalent to domestic litigation. 
542. However, international arbitration is not domestic litigation. While it is a type of 
justice, it is not a national justice795. Jarrosson declared that it would be both regrettable 
and erronous to consider an arbitrator and a national court as identical on the sole basis 
that both exercise the same jurisdictional mandate796. When parties agree to submit their 
dispute to arbitration, their intention is to remove their dispute from the jurisdiction of 
domestic courts because domestic courts are “unacceptable, unsuitable or inapporpriate 
for the case”797. It would be pointless for parties to replace litigation with another 
                                                 
789 See CLAY, paras 73 et seq.  
790 CLAY, para. 236. According to VULLIEMIN, the arbitrator is the “alter ego” of the judge (para. 202). 
Contra: MUSTILL/BOYD, p. 223 (“The analogy between arbitrator and judge is tempting, but if pressed 
too far can lead to false conclusions”).  
791 JARROSSON, La notion d’arbitrage, para. 180. See also, e.g., CLAY, para. 112 (with reference to other 
authorities); MAYER, Litispendance, connexité et chose jugée dans l'arbitrage international, p. 189; VULLIEMIN, 
para. 203; KAUFMANN-KOHLER/RIGOZZI, para. 24. 
792 JARROSSON, La notion d’arbitrage, para. 175. 
793 VULLIEMIN, para. 200. 
794 See supra, paras 342 et seq.  
795 It was said that international arbitration “[…] étant une justice à part entière, n’est pas assimilable à la justice 
étatique” (RACINE, p. 305). 
796 JARROSSON, L’arbitrage et la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme, para. 35. 
797 LEW, Achieving the Dream, p. 202. 
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dispute resolution mechanism identical to litigation. As expressed by Clay, “[…] si 
l’objectif est d’être juge à la place du juge, l’arbitre perd sa raison d’être”798. 
543. It is not enough to assert that international commercial arbitration is not 
identical to domestic litigation. The differences must affect the way in which res judicata 
issues should be dealt with before arbitral tribunals. The following section will look at 
some particularities of international commercial arbitration that may have an impact on 
res judicata in international arbitration.  
2.1.2. Fundamental features of international commercial arbitration  
544. One characteristic that justifies a departure from domestic res judicata rules in 
favour of transnational rules is that international commercial arbitration is to a great 
degree autonomous from national legal orders. For the reasons discussed below, it is 
submitted that international commercial arbitration may be considered as an arbitral 
legal order separate, but not independent, from national legal orders. This arbitral legal 
order is founded on transnational law. Accordingly, arbitral tribunals should apply 
transnational law to res judicata issues arising before them. 
545. Besides being autonomous (2.1.2.1.), international arbitration is also a 
contractual (2.1.2.2.) and private (2.1.2.3.) form of dispute resolution. Furthermore, it is 
flexible, neutral and confidential (2.1.2.4.). 
2.1.2.1. International commercial arbitration is autonomous 
546. Much has been written on the subject of the autonomy of international 
commercial arbitration799. The idea was famously expressed in 1963 by Goldman who 
asserted that 
“[...] every investigation of a theory corresponding to the 
nature of international arbitration leads ineluctably to an 
                                                 
798 CLAY, para. 62. 
799 See, e.g., FOUCHARD, L’autonomie de l’arbitrage commercial international, pp. 99 et seq. ; GOLDMAN, pp. 
347 et seq. ; MANN, pp. 157 et seq.; VON MEHREN, pp. 215 et seq. ; MAYER, L’autonomie de l’arbitre, pp. 
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autonomous, not a national, system”800.  
547. In 1967, Mann took a diametrically opposed position asserting that 
“[i]n the legal sense no international commercial arbitration 
exists. […] [E]very arbitration is a national arbitration, that is to 
say, subject to a specific system of national law801. 
548. According to Mann, international arbitration cannot be autonomous. Arbitral 
tribunals must be regarded as equivalent to the domestic courts of the arbitral seat. 
They are both “subject to the local sovereign”802.  
549. As discussed below, today the autonomy of international commercial arbitration 
is widely recognised. However, “l’autonomie est affaire de degrés”803. Different national laws 
recognise this autonomy to a greater or lesser extent. Furthermore, the autonomy of 
international arbitration from national legal systems is never absolute.  
550. Racine has described the autonomy of international commercial arbitration as 
“notion expansioniste”804; it has steadily increased over the past few decades805. The 1958 
New York Convention was “the beginning of internationalism in arbitration”806, 
recognising that arbitration agreements, proceedings and awards would have their origin 
and seek to be effective in different jurisdictions. In line with this internationalism, the 
New York Convention reduced the role of the arbitral seat807. According to Gaillard, 
the Convention clearly broke with the traditional conception considering international 
arbitration as equivalent to domestic litigation, drawing its legitimacy solely from the 
legal order of the arbitral seat808. 
551. The UNCITRAL Model Law was later adopted “in view of the desirability of 
                                                 
800 GOLDMAN, p. 380 (English translation in VON MEHREN, p. 217). As noted by MANN, the 
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uniformity of the law of arbitral procedures and the specific needs of international 
commercial arbitration practice”809. This need for improvement and harmonisation was 
based on findings that national laws were often particularly inappropriate for 
international cases, in particular national laws that equated the arbitral process with 
court litigation810.  
552. Salient features of the Model Law include the recognition of the doctrines of 
competence-competence and separability811; the recognition of the doctrine of party 
autonomy812; the limitation and delimitation of local court intervention in international 
arbitrations813; and the recognition of the principle that awards must be recognised as 
final and binding, with limited grounds for which an award may be set aside or refused 
recognition or enforcement814. These salient features are, today, generally-accepted rules 
of international arbitration. According to Lew, they constitute “a transnational law of 
international arbitration” supporting “the autonomous nature of arbitration”815. 
553. In light of this changing attitude towards international arbitration, new modern 
national arbitration laws were adopted. These laws recognise the autonomy of 
international commercial arbitration at all stages of the arbitration, namely the 
arbitration agreement, the arbitration procedure and the award816.  
Autonomy at the stage of the arbitration agreement 
554. The autonomy of international arbitration is established by the doctrines of 
competence-competence and separability. While the doctrine of separability renders the 
arbitration agreement autonomous from the main contract, the doctrine of 
                                                 
809 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985 - with amendments as 
adopted in 2006, General Assembly Resolution 40/72 (11 December 1985), p. vii (available at 
www.uncitral.org). 
810 Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL Secretariat on the Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration (available at www.uncitral.org), paras 5 et seq. 
811 Article 16 (1) UNCITRAL Model Law. 
812 Article 19 UNCITRAL Model Law. 
813 Article 5 UNCITRAL Model Law. 
814 Articles 34 to 36 UNCITRAL Model Law. 
815 LEW, Achieving the Dream, p. 191. For more examples of principles that have acquired the “dignity” of 
“common law of international arbitration”, see LALIVE, Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy, 
paras 133 et seq. 
816 RACINE, pp. 311 et seq.   
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competence-competence renders the arbitral tribunal autonomous from national courts. 
Together, both doctrines ensure that all aspects of the dispute, including jurisdiction 
and merits, will be decided by the arbitral tribunal and not by a court. 
555. The autonomy of the arbitration agreement is further corroborated by a current 
in arbitration case law that applies transnational law to the arbitration agreement in the 
absence of an express choice of national law by the parties817. Several state court cases 
echo this approach818. 
556. Nevertheless, the autonomy of international arbitration with respect to 
arbitration agreements is not absolute. First, the arbitral tribunal’s decision on 
jurisdiction is generally subject to the control of the supervisory courts of the arbitral 
seat, unless the parties have waived in advance all setting aside proceedings, as is 
currently possible under Belgian819, Panamanian820, Peruvian821, Swiss822, Swedish823 and 
                                                 
817 HASCHER, p. 25 ; MAYER, L’autonomie de l’arbitre, paras 43 et seq. See also the first partial award of 26 
June 2001 rendered by an ICC tribunal with seat in Paris between Dallah Real Estate and Tourism 
Holding Company and the Government of Pakistan (“Judicial as well as Arbitral case law now clearly 
recognise that, as a result of the principle of autonomy, the rules of law, applicable to an arbitration 
agreement, may differ from those governing the main contract, and that, in the absence of specific 
indication by the parties, such rules need not be linked to a particular national law […], but may consist 
of those transnational general principles which the Arbitrators would consider to meet the fundamental 
requirements of justice in international trade. […] [I]n view of the autonomy of the Arbitration 
Agreement, the Tribunal believes that such Agreement is not to be assessed, as to its existence, validity 
and scope, neither under the laws of Saudi Arabia nor under those of Pakistan, nor under the rules of any 
other specific local law connected or not, to the present dispute. By reason of the international character 
of the Arbitration Agreement coupled with the choice, under the main Agreement, of institutional 
arbitration under the ICC Rules without any reference in such Agreement to any national law, the 
Tribunal will decide on the matter of its jurisdiction and on all issues relating to the validity and scope of 
the Arbitration Agreement and therefore on whether the Defendant is a party to such Agreement and to 
this Arbitration, by reference to those transnational general principles and usages reflecting the 
fundamental requirements of justice in international trade and the concept of good faith in business”; 
quoted in Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Company v The Ministry of Religious Affairs, Government of 
Pakistan [2010] UKSC 46, para. 33). 
818 See, e.g., Cour de Cassation, 20 December 1993, Municipalité de Khoms El Mergeb v Dalico, Rev. arb., No. 
1 (1994), p. 116 (“[E]n vertu d'une règle matérielle du droit international de l'arbitrage, la clause compromissoire est 
indépendante juridiquement du contrat principal qui la contient directement ou par référence et que son existence et son 
efficacité s'apprécient, sous réserve des règles impératives du droit français et de l'ordre public international, d'après la 
commune volonté des parties, sans qu'il soit nécessaire de se référer à une loi étatique”). See also the decisions of the 
US Supreme Court in Scherk v Alberto-Culver Co. (417 US 506 (1974)) and Mitsubishi v Soler Chrysler Plymouth 
(473 US 614 (1985)). In Scherk the court accepted the validity of an arbitration clause, having regard to 
the international character of the contract, thereby excluding the restrictions imposed by the Security 
Exchange Act on arbitrability. In Mitsubishi the court held that, in antitrust matters, the principle of non-
arbitrability does not extend to international contracts (see LALIVE, Transnational (or Truly International) 
Public Policy, para. 57). 
819 Article 1717 (4) Judicial Code. 
820 Article 36 Décret-loi No. 5 (8 July 1999), published in Rev. arb., No. 3 (2005), p. 823. 
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Tunesian824 law825.  
557. Second, in some countries, such as Germany, England and Sweden, a party 
may, in exceptional cases, seise a state court directly with an action concerning the 
jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal826. The court is an ordinary court, not a supporting or 
supervisory court, and the question of the arbitral jurisdiction is the main object of the 
proceedings, not a preliminary question827. The autonomy of arbitral tribunals with seat 
in these countries is preserved to the extent that the tribunal may commence or 
continue the arbitration proceedings while the action is pending before the court828.  
558. Third, in most countries the arbitral tribunal has no priority to rule on its 
jurisdiction over a state court that has been seised of an action on the merits829. The 
court is entitled, when determining its own jurisdiction, to examine whether there is a 
valid arbitration agreement. The court has full power to review the arbitration 
                                                                                                                                         
821 Article 63 (8) Peruvian Arbitration Act 2008. 
822 Article 192 PILA. 
823 Section 51 SAA 99. 
824 Article 78 (6) Tunesian Arbitration Code 1993. 
825 See POUDRET/BESSON, para. 457; GAILLARD, Aspects philosophiques, pp. 119 et seq. As of 1 May 
2011, this will also be possible in France under Article 1522 Decree 2011-48. 
826 See POUDRET/BESSON, paras 484 et seq. 
827 POUDRET/BESSON, para. 483. 
828 See, e.g., Section 1032 (3) ZPO; Section 32 (4) EAA 96; Section 2 (1) SAA 99. However, pursuant to 
Section 2 (2) SAA 99, the arbitral tribunal’s decision on jurisdiction is not final and binding.  
829 French law is one of the view laws to grant arbitral tribunals a prioty to rule on their jurisdiction (see 
Article 1458 NCPC; Article 1448 Decree 2011-48. According to Article 1465 Decree 2011-48 “Le tribunal 
arbitral est seul compétent pour statuer sur les contestations relatives à son pouvoir juridictionnel”). See also Article VI 
(3) of the 1961 European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration. In Switzerland, the 
question as to whether arbitral tribunals enjoy a priority to rule on their jurisdiction is controversial (see 
generally, POUDRET/BESSON, paras 499 et seq.). POUDRET/BESSON support the negative effect of 
competence-competence only in the situation where the court called upon to refer the parties to 
arbitration is not in the same country as the arbitral seat (para. 520). According to BUCHER, a Swiss 
court seised of the merits of a dispute should refer the parties to arbitration if the arbitration agreement is 
prima facie valid and this, whether the arbitral seat is in Switzerland or abroad (BUCHER, L’examen de la 
compétence internationale par le juge suisse, pp. 181 et seq.). See also Art. 186 (1) bis PILA which requires arbitral 
tribunals with seat in Switzerland to rule on their jurisdiction and, if they accept it, to decide the merits of 
the dispute, even though an identical action is already pending before a state court or arbitral tribunal. 
Art. 186 (1) bis PILA thus confirms the autonomy of arbitral tribunals with seat in Switzerland at the 
stage of the arbitration agreement (BUCHER, L’examen de la compétence internationale par le juge suisse, p. 192 ; 
GAILLARD, Aspects philosophiques, p. 144). See also the Parliamentary Initiative by LÜCHER on the 
modification of Article 7 PILA. The initiative seeks to engrave the negative effect of the compétence-
compétence principle in the Swiss legal order (the proposed Art. 7 (2) PILA reads as follows: “En matière 
internationale, le tribunal suisse, sans égard au siège du tribunal arbitral, sursoit à statuer jusqu'à ce que celui-ci se soit 
prononcé sur sa compétence, à moins qu'un examen sommaire ne démontre qu'il n'existe entre les parties aucune convention 
d'arbitrage”).    
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agreement; it is not limited to a prima facie review830. Likewise, the prevailing view is that 
Article II (3) NYC does not recognise a priority of the arbitral tribunal to rule on its 
jurisdiction831.  
Autonomy at the stage of the arbitration procedure 
559. International commercial arbitration is autonomous with respect to the law 
governing both the procedure and the merits of the dispute832. The debate concerning 
the law governing procedure and merits is now largely closed. It is today almost 
universally accepted that arbitral tribunals cannot be constrained by the same rules as 
govern domestic court proceedings833.  
560. Modern arbitration laws no longer require arbitral tribunals to apply the 
conflict-of-laws rules of the arbitral seat to determine the law governing the merits834. 
Likewise, arbitral tribunals are not required to apply any particular domestic law to the 
merits or procedure. Under modern arbitration laws and institutional rules, the merits 
of the dispute may be governed by “rules of law”835, including rules of non-national 
origin, such as the lex mercatoria or transnational law836. However, under some laws and 
institutional rules, the arbitral tribunal cannot apply such non-national rules of law 
                                                 
830 See POUDRET/BESSON, paras 495 et seq. Pursuant to Article 8 (2) UNCITRAL ML and Section 
1032 (3) ZPO, the arbitral tribunal may commence or continue the arbitration while the action is pending 
before the court.   
831 See POUDRET/BESSON, para. 491. However, VAN DEN BERG asserts that, based on the 
Convention’s pro-enforcement bias, the words “null and void, inoperative or incapable of being 
performed” should be construed narrowly, and the invalidity of the arbitration agreement should be 
accepted in manifest cases only (VAN DEN BERG, p.155). Likewise, BUCHER concedes that Article II 
(3) NYC does not limit the power of the court to a prima facie examination of the existence and validity of 
the arbiration agreement. However, the text of Article II (3) NYC also does not grant to the court full 
power of review (BUCHER, L’examen de la compétence internationale, p. 180).   
832 See IDI, Arbitration Between States, Article 6 (“The parties have full autonomy to determine the 
procedural and substantive rules and principles that are to apply in the arbitration. In particular, […] 
these rules and principles may be derived from different national legal systems as well as from non-
national sources such as principles of international law, general principles of law, and the usages of 
international commerce”). See also GOODE, p. 20; GAILLARD, Aspects philosophiques, p. 94. On the 
autonomy of international arbitration with respect to the law governing the merits and the procedure see, 
in particular, GAILLARD, Aspects philosophiques, pp. 145 et seq.; RACINE, pp. 318 et seq. 
833 GOODE, p. 20. See also VON MEHREN, pp. 220 et seq.; LALIVE, Transnational (or Truly International) 
Public Policy, paras 36 et seq. 
834 LEW/MISTELIS/KRÖLL, paras 17-51 et seq.  
835 See, e.g., Article 1496 NCPC (Article 1511 Decree 2011-48); Article 1054 (2) Netherlands CCP; Article 
187 PILA; Article 17 (1) ICC Arbitration Rules; Article 22 (3) LCIA Arbitration Rules.  
836 On the law applicable to the merits, including the application of non-national rules of law, see 
POUDRET/BESSON, paras 676 et seq. ; LEW/MISTELIS/KRÖLL, paras 18-1 et seq. 
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without the consent of the parties837.  
561. In the absence of party choice, arbitral tribunals may generally conduct the 
procedure as they deem appropriate, subject to the safeguards of fundamental 
principles of procedure838.  
Autonomy at the stage of the award 
562. The autonomy of international arbitration also manifests itself at the stage of 
the award, but it is not absolute. By virtue of Article V NYC, the courts of the state 
where recognition or enforcement of the award is sought are entitled to control the 
award. They may refuse to give effect to an award ex officio if the subject matter in 
dispute is not arbitrable under the law of the enforcement state or if the award violates 
the public policy of that state839. Likewise, the supervisory courts of the arbitral seat 
generally have the power to set aside an award rendered there840.  
563. The autonomy of awards from national legal systems is recognised to the extent 
that the grounds for which an award may be set aside (or refused recognition or 
enforcement) are strictly limited and are interpreted narrowly. The recognition of the 
autonomy of awards is particularly manifest where the lex arbitri allows the parties to 
waive in advance all setting aside proceedings.  
564. In France, following the decision of the Paris Cour d’appel in the Götaverken 
case841, the opinion was voiced to abolish annulment proceedings before the courts of 
                                                 
837 See, e.g., Article 1051 (2) ZPO; Section 46 (3) EAA 96; Article 28 UNICTRAL ML; Article 35 (1) 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. However, according to LALIVE “modern practice clearly allows the 
arbitrator, […] failing a choice by the parties, to disregard any State law” and apply non-national law, on 
the ground that the contract has its “closest connection” with the international community of merchants 
(LALIVE, Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy, para. 165).  
838 See, e.g., Article 15 (1) ICC Rules; Article 17 (1) UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules; Article 14 LCIA 
Arbitration Rules.  
839 Article V (2) NYC. 
840 LEW/MISTELIS/KRÖLL, para. 25-10. See, however, Article 1717 (4) Judicial Code 1985 (“The 
Belgian Court can take cognizance of an application to set aside only if at least one of the parties to the 
dispute decided in the arbitral award is either a physical person having Belgian nationality or residing in 
Belgium, or a legal person formed in Belgium or having a branch (une succursale), or some seat of 
operation (un siège quelconque d'opération) there”). In 1998 Article 1717 (4) Judicial Code was modified 
to substitute the possibility of waiving setting aside proceedings for the exclusion of such proceedings. 
841 Cour d’appel de Paris, 21 February 1980, General National Maritime Transport Company Lybia, as legal 
successor of Libyan General Maritime Transport Organization v AB Götaverken, YCA, Vol. VI (1981), p. 223. 
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the arbitral seat on the grounds that the award usually has no connection with the 
country of the seat842. According to Fouchard, the award is not part of the national legal 
order of the arbitral seat, but is international843. It should only be controlled by the 
courts of the country where recognition or enforcement is sought844.  
565. Based on this conception that international awards are not part of any national 
legal order but are international judicial acts, French courts do not give effect 
automatically to foreign court decisions annulling an international award. Since 1984 
they recognise and enforce awards previously annulled at the arbitral seat if they meet 
the requirements set out in Article 1502 NCPC845.  
566. The French conception of the autonomous character of international awards 
has remained largely isolated846. Only in a few cases rendered in Belgium847, Austria848, 
the US849 and the Netherlands850 have courts accepted to give effects to awards 
                                                 
842 FOUCHARD, La portée internationale de l’annulation de la sentence arbitrale dans son pays d’origine, para. 40 
(“pourquoi annuler une sentence si elle n’a pas à être exécutée dans ce pays ? ”). 
843 See also BOLLÉE (para. 52) who contends that an award constitutes a “fait juridique” with universal 
existence. As a consequence, the award is not part of any national legal order (“[…] aucun ordre juridique 
étatique n’est fondamental pour la sentence”). However, according to Bollée awards are also not part of any 
anational legal order. As a consequence, awards cannot qualify as judicial acts (para. 151). 
844 Ibid. See also RACINE, para. 36. 
845 Cour de cassation, 9 October 1984, Pabalk Ticaret Limited Sirketi v Norsolor SA, Rev. arb. (1985), p. 431; 
Cour de cassation, 10 March 1993, Polish Ocean Line v Société Jolasry, Rev. arb. (1993), p. 258 (2nd case). 
Cour de cassation, 23 March 1994, Société Hilmarton v Société OTV, Rev. arb. (1994), pp. 327 et seq. The 
court held in relevant part : “La sentence rendue en Suisse était une sentence internationale qui n'était pas intégrée dans 
l'ordre juridique de cet Etat, de sorte que son existence demeurait établie malgré son annulation et que sa reconnaissance en 
France n'était pas contraire à l'ordre public international ”. This jurisprudence was followed by the Paris Cour 
d’appel on several occasions : Cour d’appel de Paris, 14 January 1997, République Arabe d’Egypte v Société 
Chromalloy Aero Services, JDI (1998), p. 750; Cour d’appel de Paris, 10 June 2004, Société Bargues Agro 
Industries v Société Young Pecan Company, Rev. arb. (2006), p. 154 ; Cour d’appel de Paris, 29 September 
2005, Direction générale de l’aviation civile de l’Emirat de Dubai v Société International Bechtel, Rev. arb. (2006), p. 
695; Cour d’appel de Paris, 18 January 2007, La société SA Lesbats et fils v Monsieur Volker le docteur Grub 
(cited by GAILLARD, Aspects philosophiques, p. 117). See also Cour de cassation, 29 June 2007, Société PT 
Putrabali Adyamulia v Société Rena Holding et al, Rev. arb. (2007), pp. 645 et seq. 
846 MOURRE, Termo Rio et Putrabali, p. 266. 
847 Brussels Tribunal of First Instance, 6 December 1988, Sonatrach v Ford, Bacon & Davis Inc, ASA 
Bulletin (1989), p. 213 (confirmed by Brussels Court of Appeal, 9 January 1990, Journal des tribunaux 
(1990), p. 386). 
848 Oberster Gerichtshof, 20 October 1993, Radenska v Kajo, Rev. arb. (1998), pp. 419 et seq. (confirmed by 
Oberster Gerichtshof, 23 February 1998, Radenska v Kajo, Rev. arb. (1999), pp. 385 et seq.). 
849 Chromalloy Aeroservices v The Arab Republic of Egypt, 939 F. Supp. 907 (D.D.C. 1996). Since Chromalloy, US 
courts have consistently refused to recognise or enforce awards previously annulled at the arbitral seat: 
Baker Marine (Nig.) Ltd v Chevron (Nig.) Ltd, 191 F. 3d 194 (2d Cir. 1999); Martin Spier v Calzaturificio Tecnica 
SpA, 71 F. Supp. 2d 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); TermoRio SA ESP v Electrificadoria Dela Atlantico SA ESP et al., 
421 F. Supp. 2d 87 (D.D.C. 2006) (confirmed in TermoRio SA ESP and LeaseCO Group LLC  v Electranta 
SP et al., 487 F. 3d 928 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). However, according to TermoRio, the enforcement of previously 
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previously annulled at the arbitral seat.  
Is there an arbitral legal order? 
567.  Several scholars, mainly in France, have submitted that international 
commercial arbitration constitutes an arbitral legal order largely independent from 
national legal orders851. The existence of an arbitral legal order would have important 
consequences with respect to res judicata. First, awards would be rendered, not in the 
name of any particular state, but in the name of the arbitral legal order. They would 
draw their legitimacy and efficacy from their own legal order. The res judicata effects of 
awards would thus have to be determined by the arbitral legal order itself. Another 
consequence would be that the res judicata doctrine would, a priori, not apply between 
state courts and international arbitral tribunals, because the doctrine traditionally is said 
to apply only between courts and tribunals belonging to the same legal order852.  
568. The question as to whether international commercial arbitration is a legal order 
is controversial853. For the reasons given below, it is submitted that it is possible to 
                                                                                                                                         
annulled awards is still possible where the annulment decision itself violates US public policy.  
850 Gerechtshof, Amsterdam, 28 April 2009, Yukos Capital v OAO Rosneft, YCA, Vol. XXXIV (2009), pp. 
703 et seq. (upheld by the Dutch Supreme Court in OAO Rosneft v Yukos Capital. See VAN 
HAERSOLTE-VAN HOF). See also Hoge Raad, 26 October 1973, Société européenne d’études et d’entreprises 
v République fédérale socialiste de Yougoslavie, Rev. arb. (1974), pp. 311 et seq. 
851 See, e.g., CLAY, paras 237 et seq.; RACINE, pp. 335 et seq.; GAILLARD, Aspects philosophiques, pp. 51 et 
seq. See also VULLIEMIN, paras 382 et seq. Although not in express terms, LEW also submits that there 
is an autonomous arbitral legal order (“International arbitration exists in a sphere or domain independent 
of and separate from national laws and jurisdictions”)(Achieving the Dream, p. 203). According to SHANY, 
the relation between arbitral tribunals and state courts is somewhere “in the middle”. Although strictly 
speaking they are not part of the same legal order, they still operate within the same polity, derive their 
authority from the same legal system and often apply the same law (Competing Jurisdictions, p. 116).  
852 See supra, paras 446 et seq. See also ILA, Final Report, para. 29 and paras 34 et seq.; RIVKIN, pp. 292 et 
seq.; DODGE, p. 367. 
853 Contra: see, e.g., POUDRET/BESSON, para. 112 (“Without entering into a philosophical debate, we 
consider that the parties’ will is necessarily based on a legal system from which it derives its validity. The 
lex arbitrii builds the foundation (Grundnorm) for the effectiveness of the arbitration agreement”); 
GOODE, pp. 19 et seq.; REDONDO, para. 10. See also Bank Mellat v Helliniki Techniki SA [1984] 1 QB 
291, 301 (“Despite suggestions to the contrary by some learned writers under other systems, our 
jurisprudence does not recognise the concept of arbitral procedure floating in the transnational 
firmament, unconnected with any municipal system of law”); Coppée Lavalin & Voest-Alpine v Ken-Ren 
Chemicals [1994] 2 All ER 449, 458 (“Transnationalism is a theoretical ideal which posits that international 
arbitration, at least as regards certain types of an arbitral institution arbitration, is a self-contained judicial 
system, by its very nature separate from national systems of law, and indeed antithetical to them. I doubt 
whether in its purest sense the doctrine now commands widespread support […]. At all events it cannot 
be the law of England […]”). In its final report ILA did not discuss the question of the existence of an 
arbitral legal order since the ILA recommendations on res judicata and arbitration do not cover the 
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conceive of international commercial arbitration as an arbitral legal order founded on 
transnational law. The question as to the existence of an arbitral legal order is a 
philosophical one, not a scientific one. As was said by Gaillard, it pertains to believe, if 
not faith, and not to a scientific truth. There is no right or wrong, but only coherence 
and incoherence, as well as efficiency and inefficiency854.  
569. There are several definitions of a legal order855. It has been defined as a coherent 
entirety of rules of law that govern an entity, such as a state856. According to Kelsen, a 
legal order is an order of constraint and sanction, and constraint and sanction can only 
emanate from a state857. Accordingly, a legal order is necessarily a national legal order. 
By contrast, according to Santi Romano’s doctrine of the “plurality of legal orders” (“la 
puralité des ordres juridiques”) there may be other legal orders besides the national legal 
order. Every legal order is an institution and every institution is therefore a legal 
order858. An institution is defined as “tout être ou corps social”859. The institution must exist; 
it must be a visible and permanent entity860. It must also constitute a closed and 
autonomous entity. This does not mean that this entity or institution may not interact 
with other institutions. It may form a more or less integrated part of another institution 
and may even be subordinated to another legal order. Hence, the autonomy of an 
institution must not be absolute. While there are autonomous institutions that are 
perfectly self-sufficient, others are less autonomous and cooperate with or depend on 
other institutions861. Santi Romano uses the term “relevance” to describe the relation 
between different legal orders, i.e. to what extent one legal order takes another legal 
                                                                                                                                         
situation of arbitral tribunals faced with a prior state court judgment. ILA simply states that state courts 
and international arbitral tribunals “both belong to the same legal order since both are dealing with a 
relationship between the parties which is governed by private law (and not public international law)”. ILA 
adds “[…] to the extent that state courts or arbitral tribunals may infer indirect support from these 
Recommendations […], the requirement of the same legal order is to be interpreted as expressing the 
view that state courts and arbitral tribunals pertain to the same legal order and that this requirement is 
met” (para. 35). 
854 GAILLARD, Aspects philosophiques, para. 135. 
855 The terminology may also vary. For instance, the term “legal system” is also used. 
856 See CLAY, para. 237; RACINE, para. 48; GAILLARD, Aspects philosophiques, para. 43; LAGARDE, 
paras 5 et seq. 
857 See RACINE, para. 49 with reference to KELSEN; VIRALLY, p. 374. 
858 ROMANO, p. 19. 
859 ROMANO, p. 25. 
860 ROMANO, pp. 25 et seq. 
861 ROMANO, pp. 27 et seq. 
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order into consideration. A legal order that is irrelvant to another legal order has no 
relation with the other legal order. For there to be “relevance”, the existence, content and 
efficacy of one legal order must meet the requirements of the other legal order862. 
570. According to Gaillard, a legal order is an autonomous and coherent system that 
disposes of its own legal sources863. A legal order must be self-regulating in the sense 
that its sources must allow the legal order to resolve all issues concerning it and to 
coordinate its relations with other legal orders864. Gaillard asserts that international 
arbitration constitutes an arbitral legal order entirely founded on transnational law. This 
means that the legitimacy of international arbitration is grounded on the collective 
recognition of international arbitration by national legal orders. The arbitral legal order 
results from the convergence of national laws. It is a transnational legal order that 
considers the tendencies flowing from the law and legal activities of the community of 
states865. 
571. Gaillard stresses that the transnational law that constitutes the arbitral legal 
order must be considered as a method rather than a list of rules866. The method is the 
same as under Article of the 38 ICJ Statutes to determine general principles of law. A 
transnational rule does not have to be unanimously endorsed by all national laws. 
Rather, the “transnational law method” consists in determining the dominant tendency 
among national laws. It consists essentially in a systematic use of comparative law867. 
This method allows arbitral tribunals to resolve any issues arising before them. 
According to Gaillard, there therefore is an arbitral legal order and arbitral tribunals 
must be considered as organs of this legal order. They render their awards in the name 
                                                 
862 ROMANO, p. 106. 
863 GAILLARD, Aspects philosophiques, p. 95. See also RACINE, para. 49. 
864 GAILLARD, Aspects philosophiques, pp. 112 (“[…] [U]n ensemble structuré de normes ou ‘système’ n’est 
justiciable, selon nous, de la qualification d’ordre juridique que s’il a vocation à répondre à l’ensemble des questions 
susceptibles de se poser à ses sujets et à concevoir ses sources et ses relations avec les autres ordres juridiques”) and 114 
(“Même cohérent et même complet, un ensemble de normes ne peut, à notre sens, être qualifié d’ordre juridique que s’il est à 
même de penser ses sources et ses relations avec les autres ordres juridiques”). 
865 GAILLARD, Aspects philosophiques, paras 50 et seq. See also CLAY, paras 258 et seq. 
866 GAILLARD, Aspects philosophiques, para. 54 and paras 61 et seq. 
867 GAILLARD, Aspects philosophiques, para. 60. See also OPPETIT, Philosophie de l’arbitrage commercial 
international, p. 817 (“[...] l’arbitrage commercial international, par son esprit d’ouverture comparatiste […] et par la 
generalisation de son usage sur la base de principes assez largement acceptés d’organisation et de fonctionnement, tend de plus 
en plus à l’universalité, qui ne debouche d’ailleurs pas nécessairement sur l’uniformisation […] l’universalité réside dans 
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of their own legal order, and not in the name of any national legal order868.  
572. Without re-opening the philosophical debate, we support the opinion that 
international commercial arbitration may constitute an arbitral legal order based on 
transnational law. Whatever definition is applied, a legal order always seeks to draw its 
legitimacy from its own sources and relies on its own sources to regulate itself869. It is 
submitted that international commercial arbitration meets these requirements.  
573. First, international arbitration disposes of its own sources. The international 
arbitration community has continuously elaborated a vast body of autonomous rules. 
International arbitration instruments, such as the New York Convention, the 
UNCITRAL Model Law and institutional arbitration rules, procedural soft-law 
formulated by professional organisations (to the extent that they reflect a general 
consensus), as well as an important international arbitration practice all bear witness to 
the existence of a common international arbitration law870. The existence of a real 
“jurisprudence arbitrale” has been asserted by several scholars871. In addition, the 
transnational law method described by Gaillard allows arbitral tribunals to elaborate 
new rules to deal with all issues arising before them. While international arbitrations are 
also governed by national arbitration laws, today the influence of any particular national 
arbitration law on international arbitration is limited.  
574. The international commercial arbitration law that makes up the arbitral legal 
order is characterised by its transnationality. It does not pertain to any particular 
national legal order, but is comprised of rules that are collectively recognised by the 
majority of states. International arbitration law is necessarily transnational because it 
serves an international arbitration community that is itself transnational. It is 
                                                 
868 GAILLARD, Aspects philosophiques, paras 60 et seq. 
869 VIRALLY, p. 376. 
870 RACINE, para. 48; LEW, Achieving the Dream, p. 196; See also KAUFMANN-KOHLER/RIGOZZI, 
para. 14. 
871 See, e.g., CLAY, paras 263 et seq. ; RACINE, para. 48; MAYER, L’autonomie de l’arbitre, pp. 426 et seq. 
See also the interim award of 23 September 1982 in the Dow Chemical case (ICC Case No. 4131, 1982), p. 
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characterised by a lack of borders872. The participants in an international arbitration 
frequently are from different jurisdictions with conflicting legal, cultural, political and 
ethical systems873. The arbitral seat usually is in a third jurisdiction. Finally, international 
arbitrations are often subject to international arbitration rules and the merits are 
frequently resolved by reference to long and regulatory international contracts, as well 
as transnational commercial law874.  
575. Second, it would seem that international commercial arbitration draws its 
legitimacy not from any particular national legal order, but from the collective 
recognition by all national legal orders of international arbitration as a fair and efficient 
mechanism of dispute resolution875. Not only is international arbitration globally 
recognised, it is wanted and encouraged by the majority of states876. This attitude 
towards arbitration is mirrored in national arbitration legislations and the jurisprudence 
of domestic courts. It is also witnessed by the wide adoption of the New York 
Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law.  
576. Third, international arbitration is an organised and largely self-regulatory 
institution. It operates to a great extent independently, with only limited intervention of 
national arbitration laws and courts877. Admittedly, international arbitration is not 
entirely independent from national legal orders. It needs their recognition and 
support878. However, this does not compromise the existence of an arbitral legal order. 
A legal order does not necessarily have to be absolutely autonomous and self-
sufficient879. Expressed in the words of Santi Romano, the arbitral legal order is not in a 
situation of “irrelevance” but “relevance” with regard to national legal orders. The arbitral 
legal order “peacefully”880 coexists and cooperates with national legal orders. There are 
“gangways”881, “contact points”882 or even “tentacles”883 between the arbitral and 
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875 See OPPETIT, Philosophie de l’arbitrage commercial international, p. 815. 
876 RACINE, paras 58 et seq. 
877 RACINE, paras 45 et seq. 
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national legal orders. These relations should be viewed as an illustration of Santi 
Romano’s “relevance”; as relations of collaboration between different legal orders884. 
They should not be viewed as an integration of international arbitration in a national 
legal order.  
577. The existence of annulment proceedings are not necessarily a sign or 
consequence of the integration of international arbitration in the national legal order of 
the arbitral seat885. The choice of the arbitral seat does not so much witness the parties’ 
intention to subject themselves to the sovereignty of the state of the arbitral seat. The 
role of the arbitration law of the seat should not be to impose obligations on the parties 
and arbitrators, a violation of which will be sanctioned by the annulment of the award. 
Rather, its role should be to support the arbitration in that it supplements institutional 
or ad hoc arbitration rules and gives maximum efficacy to the arbitration proceeding and 
the award886.  
578. By determining a seat the parties also determine the domestic courts that are 
expected to support, not interfere in the arbitration. These courts are associates of the 
arbitrators. Their task is to ensure the efficacy of the arbitration887. This role of 
supporting and collaborating with the arbitration process also applies with respect to 
the supervisory courts888. Annulment proceedings constitute a mechanism of recourse 
against an award to ensure that the proceedings and the award meet fundamental 
standards of justice. They constitute less a tool at the disposal of the state to control 
arbitrations, but rather a tool serving the parties by providing them with the security 
and certainty that justice was done. Annulment proceedings are generally undertaken at 
the initiative of a party, not at the initiative of the supervisory courts of the arbitral 
                                                                                                                                         
882 RACINE, para. 4. 
883 LEW, Achieving the Dream, p. 203. 
884 RACINE, para. 50. 
885 In this sense, see GOODE, pp. 27 et seq.  
886 VULLIEMIN, p. 270; RACINE, para. 34. 
887 RACINE, para. 34; HOLTZMANN, L’arbitrage et les tribunaux: des associés dans un système de justice 
internationale, p. 253; LEW, Achieving the Dream, p. 181. 
888 See the DAC report on the EAA 96, re section 68 (“The test of ‘substantial injustice’ is intended to be 
applied by way of support for the arbitral process, not by way of interference with that process. Thus it is 
only in those cases where it can be said that what has happened is so far removed from what could 
reasonably be expected of the arbitral process that we would expect the Court to take action. The test is 
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seat889. The role of the supervisory courts is not to give effect to an award by granting it 
a seal of approval. The award is created by the arbitrators and it generally is effective 
once rendered or notified to the parties. It may be enforced under the New York 
Convention even if the parties choose not to challenge it before the courts of the 
arbitral seat890.  
579. The supporting role of the supervisory courts is further illustrated by the fact 
that the parties generally want to have the possibility to challenge their awards in 
annulment proceedings. This is illustrated by the failed attempt in Belgium to exclude 
annulment proceedings between foreign parties891. In the absence of a centralised 
international arbitration body892, the national courts at the arbitral seat are the 
appropriate forum for such proceedings. Their authority to annul an award is justified 
by the choice of the parties, who have chosen the arbitration law and domestic courts 
of the arbitral seat to support their arbitration. These courts were chosen by the parties 
in view of their neutrality and reliability893. They are also the appropriate courts to 
review an award in application of the arbitration law of the arbitral seat894. 
580. The practice to refuse the recognition and enforcement of annulled awards may 
also be explained by the collaborating and supporting role of national courts. It 
supports the arbitral legal order by ensuring its coherence and the harmony of 
decisions. It appears generally accepted today that Article V (1)(e) NYC merely allows, 
but does not require, the refusal to recognise or enforce an annulled award. The fact 
that there is a possibility to recognise and enforce an annulled award is a sign that an 
annulled award does not seise to exist. Whether or not it would be appropriate to give 
effects to an annulled award is a different question. It is a question of efficiency and 
coherence. It does not determine the existence of an arbitral legal order.     
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581. Finally, the fact that only states have the necessary coercive power to force 
parties to comply with an award is not enough to deny the existence of the arbitral legal 
order. When ordering a party to comply with an award, the courts of the place of 
enforcement support the arbitration by ensuring its efficacy895.  
582. As mentioned above, the existence of an arbitral legal order would have 
consequences with regard to res judicata. First, the existence of an arbitral legal order 
founded on transnational law would justify the transnational approach to res judicata. 
Accepting the existence of an arbitral legal order means acknowledging that this legal 
order disposes of its own sources to deal with res judicata issues896.  
583. The res judicata doctrine traditionally applies only between courts and tribunals 
belonging to the same legal order. However, the res judicata doctrine may apply between 
arbitral tribunals and national courts, even if they do not belong to the same legal order. 
According to Shany, the res judicata doctrine may apply between national and 
international courts, i.e. between courts belonging to different legal orders, if  
“(1) the regulated interactions are not configured in a 
hierarchical manner; and (2) the judicial bodies involved in 
jurisdictional interactions are authorized to apply international 
jurisdiction-regulating rules”897.  
584. Concerning the first requirement, the res judicata doctrine only applies in a 
horizontal context among parallel courts. Inferior court decisions never bind superior 
courts898. This requirement is met between arbitral tribunals and national courts. The 
arbitral legal order exists parallely to the national legal order. Arbitration constitutes an 
alternative to litigation. The same disputes or issues between the same parties may be 
submitted before an arbitral tribunal and a national court. Contrary to the final ILA 
report on res judicata and arbitration, we do not consider that arbitral tribunals and 
national courts belong to the same legal order because “both are dealing with a 
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relationship between the parties which is governed by private law (and not by public 
international law)”899. This merely demonstrates that the arbitral and national legal 
orders coexist parallely900. Because of this, international arbitration cannot ignore 
domestic litigation and vice versa. The reason why the doctrine of res judicata may apply 
between arbitral tribunals and national courts is not because these courts and tribunals 
belong to the same legal order. Rather, the doctrine applies despite the fact that they 
belong to different legal orders, because national courts and arbitral tribunals can be 
viewed as alternatives to one another901.  
585. There also is no problem of “identicalness of disputes”902 between arbitration 
and court proceedings. In public international law, it has been questioned whether 
disputes brought before tribunals belonging to different legal orders can ever possess 
the required degree of similarity for the doctrine of res judicata to apply, i.e. whether the 
“same parties” and “same issues” test can ever be met903. It is on this basis that it is 
often considered that a national judgment cannot constitute a res judicata before 
international courts and tribunals904. However, because the same issues may arise 
between the same parties before arbitral tribunals and national courts, the res judicata 
doctrine should apply despite their belonging to different legal orders.  
586. The second requirement is also met as the applicability of the res judicata 
doctrine between arbitral tribunals and national courts is explicitly provided for by 
international arbitration law and practice905. Although Article III NYC does not contain 
detailed res judicata rules, it nevertheless provides for the application of the general 
principle by requiring national courts to consider awards as binding between the parties. 
The New York Convention therefore explicitly regulates the interactions between 
national courts and arbitral tribunals in application of the res judicata doctrine. 
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900 See also CLAY, para. 265. 
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Furthermore, as was seen in Chapter Four of this research, national courts and arbitral 
tribunals have continuously relied on the res judicata doctrine to consider whether they 
should be bound by prior awards or judgments.  
2.1.2.2. International commercial arbitration is contractual 
587. International arbitration is based on an arbitration agreement between the 
parties. This agreement is the “foundation stone of international arbitration”906. It is the 
foundation of the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction and the validity of the award907. The 
contractual foundation of international arbitration distinguishes it from litigation. While 
the court’s power to adjudicate necessarily derives from statute908, the source of the 
arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction is contractual909. This has several consequences for the 
treatment of res judicata issues.  
588. Arbitrators, unlike judges, do not have a general power to adjudicate. They have 
a temporary mandate to decide the particular dispute submitted to them. According to 
Mayer, the problem of res judicata first of all presents itself to arbitral tribunals as a 
question concerning the existence of their jurisdiction910. When a party requests the 
arbitral tribunal not to decide a certain dispute or issue on the grounds that it has 
already been decided by another court or tribunal, the arbitral tribunal has to consider 
whether and to what extent it has jurisdiction over the dispute or issue in question. The 
arbitral tribunal does so by examining and interpreting the arbitration agreement911.  
589. Mayer argues that, because of the contractual nature of arbitration, arbitrators 
are not “interchangeable”912. The jurisdiction of judges is based on a statute and exists 
independently of an agreement between the parties, except where it is based on a 
choice-of-court agreement. They exercise a public office and are a manifestation of 
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state power913. They all exercise the same mandate and are interchangeable to the extent 
that they act within the boundaries of their jurisdiction. Since they are interchangeable, 
it does not matter which one of them decides the dispute914. This holds true even 
between judges from different jurisdictions. States will commonly recognise and 
enforce judgments rendered by foreign courts, safe that certain requirements are met. 
Where these requirements are met, a foreign judgment will be considered as equivalent 
to a domestic judgment. By the same token, a foreign judge is considered as equivalent 
to a domestic judge. They are thus interchangeable915.  
590. By contrast, arbitral tribunals are not interchangeable; neither with another 
arbitral tribunal916, nor with another state court. By concluding an arbitration 
agreement, the parties have conferred upon the arbitral tribunal the mandate to decide a 
particular dispute. Each arbitral tribunal receives its own specific mandate. Because 
parties have different preferences, they may - and in many cases will - decide to submit 
disputes to different courts or tribunals in different places917.  
591. The arbitrators must exercise their mandate fully and in conformity with the 
arbitration agreement. They would violate their mandate if they do not exercise their 
jurisdiction whenever there is the slightest interest to do so918. Arbitral tribunals should 
deny exercising their jurisdiction - “le plus grand sacrifice de l’instance arbitrale”919 - only 
rarely920. Hence, the coordination of jurisdictions between different arbitral tribunals or 
between arbitral tribunals and state courts must always be compatible the arbitral 
tribunal’s mandate.  
592. The arbitration agreement constitutes “the proper frame of reference”921 for res 
judicata issues. The parties, when concluding an arbitration agreement, agree to be 
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bound by the awards rendered during the course of the arbitration. A contrario, the 
awards bind the parties by virtue of their agreement922. Arbitral tribunals should 
consider the arbitration agreement when dealing with res judicata issues. While the 
agreement will normally be silent with regard to res judicata, the agreement will ordinarily 
express expectations of finality, efficiency and efficacy that must be taken into 
consideration923. 
2.1.2.3. International commercial arbitration is private 
593. International arbitration generally is private; the arbitration agreement is private 
between the parties924. On the basis of this private agreement, the arbitrators render a 
private decision925, i.e. the award.  
594. A consequence of the private nature of international arbitration is that the 
arbitration agreement gives rise to private rights. With respect to res judicata, it is 
sometimes considered that the res judicata effect of an award is a private right that results 
directly from the arbitration agreement926, i.e. the right to rely on the award in 
subsequent proceedings by virtue of the res judicata doctrine. When the parties conclude 
an arbitration agreement, their intention is to obtain the fair and final resolution of their 
dispute. This intention to finally resolve the dispute was said to be “the purpose and 
very definition of an agreement to arbitrate”927.  
595. The opinion that the res judicata effect of an award is a private right conferred on 
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the parties by the arbitration agreement is not generally accepted928. However, it is 
shared by several leading authorities in international arbitration929.  
596. The fact that the parties generally bear the burden of multiple arbitration 
proceedings supports the argument that res judicata is a private right. The state’s public 
interest is reduced to avoiding the costs and time related to the supportive and 
supervisory powers of the domestic courts930. The parties – not the state – generally 
bear the inconveniences of multiple arbitration proceedings. If the parties are willing to 
pay for the adjudication of a dispute that has already been decided by another court or 
tribunal, there should be no reason to prevent them from doing so.  
597. The same holds true for the risk that the second award will not be recognised or 
enforced in a country where a contradictory award or judgment was already rendered or 
recognised. If the parties are willing to take this risk, they should be allowed to do so. 
This is corroborated by the principle of party autonomy. Within the limits of the 
boundaries set by the lex arbitri, the parties have the ultimate control over the arbitration 
and may determine its details931. Since the parties are allowed to control the proceedings 
and since the parties’ interests are primarily at stake, they should have their say with 
respect to res judicata932. 
598. If the res judicata effect of awards is a private right that derives directly from the 
arbitration agreement, then the res judicata doctrine should not be invoked ex officio by 
the arbitrators933; this should be left to the parties. Likewise, the parties should be 
allowed to waive the application of res judicata rules934. It also means that the arbitration 
agreement is the source and foundation of the parties’ private rights, including res 
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judicata935.  
2.1.2.4. Other fundamental features of international commercial arbitration 
599. International commercial arbitration is flexible, neutral and confidential. These 
features may influence the way in which arbitral tribunals deal with res judicata issues.  
600. The flexibility of the arbitration procedure is a principal feature of international 
arbitration. While arbitral tribunals exercise the same task as domestic courts, the 
jurisdictional framework is different in international arbitration. It is more flexible, 
simpler and closer to the parties936. The parties are generally entitled to fix the arbitral 
procedure according to the needs of the particular case937. The study into corporate 
attitudes and practices towards international arbitration conducted by PWC and the 
School of International Arbitration revealed that the flexibility of the arbitral procedure 
is the most widely recognised advantage of international arbitration938. This speaks 
against the rigid application of domestic res judicata rules in international arbitration. It 
also speaks against transnational res judicata rules that imitate the rigidity, technicality and 
formality of domestic rules. Transnational res judicata rules should take into account the 
parties’ expectation of flexibility. This would justify granting international arbitral 
tribunals certain discretionary powers, a certain “liberté d’apprécitaion”939, when dealing 
with res judicata issues.  
601. International arbitration is neutral. It can be established in a neutral venue with 
no connection with either the parties or the dispute. This neutrality enables arbitral 
tribunals to apply non-national rules reflecting the nature and objectives of international 
arbitration, as well as the expectations of the parties940. It also explains the tribunal’s 
primary loyalty to the parties. Arbitrators owe their professional duty to the parties. 
This distinguishes arbitrators from judges who owe a duty to their state to safeguard the 
state’s laws and their underlying policies; they are the keepers of the state’s laws and 
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values. The arbitrators, on the other hand, are the keepers of the parties’ interests.  
602. The fact that international arbitral tribunals owe their duty primarily to the 
parties may affect the way in which res judicata should be dealt with by the tribunals. 
This was expressed by Hobér in the following terms: 
“[S]ubject to requirements of international public policy, 
however defined, the arbitrators have no obligations, and are 
not entitled to, take measures in the interest of other persons 
than the parties to the arbitration in question, even if such 
measures clearly would promote a sensible solution – from a 
general point of view – to problems that may have arisen 
through parallel or multiple proceedings. […] Therefore, when 
discussing the options open to arbitrators and the duties of 
arbitrators to take measures to avoid undesirable effects of 
parallel or multiple proceedings one must always keep in mind 
[this limitation] on the powers of arbitrators”941. 
603. The same idea was also expressed in ICC Case No. 10623 of 2001. This case did 
not concern the res judicata effect of a prior award or judgment, but the question 
whether an arbitral tribunal is bound by an anti-arbitration injunction issued by a court 
at the arbitral seat. However, the reasoning may apply mutatis mutandis in the res judicata 
context, in particular with regard to the question whether an arbitral tribunal should be 
bound by a prior court decision concerning the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal. The 
arbitral tribunal held that it had discretion as to whether or not it should comply with 
the injunction. It decided not to suspend the arbitration on the grounds that its primary 
duty was owed to the parties. The tribunal held in relevant part:  
“An international arbitral tribunal is not an organ of the state in 
which it has its seat in the same way that a court of the seat 
would be. The primary source of the Tribunal’s powers is the 
parties’ agreement to arbitrate. An important consequence of 
this is that the Tribunal has a duty vis à vis the parties to ensure 
that their arbitration agreement is not frustrated. In certain 
circumstances, it may be necessary to decline to comply with 
an order issued by a court of the seat, in the fulfillment of the 
Tribunal’s larger duty to the parties. […] The Tribunal owes a 
duty to the parties to ensure that their agreement to submit 
disputes to international arbitration is rendered effective even 
                                                 
941 HOBÉR, p. 250. 
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where that creates a conflict with the courts of the seat of the 
arbitration”942.  
604. Finally, due to the private nature of international arbitration, many consider that 
arbitration is also confidential. This means that the existence of the arbitration, the 
subject matter, the evidence, the documents presented in the arbitration and the arbitral 
tribunal’s decisions cannot be divulged to third parties943. Where the parties in the 
second arbitration are not the same as in the first arbitration, the confidentiality of the 
first arbitration could make it impossible for the second tribunal to take the first 
arbitration into account, even though both arbitrations are closely related944. However, 
where the parties are the same, confidentiality should not constitute an obstacle to the 
application of res judicata principles. This was decided in Aegis v European Re where the 
Privy Council accepted a plea of issue estoppel, explicitly holding that any obligation of 
confidentiality does not apply as between the same parties in the second arbitration945. 
In this case, Aegis obtained an injunction restraining European Re from divulging the 
first award in the second arbitration on the grounds that it would breach the 
confidentiality of the first arbitration. The injunction was later discharged. The Privy 
Council refused to grant Aegis’ request to reinstate the injunction. It held that the 
purpose of the confidentiality agreement was to prevent the divulgation of materials 
which might be of value to persons with interests adverse to Aegis and European Re. 
However,  
“the otherwise legitimate use of an earlier award in a later, also 
private, arbitration between the same two parties would not 
raise the mischief against which the confidentiality agreement is 
directed”946. 
605.  The Privy Council held that a confidentiality agreement could not be construed 
so as to prevent one party from relying upon a prior award against the other party: 
“If the winning party was precluded from referring to the 
                                                 
942 ICC Case No. 10623, Award of 7 December 2001, ASA Bulletin, Vol. 21, No. 1 (2003), pp. 82 et seq., 
paras 128 and 138. 
943 LEW/MISTELIS/KRÖLL, para. 1-26. 
944 REDFERN/HUNTER/BLACKABY/PARTASIDES, para. 1-113 ; JARROSSON, L’autorité de chose 
jugée des sentences arbitrales, para. B(1)(b) ; HASCHER, p. 37. 
945 SHEPPARD, Res Judicata and Estoppel, p. 235. 
946 [2003] 1 All ER (Comm) 253, 258. 
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award, it would be unable to enforce it, which would be 
fundamentally inconsitent with and frustrate the purpose of the 
arbitration”947. 
2.1.3. Conclusion 
606. In relation to the res judicata effects of international awards, Jarrosson said that, 
intuitively, one feels that the res judicata effect of awards must take into account the 
particularity of international arbitration, which lies in particular in its contractual 
foundation and its flexibility948. The above analysis of certain fundamental features of 
international arbitration confirms this intuition. It has shown that several features of 
international arbitration influence the way in which arbitral tribunals should deal with 
res judicata issues.  
607. First, international commercial arbitration is autonomous from national legal 
orders to the extent that it may be considered as an arbitral legal order founded on 
transnational law. The existence of a largely autonomous and transnational arbitral legal 
order supports the application of transnational res judicata principles by international 
arbitral tribunals.  
608. These transnational res judicata principles should take into consideration several 
characteristics of international commercial arbitration. Due to arbitration’s contractual 
and private nature, and because international arbitral tribunals owe their professional 
duty primarily to the parties, arbitral tribunals should respect the parties’ agreements 
regarding res judicata. In the absence of specific party agreements, the tribunal should in 
any case consider the parties’ legitimate expectations of finality, efficiency and efficacy 
expressed explicitly or implicitly in the arbitration agreement. Due to the importance 
that parties attach to the flexibility of arbitration proceedings, arbitral tribunals should 
also enjoy a certain amount of discretion when dealing with res judicata issues.  
609. However, it must not be forgotten that international commercial arbitration also 
bears several important resemblances to domestic litigation with respect to res judicata. 
                                                 
947 [2003] 1 All ER (Comm) 253, 254. 
948 JARROSSON, L’autorité de chose jugée des sentences arbitrales (“Intuitivement, l’observateur sent que l’autorité de la 
chose jugée de la sentence ne pourra pas échapper à une certaine originalité, inhérente à cette forme particulière de justice 
qu’est l’arbitrage, qui se charactérise notamment par son origine conventionnelle et sa procédure peu formaliste”). 
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There is a profound analogy between these two mechanisms of dispute resolution for 
purposes of res judicata.  
2.2. Sources of Transnational Res Judicata Principles  
610.  If the existence of an arbitral legal order is admitted, then international arbitral 
tribunals should examine the sources pertaining to this legal order to determine the 
effects to be given to prior awards and judgments in the arbitration. Hence, the primary 
source for transnational res judicata rules is international commercial arbitration law and 
practice.  
611. In Chapter Four it was determined that international arbitration law does not 
provide any detailed res judicata rules for arbitral tribunals. Likewise, save for few 
exceptions, no clear res judicata rules emerge from international arbitration practice. 
However, international arbitration law and practice nevertheless lay down certain 
transnational standards for res judicata, which require arbitral tribunals to give certain res 
judicata effects to prior awards and judgments when certain requirements are met.  
612. With respect to awards, the res judicata effect of awards forms an inherent part 
of international arbitration. It is the objective of every arbitration949. National arbitration 
laws and international arbitration instruments require the recognition of the binding 
effects of awards. Article III NYC requires courts in Contracting States to recognise 
awards as binding. Although the New York Convention is not directly applicable before 
international arbitral tribunals950, it nevertheless establishes certain standards that 
arbitral tribunals must consider.  
613. Although international arbitration law generally is silent about the res judicata 
effects of prior judgments in international arbitrations, arbitration case law has shown 
on several occasions that prior judgments may operate as res judicata in arbitration 
proceedings and a failure to give res judicata effects to a prior judgment may result in the 
award being annulled or refused recognition or enforcement951.  
                                                 
949 BORN, p. 2893; SHELL, p. 665. 
950 POUDRET/BESSON, para. 72. 
951 See BORN who refers to several national court decisions rendered in France, Switzerland and the US 
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614.  The transnational res judicata rules to be applied by arbitral tribunals must be 
developed in light of common international arbitration law that derives from national 
arbitration legislation and court practice, as well as international arbitration instruments, 
such as institutional arbitration rules and international arbitration conventions. The 
common international arbitration law may comprise rules and guidelines formulated by 
professional organisations, such as the ILA reports and guidelines, to the extent that 
they enoy a general acceptance in international arbitration practice. Transnational res 
judicata rules may also be developed in light of dominant tendencies emerging from 
international arbitration practice952. They must take into consideration the particularities 
and objectives of international arbitration. In particular, they must pay close attention to 
the legitimate expectations of the parties. When choosing international arbitration, the 
parties will always expect the final, fair and efficient resolution of their dispute outside 
the realm of national courts. They will also expect a neutral arbitral tribunal freed of the 
constraints of domestic laws and rigid procedures.  
615. If international arbitral tribunals should not apply any particular domestic res 
judicata rules designed for judgments, this does not mean that transnational res judicata 
rules for international arbitration may not usefully build on such rules. There are 
important similarities between arbitration and litigation with respect to res judicata. The 
policies of fairness, efficiency, upholding the integrity of the adjudication process and 
effectuating the parties’ intentions apply in international arbitration, as well as in 
litigation953. International arbitration law and practice has developed not so much by the 
implementation of completely new and specific rules, but by the adaptation of 
traditional rules to new situations emerging from international commerce. Oppetit 
described this phenomenon as “acculturation juridique”954.  
616. As mentioned earlier, the application of general principles derived from 
domestic res judicata rules appears a priori appropriate in international arbitration955. The 
                                                                                                                                         
(pp. 2915 et seq.). See also, e.g., CRCICA Case No. 67/1995; ICC Case No. 6363, 1991; ICC Case No. 
6535, 1992. 
952 See GAILLARD, Aspects philosophiques, para. 118. 
953 BORN, p. 2915. See also supra, paras 331 et seq. 
954 OPPETIT, Philosophie de l’arbitrage commercial international, pp. 815 et seq. It has also been referred to as 
“legal transplant” (See supra, para. 528). 
955 See supra, para. 526. 
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parties will be familiar with transnational res judicata rules that are inspired by general 
domestic res judicata rules. The PWC/SIA study into corporate attitudes and practices 
towards international arbitration established that the most common explanation for 
avoiding transnational litigation is the parties’ anxiety about litigating under a foreign 
law before a court far from home, with a lack of familiarity with local court procedures 
and language956. Formulating transnational res judicata rules inspired by domestic 
litigation rules would avoid the application of a foreign, unfamiliar and possibly 
unexpected law to res judicata. At the same time, the parties would be familiar with the 
principles applied and the outcome would arguably be more foreseeable to the 
parties957. In addition, due to the wide-spread recognition in national laws of the res 
judicata doctrine, the parties will likely expect the application of res judicata rules that 
resemble domestic res judicata rules to a certain degree. When choosing international 
commercial arbitration, parties generally do not seek to be juged differently than in 
court proceedings, in particular in application of non-legal principles based on moral 
and equity. They expect to be judged in application of similar legal standards, albeit in a 
different legal environment. The exception is where the parties authorise the arbitral 
tribunal to act as amiable compositeur or ex aequo et bono958. 
617. There are no serious reasons why international arbitral tribunals should not 
apply similar res judicata rules as national courts959. Transnational res judicata rules for 
international arbitral tribunals could be inspired by the ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of 
Transnational Civil Procedure which apply primarily in transnational commercial 
disputes and the aim of which is precisely to reduce uncertainties and anxieties related 
to litigation under unfamiliar procedural systems960. Another (it was said the “most 
obvious”961) source of inspiration is EC Regulation No. 44/2001, together with the 
ECJ’s case law962. Inspiration could also be sought in the public international law 
                                                 
956 PWC/SIA, p. 5. 
957 GAILLARD, Aspects philosophiques, p. 113. 
958 On the question whether parties in international arbitration seek to be judged in application of a jus 
naturalis, see CLAY, pp. 222 et seq. 
959 BORN, p. 2915. 
960 See supra, paras 229 et seq. 
961 SHEPPARD, The Scope and Res Judicata Effect of Arbitral Awards, p. 265. 
962 See supra, paras 195 et seq. 
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doctrine of res judicata which was developed on the basis of domestic res judicata rules963. 
In any event, however, the extent to which transnational res judicata principles may be 
built on domestic litigation rules on res judicata must be limited to avoid making 
arbitration look like litigation and compromise its flexibility. Domestic litigation rules 
on res judicata may provide “the starting point, not the end result, of analysis”964.  
2.3. Legal Basis for the Application of Transnational Res Judicata Principles 
618. The question arises as to the legal basis on which international arbitrators could 
apply transnational res judicata principles in the absence of a choice by the parties965.  
619. Based on the autonomy of international commercial arbitration, it may be 
argued that arbitral tribunals are not required to apply any particular domestic res judicata 
rules, unless instructed to do so by the parties. A contrario, arbitral tribunals may apply 
transnational rules in the absence of an express choice of a national law by the parties.  
620. According to Hascher res judicata is a manifestation of the arbitrators’ 
jurisdictional authority (“une manifestation du pouvoir juridictionnel de l’arbitre”966). This 
authority, in turn, is based on the common will of the parties as expressed in the 
arbitration agreement. By reference to this common will the arbitrators may determine 
the existence and scope of their jurisdiction and, thus, the question of res judicata967.  
621. It was seen above that an important current in international arbitration case law 
considers that arbitration agreements may be governed by transnational law in the 
absence of an express choice of national law by the parties968. Hascher argues that it 
should be possible to adopt the same approach with regard to res judicata969. This would 
                                                 
963 See supra, paras 236 et seq. 
964 BORN, pp. 188 et seq. (“[…] it is true that the field of international arbitration draws essential doctrine 
and rules from contract law and from the law of civil procedure and judgments. But in many cases, 
particularly in international matters, these disciplines are at most analogies, providing the starting point, 
not the end result, of analysis. In all cases, it remains essential to categorize and treat arbitration as a 
distinctive and autonomous discipline, specially designed to achieve a particular set of objectives, which 
other branches of private international law fail satisfactorily to resolve”). 
965 See ALFORD. 
966 HASCHER, p. 25. 
967 Ibid. 
968 See supra, para. 555 
969 HASCHER, p. 25. 
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be corroborated by the analysis of arbitration practice in chapter four which has shown 
a recent tendency among arbitral tribunals to replace the strict application of domestic 
res judicata rules by more pragmatic solutions that further the objectives of the parties’ 
arbitration agreement970. Furthermore, according to Hascher, it is accepted that the 
related doctrine of lis pendens is governed by the law governing the arbitration 
agreement, because lis pendens impacts on the agreement’s scope and efficacy971. The 
same argument should apply to res judicata. 
622. If arbitral tribunals do not have a lex fori and are not organs of a state but of an 
arbitral legal order, then they are also not bound by any national system of private 
international law. According to Lalive, they should however be bound by transnational 
law, comprised of generally accepted principles972. The doctrine of res judicata is widely 
recognised, either as a custom or a general principle of law. This means that res judicata 
principles are part of the transnational law that international arbitrators must apply, 
unless the parties have expressly chosen a national law to govern res judicata, or have 
waived the application of res judicata principles.  
623. According to Mayer, when determining the existence and scope of their 
jurisdiction, international arbitrators are not bound to apply the rules of any legal order 
(national or otherwise). However, the arbitrators’ autonomy is limited by practical 
considerations, in particular the efficacy of their award973. Another consideration is the 
advantage of creating transnational rules for international arbitration and to thereby 
contribute to the harmonisation of international arbitration law974. According to Mayer, 
res judicata should be governed by such rules975.  
624. Admittedly, the above line of argumentation is not generally accepted. 
                                                 
970 See supra, para. 452. 
971 HASCHER, p. 25 with reference to ICC Case No. 6840, 1991 (“L’autonomie juridique de la convention 
d’arbitrage entraîne la creation d’une règle matérielle spéciale aux termes de laquelle aucune concurrence ne peut intervener 
entre deux orders juridiques qui ne sont pas également competent”). 
972 LALIVE, Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy, paras 43 et seq. and para. 152. See also 
Mitsubishi v Soler Chrysler Plymouth, 473 US 614, 636 (1985)(“The international arbitral tribunal owes no 
prior allegiance to the legal norms of particular states; hence it has no direct obligation to vindicate their 
statutory dictates. The tribunal, however, is bound to effectuate the intentions of the parties”). 
973 MAYER, L’autonomie de l’arbitre, paras 67 et seq. 
974 MAYER, L’autonomie de l’arbitre, paras 95 et seq. 
975 MAYER, Litispendance, connexité et chose jugée dans l'arbitrage international, pp. 190 et seq. 
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However, the application of transnational res judicata rules is also supported by most 
modern national arbitration laws and institutional rules. As was seen above, modern 
arbitration laws and institutional rules generally do not require international arbitrators 
to apply any particular domestic law to the merits or procedure, but allow the 
application of non-national rules of law976.  
625. If (as is argued) res judicata pertains to procedure977, international arbitrators may 
apply transnational res judicata rules because (in the absence of party choice) they may 
generally conduct the procedure as they deem appropriate978. 
626. However, the application of transnational res judicata principles may not always 
be possible if res judicata is considered to pertain to substance. Under some arbitration 
laws and institutional rules, arbitrators cannot apply non-national rules of law without 
the consent of the parties979. Likewise, in the absence of party choice, arbitrators 
sometimes can apply non-national law only if the dispute has its closest connection with 
this body of law980. This has been held to be the case in exceptional circumstances 
where the contract in dispute is connected to several countries and it is impossible for 
the arbitrators to establish the “closest connection” with any jurisdiction in particular981.  
3. CONCLUSION 
627. Arbitral tribunals generally can and should apply transnational res judicata rules in 
the absence of an express choice of national law by the parties. The conflict-of-laws 
approach and the comparative law approach are not appropriate to satisfactorily 
address res judicata issues before international arbitral tribunals. By contrast, the 
                                                 
976 See supra, paras 560 et seq. 
977 See supra, para. 517. 
978 See supra, para. 561. 
979 See supra, para. 560. It has been argued that the parties are presumed to have chosen transnational law 
if they have not expressly chosen a national law to govern their dispute (see MAYER, L’autonomie de 
l’arbitre, para.73). MUSTILL refuted this suggestion in pertinent terms: “This striking proposition ignores 
the possibility that the choice of a national law was so obvious as not to be worth mentioning, or that the 
parties never thought about the matter at all. Moreover, even if the parties had in fact disagreed, there 
seems no warrant for inferring unanimity in favour of ruling out all potentially relevant national systems 
and substituting an anational system of which only the smallest minority of businessmen can ever have 
heard” (p. 101). 
980 See, e.g., Article 187 (1) PILA.  
981 KAUFMANN-KOHLER/RIGOZZI, para. 644; MAYER, L’autonomie de l’arbitre, para. 74. 
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transnational approach is appropriate for several reasons. The transnational approach 
avoids inappropriate analogies between arbitration and litigation. Transnational res 
judicata rules may take into account the nature and objectives of international 
arbitration, as well as the legitimate expectations of the parties. Particular attention 
should be paid to the parties’ arbitration agreement and to important expectations as to 
efficiency, flexibility and finality. Finally, a coherent and harmonised approach towards 
res judicata before international arbitral tribunals could ensure more consistent solutions 
to res judicata. This in turn would provide an increased level of efficiency, fairness, 
certainty and predictability of the arbitration process. 
628. International arbitral tribunals should revert to the transnational law method to 
determine res judicata principles. This means that international arbitrators must look for 
generally (not unanimously) accepted principles. Such general principles should be 
developed in light of international arbitration law and practice. To the extent that they 
respect the particularities, nature and objectives of international commercial arbitration, 
transnational res judicata rules for international arbitral tribunals may build on domestic 
res judicata rules. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Chapter 6 : Transnational Res Judicata Principles for International Commercial Arbitral Tribunals 
Transnational Res Judicata Principles for International Arbitral Tribunals  
 
629. The objective of this chapter is to suggest res judicata principles for international 
arbitral tribunals based on transnational law. Given the lack of a universal res judicata 
doctrine and the uncertainty presently existing in international arbitration law and 
practice as to how to deal with res judicata issues, a codification of transnational res 
judicata rules is premature. Therefore, the goal is to suggest possible solutions to the 
problem of res judicata before international arbitral tribunals. Ideally, over the years a 
jurisprudence constante with respect to res judicata will emerge from arbitration case law.  
630. As will be discussed below, arbitral tribunals should apply essentially the same 
res judicata principles to prior judgments and awards. Besides the advantage of simplicity, 
this is justified by the several similarities between arbitration and litigation with respect 
to res judicata. There appears to be no reason to apply substantially different res judicata 
rules to judgments and awards.  
631. However, several differences between arbitration and litigation must be taken 
into consideration. In order to better take account of these differences, as well as for 
reasons of clarity, the following analysis will deal with res judicata issues arising out of 
prior judgments (1.) and awards (2.) separately. After considering the constitutent 
elements of a res judicata, the analysis will determine the scope of the res judicata effects 
to be afforded to prior judgments and awards and, finally, the requirements that must 
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be met for prior judgments and awards to operate as a res judicata in arbitration 
proceedings. Transnational res judicata principles for international arbitral tribunals will 
be formulated in the conclusion to this chapter, building on the ILA recommendations 
on res judicata and arbitration (3.). 
1. RES JUDICATA IN CASE OF PRIOR STATE COURT JUDGMENTS BEFORE 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS 
632. As a preliminary remark it should be considered whether, and to what extent, 
the national law of the country where the prior judgment was rendered must be applied 
or taken into account. The question is to what extend the res judicata effects of a prior 
judgment may be governed by transnational rules.  
633. There are two alternative approaches in transnational litigation to determine the 
preclusive effects of a prior judgement in subsequent proceedings in another country. 
According to the doctrine of extension of effects a judgment must be accepted in the 
recognising state with the original effects it would have in the state in which it was 
rendered. It is thus the law of the country where the first judgment was rendered that 
will determine the judgment’s preclusive effects in the subsequent proceedings. The 
underlying rationale is that full faith and credit must be shown to judgments rendered in 
another state982. This appears to be the approach favoured (at least implicitly with 
regard to claim preclusion) under the EC Regulation 44/2001983. It is also the approach 
adopted in the US by the statute implementing the full faith and credit clause of the 
American Constitution984.  
634. By contrast, according to the doctrine of equalisation of effects, the effects of a 
foreign judgment are equalised with the effects that are obtainable before the courts of 
the recognising state. This approach is based on the premise that the recognising state 
has the right within its territory to afford the same preclusive effects to the recognised 
                                                 
982 BARNETT, para. 7.10. 
983 See supra, para. 213. According to RIGAUX/FALLON, the doctrine of extension of effects is 
followed in Belgium (para. 10.44). 
984 LASOK/STONE, p. 290 who refer to 28 U.S. Code (1964), s. 1738, implementing Article IV (1) of 
the 1789 US Constitution. 
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foreign judgment as it would give a corresponding national judgment985. In England, the 
doctrine of equalisation of effects applies at common law to foreign judgments 
recognised under the traditional rules986. It may be justified by the view that res judicata 
can be described as a rule of evidence and is hence part of the law of the recognising 
state987. This is also the approach followed by the ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of 
Transnational Civil Procedure988. 
635. While Swiss law appears to follow the doctrine of extension of effects989, in 
France the question is controversial990. Mayer and Heuzé favour the doctrine of 
extension of effects. According to these authors, the law of the country where the first 
judgment was rendered determines whether a prior decision may operate as a res judicata 
in subsequent proceedings in France. This law will also limit the preclusive effects of 
the prior decision in France as a decision cannot have more or broader preclusive 
effects abroad than it would have in its country of origin991. For Mayer, the same applies 
in international arbitration. The law of the country where the prior judgment was 
rendered limits the judgment’s preclusive effects in a subsequent arbitration992.  
636. Arbitral tribunals should follow the doctrine of equalisation of effects to 
determine the effects of a prior judgment in arbitration proceedings. This means that 
the effects to be given to a prior judgment in an arbitration should be determined 
autonomously, taking into consideration the particularities and objectives of 
international arbitration. It also means that prior judgements should be given 
                                                 
985 BARNETT, para. 7.09. 
986 BARNETT, para. 7.09. 
987 BARNETT, para. 2.33 ; TAPPER, p. 92. See also Associated Electric and Gas Insurance Services Ltd v 
European Reinsurance Co of Zurich [2003] 1 WLR 1041 PC, 1048 (“It is true that estoppels can be described 
as rules of evidence […]”). 
988 Principle 30, comment P-30B. 
989 See supra, para. 403. 
990 See MAYER, Litispendance, connexité et chose jugée dans l’arbitrage international, p. 187. Huet seems to favour 
the doctrine of equalisation of effects (see HUET, para. 126). According to this author, res judicata is 
governed exclusively by the lex fori of the court seised of the second proceedings. If res judicata was above 
all a presumption of truth, then the law of the country where the prior judgment was rendered would 
clearly have to govern res judicata. However, for Huet res judicata is less a presumption of truth than a 
means to put an end to proceedings and avoid inconsistent judgments. It is for the law of the country 
where the res judicata is invoked to determine whether and to what extent a prior foreign judgment may 
preclude subsequent proceedings in that country. In this sense, see also BOLLÉE, paras 337 and 345 et 
seq. 
991 MAYER/HEUZÉ, para. 403. 
992 MAYER, Litispendance, connexité et chose jugée dans l’arbitrage international, p. 199. 
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substantially the same preclusive effects in an arbitration as prior awards. It does not 
mean, however, that arbitral tribunals should ignore the law of the country where the 
prior judgment was rendered. Reference to this law is in line with the judgment’s origin 
in this national legal order and may well be expected by the parties. The arbitrators may 
consider this law to determine whether and to what extent the decision could operate as 
a res judicata under that law.  
637. If the existence of an arbitral legal order is accepted, then this arbitral legal 
order should determine whether, and to what extent, it will give preclusive effects to 
prior judgments. It is true that the prior judgment is part of the national legal order of 
the country where it was rendered and this national legal order has the authority to 
specify which types of judgment can have res judicata effect and to what extent. The 
state has the authority to restrict the jurisdicion of its courts by prohibiting them to 
reconsider matters that have already been finally decided by another court. However, 
this authority is limited to its territory993. It fades once the judgment leaves the confines 
of the national legal order and is adopted by another legal order. At this moment the 
receiving legal order has the greater interest to determine whether, and to what extent, a 
prior judgment should have res judicata effects in accordance with its own interests and 
objectives.  
638. The full faith and credit argument cannot be relied upon to support the 
application of the doctrine of extension of effects. This argument is often relied upon 
in federal structures, namely in case of judgments rendered in sister states in the US or 
within the system of the EC Regulation 44/2001994. The full faith and credit argument 
is appropriate in these structures as they are built on mutual trust between sister states 
and Member States, as well as on the premise that the judges of sister/Member States 
are interchangeable between each other. However, the same is not true in international 
arbitration where arbitral tribunals cannot be considered as interchangeable with state 
courts995.  
639. In addition, the doctrine of equalisation of effects would ensure greater 
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995 See supra, paras 589 et seq.  
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uniformity in the application of transnational res judicata principles by international 
arbitral tribunals. Under the doctrine of extension of effects, any transnational res 
judicata principles would always apply in conjunction with the domestic res judicata rules 
of the country where the prior judgment was rendered. By contrast, under the doctrine 
of equalisation of effects arbitral tribunals would apply the same res judicata principles no 
matter where the prior judgment was rendered. The question whether, and to what 
extent, a prior judgment has res judicata effects in arbitration proceedings would not vary 
depending on the country where the prior judgment was pronounced. The advantages 
would not only be greater uniformity and simplicity in the application of transnational 
res judicata rules, but also greater certainty and predictability for arbitration users.  
640. The doctrine of equalisation of effects could also help arbitral tribunals protect 
the arbitration process. Arbitral tribunals would have the authority to determine 
themselves whether and to what extent they can and should exercise their jurisdiction, 
without being tied to the res judicata rules of the law of the country where a prior 
judgment was rendered.  
641. Nothwithstanding the above, to protect the efficacy of their award, arbitral 
tribunals should always take account of the law of the arbitral seat. Even if arbitral 
tribunals should in principle not be constrained by the law of the arbitral seat when 
dealing with res judicata issues, ignoring this law may prove imprudent in practice as it 
may lead to the setting aside of the award, which in turn would constitute a waste of 
valuable resources.  
1.1. Constituent Elements of a Res Judicata 
642. While there does not appear to be a universally accepted definition of a decision 
capable of operating as a res judicata in later proceedings, there seems to be a certain 
agreement on the constituent elements of a res judicata. Although expressed in different 
terms, a res judicata usually is a judicial decision rendered by a judicial court or tribunal 
that finally and conclusively determines a legal dispute between the parties. 
1.1.1. A judicial decision 
643. Arbitral tribunals should normally be able to verify this element without major 
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difficulties or any particular regard to the law of the country where the prior decision 
was rendered. A judicial decision can usually be described as any judicial adjudication 
that determines a legal dispute between the parties996.  
1.1.2. A judicial tribunal 
644. In order to qualify as a res judicata, a judgment must be rendered by a judicial 
tribunal. The court or tribunal must have the authority to decide a legal dispute by a 
final judgment. It may be necessary to consult the law of the country where the prior 
court is located to determine whether this is the case.  
1.1.3. A final and conclusive decision 
645. A prior decision generally can only operate as a res judicata if it is final and 
conclusive for res judicata purposes997. This finality requirement is expressed in different 
terms in different jurisdictions. However, finality usually means that the decision puts 
an end to the court’s jurisdiction over the decided matter. The decision is binding on 
the parties and cannot be re-opened in the same court by further proceedings998.  
646. If there appears to be some consensus on the meaning of the finality 
requirement, there is no consensus on the precise moment when a decision becomes 
final and conclusive for res judicata purposes999.  
647. While English courts generally verify the res judicata status of a foreign judgment 
by reference to English res judicata criteria, the requirement that the foreign judgment be 
final and conclusive is assessed according to the law of the country where the judgment 
was rendered. This was made clear by the House of Lords in Carl Zeiss (2)1000, where 
                                                 
996 See supra, paras 39, 120 and 157. 
997 HABSCHEID, L’autorité de la chose jugée en droit comparé, p. 186. 
998 See supra, paras 42 et seq., 84 et seq., 122 et seq., 162 et seq., 256 et seq. 
999 See supra, para. 184. 
1000 Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner & Keeler Ltd (No 2) [1967] 1 AC 853, HL. The House of Lords endorsed its 
decision in Nouvion v Freeman (1889) 15 App Cas 1, HL. In Carl Zeiss, Lord Reid said: “When we come to 
issue estoppel, I think that by parity of reasoning we should have to be satisfied that the issues in 
question cannot be relitigated in the foreign country. In other words it would have to be proved in this 
case that the courts of the German Federal Republic would not allow the re-opening in any new case 
between the same parties of the issues decided by the Supreme Court in 1960, which are now said to 
found an estoppel here. There would seem to be no authority of any kind on this matter, but it seems to 
me to verge on absurdity that we should regard as conclusive something in a German judgment which 
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their Lordships ruled that a foreign judgment will only operate as a res judicata in 
England if it is final and conclusive before the foreign court that rendered it and 
according to the law of the country where it was pronounced; there is no provision in 
English law as to the finality of a foreign judgment in its country of origin1001.  
648. For the same reason this solution should also be adopted by arbitral tribunals. It 
is for the state in whose territory the judgment was pronounced to determine the 
moment at which a national court judgment becomes final and conclusive for the 
parties and the court that rendered it. It would not be efficient for arbitral tribunals to 
grant preclusive effects to a prior judgment that can still be altered by the court that 
rendered it1002. Arbitral tribunals should wait until the judgment can no longer be 
modified by that court so as to avoid the rendering of inconsistant decisions. For the 
same reason, if appeal proceedings have been brought against the prior judgment, it 
may be advisable for an arbitral tribunal to await the outcome of the appeal, even if, 
according to the law of the judgment’s country of origin, appeal proceedings have no 
impact on the judgment’s res judicata status.     
1.1.4. A judicial tribunal with jurisdiction over the parties and the subject 
matter? 
649. The question arises whether a prior judgment should only operate as a res 
judicata in arbitration proceedings if it was rendered by a court with jurisdiction over the 
parties and the subject matter1003. If so, the next question is in accordance with which 
law the court’s jurisdiction must be verified.  
650. Arbitral tribunals usually must exercise their jurisdiction if there is an interest to 
do so. A priori, this is the case every time the arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction. Hence, 
rather than verifying the jurisdiction of the prior national court, the arbitral tribunal 
                                                                                                                                         
the German courts themselves would not regard as conclusive. It is quite true that estoppel is a matter 
for the lex fori, but the lex fori ought to be developed in a manner consistent with good sense”. 
1001 See BARNETT, paras 2.35 et seq., in particular para. 2.41. 
1002 In this sense, see also SCHLOSSER, Conflits entre jugement judiciaire et arbitrage, pp. 391 et seq. 
1003 The laws of some countries, e.g. England and US, require that the prior judgment be rendered by a 
court or tribunal having jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter. In other countries, e.g. France 
and Switzerland, a decision may operate as a res judicata even if it was rendered by a tribunal lacking 
jurisdiction (see supra, paras 126 and 164). 
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must determine its own jurisdiction.  
651. In the rare situation where the prior judgment was rendered on precisely the 
same facts and cause of action and between the same parties, the question whether the 
prior court had jurisdiction over the dispute ends here. If the arbitral tribunal decides 
that it has jurisdiction, then by the same token it also decided that the national court did 
not have jurisdiction.  
652. The question is more difficult where a prior judgment was rendered between 
the same parties, and where the dispute now before the arbitral tribunal overlaps only 
to a certain degree with what has already been decided in the judgment. In this 
situation, the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal does not exclude the jurisdiction of the 
state court.  
653. Where the prior judgment was rendered in the same country as the arbitral seat, 
it should be for the law of that country to determine whether the jurisdiction of the 
prior court is a constituent element of a res judicata and, if so, whether the court that 
rendered the first judgment had jurisdiction to do so.  
654. Where the prior judgment was rendered outside the country of the arbitral seat, 
it may suffice to verify the international jurisdiction of the prior court according to the 
private international law rules of the arbitral seat, without particular regard to the law of 
the country where the judgment was rendered. The reason is that where the prior 
judgment is foreign, the criteria to verify the res judicata status of a foreign judgment 
often correspond to the criteria that must be met for the recognition of a foreign 
judgment1004. The court’s judgment will usually be recognised (and hence qualify as a res 
judicata) at the arbitral seat if the court had jurisdiction in the international sense. 
Whether the foreign court also had jurisdiction according to its local law is usually not 
regarded as material in the country of the arbitral seat.  
1.1.5. A decision “on the merits” 
655. As was seen in Chapter Three of this research, res judicata issues may arise with 
                                                 
1004 This is the case, for example, in England. See BARNETT, paras 2.01 et seq. 
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respect to (i) prior judgments in an identical case involving the same dispute between 
the same parties; (ii) prior judgements in a different case, involving the same parties and 
an identical issue; (iii) prior judgments on jurisdiction; and (iv) prior judgments on 
interim measures. The question arises which of these judgments should be able to 
operate as a res judicata in subsequent arbitration proceedings, i.e. which of these 
judgments should be considered as “on the merits” for res judicata purposes.   
1.1.5.1. Prior judgments in an identical case 
656. A prior judgment that finally disposes of the merits of the dispute in an identical 
case should undoubtedly be considered as “on the merits” for res judicata purposes and, 
thus, should in principle be able to operate as a res judicata in arbitration proceedings. 
While this situation should be rare in practice, it may occur where the jurisdiction of the 
prior court is contested1005.  
657. Where the res judicata effect of a prior judgment in the same case is invoked, the 
arbitral tribunal should commence by examining its own jurisdiction over the dispute. If 
the arbitrators conclude that they have jurisdiction, they must then decide whether to 
exercise their jurisdiction. The central question in this situation is whether the arbitral 
tribunal is bound by the prior court’s explicit or implicit ruling on the validity of the 
arbitration agreement. This question will be discussed below1006.  
658. At this stage it may be noted that even though the arbitrators consider to have 
jurisdiction over the dispute, where the court that rendered the prior judgment was 
located in the country of the arbitral seat, the arbitrators should think twice before 
reconsidering the dispute if all the traditional res judicata requirements are met, i.e. if the 
prior judgment is considered a valid res judicata according to the local law and if the 
identity test is met1007. Any award rendered in this situation will risk being set aside. In 
these circumstances, reconsidering the dispute may well be a waste; the arbitral tribunal 
should not rely on the fact that the award may still be enforced elsewhere, as most 
countries will refuse to enforce an award that was annulled at the place of arbitration.  
                                                 
1005 See supra, paras 308 et seq.  
1006 See infra, paras 664 et seq. 
1007 See infra, paras 706 et seq. 
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659. The same applies where the prior judgment was rendered in a different country 
if it was recognised at the arbitral seat. If the prior judgment has not yet been 
recognised and if the arbitral tribunal decides that it has jurisdiction and the parties have 
not waived their right to arbitration, then the arbitral tribunal may predict that the prior 
judgment cannot be recognised at the arbitral seat. In this case, the judgment should 
not prevent the arbitral tribunal from reconsidering the dispute. Nonetheless, the 
arbitral tribunal should still give due consideration to the prior judgment so as to avoid 
contradictions.  
660. The above is less based on strict res judicata principles, but rather on 
considerations of coherence and efficiency. If arbitral tribunals are organs of the arbitral 
legal order, they are not - strictly speaking - under an obligation to give res judicata 
effects to a prior judgment. If the arbitrators consider that they have jurisdiction over 
the dispute and that it would be appropriate for them to exercise this jurisdiction, then 
they should have the authority to reconsider the dispute, always giving due 
consideration to the determinations of the prior court. While in most cases the 
arbitrators will probably refuse to reconsider the case in the face of a prior judgment 
rendered or recognised at the arbitral seat, in some situations the arbitrators may 
proceed to determine the dispute, for example where the arbitrators find the arbitration 
agreement to be valid and the prior judgment constitutes an unjustified or indeed 
unlawful attempt to take the dispute out of the hands of the arbitrators.  
661.  Because the parties generally bear the burden of multiple arbitration 
proceedings, they should in principle be allowed to waive the res judicata effects of a 
judgment and request the arbitral tribunal to reconsider the same dispute1008. However, 
the arbitral tribunal should verify that the parties have the right to waive the application 
of res judicata rules under the law governing the arbitration to avoid possible annulment 
proceedings against the award. This would be important where it is disputed whether 
the parties have waived the res judicata effects of a prior judgment rendered or 
recognised at the arbitral seat and one of them urges the arbitral tribunal to reconsider 
the dispute. If all parties request the arbitral tribunal to rearbitrate the case, they should 
                                                 
1008 See supra, paras 596 et seq. 
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normally bear the risk that the award will not be recognised or enforced in a country 
where the prior (contradictory) judgment was rendered or recognised.  
1.1.5.2. Prior judgment in a different case  
662. A prior judgement that finally disposes of the merits of a dispute in a case that 
overlaps to a certain degree with the one before the arbitrators should in principle also 
be considered as “on the merits” and be capable of operating as a res judicata in 
subsequent arbitration proceedings. As before, the arbitral tribunal should begin by 
determining the existence and scope of its own jurisdiction. If the arbitrators conclude 
that they have jurisdiction, they must decide whether and to what extent they should 
exercise their jurisdiction. They must determine to what extent the prior judgment may 
preclude the reconsideration of the case. 
663. This question depends largely on the question of the scope of res judicata effects 
that arbitral tribunals should afford to judgments, namely whether a judgment should 
have positive res judicata effects or give rise to issue estoppel or abuse of process. This 
question will be examined in further detail below1009.  
1.1.5.3. Prior judgments on jurisdiction 
664. Should a prior judgment on jurisdiction be capable of operating as a res judicata 
in a subsequent arbitration? This question arises only where a national court has held, 
“on the merits” and not merely on a prima facie basis, that there either is a valid 
arbitration agreement or that there is no such agreement1010. This may be the case, for 
example, where a national court accepts jurisdiction over a dispute on the basis that the 
arbitration agreement is not valid or inoperative. Similarly, the question may arise in 
case of a prior court’s declaratory judgment as to the existence or validity of the 
                                                 
1009 See infra, paras 688 et seq.  
1010 BORN, p. 2921. No res judicata issue arises where a national court, based on a prima facie analysis, has 
held that there appears to be a valid arbitration agreement. Likewise, no res judicata issue arises where a 
national court has stayed litigation as a matter of discretion, without rendering a decision on the validity 
of the arbitration agreement, or where a national court has held on the merits that there is a valid 
agreement to arbitrate the question of jurisdiction, leaving such jurisdictional decisions to the arbitrators. 
In all of these cases, the national court would have rendered an interlocutory procedural ruling, leaving 
the final resolution of the jurisdictional question to the arbitrators. Hence, these national court decisions 
cannot operate as a res judicata in the arbitration (BORN, p. 2920). 
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arbitration agreement. In these cases, the question is whether the res judicata effect of a 
prior judgment on jurisdiction bars the arbitral tribunal from examining its own 
jurisdiction.  
665. This question is controversial1011. It is delicate as there are serious arguments 
both in favour and against granting preclusive effects to a prior judgment on 
jurisdiction1012.  
666. It may be argued that a prior judgment on jurisdiction should be entitled to res 
judicata effects in subsequent arbitration proceedings, because the arbitral tribunal’s 
decision on its own jurisdiction is subject to the control by the supervisory courts at the 
arbitral seat. A state court has the same power to rule on its jurisdiction, and hence 
examine the validity of the arbitration argreement, as the arbitral tribunal. There is no 
reason to presume that the prior court would not accurately assess the validity of the 
arbitration agreement in dispute. There also is no reason to force a party who does not 
consider itself bound by an arbitration agreement to first go before an arbitral tribunal 
to request a declaration as to the validity (or lack thereof) of the arbitration agreement 
and then commence proceedings before the competent state court. According to this 
line of argumentation, the arbitral tribunal should give res judicata effects to the prior 
decision on jurisdiction if not doing so could lead to the annulment of the arbitral 
tribunal’s award by the supervisory courts of the arbitral seat. 
                                                 
1011 SHEPPARD, The Scope and Res Judicata Effect of Arbitral Awards, pp. 278 et seq. In Switzerland, Perret 
has argued that an arbitral tribunal is not bound by a prior judgment where the court accepts jurisdiction 
over the dispute after holding that the arbitration agreement is null and void (see PERRET, pp. 68 and 
77). According to others, if the judgment on jurisdiction was rendered in the country of the arbitral seat, 
the arbitral tribunal is bound by the judgment (POUDRET, p. 159; LALIVE/POUDRET/REYMOND, 
Le droit de l’arbitrage interne et international en Suisse, 1989, pp. 286 et seq. See also BUCHER, p. 176). 
According to Bucher, if the judgment was rendered in a different country, the arbitral tribunal should 
examine its own jurisdiction. If it finds that it has jurisdiction according to the law governing the 
arbitration, it should proceed on the merits of the dispute. It is not bound by a prior judgment rendered 
by a court lacking international jurisdiction as its res judicata effects will not be recognised in Switzerland 
(BUCHER, p. 191). On the position of the Federal Tribunal see DTF 124 III 83 and KAUFMANN-
KOHLER/RIGOZZI, paras 449a et seq. In England a prior judgment in which a court accepts 
jurisdiction after declaring the arbitration agreement null and void should be binding in a subsequent 
arbitration. The court’s decision regarding the validity of the arbitration agreement is final and gives rise 
to issue estoppel in the arbitration (BORN, pp. 2921 et seq.; Republic of Kazakhstan v Istil Group Inc [2006] 
EWHC 448 (Comm), [2006] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 370; [2007] EWHC 2729 (Comm); [2008] 1 Lloyd’s Report 
382 (QB)(see supra, fn 548)). 
1012 See BORN, pp. 2921 et seq. 
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667. By contrast, it has been argued by Born that no preclusive effects should be 
given to prior judgments on jurisdiction, regardless of whether the judgment was 
rendered in the country of the arbitral seat or elsewhere1013. This is justified by the 
arbitral tribunal’s autonomy from the courts of the arbitral seat1014. Judgments which 
annul an award are not necessarily binding on the arbitral tribunal or the courts of other 
countries, which may recognise and enforce annulled awards. If the arbitral tribunal is 
not bound by the decisions of the annulment court, it is also not bound by the 
judgments on jurisdiction of the courts of the arbitral seat. If a valid arbitration 
agreement exists pursuant to the New York Convention, then a judgment on 
jurisdiction to the contrary would not only be wrong but also an improper intrusion 
into matters reserved by the arbitration agreement for determination by the arbitral 
tribunal. A judgment rendered in violation of the New York Convention should not be 
entitled to have res judicata effects in arbitration proceedings. Born submits that arbitral 
tribunals should take the prior judgment on jurisdiction into consideration. However, if 
the arbitrators conclude that the prior judgment is incorrect or denies arbitral 
jurisdiction on the basis of non-arbitrability or public policy, then the arbitral tribunal 
may disregard the prior judgment and reach a different conclusion.  
668. In our opinion, prior judgments on jurisdiction generally should not be binding 
on arbitral tribunals so as to protect the arbitration process from unnecessary and 
unjustified interferences by national courts. It must be shielded against dilatory tactics 
designed to paralyse or avoid an arbitration that the parties validly agreed upon. A party 
contesting the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal may validly seise the courts of the 
arbitral seat directly with an action concerning the jurisdiction of the tribunal. The party 
may also in good faith initiate proceedings on the merits before a national court and 
obtain a judgment to the effect that the court, rather than the arbitral tribunal, has 
                                                 
1013 See BORN, pp. 2923 et seq. Born distinguishes between, on the one hand, judgments regarding the 
scope of the arbitration agreement, the termination or lapse of the agreement, or the waiver of an 
admitted right to arbitrate, and, on the other hand, judgments concerning the existence and validity of the 
agreement. According to Born, both types of jurisdictional judgments should not have any res judicata 
effects in a subsequent arbitration.  
1014 Born admits that this is controversial. According to Mayer, an arbitral tribunal should be bound by a 
prior judgment rendered or recognised in the country of the arbitral seat. In this case, the second arbitral 
tribunal should decline jurisdiction over the dispute to avoid annulment of its award (MAYER, 
Litispendence, connexité et chose jugée dans l’arbitrage international, p. 202). 
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jurisdiction over the dispute. However, a prospective respondent in arbitration may 
attempt to gain an undue advantage by bringing the dispute before its own courts 
despite the existence of an arbitration agreement. The respondent may also obtain an 
anti-arbitration injunction on the grounds that the arbitration agreement is not valid. 
This “vexing problem” was pertinently described by Paulsson:  
“The subversion of an arbitration agreement is a grave matter. 
Instead of a neutral forum, the victim suddenly finds itself 
confronted by a jurisdiction which will judge its conduct 
according to a very different yardstick. Without even 
mentioning the unmentionable (corruption and xenophobia), 
everything is suddenly stacked in favour of the other side: 
language, procedure, practical convenience, ability to use one’s 
lawyers, cultural affinities with the decision-maker … and the 
list goes on”1015. 
669.  In order to protect international arbitration against such scenarios, it is 
important to strengthen the arbitral tribunal’s autonomy from national courts. This is 
achieved by strengthening the arbitral tribunals’ competence-competence. Arbitral 
tribunals should be free to consider and reach their own conclusions as to their 
jurisdiction and not be bound by the prior jurisdictional determinations of state courts, 
whether they are located in the country of the arbitral seat or elsewhere. In most cases 
this will not pose problems as courts and arbitrators will frequently reach the same 
conclusion with regard to arbitral jurisdiction, in particular where they are located in the 
same country1016.  
670. However, arbitral tribunals cannot act “as if they did not belong to this 
world”1017. While in theory they may decide on their jurisdiction as if the prior judgment 
on jurisdiction had not been rendered1018, in practice they should normally not ignore 
the prior jurisdictional determinations of national courts, in particular those of the 
courts at the arbitral seat. Where a court at the arbitral seat finally decided that the 
arbitral tribunal does not have jurisdiction over the parties and the dispute, “it may be 
                                                 
1015 PAULSSON, Interference by National Courts, p. 135. 
1016 BORN, p. 2927. 
1017 LALIVE, Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy, para. 44. 
1018 PINNA, para. 6. 
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pointless, imprudent, or indeed unlawful”1019 for the arbitral tribunal to act, absent other 
serious factors, in contradiction with the ruling, even if the arbitrators believe it to be 
wrong. This applies especially where the law of the arbitral seat clearly gives the court 
the authority to rule on the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction1020. If the arbitrators accept 
their jurisdiction despite the prior contradictory court ruling and proceed on the merits, 
their award might be set aside.  
671. Nevertheless, in certain situations arbitrators should be free to ignore the 
jurisdictional determinations of the courts at the arbitral seat, namely to fulfill their duty 
to the parties and ensure that the arbitration agreement is not frustrated. This might be 
the case where the respondent in the arbitration is the state or state entity of the 
country of the arbitral seat. If the arbitrators have justifiable reasons to believe that the 
courts of the arbitral seat were used as an instrumentality of the respondent to avoid the 
arbitration, they should be entitled to ignore the court’s jurisdictional ruling. In these 
circumstances, the arbitrators may indeed be justified as a matter of international law to 
hold that the national courts were not entitled to interfere in the arbitration1021. 
672. Where the prior decision was rendered by a national court in a country other 
than the arbitral seat, the arbitral tribunal should weigh the consequences of accepting 
its jurisdiction despite the prior judgment denying the arbitrators’ jurisdiction over the 
dispute. The arbitral tribunal’s award may be refused recognition and enforcement in 
the country where the prior judgement was rendered. If enforcement may be sought in 
other jurisdictions, the arbitral tribunal may feel free to accept jurisdiction and proceed 
on the merits. The arbitrators should also ensure that their refusal to give res judicata 
effects to the foreign judgment on jurisdiction may not impair their award’s efficacy at 
the place of arbitration.  
673. Where the national court and arbitral tribunal are located in different Member 
                                                 
1019 PAULSSON, Interference by National Courts, p. 125. 
1020 PAULSSON, Interference by National Courts, p. 130. 
1021 PAULSSON, Interference by National Courts, p. 131. For an illustration see, e.g., High Court, Dhaka, 
Himpurna California Energy Ltd v Republic of Indonesia, 5 April 2000, 15 Mealey’s Int. Arb. Rev. (February 
2000), pp. A1 et seq.; Supreme Court of Pakistan, HUBCO v WAPDA, 20 June 2000, Arbitration 
International, Vol. 16, No. 4 (2000), pp. 439 et seq.; ICC Case No. 10623, 2001. These cases concern anti-
arbitration injunctions. The reasoning may however apply, mutatis mutandis, in the res judicata context. 
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States of the EU or EEA, the arbitrators will have to consider whether a prior court’s 
decision holding that there is no valid arbitration agreement is covered by the EC 
Regulation No. 44/2001 or the Lugano Convention.  
674. As the law stands today, due to the arbitration exclusion in Article 1 (2)(d) JR 
(Article 1 (2)(4) LC), the Regulation excludes not only arbitration proceedings, but also 
court proceedings relating to arbitration. However, since the ECJ’s decision in Allianz 
SpA v West Tankers Inc it is clear that the EC Regulation applies to a Member State’s 
court decision on the merits of a civil or commercial dispute, in which the court 
accepted its jurisdiction and held preliminarily that there is no valid arbitration 
agreement1022.  
675. As a result, such decisions must be recognised in all other Member States 
pursuant to Articles 32 et seq. JR. The courts in other Member States normally will not 
be able to review the prior court’s assessment of its jurisdiction1023, including the court’s 
assessment of the validity of the arbitration agreement1024. Courts and arbitral tribunals 
with seat in another Member State will thus have to decline jurisdiction over the same 
dispute on the grounds that no valid arbitration agreement exists, even though the 
arbitration agreement would be valid according to the law of the place of arbitration1025. 
This being said, several commentators have argued that a review of the validity of the 
arbitration agreement by the courts in the recognising country should in any case be 
                                                 
1022 ECJ, Allianz SpA et al v West Tankers Inc, Case C-185/07, 10 February 2009 (“If, because of the 
subject matter the dispute, that is, the nature of the rights to be protected in proceedings, such as a claim 
for damages, those proceedings come within the scope of Regulation No 44/2001, a preliminary issue 
concerning the applicability of an arbitration agreement, including in particular its validity, also comes 
within its scope of application”). See also ECJ, Marc Rich & Co. AG v Società Italiana Impianti PA, Case C-
190/89, 21 July 1991, 1991 ECR, p. I-3855, para. 28; ECJ, Van Uden Maritime BV, trading as Van Uden 
Africa Line v Kommanditgesellschaft in Firma Deco-Line and Another, Case C-391/95, 17 November 1998, 1998 
ECR, p. I-7091, para. 32. 
1023 Articles 33 (1) and 35 (3) JR and Articles 26 (1) and 28 (4) LC. A list of exceptions is provided in 
Articles 35 (1) JR and 28 (1) LC. 
1024 KROPHOLLER, p. 101, para. 46; WICKI, p. 312.  
1025 See decision of the English Court of Appeal in National Navigation Company v. Endesa Generacion SA 
[2009] EWCA Civ 1397, para. 59 (“A regulation judgment can however give rise to an issue estoppel as 
much in Arbitration proceedings excluded from the regulation as in any other proceedings in an English 
court”). This should not apply where the prior court’s judgment violates public policy (Article 34 (1) 
JR/Article 27 (1) LC). 
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possible1026.  
676. Arbitral tribunals with seat in a Member State of the EU or EEA should think 
twice before accepting their jurisdiction where a national court in another Member State 
has rendered a judgment on the merits, implicitly declaring the arbitration agreement in 
question to be null, void or inoperative. Because this judgment might well have to be 
automatically recognised in the country of the arbitral seat, the arbitral tribunal’s award 
will risk being set aside.  
1.1.5.4. Prior judgments on interim measures 
677. Where a national court has granted or denied a request for interim relief, an 
arbitral tribunal seised subsequently of the same request has to decide whether the prior 
court’s decision may preclude the arbitrators from reconsidering the request. 
678. Interim or provisional measures, as the term suggests, are intended to have 
provisional effects pending the final resolution of the dispute. These measures are 
ordinarily not intended to operate as res judicata “in the conventional sense”1027, because 
they may be revised, reconsidered, modified or revoked where the circumstances have 
changed or in accordance with new facts1028.  
679. In addition, it is clear that an interim measure cannot act as a res judicata with 
regard to the merits of the case, even if the court that rendered the measure considered 
                                                 
1026 See, e.g., VAN HOUTTE, p. 90 (VAN HOUTTE invokes a conflict between the Brussels and 
Lugano Conventions/EC Regulation and the New York Convention. The recognition and enforcement 
of a judgment rendered in violation of Article II NYC could be considered as a violation of public 
policy); GAUDEMET-TALLON, para. 363 (According to GAUDEMET-TALLON, a judgment should 
be considered as falling within the scope of the arbitration exclusion whenever there was a “serious” 
debate regarding the existence of a valid arbitration agreement and lack of jurisdiction was raised in good 
faith by the respondent before the court that rendered the judgment. Because in these cases the judgment 
would not be covered by the EC Regulation/Lugano Convention, the courts in the recognising country 
would be allowed to review the international jurisdiction of the prior court and, thus, the jurisdiction of 
the arbitral tribunal. In this sense, see also AUDIT, Arbitration and the Brussels Convention, pp. 1 et seq.); 
BESSON, Le sort et les effets au sein de l’Espace judiciaire européen d’un jugement écartant une exception d’arbitrage et 
statuant sur le fond, pp. 343 et seq. (According to BESSON, when denying the existence of a valid 
arbitration agreement, the national court that rendered the prior judgment also decided on the material 
scope of application of the EC Regulation/Lugano Convention. Because the material applicability of 
these instruments can be reviewed at the recognition and enforcement stage, the question of the arbitral 
jurisdiction can also be reconsidered at this moment). 
1027 YEŞILIRMAK, para. 5-63. 
1028 Ibid. 
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issues relating to the merits, such as the likelihood of success or a good arguable case 
on the merits. An arbitral tribunal deciding the merits of the dispute will not be bound 
by any determinations concerning the merits made by a national court in the interim 
measure. The national court’s decision on interim relief is limited in scope to questions 
regarding a prima facie claim, relevant to the requested measure. The arbitral tribunal on 
the other hand has the exclusive jurisdiction over the merits of the dispute1029.  
680. Nevertheless, it appears to be admitted that interim measures have some 
temporary res judicata effects. The parties are bound by the measure until it is rescinded 
or modified and the court that rendered the measure cannot reconsider it, unless new 
facts emerge that change the basis on which it was rendered1030. 
681. As was seen earlier in this research, in ICC Case No. 4126 of 1984 and Order 
No. 5 of 2 April 2002 the arbitral tribunal had to decide whether a party could seek 
interim relief in the arbitration despite the fact that an identical or similar request for 
relief had previously been denied by a state court. In both cases the arbitral tribunal 
considered the application of res judicata rules. In both cases the tribunals refused to 
grant the request for interim relief1031. 
682. In ICC Case No. 4126, after finding that the party identity requirement was not 
met, the tribunal nevertheless denied the party’s request for interim relief based on “the 
rules of good procedural order”1032. Because the object of the new request was 
essentially identical to the object of the prior request and because there was no change 
in circumstances, the tribunal held that the party to both procedures was bound by the 
prior court decision denying the interim measure. As was seen above, this decision was 
endorsed by the ICC tribunal in Order No. 5 of 2 April 20021033.  
683. In the circumstances of these cases, the application of preclusion rules appears 
fully justified to prevent the wasteful and unnecessary reconsideration of the prior court 
decision. If a national court dismissed a request for interim relief on non-jurisdictional 
                                                 
1029 BORN, p. 2930. 
1030 See, e.g., French and Swiss law (supra, paras 124 and 160). 
1031 See supra, paras 483 et seq. 
1032 See supra, paras 448 et seq. for a quotation of the relevant passages in the award. 
1033 See supra, paras 454 et seq. 
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grounds, then the court’s decision should in principle bind the parties, as well as the 
arbitral tribunal subsequently seised of an identical request, unless there is a change in 
circumstances. Likewise, where a party has obtained interim relief in aid of arbitration 
from a national court, over the objections of the adverse party, there are good reasons 
to conclude that, absent a change in circumstances, the arbitral tribunal should be 
bound by the prior court’s decision1034. By contrast, where there was a relevant change 
in circumstances between the time of the national court decision and the subsequent 
application to an arbitral tribunal, the prior court’s decision on interim relief should 
only have limited preclusive effets (if any) in the arbitration1035. 
684. It has been argued that prior national court decisions granting interim relief 
should not have any preclusive effects before an arbitral tribunal seised of the same 
request. Because of the provisional nature of the measure, the arbitrators can review 
and alter the measures taken by national courts. Where there is a conflict between the 
provisional measures, the decision of the arbitral tribunal should prevail1036. This 
argumentation applies where a national court was seised of a request for interim relief 
despite the existence of an arbitration agreement and, with particular force, where the 
arbitral tribunal was already constituted and where the interim relief requested from the 
national court is of the same kind as the relief ultimately sought from the arbitrators. 
Interim measures can often have a decisive impact on the outcome of a dispute. Thus, 
there is a risk that a court ordered interim measure will take the dispute out of the 
hands of the arbitrators. To prevent this, the arbitral tribunal, who has the exclusive 
jurisdiction over the merits of the dispute, should be able to alter an interim measure 
previously granted by a national court if it considers this to be appropriate. In addition, 
the arbitral tribunal may have a much more complete factual and legal record of the 
case and may thus be best suited to decide the request for interim measures. 
685. On the other hand, it has been argued that arbitral tribunals should adopt a sui 
generis analysis of preclusion issues in the context of interim measures. Where a party’s 
request for interim relief was denied by a national court, it should not be allowed to 
                                                 
1034 BORN, p. 2931. Born notes that where interim relief was granted on an ex parte basis, there should 
obviously be no preclusive effects from the resulting ex parte decision. 
1035 BORN, pp. 2930 et seq. 
1036 FOUCHARD/GAILLARD/GOLDMAN, para. 1330. 
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renew its request before an arbitral tribunal. By contrast, the party that did not initiate 
the request for interim measures before the national court should be allowed to apply to 
the arbitral tribunal to withdraw or revise a measure previously granted by the court1037.  
686. It is contended that arbitral tribunals should adopt this sui generis approach. A 
party that was previously denied interim relief before a national court should not have a 
second bite at the same cherry before the arbitrators. Where the court proceedings 
respected fundamental principles of due process, the losing party generally has no 
sufficient interest to repeat, against the will of the adverse party, proceedings which the 
parties already went through. Thus, in this situation the arbitral tribunal should give 
preclusive effects to the prior court decision. As was seen above, this approach is 
already followed by arbitral tribunals.  
687. It is also justified to allow the party that did not request the interim relief from a 
national court to apply to the arbitral tribunal to alter a measure granted by the court. 
While the arbitrators should always give due considerations to the court’s decision, they 
should have the authority to review the measure if they consider this appropriate. This 
respects the arbitral tribunal’s primacy as the parties’ chosen mechanism for the 
resolution of their dispute. It is also important to protect the arbitral tribunal’s 
jurisdiction over the merits of the dispute.  
1.2. The Scope of Res Judicata Effects to be Afforded to Prior Judgments in 
Arbitration Proceedings 
688. Having determined the type of decisions that may operate as a res judicata in 
arbitration proceedings, it is now necessary to investigate to what extent these decisions 
should be afforded res judicata effects. Should these res judicata effects be limited to claim 
preclusive effects as in civil law countries or also cover issue preclusive effects and 
abuse of process as in common law countries? 
689. The extent of preclusive effects to be given to a judgment should be determined 
by the policies underlying the res judicata doctrine, taking into consideration the nature 
and objectives of international arbitration, as well as the legitimate expectations of the 
                                                 
1037 BORN, pp. 2932 et seq. 
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parties. A priori, there appears to be no reason why a judgment should not in principle 
be capable of having issue preclusive effects in a subsequent arbitration. Likewise, it 
should a priori depend on the discretion of the arbitral tribunals whether to give a 
judgment preclusive effects with regard to matters that were not, but could and should 
have been, raised in prior court proceedings.  
690. It was seen above that the question of claim preclusion arises most often where 
a prior judgment was rendered on the merits in a case involving a different claim than 
the one before the arbitral tribunal. The national court may have rendered a judgment 
on question X. Question X may then arise again before the arbitrators seised of 
question Y. The question is whether the arbitrators are bound by the court’s judgment 
on X.  
691. The arbitral tribunal seised of question Y should be bound by the prior 
judgment on question X. The arbitral tribunal normally would have jurisdiction to 
decide question X as this preliminary issue is necessary for the resolution of question Y. 
However, because question X was the main issue and not merely a preliminary issue in 
the prior court proceedings, the national court had a stronger interest in deciding X. 
The arbitral tribunal therefore should not reconsider, but should implement the court’s 
judgment1038. 
692. Within the context of arbitral tribunals facing prior arbitral awards, the final 
ILA report on arbitration and res judicata endorses a broad notion of claim preclusion 
under which res judicata not only is to be read from the dispositive part of the decision 
but also from its underlying reasoning. If it is clear from a prior arbitral tribunal’s 
reasoning that the dispositive part is to be interpreted in a way to bar further or 
subsequent arbitration proceedings, claim preclusion ought to follow for the sake of 
arbitral efficiency and finality. Giving res judicata effects to the prior award as well as its 
underlying reasoning would prevent that some evidence or legal argument regarding 
that cause of action will be reargued1039.  
                                                 
1038 MAYER, Litispendence, connexité et chose jugée dans l’arbitrage international, p. 198. 
1039 ILA, Final Report, para. 52. 
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693. It would be possible in principle for arbitral tribunals to grant preclusive effects 
to reasons necessarily underlying prior judgments. Even though this solution may not 
be well grounded in transnational law, it should be acceptable for reasons of procedural 
efficiency and finality1040. However, due to the lack of interchangeability between 
arbitral tribunals and national courts, it does not seem appropriate in international 
arbitration to give res judicata effects to reasons underlying prior court judgments1041. 
However, arbitrators may always consider reasons to interpret the meaning and scope 
of the judgment1042. 
694. Unless the parties agree otherwise, arbitral tribunals generally should not be 
bound by the reasons underlying a prior judgment. An arbitral tribunal seised of a 
dispute should be able to reach its own conclusions based on the parties’ submissions, 
without being bound by the determinations of particular issues contained in the 
reasoning of a prior judgment rendered in a different case between the same parties. An 
arbitral tribunal must be able to decide the dispute before it for its own reasons and 
based on its own opinions.  
695. No preclusive effects should be given to reasons where an arbitral tribunal is 
seised of question Y and this same question was already necessarily decided as a 
preliminary issue in the reasoning of a court judgment between the same parties 
involving question X. Because the prior court decided the question as a preliminary 
issue, it did not have a greater interest than the arbitrators in deciding the question. To 
the contrary, the arbitral tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction to decide question Y and 
thus has a greater interest than the national court to determine the issue. Therefore, the 
arbitral tribunal should not be bound by the prior court’s decision on a preliminary 
issue where the same issue arises as the main issue before the arbitrators.  
696.  As explained by Mayer, the same applies, albeit with less force, where an 
arbitral tribunal seised of a dispute has to decide the preliminary issue X, and issue X 
was already necessarily determined as a preliminary issue in the reasoning of a prior 
                                                 
1040 In this sense (with regard to issue estoppel), see ILA, Final Report, para. 56. 
1041 See MAYER, Litispendence, connexité et chose jugée dans l’arbitrage international, pp. 197 et seq. 
1042 According to HÉRON, considering reasons to interpret and clarify a decision’s dispositif essentially 
has as a result to afford these reasons res judicata effects (para. 4). 
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judgment in a different case between the same parties1043. Because the prior court 
decided issue X as a preliminary issue, it did not have a greater interest than the 
arbitrators in deciding the question; the national court and the arbitral tribunal have the 
same interest to determine the particular preliminary issue. 
697. These two situations are not situations of claim preclusion, but of issue 
preclusion. Hence, it is suggested that the doctrine of issue preclusion should not apply 
before international arbitral tribunals. Adopting the issue preclusion doctrine would 
undoubtedly be useful for reasons of procedural efficiency and the avoidance of 
contradictory decisions. However, because the arbitral tribunal’s interest in reaching its 
own conclusions on the particular issue before it is at least as great as the national 
court’s interest, it is contended that issue preclusion should not apply. As was seen 
above, a reason behind the civil law approach against issue preclusion is that the 
importance of a legal action and a specific issue figuring in that action could differ 
widely in relation to another legal action1044. This reasoning seems to apply with even 
greater force in the relations between court and arbitration proceedings due to the lack 
of interchangeability between arbitral tribunals and state courts. Not granting issue 
preclusive effects to prior court judgments in subsequent arbitration proceedings seems 
to better respect the parties’ intention to submit a particular dispute to arbitration.  
698. In order to avoid contradictory decisions on preliminary issues, arbitral tribunals 
should be guided by principles of procedural efficiency and good faith and give due 
consideration to the determinations of the national court. The concern to make 
arbitration proceedings faster and cheaper should allow arbitrators to adopt the prior 
preliminary rulings of a court1045. However, if the arbitrators disagree with the national 
court’s preliminary findings, they should be able to depart from them so as to decide 
the dispute for their own reasons and based on their own opinions. This means that 
arbitral tribunals should have the authority to depart from earlier national court rulings 
on particular (preliminary) issues or to adopt them where this is considered appropriate. 
The parties may expressly agree on the application of issue preclusion principles. The 
                                                 
1043 MAYER, Litispendence, connexité et chose jugée dans l’arbitrage international, p. 198. 
1044 See supra, para. 181. 
1045 As was seen supra (para. 497), the 2006 PWC/SIA survey has shown that procedural efficiency is an 
important concern of international arbitration users.  
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arbitrators may also consider it appropritate to adopt prior court rulings on specific 
issues where the parties are from common law jurisdictions and legitimately expect the 
application of issue preclusion principles and where the traditional requirements for the 
application of the issue preclusion doctrine are met1046. Conversely, the arbitrators may 
not do so where the parties are from civil law jurisdictions and unfamiliar with the 
concept of issue preclusion.  
699. In addition, it may be premature to impose the application of issue preclusion 
principles on arbitral tribunals. Even if this doctrine might be acceptable worldwide for 
reasons of procedural efficiency and finality, it remains that at present it is not 
recognised in civil law jurisdictions. The ALI/UNIDROIT Principle on Transnational 
Civil Procedure generally exclude the issue preclusion doctrine. Issue preclusion may be 
invoked only in exceptional cases when the re-litigation of certain factual or legal issues 
would be clearly abusive1047.  
700. Finally, the question arises whether arbitral tribunals should apply the abuse of 
process doctrine. The approach suggested in the final ILA report appears appropriate 
also where the plea of abuse of process is based on prior court proceedings. According 
to Recommendation No. 5, 
“[a]n arbitral award has preclusive effects in the further arbitral 
proceedings as to a claim, cause of action or issue of fact or 
law, which could have been raised, but was not, in the 
proceedings resulting in that award, provided that the raising of 
any such new claim, cause of action or new issue of fact or law 
amounts to procedural unfairness or abuse.” 
701. When deciding whether a party should be barred from raising a claim, cause of 
action or issue in the arbitration on the grounds that the party should have raised it in 
the court proceedings, arbitral tribunals must balance the private and public interests at 
stake. A claimant may have justifiable reasons for not raising certain issues in the court 
proceedings. The claimant has a corresponding right to have access to justice with 
regard to such issues not already determined in prior proceedings. By contrast, the 
                                                 
1046 ILA, Final Report, para. 56. 
1047 See supra, paras 231 et seq. 
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respondent has a right to a fair trial. It has a legitimate interest to be protected against 
further proceedings where the claimant failed to raise certain issues in prior 
proceedings. There also is a public interest in not having arbitration proceedings in such 
circumstances so as to avoid additional proceedings before the supervisory courts at the 
arbitral seat1048.  
702. The arbitrators should have the authority to decide whether to apply the abuse 
of process doctrine or not. The party pleading abuse of process will have to persuade 
the arbitrators that the new arbitration proceedings constitute an abuse of process and a 
procedural unfairness. The arbitrators must be convinced that it would be just to deny 
the adverse party the opportunity (or right) to raise a matter that has not been 
determined in a prior decision, because this matter could and should in good faith have 
been brought in the prior proceedings.  
1.3. Requirements for the Application of the Res Judicata Doctrine 
703. The final ILA Report on res judicata and arbitration identified five cumulative 
requirements for the application of the res judicata doctrine between arbitral tribunals: 
“- The prior award must be final and binding and capable of 
recognition in the country where the arbitral tribunal of the 
subsequent arbitration proceedings has its seat 
- The arbitration proceedings in which the res judicata issue is 
raised, must pertain to the same legal order as the prior 
award 
- Identity of the subject matter 
- Identity of the cause of action 
- Identity of the parties”1049. 
704. These are the traditional res judicata requirements transposed from litigation to 
arbitration. The application of these requirements seems generally appropriate. Because 
the aim of the res judicata doctrine is essentially the same whether the prior decision is a 
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1049 ILA, Final Report, para. 29. 
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judgment or an award there appear to be no good reasons for applying different res 
judicata requirements. Accordingly, the requirements listed above should apply mutadis 
mutandis where arbitral tribunals have to determine the res judicata effects of a prior 
judgment.  
705. The following analysis will begin by examining the triple identity test (1.3.1.). It 
will then investigate whether a prior judgment must be capable of recognition at the 
arbitral seat in order to operate as a res judicata in the arbitration proceedings (1.3.2.). 
The requirement of the same legal order was already discussed in chapter five1050. 
1.3.1. The triple identity test 
706. With regard to the triple identity test, ILA’s Recommendation No. 3 provides 
that a prior award should have res judicata effects in subsequent arbitration proceedings 
if 
“[…] 
3.2  it has decided on or disposed of a claim for relief 
which is sought or is being reargued in further 
arbitration proceedings; 
3.3  it is based upon a cause of action which is invoked 
in further arbitration proceedings; and  
3.4  it has been rendered between the same parties”. 
707. There appear to be no reasons why this triple identiy test should not apply 
where an arbitral tribunal has to determine the res judicata effects of a prior judgment. 
The triple identity test ensures the identicalness of the disputes in both proceedings. It 
thereby avoids that a party is deprived of its right of access to justice with regard to a 
matter that was not already decided in prior proceedings. In other words, it avoids the 
denial of justice. By the same token, it also avoids unnecessary and wasteful 
duplications of proceedings: it is redundant to adjudicate the same dispute in more than 
one set of proceedings and it is undesirable that parties to a single dispute, through their 
                                                 
1050 See supra, paras 583 et seq. 
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own conduct, would generate inconsistent decisions regarding their rights and duties1051. 
These underlying rationales are the same whether the prior decision is a judgment or an 
award.  
708. The triple identity test applies only in case of claim preclusion. It does not apply 
in case of issue preclusion which traditionally applies not only regarding the same claim, 
but also regarding different claims1052. Likewise, it does not apply in case of abuse of 
process which, by definition, involves a claim, cause of action or issue that was not 
raised in the prior proceedings. 
709. Transnational law should define the test to assess the identity between a prior 
and a subsequent dispute. This will not be an easy task due to the uncertainties in both 
national and international law as to the interpretation to be given to the notions of 
“parties”, “cause” and “object”. Arbitral tribunals should attempt to determine the 
dominant tendency among national laws, with particular regard to those national laws 
most closely connected to the parties and the dispute1053. Useful inspiration could also 
be sought in public international law which developed a triple identity test based on 
domestic res judicata rules1054. Likewise, the ECJ has interpreted the triple identity test in 
several cases pertaining to lis pendens1055.  
710. Due to the uncertainty of existing law on the matter, we will refrain from 
formulating new transnational definitions of the notions of “parties”, “cause” and 
“object”. However, it is useful to comment on the scope to be given to these notions.  
711. There are important arguments in favour of a broad interpretation of the triple 
identity test. A strict application of the test can put form over substance and ignore the 
“underlying economic realities”1056. Citing as an example the Lauder/CME cases, Shany 
observed  
                                                 
1051 SHANY, Similarity in the Eye of the Beholder, pp. 126 et seq. 
1052 MAYER, Litispendence, connexité et chose jugée dans l’arbitrage international, p. 197; ILA, Final Report, para. 
57. See also supra, paras 54 et seq. and 95 et seq. 
1053 See supra, para. 571. 
1054 See supra, paras 272 et seq. 
1055 See supra, paras 205 et seq. International arbitrators should however be careful when applying a triple 
identity test designed for lis pendens. Because the consequences of lis pendens are less drastic than those of 
res judicata, the test may be interpreted more broadly in a lis pendens situation.  
1056 SCHREUER/REINISCH, The Partial Award of September 13, 2001, para. 223. 
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“a wider trend to erode or circumvent the application of 
jurisdiction-regulating rules [such as the res judicata doctrine] 
through emphasizing the differences existing between related 
claims in a way that puts into question the very need for their 
regulation”1057.  
712. Accordingly, a strict interpretation of the identity test may lead to abuse by 
parties trying to get a second bite at the cherry. Likewise, it may be contrary to strong 
public policy grounds underlying the res judicata doctrine, such as the avoidance of 
wasteful duplications of proceedings leading to inconsistent decisions1058. If arbitral 
tribunals were to adopt a strict approach with regard to the identity test, the res judicata 
doctrine would rarely apply1059. Indeed, multiple proceedings in international arbitration 
rarely involve exactly the same parties and issues1060. Economic disputes may often be 
highly complex, involving closely related economic entities and separate yet essentially 
identical instruments1061. In this context, a strict application of the identity test could 
lead to injustice in international arbitration where there are limited possibilities to avoid 
parallel proceedings1062. To avoid such injustice it has been argued that arbitral tribunals 
must look at the underlying nature of a dispute and not at its formal classification. 
Although a dispute may not appear to be literally identical to a dispute previously 
decided, it may be substantially identical1063.  
713. Conversely, a broad interpretation of the identity test could violate a party’s 
right of access to justice, which is both a human right and a general principle of justice. 
If the parties and questions at issue in both proceedings are not identical, then each 
party has the right to bring separate proceedings1064. Where the prior decision was a 
judgment, it may be argued that a broad interpretation of the identity test could deprive 
                                                 
1057 SHANY, Similarity in the Eye of the Beholder:, p. 122. 
1058 SHEPPARD, The Scope and Res Judicata Effect of Arbitral Awards, p. 282. 
1059 SCHREUER/REINISCH, The Partial Award of September 13, 2001, para. 265. See also SHEPPARD, 
The Scope and Res Judicata Effect of Arbitral Awards, p. 278 (“[…] there are relatively few cases where res 
judicata has been applied. Very often, the tribunal has found that the triple identity test has not been 
met”). 
1060 HOBÉR, p. 245. 
1061 SHANY, Similarity in the Eye of the Beholder, pp. 130 et seq.; BREKOULAKIS, p. 189. 
1062 SHEPPARD, The Scope and Res Judicata Effect of Arbitral Awards, p. 282. See also supra, para. 509. 
1063 SCHREUER/REINISCH, The Partial Award of September 13, 2001, paras 273 et seq. See also BUCHER 
who favours an “identité fonctionelle” as opposed to a “identité formelle” of claims (in the context of lis pendens 
in international litigation)(L’examen de la compétence internationale, p. 168).   
1064 HASCHER, p. 26; SHANY, Similarity in the Eye of the Beholder, pp. 125 and 127. 
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a party of its right to arbitrate a certain dispute or issue1065. The lack of 
interchangeability between arbitral tribunals and national courts thus militates for a 
narrow interpretation of the identity test. Where there is the slightest interest for the 
arbitral tribunal to exercise its jurisdiction over the dispute, namely because the parties 
and the dispute in the prior court proceedings were not the same, it should not refuse 
to do so based on res judicata. In addition, because the application of the res judicata 
doctrine has serious consequences, i.e. the denial by the arbitral tribunal to exercise its 
jurisdiction, it appears justified to apply this doctrine only where a strict identity test is 
met. 
714. Arbitral tribunals ultimately face a policy choice. They can either apply a strict 
identity test to protect and give maximum effectiveness to the arbitration agreement, or 
they can apply a broad identity test to further policy considerations such as procedural 
efficiency and legal coherence. A strict application of the identity test might have the 
benefit of clarity, predictability and ease of application1066. By contrast, a broader, more 
flexible identity test might allow arbitral tribunals to fully address the complexity of the 
legal situation and engage in pragmatic problem solving. A flexible identity test would 
afford a higher degree of discretionary power to arbitral tribunals and, thus, reduce legal 
certainty and predictability1067.  
715. For the reasons given above, a narrow identity test appears justified. However, 
an arbitral tribunal’s mandate is limited. Arbitrators should be wary of resolving aspects 
of a dispute that they were not authorized to resolve. By adopting a too narrow identiy 
test and thereby interpreting the scope of their jurisdiction too broadly, arbitral 
tribunals might exceed their mandate1068. Likewise, arbitrators should be careful not to 
adopt an overly formalistic approach to avoid parties from unduly evading the 
application of the res judicata doctrine. Overreliance on formal criteria may open the 
                                                 
1065 Where the first decision is an award, this consideration seems less important, because the party will 
not be denied the opportunity to arbitrate. The argument may be invoked nonetheless, because arbitral 
tribunals cannot be considered as interchangeable between each other (see supra, paras 589 et seq.). 
1066 SHANY, Similarity in the Eye of the Beholder, p. 129; SHEPPARD, The Scope and Res Judicata Effect of 
Arbitral Awards, p. 282. 
1067 SHANY, Similarity in the Eye of the Beholder, p. 129.  
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doors to abuse through deliberate recourse to multiple proceedings1069. Such abuse is 
particularly feasible in international arbitration where arbitrators frequently face highly 
complex disputes involving multiple and closely related parties, contracts and issues.  
716. In order to avoid such abuse, arbitral tribunals could be guided by the abuse of 
rights (abus de droit) principle, which is recognized as a general principle of law1070. In 
exceptional circumstances, this principle could bar parties from unduly invoking the 
right to bring a new claim when a virtually identical claim has already been adjudicated 
in prior proceedings. It might also give arbitral tribunals the authority to prevent parties 
from raising in the arbitration certain claims of relief that they could and should have 
brought in the prior litigation. The final ILA Report appears to support the application 
of the abus de droit principle in this context, referring to it as the abuse of process and 
procedural unfairness doctrine1071. According to ILA, this doctrine applies with regard 
to the identity of cause of action requirement1072. In certain situations the arbitrators 
may conclude as to an abuse of process or procedural unfairness if a party attempts to 
modify the cause of action by raising a different ground in support of the same claim 
for relief. Arbitrators should examine whether the different provisions relied upon in 
support of the claim are substantially identical or different. If the provisions contain 
substantially the same rule, the arbitrators may conclude as to the identity of the cause 
of action1073.   
717. The abuse of process and procedural unfairness doctrine should also apply with 
regard to the party identity requirement. A party to an arbitration should not be able to 
                                                 
1069 SHANY, Similarity in the Eye of the Beholder, p. 130. 
1070 SHANY, Similarity in the Eye of the Beholder, p. 124; CHENG, p. 121.  
1071 ILA, Final Report, para. 42. 
1072 ILA, Final Report, para. 43. 
1073 It has been suggested that arbitral tribunals may consider a dispute identical to a dispute previously 
decided where the same claim is based on the same factual background (in this sense see 
SCHREUER/REINISCH, The Partial Award of September 13, 2001, para. 257). This appears to be in line 
with recent developments in civil law countries where courts now adopt a broader and more pragmatic 
approach to assess the identity of questions in dispute. This new approach aligns these civil law countries 
with the pragmatic approach followed in common law countries, as well as the broad approach adopted 
by the ECJ when interpreting the identity of “cause of action” requirement under EC Regulation No. 
44/2001 (see supra, paras 208 et seq.). It also mirrors the tendency of international courts and tribunals to 
focus on the facts underlying the claims in order to determine whether two disputes are identical or not 
(See supra, para. 294). Accordingly, it could be appropriate for arbitrators to replace the two requirements 
of identity of cause and object by the single requirement of “identity of questions in dispute”. This would 
avoid the problematic distinction between identity of cause and object. 
The Doctrine of Res Judicata Before International Arbitral Tribunals 
240 
 
avoid the res judicata effects of a prior judgment by unduly invoking a separate legal 
identity. A common law-style “privity of interest” test appears appropriate to assess the 
“sameness” between parties. The test would be met where the parties are either 
formally identical or so closely related as to represent virtually the same interests1074. 
However, arbitral tribunals must be careful to not unduly restrict the right of access to 
justice of a party with different interests, which may be the result of an overly broad 
interpretation of the identity of parties requirment1075. 
718. Where the identity test is not met, arbitral tribunals should always take the prior 
judgment into consideration in order to avoid contradictory decisions. Shany suggests 
the application of the principle of judicial comity which encourages tribunals to 
consider following the conclusions of law and fact reached by a prior court. This may 
provide arbitral tribunals with a way to break the legal deadlock that the current 
uncertainties surrounding the ascertaining of “sameness” of parties and issues entail1076. 
As was seen earlier, in practice arbitral tribunals have given preclusive and conclusive 
effects to prior awards and judgments, even though the strict identity test was not 
met1077. Although no trend as to this effect has been observed, it can be argued that the 
more a prior dispute is identical to the dispute before the arbitral tribunal, the more 
drastic preclusive and conclusive effects should be given to the prior judgment. In other 
words, the degree of identicalness between the disputes in both proceedings should 
determine the intensity of the preclusive and conclusive effects to be given to the prior 
judgment1078.  
                                                 
1074 See, e.g., Cour d’appel de Paris, 13 September 2007, Société Comptoir Commercial Blidéen v Société l’Union 
Invivo, Rev. arb., No. 2 (2008), pp. 313 et seq. While this case involved the consolidation of disputes over 
related contracts, the reasoning is interesting also for res judicata purposes. The dispute involved several 
parties and contracts. The arbitral tribunal decided to rule on all of the contracts and with regard to all 
parties in one and the same award. One of the parties challenged the award on the ground that the 
arbitral tribunal was wrong to do so. The court rejected the claim, noting that all of the disputed 
contracts were identical and were made as part of the same business relationship between the parties, 
whose separation was therefore purely formal. In addition, the parties did not have differing interests and 
they had the same director. The court concluded that the filing of a single arbitration request covering 
identical disputes was, moreover, a reasonable and useful procedural tactic and in everyone’s interest (see 
AUDIT, French Court Decisions on Arbitration, para. 17, p. 18). 
1075 SHANY, Similarity in the Eye of the Beholder, p. 131. 
1076 SHANY, Similarity in the Eye of the Beholder, p. 138. 
1077 See supra, paras 482 et seq. 
1078 This was argued by BREKOULAKIS with regard to the party identity requirement (pp. 195 et seq.). 
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1.3.2. Is the prior judgment capable of recognition in the country of the arbitral 
seat? 
719. It is generally considered a requirement for the application of the res judicata 
doctrine that a foreign judgment must be capable of recognition in the country of the 
subsequent proceedings1079. The purpose of this requirement is twofold: on the one 
hand, it seeks to avoid the coexistence in one jurisdiction of contradictory decisions 
that are equally enforceable. On the other hand, it seeks to allow a party that cannot use 
the foreign judgment for enforcement purposes in the relevant jurisdiction to pursue 
the case there in order to open up for the possibility of local enforcement1080. The 
requirement is plainly justified in private international litigation, because the jurisdiction 
of state courts normally is not based solely on a choice of court agreement, but on 
contacts with the country (e.g. a domicile or a place of business) that are sufficiently 
close to justify the jurisdiction of the country’s courts. However, the situation is 
different in international arbitration. Ordinarily, the arbitral seat is chosen precisely 
because neither of the parties had any connection there.  
720. According to Söderlund the question of whether a prior judgment is 
enforceable at the place of arbitration is normally of slight interest to the parties. Due to 
the lack of connection with the arbitral seat neither of the parties would forsee any need 
for enforcement measures at the arbitral seat in the future. What is relevant is not 
whether the prior judgment is capable of recognition and enforcement at the arbitral 
seat, but whether the national court had jurisdiction to render the judgment1081.  
721. In addition, it may be argued that if the existence of an arbitral legal order is 
admitted, then the question whether the prior judgment is capable of recognition in the 
country of the arbitral seat is (at least in theory) of no importance to the arbitral legal 
order. The proper question is whether the prior judgment is capable of recognition in 
the arbitral legal order. This will not be the case if the national court had rendered the 
prior judgment in violation of an arbitration agreement.  
                                                 
1079 SHEPPARD, Res Judicata and Estoppel, p. 232. 
1080 SÖDERLUND, p. 303. 
1081 SÖDERLUND, pp. 305 et seq. 
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722. Rather than verifying whether the prior judgment is capable of recognition in 
the country of the arbitral seat, it appears more appropriate for arbitral tribunals to 
examine whether the prior judgment was “valid”, i.e. whether it was rendered in 
conformity with Article II (3) NYC and due process principles.  
723.  It may in any case be prudent for arbitral tribunals to verify whether a prior 
judgment is capable of recognition in the country of the arbitral seat. Where a request 
for recognition or enforcement has already been brought at the arbitral seat, the arbitral 
tribunal may deem it appropriate to await the enforcement court’s decision. However, 
where no such request has been brought, the arbitral tribunal may have to predict 
whether the judgment will be capable of recognition at the arbitral seat1082. This is 
important if the local courts cannot be expected to render a decision on the issue within 
a reasonable period of time1083. The arbitrators will normally have to determine whether 
the prior court had jurisdiction in the international sense and whether the judgment is 
in conformity with the public policy of the arbitral seat. The foreign court’s 
international jurisdiction should be denied if the judgment was rendered in violation of 
Article II (3) NYC1084.  
724. The test to determine whether a foreign judgment is capable of recognition in 
the country of the arbitral seat thus closely resembles the proposed test as to the 
“validity” of the prior judgment. If the judgment is capable of recognition in the 
country of the arbitral seat it will likely also be “valid”.  
725. By contrast, a judgment that is not capable of recognition in the country of the 
arbitral seat might still be considered as “valid” and afforded res judicata effects in the 
arbitration. Whether an arbitral tribunal should give res judicata effects to a judgment 
that cannot be recognised at the arbitral seat should depend on the reason for which 
recognition has been denied. A court’s decision denying interim relief may not be 
recognised in the country of the arbitral seat simply because decisions on interim relief 
                                                 
1082 In some countries, such as France, while arbitrators may predict a foreign judgment’s 
“recognisability”, they do not have the authority to decide whether a foreign judgment will be recognised 
in the country of the arbitral seat (see, e.g., PINNA, para. 17). 
1083 See MAYER, Litispendence, connexité et chose jugée dans l’arbitrage international, p. 199. 
1084 This was the solution adopted by the Swiss Federal Tribunal in Compania Minera Condesa SA v BRGM-
Perou SAS (ATF 124 III 83, 87). See also SÖDERLUND, pp. 304 et seq. 
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do not qualify as “decisions capable of recognition” in that country1085. However, if the 
national court had jurisdiction to render the decision denying interim relief, if principles 
of due process were observed and if there was no change in circumstances, preclusive 
effects should be given to the court’s decision1086. By contrast, where a foreign 
judgment was not recognised because it violates public policy considerations of the 
arbitral seat, an award that gives res judicata effects to the foreign judgment might be set 
aside. 
1.4. Conclusion 
726. Transnational law should govern questions of res judicata arising out of 
judgments before international arbitral tribunals. While national laws may serve as 
guidance, transnational law should ultimately determine which type of national court 
decision should be able to operate as a res judicata in arbitration proceedings. It should 
also determine the scope of the res judicata effects to be given to a prior judgment, as 
well as the requirements for the application of the res judicata doctrine.  
727. Judicial decisions rendered by a judicial court or tribunal that finally and 
conclusively determine a dispute “on the merits” may have res judicata effects in an 
arbitration. Reference to the law of the country where the judgment was rendered may 
be required to determine whether the decision was rendered by a judicial tribunal with 
competent jurisdiction and whether the decision is final and conclusive. However, 
whether a judgment is “on the merits” for res judicata purposes should be determined 
autonomously. While decisions determining the substance of a dispute should operate 
as a res judicata, the same should not apply to court decisions regarding the arbitral 
jurisdiction. Likewise, while court decisions denying interim relief should have 
preclusive effects before arbitral tribunals seised of an identical request for interim 
relief, this should not apply to court decisions granting such a request.  
728. A judgment that qualifies as a res judicata should have only claim preclusive 
effects in subsequent arbitration proceedings. While arbitral tribunals should be bound 
by the final determination of a matter that constituted the main issue in the court 
                                                 
1085 This seems to be the case in Switzerland (see, e.g., Order No. 5 of 2 April 2002). 
1086 See supra, paras 677 et seq. 
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proceedings, they should not be bound by a court’s ruling on a preliminary issue, even 
if this issue was essential for the judgment. Such decisions that were contained in the 
reasons of the judgment should not have res judicata effects in the arbitration so as to 
allow the arbitrators to determine the dispute before them based on their own 
conclusions and convictions. However, arbitral tribunals should have the authority to 
adopt or depart from earlier rulings on preliminary issues if they consider this 
appropriate. Likewise, the application of the abuse of process doctrine should also be 
discretionary.  
729. Finally, with regard to the res judicata requirements, while arbitral tribunals 
should generally apply the traditional identity test, it is contended that arbitral tribunals 
should seek to develop a test that is based on transnational law and guided by the abus 
de droit principle. Before granting res judicata effects to a prior judgment, arbitral tribunals 
should also verify that the judgment in question is “valid”. This test should largely 
coïncide with the test as to whether a foreign judgment is capable of recognition at the 
place of arbitration.  
2. RES JUDICATA IN CASE OF PRIOR ARBITRAL AWARDS BEFORE INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS 
730. Substantially the same res judicata principles should apply where the prior 
decision is an arbitral award. Hence, much of the forgoing analysis applies mutatis 
mutandis where the prior decision is an award.  
731. As in the first part of this chapter, an introductory remark needs to be made 
with regard to the relevance of domestic laws. The lex arbitri governing both the first 
and second arbitration will generally be silent with regard to res judicata and will thus be 
of little relevance. Furthermore, because of the autonomy of international arbitration 
from national legal systems, the domestic res judicata rules of the first and second arbitral 
seat do not bind international arbitrators.  
732. It is contended that arbitral tribunals should adopt a full transnational approach 
to res judicata where the prior decision is an award. They should seek to develop 
transnational rules covering all aspects of res judicata, including the notion of an award 
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that qualifies as a res judicata (or “res arbitrata”), the scope of the res judicata effects to be 
given to a prior award, as well as the requirements that need to be met for an award to 
operate as a res judicata in subsequent arbitration proceedings1087.  
733.  This full transnational approach to res judicata must be developed by arbitral 
tribunals over the years. At present arbitral tribunals will sometimes refer to domestic 
res judicata rules for guidance. Arbitral tribunals may “double-check” their solutions 
against those domestic res judicata rules that have a close connection to the parties and 
the dispute. Furthermore, to avoid annulment of their award, the arbitrators should 
always consider the law of the place of arbitration. This solution was adopted by the 
arbitrators in ICC Case No. 13509 of 2006. The arbitrators made clear that they would 
look at French law merely as a source of inspiration without being bound by it, even 
though the seat of the arbitration was in France, the first award was rendered in France, 
the law governing the merits in both arbitrations was French law and both parties to the 
arbitration relied on French law with regard to res judicata. The tribunal held that, in 
these circumstances, it would be appropriate to look at French res judicata rules, always 
pointing out however that it was not bound by these rules1088. 
2.1. Constituent Elements of a Res Judicata 
734. If it is generally accepted in international arbitration law that awards have res 
judicata effects, it is necessary to determine what an award is before determining the 
nature and extent of these effects. It is then necessary to investigate whether all or only 
certain types of awards may become res judicata. It is contended that only final arbitral 
awards “on the merits” rendered by an arbitral tribunal with jurisdiction over the parties 
and the subject matter will be capable of operating as a res judicata.  
2.1.1. An arbitral award 
735. There currently is no universal definition of the term “arbitral award”1089. The 
European Convention is silent and the New York Convention merely states that  
                                                 
1087 In this sense, see HASCHER, pp. 25 et seq. 
1088 See supra, para. 444. 
1089 LIEBSCHER, pp. 115 et seq .; ILA, Final Report, para. 18; LEW/MISTELIS/KRÖLL, para. 24-4.   
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“[t]he term ‘arbitral award’ shall include not only awards made 
by arbitrators appointed for each case but also those made by 
permanent arbitral bodies to which the parties have 
submitted”1090. 
736. As was seen earlier, because no agreement on an acceptable general definition 
could be reached the term “award” was left undefined in the UNCITRAL Model 
Law1091. Likewise, the ICC working party on dissenting opinions and interim and partial 
awards did not reach a consensus on a general definition of the terms “award”, “interim 
award” and “partial award”1092. National arbitration laws often do not contain an 
express definition of the term “award” and the way in which the term is interpreted 
may vary among jurisdictions1093.  
737. It has been submitted that any decision that finally resolves a substantive issue 
affecting the rights and obligations of the parties is an award. An award concludes the 
dispute as to the specific issue determined in the award, disposes of the parties’ 
respective claims, may be confirmed by recognition and enforcement and may be 
challenged in the courts at the arbitral seat1094. By contrast, procedural orders, i.e. 
decisions of the arbitral tribunal that aim at organising the procedure, relate to technical 
and procedural matters and are rendered without formality or reasoning, are not 
awards1095.  
738. A distinction must be drawn between final, partial and interim awards. While a 
final award resolves all the issues in the arbitration and puts an end to the arbitration 
proceedings rendering the arbitrators functus officio, a partial award only terminates the 
proceedings in respect of the specific issues it decided. However, a partial award is 
“final” in the sense that it is binding on the parties and subject to the means of recourse 
every arbitration law makes applicable to (full) final awards1096.  
                                                 
1090 Article I (2) NYC. 
1091 See supra, paras 408 et seq. 
1092 See LIEBSCHER, p. 115. 
1093  See supra, paras 380 and 394.  
1094 LEW/MISTELIS/KRÖLL, paras 24.12 et seq. See also 
REDFERN/HUNTER/BLACKABY/PARTASIDES, paras 9-05 et seq. LIEBSCHER proposes to 
define an “award” as an act capable of direct challenge before the courts at the arbitral seat (p. 115). 
1095 LEW/MISTELIS/KRÖLL, paras 24-5 et seq. 
1096 LEW/MISTELIS/KRÖLL, paras 24-16 et seq. 
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739. The term “interim award” is often used interchangeably with that of “partial 
award”1097. To avoid confusion Lew, Mistelis and Kröll1098 suggest that the term “partial 
award” should cover all awards that settle specific issues before the arbitrators, 
including issues of jurisdiction, applicable law or liability. By contrast, the term “interim 
award” should only designate awards that are not “final” in the sense that they do not 
finally determine an issue and cannot be challenged independently from the final award 
(e.g. an award making orders for interim relief)1099. They do not terminate any aspect of 
the dispute before the arbitrators.  
740. According to ILA, because no international consensus is likely to emerge in the 
near future regarding the characterisation of awards and procedural orders, the lex arbitri 
of the first arbitration should determine whether a prior decision constitutes an award 
for the purposes of res judicata1100. ILA thereby transposes to arbitral awards the conflict-
of-laws rule generally applicable to national court judgments. While this may be 
acceptable in principle, it is at odds with an autonomous conception of international 
arbitration. Arbitral tribunals should develop a transnational term of “award” capable of 
operating as a res judicata. Arbitrators should not be bound by the lex arbitri of the prior 
award, but may look at it for guidance1101.  
741. Based on the above, it is submitted that all final arbitral awards (full and partial) 
should be considered as an “award” capable of operating as a res judicata.  
2.1.2. A final and binding arbitral award 
742. There is no consensus among national laws as to the moment when awards 
become res judicata. An arbitral award may be res judicata as of the time the award is 
                                                 
1097 LEW/MISTELIS/KRÖLL, para. 24-24. See also 
REDFERN/HUNTER/BLACKABY/PARTASIDES, paras 9-19 et seq.; 
FOUCHARD/GAILLARD/GOLDMAN, para. 1357; RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, pp. 736 et seq.; 
BERGER, p. 588. 
1098 See also FOUCHARD/GAILLARD/GOLDMAN, para. 1359; BERGER, p. 591. 
1099 LEW/MISTELIS/KRÖLL, paras 24-24 et seq. 
1100 ILA, Final Report, para. 18. 
1101 In this sense, see HASCHER who refers to ICC Case No. 6079 of 1992 where an arbitral tribunal, 
based on a broad arbitration agreement, competence-competence, as well as the principle of party 
autonomy held that is was not bound by its own prior (interim) decision (p. 27).  
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rendered1102, signed1103, communicated to the parties1104 or at such time as means of 
recourse can no longer be instituted against the award1105. As was seen above, no 
provision specifying the date when an award becomes res judicata was included in the 
UNCITRAL Model Law due to the lack of agreement as to which date should be 
retained1106. 
743. According to ILA’s Recommendation No. 3.1, an arbitral award should become 
res judicata when it has become final and binding in the country of origin. The final 
report specifies that this means that it can no longer be challenged before the domestic 
courts at the place of arbitration: either no challenge can be brought against the award 
or a challenge has been denied by a final decision of a domestic court at the place of 
arbitration1107. Hence, an award should not be given preclusive and conclusive effects as 
of the moment it constitutes a res judicata pursuant to the lex arbitri (namely when it is 
rendered, communicated to the parties or other), but as of the moment it can no longer 
be challenged before the supervisory courts at the arbitral seat1108.  
744. At first sight, ILA’s recommendation seems at odds with the autonomous 
nature of international arbitration. Accordingly, arbitral tribunals should develop a 
transnational res judicata rule stipulating the moment at which arbitral awards should be 
considered as final for res judicata purposes. This should be the moment at which the 
award can no longer be modified, i.e. once it is binding on the parties and the tribunal 
that rendered it. Drawing a parallel with Article V(1)(e) NYC, this could be the moment 
when the award has become “binding” for purposes of recognition and enforcement. 
The term “binding” under Article V (1)(e) NYC must be given an autonomous 
interpretation in the sense that it is not subject to national law determination. The 
award becomes “binding” at a moment prior to the setting aside proceedings, namely if 
it is not open to appeal on the merits before a judge or an appeal arbitral tribunal1109. If 
                                                 
1102 See, e.g., Article 1476 NCPC. 
1103 See, e.g., Article 824 bis Italian Arbitration Act 2006. 
1104 See, e.g., Article 190 (1) PILA. 
1105 See, e.g., Article 1703 Judicial Code (Belgium). 
1106 See supra, paras 406 et seq.  
1107 ILA, Final Report, para. 31. 
1108 In this sense see also RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, p. 797. 
1109VAN DEN BERG, p. 395 ; LEW/MISTELIS/KRÖLL, para. 26-101; 
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the award may be recognised and enforced once it has become “binding”, then it 
should also have res judicata effects at that moment1110. 
745. However, for reasons of coherence and efficiency, it may be appropriate for 
arbitral tribunals to grant res judicata effects to awards only if they can no longer be 
challenged at the arbitral seat. Where the deadline for bringing annulment proceedings 
has not yet expired or where annulment proceedings have been brought, it may be 
preferable for arbitral tribunals to await the expiration of the deadline or outcome of 
annulment proceedings, rather than to give res judicata effects to a prior award that 
might not stand the test of time.  
2.1.3. A valid arbitral award 
746. According to ILA, awards must not only be final, but also valid pursuant to the 
lex arbitri of the prior arbitration proceedings. Awards set aside at the prior arbitral seat 
will no longer be valid and thus no longer produce conclusive and preclusive effects1111.  
747. If the existence of an arbitral legal order is admitted, then (in theory) an 
annulled award does not lose its validity for purposes of res judicata. Consequently, 
annulled awards may be given res judicata effects in further arbitration proceedings. 
However, for reasons of legal coherence, certainty and efficiency, it generally does not 
appear useful to give res judicata effects to annulled awards in practice. The parties have 
chosen the supervisory courts at the first arbitral seat to review the award. If these 
supervisory courts annul the award it should not be given res judicata effects in 
subsequent arbitration proceedings, as this may lead to irreconcilable decisions which 
may be enforced in parallel in different countries.  
748. Accordingly, in order for an award to operate as a res judicata it should be valid 
in the sense that it was not annulled at the arbitral seat. As will be discussed below, an 
arbitral award should also not be considered as valid for res judicata purposes if it was 
                                                                                                                                         
REDFERN/HUNTER/BLACKABY/PARTASIDES, para. 11-85; RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, pp. 
791 et seq. 
1110 BERGER recommends that the arbitrators reach an agreement with the parties to fix in the award 
the exact moment at which it becomes res judicata (BERGER, pp. 613 et seq.). 
1111 ILA , Final Report, paras 32 et seq. 
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refused recognition or enforcement in the country of the subsequent arbitral seat for 
one of the grounds listed in Article V (1) NYC1112. 
2.1.4. An arbitral tribunal with jurisdiction over the parties and the subject 
matter? 
749. For the reasons discussed below, the question of the jurisdiction of the first 
arbitral tribunal is part of the validity of the prior award, examined in the previous 
section.  
750. As in case of a prior court judgment, where a prior award is invoked before an 
arbitral tribunal the arbitrators must begin by examining their own jurisdiction. The 
tribunal should be able to examine its own jurisdiction if one party contests the 
jurisdiction of the prior tribunal1113. If the arbitral tribunal accepts jurisdiction over the 
dispute, it excludes at the same time the jurisdiction of the prior tribunal.  
751. It is doubtful whether the second arbitral tribunal is the appropriate forum for 
reviewing the jurisdiction of the first tribunal. If one party contests the jurisdiction of 
the first tribunal, it should do so before the supervisory courts of the first arbitral 
seat1114. These courts (not a further arbitral tribunal) have been chosen by the parties to 
review the prior award, including the prior arbitral tribunal’s decision on jurisdiction. In 
addition, arbitral tribunals are generally reluctant to erect themselves as “appeal bodies” 
and to review the awards of other arbitral tribunals1115. Most arbitral tribunals will not 
review a prior tribunal’s assessment of the arbitration agreement, but will await the 
outcome of annulment proceedings.  
752. As will be discussed in further detail below, where the arbitration proceedings 
giving rise to the prior award were held in a different country, the second arbitral 
tribunal may have to predict whether the prior award will be capable of recognition at 
the second place of arbitration1116. This may involve an assessment as to whether the 
                                                 
1112 See infra, para. 801. 
1113 MAYER, Litispendence, connexité et chose jugée dans l’arbitrage international, p. 196. 
1114 BORN, p. 2915, fn 169.  
1115 See, in particular, ICC Case No. 3383, 1979 (supra, paras 445 et seq.). See also MAYER, Litispendence, 
connexité et chose jugée dans l’arbitrage international, p. 196. 
1116 See infra, paras 797 et seq. 
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prior award was based on a valid arbitration agreement pursuant to the law chosen by 
the parties or, in the absence of such choice, the lex arbitri1117. Where the prior award 
was not challenged or where the annulment court denied a lack of jurisidiction, the 
second arbitral tribunal will generally not have to review again the validity of the 
arbitration agreement. However, the second arbitral tribunal may have to determine 
whether the dispute in the first arbitration is arbitrable pursuant to the law of the 
enforcement country, i.e. the arbitral seat of the subsequent arbitration proceedings1118.  
2.1.5. An arbitral award “on the merits” 
753. According to ILA, only full final awards (including consent awards), partial final 
awards and awards on jurisdiction may qualify as res judicata. This means that only 
awards that contain final determinations may operate as a res judicata in subsequent 
arbitration proceedings, whether these determinations are on the merits or on 
jurisdiction1119. By contrast, no res judicata effects should attach to prior provisional 
awards or procedural orders1120. This is in line with the above conclusions regarding the 
definition of an award. As was seen, the term “award” generally describes arbitral 
decisions that finally determine the specific issues with which they deal, covering full 
final and partial final awards as defined above1121.  
754. The above is also corroborated by the survey of arbitration case law conducted 
in chapter three, which has shown that res judicata issues arise primarily in case of a prior 
final (full or partial) award on the merits or on jurisdiction. In addition, the survey has 
highlighted the situations in which a prior award is most likely to give rise to res judicata 
issues in subsequent arbitration proceedings: while res judicata issues may arise with 
respect to prior awards on the merits in an identical case, in most cases the prior award 
on the merits was rendered in a slightly different case. Furthermore, on several 
                                                 
1117 Article V (1)(a) NYC. 
1118 Article V (2) (a) NYC. 
1119 ILA, Final Report, para. 19. 
1120 ILA, Final Report, paras 19 and 22. The ILA recommendations on res judicata do not apply to awards 
regarding interim measures. Admittedly, awards granting interim relief can never be final and conclusive 
in the sense that they may be rescinded or modified by the arbitral tribunal in case of a change in 
circumstances. However, as in case of national court decisions on interim relief, it appears that awards 
regarding interim measures should have some temporary res judicata effects (see supra, paras 677 et seq.).  
1121 See supra, paras 737 et seq. 
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occasions arbitral tribunals had to decide whether they should be bound by prior 
positive or negative decisions on jurisdiction. Finally, it was seen that arbitral tribunals 
had to determine whether and to what extent they should be bound by their own prior 
partial awards. 
755. It is necessary to further investigate which type of prior award should be able to 
operate as a res judicata in a subsequent arbitration, i.e. which type of prior award should 
be considered as rendered “on the merits” for purposes of res judicata.  
2.1.5.1. Prior full final award in an identical case 
756. A prior full final award in an identical case will be considered as “on the merits” 
for res judicata purposes. Such awards are clearly covered by Article III NYC.  
757. As in case of prior judgments, the situation where a prior full final award was 
rendered on the merits in exactly the same case should be rare and may typically arise 
where one party contests the jurisdiction of the prior tribunal. Hence, the central 
question is whether the subsequent arbitral tribunal should be entitled to determine its 
own jurisdiction and re-arbitrate the dispute if it finds that it has jurisdiction over the 
parties and the subject matter. This will necessarily entail an implicit ruling on the 
jurisdiction of the prior tribunal.  
758. As suggested earlier, arbitral tribunals will generally not review the prior arbitral 
tribunal’s jurisdiction1122. Unless the parties have waived the res judicata effects of the 
prior award, arbitral tribunals will most likely refuse to re-open the case where the prior 
tribunal has accepted jurisdiction and has rendered a full final award on the merits in an 
identical case.  
759. Reconsidering the dispute in such circumstances would generally be contrary to 
principles of procedural efficiency and economy. It may be a waste of valuable 
resources if the prior award was rendered (or recognised) in the country where the 
subsequent arbitral tribunal has its seat; the second award may well be set aside if it is 
irreconcilable with the prior award. In this case, it will also not be recognised and 
                                                 
1122 See supra, para. 750. 
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enforced in most other countries.  
760. It may be argued that where a prior award was rendered on the merits in an 
identical case, then a new arbitral tribunal cannot decide the same dispute based on the 
same arbitration agreement. The arbitration agreement is not valid or operable 
anymore1123. The exception is where the parties have waived the res judicata effects of the 
prior award and agreed to resubmit the dispute to arbitration1124. However, in the 
absence of such a waiver, a new award would be considered as rendered without 
jurisdictional basis and thus risk being set aside at the arbitral seat and refused 
recognition and enforcement pursuant to Article V (1) (a) NYC. 
761. This argument seems valid only if the arbitration agreement gave jurisdiction to 
the prior arbitral tribunal. If the subsequent arbitral tribunal considers that it has 
jursidiction over the parties and the dispute based on the arbitration agreement in 
question, then this arbitration agreement cannot be considered as having been “used 
up” by the prior tribunal. The question therefore boils down to whether the subsequent 
arbitral tribunal is bound by the prior tribunal’s decision on jurisdiction. This will be 
discussed in further detail below1125.  
762. At this point it may be noted that if the arbitrators consider that they have 
jurisdiction over the parties and the dispute and that it would be appropriate for them 
to exercise this jurisdiction, then they should in principle be allowed to do so, taking the 
prior award into consideration to avoid a waste of resources and conflicting decisions. 
This result flows from the fact that arbitral tribunals are not interchangeable, even 
between each other.  
                                                 
1123 See MAYER, Litispendence, connexité et chose jugée dans l’arbitrage international, p. 196. See also 
SCHLOSSER, Conflits entre jugement judiciaire et arbitrage, p. 374. According to SCHLOSSER, the prior 
(national court) decision must have become res judicata.  
1124 In this case it may be argued that the parties have concluded a new arbitration agreement. See PCA, 
The Government of Sudan v The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army, Final Award, 22 July 2009, paras 450 
et seq. (“Whatever the [res judicata] status of the ABC Experts’ Report, the Arbitration Agreement 
concluded by the Parties in 2008 had the effect of reopening questions that had been accepted as ‘final 
and binding,’ thus novating the issues for decision in accordance with the contingencies in Article 2. 
When both Parties consented to this arbitration, that consent extended to all the matters provided under 
Article 2 of the Arbitration Agreement, and had the effect of re-opening the ABC Experts’ Report to 
‘excess of mandate’ review under Article 2(a) and a potential new delimitation exercise under Article 
2(c)”). 
1125 See infra, paras 770 et seq. 
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763. Considerations of legal coherence, certainty and efficiency will frequently 
militate against reconsidering the dispute. A situation where it might be appropriate for 
an arbitral tribunal to reconsider a dispute is where the previous award is a default 
award. In this case the subsequent tribunal must be careful not to violate a party’s right 
to due process (in particular, its right to a “day in court”) by refusing to decide the 
dispute brought before it by the party who failed to participate in the prior arbitration. 
In general, a party should not be under an obligation to participate in an arbitration if it 
considers the arbitral tribunal to lack jurisdiction. However, default awards are generally 
acceptable provided each party was given an opportunity to present its case and to reply 
to the arguments of the other party. If there is evidence that copies of all notices and 
submissions were sent to the parties in time and by recorded delivery and the defaulting 
party simply refused to participate, then the award will normally be acceptable1126. If the 
default award was not challenged by the defaulting party or was upheld by the 
supervisory courts of the arbitral seat, then a subsequent arbitral tribunal should 
generally not reconsider the dispute1127. 
2.1.5.2. Prior full final award in a different case  
764. As in case of a prior national court judgment, a prior award that finally disposes 
of the merits of a dispute in a case that overlaps to a certain degree with the one before 
the second tribunal may generally be considered as “on the merits” for res judicata 
purposes.  
765. As in the first part of this chapter, the question concerns the scope of res judicata 
effects that arbitral tribunals can or should afford to prior awards. It will be examined 
in further detail below1128.  
2.1.5.3. Prior partial final award  
766. Partial final awards that finally determine specific issues before the arbitrators 
and can be challenged before the supervisory courts of the arbitral seat are generally 
                                                 
1126 LEW/MISTELIS/KRÖLL, para. 24-32.  
1127 See BORN, pp. 2913 et seq. 
1128 See infra, paras 775 et seq.  
Transnational Res Judicata Principles for International Arbitral Tribunals 
255 
 
recognised as having res judicata effects in the same manner as full final awards1129. As 
full final awards, they are covered by Article III NYC and must therefore be recognised 
as binding.  
767. The above should hold true whether the res judicata effect of a prior partial 
award is invoked before a different arbitral tribunal or before the same tribunal. This 
being said, the principle that a partial award has res judicata effect before the tribunal that 
rendered it might give rise to problems in practice. In the debate of 7 February 2001 on 
the res judicata effects of arbitral awards, Reymond noted that problems may arise, for 
example, if the arbitrators realise at a later stage in the proceedings that they did not 
consider certain issues of fact or law important to the decision in the prior partial 
award. In such a situation, arbitrators will seek to limit the scope of the res judicata effect 
of the prior partial award as much as possible. Hascher confirmed that on several 
occasions arbitral tribunals have reverted to “des acrobaties qui sont quand même difficiles à 
accepter”1130 to avoid the res judicata effect of their own partial awards. While the arbitral 
tribunals stated that they were merely interpreting their partial award, in reality they 
were reconsidering the prior decision1131.  
768. The interests of finality, efficiency and legal certainty appear to outweigh these 
difficulties and they should therefore not give rise to an exception to the res judicata 
effect of prior partial awards. Difficulties may be mitigated if arbitral tribunals follow a 
cautious approach with regard to the rendering of partial awards. Where one party 
requests a partial award against the will of the other party, arbitral tribunals may prefer 
to render a single final award or comply with the party’s request only after receiving the 
submissions of both parties and giving each party an opportunity to explain its 
position1132. 
769. A widely accepted exception to res judicata exists where a prior award has been 
procured by fraud. As was seen earlier, in Antoine Biloune et al v Ghana Investments Centre et 
                                                 
1129 BORN, p. 2913; SHEPPARD, The Scope and Res Judicata Effect of Arbitral Awards, p. 279; 
LEW/MISTELIS/KRÖLL, para. 24-17. 
1130 HASCHER, p. 39. 
1131 HASCHER, pp. 38 et seq.  
1132 REDFERN/HUNTER/BLACKABY/PARTASIDES, para. 9-28. See also BERGER, p. 592. 
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al the UNCITRAL tribunal, applying customary principles of international law, held 
that it would exceptionally reconsider its prior partial award if it was shown by credible 
evidence that the tribunal had been the victim of fraud and that its determinations in 
the previous award were based on false testimony1133. 
2.1.5.4. Prior award on jurisdiction 
770. The question whether an arbitral tribunal’s decision on jurisdiction may operate 
as a res judicata in subsequent arbitral proceedings merits special attention.  
771. The question whether the arbitral tribunal’s decision on jurisdiction may be 
considered as a genuine award is disputed among scholars1134. However, several leading 
commentators affirm that both positive and negative arbitral decisions on jurisdiction 
constitute “genuine arbitral awards”1135 and are thus capable of operating as a res judicata 
in further arbitration proceedings. There is no reason why awards on jurisdiction should 
not be entitled to the same res judicata effects as other arbitral awards1136. As awards they 
must also be recognised as binding by national courts pursuant to Article III NYC.  
772. This is also the position taken by ILA who cautiously submits that the 
recommendations on res judicata and arbitration “do not exclude” giving res judicata 
effects to awards on jurisdiction. A negative jurisdictional award on jurisdiction entails a 
final decision that there is no valid arbitration agreement covering the dispute or the 
parties in question. Conversely, a positive jurisdictional award finally decides that such 
                                                 
1133 See supra, paras 479 et seq. 
1134 According to BOO, arbitral decisions on jurisdiction do not constitute awards under the UNCITRAL 
Model Law because they cannot be challenged under Article 34 ML. However, BOO argues that a 
tribunal’s negative ruling on jurisdiction under Article 16 ML is final and binding, but only with regard to 
the particular arbitral proceedings in which the decision was rendered. For BOO, positive rulings on 
jurisdiction cannot be considered as awards. Although BOO does not state this expressly, he appears to 
suggest that the tribunal’s positive ruling on jurisdiction should be considered final and binding, at least 
once upheld by the supervisory courts (BOO, pp. 128 et seq.). JONES submits that a tribunal’s decision 
on jurisdiction can never be final and binding, because it can always be reviewed by the supervisory 
courts at the arbitral seat. In addition, the courts in the country of enforcement are also entitled to review 
an arbitral tribunal’s decision on jurisdiction pursuant to Article V (1)(a) NYC. The only situation where 
an arbitral tribunal’s decision on jurisdiction is final and binding is where the parties have concluded an 
ad hoc agreement to arbitrate an existing dispute about jurisdiction which expressly gives the arbitrators 
the sole jurisdiction to decide questions of jurisdiction arising under the agreement (JONES, p. 63). 
1135 FOUCHARD/GAILLARD/GOLDMAN, para. 1357. 
1136 BORN, pp. 2914 et seq.; LEW/MISTELIS/KRÖLL, para. 24-24 ; SHEPPARD, The Scope and Res 
Judicata Effect of Arbitral Awards, p. 278; POUDRET, Concluding Remarks on Relationship Between State Courts 
and Arbitral Tribunals, p. 156. 
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an agreement exists. The mere fact that these jurisdictional awards may be challenged 
before the supervisory courts has no impact on their capacity to operate as res judicata. If 
the jurisdictional award is annulled it will not be considered a valid award and may not 
operate as a res judicata1137. 
773.  It has already been argued above that because arbitral tribunals are not 
interchangeable between each other, they should in principle be allowed to rule on their 
jurisdiction if seised of a dispute, despite the existence of a prior arbitral award in an 
identical or related case1138. Because the arbitrators owe a primary duty to the parties, 
they are entitled to determine independently whether and to what extent they have 
jurisdiction over the particular dispute before them. They generally must exercise this 
jurisdiction if there is a valid arbitration agreement conferring jurisdiction upon the 
arbitral tribunal. Likewise, there appears to be no reason to treat prior awards on 
jurisdiction differently to prior judgments on jurisdiction. Accordingly, arbitral tribunals 
should generally not be bound by a prior decision on jurisdiction. Giving due 
consideration to the jurisdictional ruling of the prior arbitral tribunal, the subsequent 
tribunal should be entitled to reach its own conclusions regarding the existence and 
scope of its jurisdiction1139.  
774. It was seen above that one central consideration for denying res judicata effects 
to a prior national court ruling on the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal is to protect 
international arbitration against national court interventions the purpose of which is to 
frustrate the arbitration agreement1140. This concern to protect the arbitration process 
also exists where the prior decision on jurisdiction was rendered by another arbitral 
tribunal. A party may initiate arbitration proceedings in order to sabotage another 
arbitration. Arguably, the concern may be less strong as in case of prior court decisions 
on jurisdiction. Considerations of putting an end to the dispute, avoiding the wasteful 
duplication of proceedings and contradictory awards may thus prevail in most cases. 
Accordingly, where a prior arbitral tribunal has rendered an award on the existence and 
                                                 
1137 ILA, Final Report, para. 20. 
1138 See supra, para. 762. 
1139 This appears to be the approach followed by Swiss arbitration law (in the lis pendens context) in Art. 
186 para. 1bis PILA. 
1140 See supra, paras 668 et seq. 
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validity of the arbitration agreement and this award was not challenged or was upheld 
by the supervisory courts at the arbitral seat, a subsequent arbitral tribunal will likely 
afford preclusive effects to the prior award and not reconsider the issue of jurisdiction.  
2.2. The Scope of Res Judicata Effects to be Afforded to Prior Arbitral Awards 
in Arbitration Proceedings 
775. The ILA Recommendations provide for broad res judicata effects of awards, 
covering claim preclusion, issue preclusion and abuse of process. The res judicata effects 
of an award also cover its underlying reasoning1141. Recommendation No. 4 states: 
“An arbitral award has conclusive and preclusive effects as to: 
4.1 determinations and relief contained in its dispositive 
part as well as in all reasoning necessary thereto; 
4.2 issues of fact or law which have actually been 
arbitrated and determined by it, provided any such 
determination was essential or fundamental to the 
dispositive part of the arbitral award; and 
4.3 a claim, cause of action or issue of fact or law which 
could and should have been raised in prior 
proceedings resulting in the award, provided the 
raising of any such new claim, cause of action or 
new issue of fact or law amounts to an abuse of 
process or procedural unfairness”. 
776. This position is also taken by Born, according to whom such broad common 
law-style res judicata effects of awards are in line with the expectations of the parties 
regarding finality, as well as the objectives of the arbitral process1142. According to 
Veeder, while awards should give rise to a plea of issue estoppel, it is highly unlikely 
that the abuse of process doctrine may apply in international arbitration1143. Finally, 
Mayer submits that awards may give rise to claim preclusion and abuse of process in 
subsequent arbitral proceedings. The doctrine of issue estoppel may apply in limited 
                                                 
1141 ILA, Final Report, paras 51 et seq.  
1142 BORN, pp. 2894 and 2912. 
1143 VEEDER, pp. 75 and 77. 
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circumstances only1144.  
777. The lack of interchangeability between arbitral tribunals calls for a certain 
limitation of the res judicata effects of awards, akin to the effects afforded to prior 
judgments in international arbitration. Accordingly, much of what was said with regard 
to the scope of res judicata effects to be afforded to prior judgments applies mutatis 
mutandis with respect to prior awards1145. However, for the reasons discussed below, it is 
contended that issue preclusive effects may be justified where a specific issue was finally 
and necessarily determined in a prior partial award. Reasons underlying a prior award 
should only be given res judicata effects where a prior partial award is relied upon before 
the arbitral tribunal that rendered it. 
778. As in case of prior judgments, the question of claim preclusion will most likely 
arise in a situation where the prior and subsequent arbitral proceedings overlap with 
regard to certain issues. Where the prior tribunal finally decided a specific question X as 
the main issue in the arbitration, the subsequent arbitral tribunal before which question 
X arises as a preliminary issue should be bound by the prior tribunal’s award.  
779. Conversely, where the prior arbitral tribunal rendered a decision on a 
preliminary issue X and this issue arises again in the subsequent arbitration as a main 
issue, the second arbitral tribunal should not be bound by the prior tribunal’s 
determinations, even if the preliminary issue determined in the first proceedings was 
essential to the first award. The subsequent arbitral tribunal has the greater interest in 
deciding question X. The parties wanted to submit question X to the subsequent 
tribunal for final determination and this will should be respected1146.  
780. The same should apply where the prior arbitral tribunal decided the preliminary 
issue X and the same preliminary issue arises again before a subsequent arbitral tribunal 
seised of a different claim between the same parties. As in case of prior judgements, the 
subsequent arbitral tribunal must be allowed to decide the dispute brought before it 
                                                 
1144 MAYER, Litispendence, connexité et chose jugée dans l’arbitrage international, pp. 195 et seq. 
1145 See supra, paras 688 et seq. 
1146 This solution was adopted in Case No. 1491 of 1992 before the Chamber of National and 
International Arbitration of Milan. See also TRAIN, Les contrats liés devant l’arbitre du commerce international, 
para. 636 and para. 682, fn 34. 
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based on its own reasons and convictions. For reasons of procedural efficiency and to 
avoid contradictory decisions on preliminary issues, the subsequent arbitral tribunal 
should take the prior tribunal’s determinations into account and adopt them as far as 
possible.  
781.  It emerges from the above that the res judicata effects of an arbitral award 
should in principle not extend to the award’s reasons. This is in line with the presumed 
intentions of the parties. When submitting a particular dispute to arbitration, the parties 
generally do not agree to be bound by an arbitral tribunal’s reasoning, but only by the 
tribunal’s determination of their dispute in the award. Hence, only the award, but not its 
underlying reasoning should operate as a res judicata in subsequent arbitration 
proceedings. It is via this reasoning that the prior tribunal reached its conclusions with 
regard to the dispute submitted to it. While the subsequent arbitral tribunal should take 
this reasoning into account, it should have the same authority to decide the particular 
dispute before it as the prior tribunal, based on its own reasons and opinions1147.  
782. For the reasons discussed in the first part of this chapter, it appears preferable 
not to impose the application of issue preclusion principles in international arbitration, 
but rather to give arbitral tribunals the authority to adopt or depart from rulings on 
particular issues necessarily and finally decided in a prior award’s underlying 
reasoning1148.  
783. This conclusion is not altered by the fact that some arbitral tribunals have 
afforded res judicata effects to a prior award’s reasoning. Importantly, in these cases the 
arbitral tribunals gave res judicata effects to a prior award’s reasons because this was 
provided for by the law governing res judicata. In ICC Cases Nos 2745 & 2762 of 1977 
the arbitral tribunal granted res judicata effects to the prior award’s underlying reasoning 
in accordance with French and Belgian law. The tribunal stated that it would not have 
been entitled to give res judicata effects to the prior award’s reasons if German law had 
governed res judicata1149. In ICC Case No. 7438 of 1994 the arbitral tribunal, applying the 
procedural law of the canton of Zurich, strictly adhered to the rule that the res judicata 
                                                 
1147 See MAYER, Litispendence, connexité et chose jugée dans l’arbitrage international, p. 198.  
1148 See supra, paras 698 et seq. 
1149 See supra, paras 474 et seq. 
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effect of a decision attaches only to its dispositif. In conformity with Swiss law, the sole 
arbitrator referred to the reasoning only to determine the meaning and scope of the first 
award’s dispositive part1150.  
784. The general exclusion of issue preclusion principles should suffer an exception 
where a particular issue was determined in a prior partial award. Where the parties 
wanted to have a specific issue settled in a partial award, they also agreed to be bound 
by the partial award. A subsequent arbitral tribunal should respect the parties’ intention 
to be bound by the partial award by affording it res judicata effect1151. By allowing the 
prior tribunal to finally decide the specific issue in a partial award, the parties have taken 
the matter out of the hands of the subsequent tribunal.  
785. The same should apply where only one of the parties requested the rendering of 
the partial award and the prior tribunal granted this request after giving each party the 
opportunity to explain its position. It appears that policy considerations of coherence, 
efficiency and finality should prevail over the subsequent arbitral tribunal’s interest in 
reconsidering the particular issue. A party dissatisfied with the partial award should seek 
revision before the supervisory courts at the arbitral seat. If the partial award is not 
challenged or upheld by the supervisory courts, the subsequent arbitral tribunal before 
which the prior partial award is invoked should afford it res judicata effect.  
786. This being said, the prior partial award’s res judicata effects should be limited to 
its dispositive part. The general rule that an award’s underlying reasons do not become 
res judicata should also apply with regard to partial awards. There generally appear to be 
no reasons to treat partial awards differently to full final awards in this respect.  
787. An exception to this rule seems only justified where a partial award is invoked 
before the arbitral tribunal that rendered it. In this situation, the argument as to the lack 
of interchangeability between different arbitral tribunals obviously cannot justify a 
narrow approach toward res judicata. The policy considerations of procedural efficiency, 
finality and fairness, as well as of legal coherence and certainty should all prevail over 
                                                 
1150 See supra, para. 476. 
1151 In this sense, see MAYER, Litispendence, connexité et chose jugée dans l’arbitrage international, p. 199. 
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the arbitral tribunal’s or a party’s interest to reconsider a specific issue decided in a prior 
partial award1152. Likewise, it would be unjust to the parties if an arbitral tribunal was 
bound by the decision taken in its partial award, but could later contradict the reasons it 
has given itself as the necessary foundation for that partial award1153. Accordingly, an 
arbitral tribunal should give res judicata effects to its own partial awards and these effects 
should cover the awards’ underlying reasons1154.  
788. Finally, for the reasons discussed in the first part of this chapter, the cautious 
approach to abuse of process suggested by ILA in Recommendation No. 5 should be 
adopted by international arbitral tribunals faced with a prior award1155. Subsequent 
arbitral tribunals should be mindful not to deprive a party of its right to arbitrate a 
particular question at issue that has not already been decided in a prior award. In 
international arbitration, the principle of party autonomy gives the parties wide 
discretion in determining their strategies. Several reasons may justify why a party did 
not raise a certain claim, cause of action or issue in prior arbitration proceedings. This 
was expressed in pertinent terms in ILA’s final report: 
“Costs, psychological influences, relational elements, cross-
cultural considerations, persuasiveness, political constraints and 
other aspects may be responsible for not instituting certain 
claims or for not raising certain causes of action or issues of 
fact or law, and caution is in order to avoid res judicata 
amounting to a patronizing review of what parties and counsel 
ought to have done in managing their case”1156.  
789. At the same time, it can be argued persuasively that the principle of party 
autonomy should not entitle a party to hold back claims, causes of action and issues for 
re-arbitration in subsequent arbitration proceedings that it could and should have raised 
in good faith in prior arbitration proceedings. The principle of good faith in 
proceedings requires the parties to an international arbitration to raise all claims that are 
covered by the parties’ arbitration agreement and all causes of action and issues related 
                                                 
1152 As was seen above, it is admitted that arbitral tribunals may exceptionally reconsider their prior partial 
awards if there has been fraud on the tribunal (see supra, para. 769). 
1153 MAYER, Litispendence, connexité et chose jugée dans l’arbitrage international, pp. 200 et seq. 
1154 This solution was adopted by the arbitrator in ICC Case No. 3267, 1984 (see supra, para. 478). 
1155 See supra, paras 700 et seq. 
1156 ILA, Final Report, para. 60. 
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to the claim brought in the arbitration as early as possible. Allowing the parties to hold 
back certain claims, causes of action and issues covered by the arbitration agreement 
would encourage technical pleadings and multiple proceedings which would be contrary 
to the objective of international arbitration to provide for a speedy, final and efficient 
resolution of the parties’ dispute in a single forum1157.  
2.3. Requirements for the Application of the Res Judicata Doctrine 
790. As was seen above, the requirements that must be met for a prior award to have 
res judicata effect in subsequent arbitration proceedings are set out in ILA’s 
Recommendation No. 3 according to which  
“[a]n arbitral award has conclusive and preclusive effects if: 
3.1 it has become final and binding in the country of 
origin and there is no impediment to recognition in 
the country of the seat of the subsequent 
arbitration; 
3.2 it has decided on or disposed of a claim for relief 
which is sought or is being reargued in further 
arbitration proceedings; 
3.3 it is based upon a cause of action which is invoked 
in further arbitration proceedings; and  
3.4 it has been rendered between the same parties”. 
791. The following analysis will briefly consider the triple identity test in the situation 
where the prior decision relied upon is an arbitral award (2.3.1.). It will then examine 
whether a prior award must be capable of recognition in the country of the arbitral seat 
of the subsequent arbitration in order to operate as a res judicata (2.3.2.). The 
requirement as to the finality of the prior award in its country of origin has already been 
examined above1158.  
2.3.1. The triple identity test 
792. The rationales underlying the triple identity test are the same regardless of the 
                                                 
1157 BORN, pp. 2893 et seq.; HASCHER, p. 26. 
1158 See supra, paras 742 et seq. 
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nature of the prior decision1159. Therefore, the considerations made above with regard 
to the identity test in case of prior judgments apply mutatis mutandis to the situation 
where the res judicata effect of a prior award is invoked in further arbitration 
proceedings1160.  
793. It was argued by Brekoulakis that, because of the limited possibilities to join 
related parties in arbitration proceedings, a prior award should have certain preclusive 
and conclusive effects also on related third parties, i.e. parties who have not signed the 
arbitration agreement nor taken part in the prior arbitration process, but who have a 
close contractual link to the parties in the prior arbitration1161. According to 
Brekoulakis, a third party should not be precluded from bringing its claims in a separate 
arbitration against one of the parties in the prior proceedings. Further, the prior award 
cannot be enforced by or against the third party. However, a related third party should 
be bound in subsequent arbitration proceedings by final determinations of legal and 
factual issues that are common to both proceedings. Brekoulakis proposes to give 
arbitral tribunals a discretionary power to decide whether a related third party should be 
bound by the legal and factual determinations of the prior tribunal1162.  
794.  For the reasons discussed above, arbitral tribunals should in principle not be 
bound by the issues determined in the reasoning of a prior award, even if these 
determinations were essential to the award1163. This general rule applies with even 
greater force where the subsequent arbitration involves a related third party, who did 
not participate in the first arbitration and, therefore, did not have an opportunity to 
express its opinion on the factual and legal issues decided in the prior award. Hence, a 
related third party generally should not be bound by the factual and legal 
determinations made in a prior award between other parties1164.  
795. However, although a related third party is not bound by a prior award to which 
                                                 
1159 See supra, para. 707. 
1160 See supra, paras 706 et seq. 
1161 BREKOULAKIS, pp. 189 et seq. 
1162 BREKOULAKIS, pp. 198 et seq. 
1163 See supra, paras 779 et seq. 
1164 In this sense, see also MAYER, Litispendence, connexité et chose jugée dans l’arbitrage international, pp. 199 et 
seq. 
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it was not a party, it may nevertheless have to respect the legal situation created by the 
prior award. This has been submitted by Mayer, invoking the concept known in French 
law as “opposabilité aux tiers”. This means that a party in an arbitration may have to 
respect an award rendered between other parties in a prior arbitration that finally 
decides the rights and obligations of those parties. The prior award has res judicata 
effects only between the parties to the prior arbitration. However, the parties to the 
prior award should be allowed to rely on the award in the subsequent arbitration against 
the related third party to the extent that it finally determines the legal situation between 
them. Conversely, the third related party should also be allowed to invoke the 
conclusive effects of the prior award in the subsequent arbitration against the parties to 
the prior award1165.  
796. The application of the “opposabilité” principle seems appropriate. If a prior award 
finally decided the legal situation between A and B, a subsequent arbitral tribunal seized 
of a related dispute between A, B and C (or only A and C) should be bound by that 
prior award if the legal situation between A and B arises before it again as a preliminary 
issue. The prior tribunal had a greater interest in determining the legal situation between 
A and B than the subsequent tribunal. The same should apply where the legal situation 
between A and B was finally decided in a prior judgment.  
2.3.2. Is the prior award capable of recognition in the country of the arbitral seat 
of the subsequent arbitration? 
797. According to ILA Recommendation No. 3.1 a prior award may only operate as 
a res judicata in subsequent arbitration proceedings if it is capable of recognition in the 
country of the arbitral seat of the subsequent arbitration.  
798. This requirement is at odds with the conception of international arbitration as 
an arbitral legal order. Recognition entails the transfer of a decision from one legal 
order to another. If there is an arbitral legal order then there is no such transfer. The 
prior award, even if rendered in a country other than the country of the subsequent 
arbitral seat, is not transferred from one legal order to another. Therefore, the question 
                                                 
1165 MAYER, Litispendence, connexité et chose jugée dans l’arbitrage international, p. 200. 
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of recognition does not arise1166.  
799. The requirement is also at odds with the reluctance among international arbitral 
tribunals to scrutinise awards rendered by other arbitral tribunals. It has been suggested 
that arbitral tribunals do not have the right to verify whether a prior award is capable of 
recognition in the country of the arbitral seat of the subsequent arbitration. Examining 
the validity of the prior award would be outside the subsequent tribunal’s jurisdiction. If 
the prior award was not challenged or was upheld by the supervisory courts at the prior 
arbitral seat, then the subsequent arbitral tribunal must afford the award res judicata 
effects1167.  
800. However, where a request for recognition of the prior award has already been 
made before the courts of the arbitral seat of the subsequent tribunal, the latter may 
deem it appropriate to await the decision of the enforcement court1168. If the 
enforcement court grants recognition and enforcement to the prior award, the 
subsequent tribunal should respect its res judicata effects and refuse to reconsider the 
dispute to the extent that it was decided in the prior award. 
801. If the enforcement court refuses to recognise the prior award the question 
arises whether the subsequent arbitral tribunal should refuse to grant res judicata effect to 
the prior award and, hence, reconsider the matter. The subsequent arbitral tribunal 
should in principle not be bound by the decision of the enforcement court. The answer 
to the question whether it should give res judicata effect to an award that was refused 
recognition should depend on the reason for which recognition and enforcement was 
refused. If it was refused for one of the grounds listed in Article V (1) NYC, the 
subsequent arbitral tribunal may prefer not to give res judicata effects to the prior award. 
Where one of these grounds is present, the prior award may also have been annulled in 
its country of origin. It is also possible that the prior award will not be recognised in 
other Contracting States to the New York Convention. Therefore, because it is possible 
                                                 
1166 HASCHER, p. 28. 
1167 Commentary to ICC Case No. 3383, 1979, p. 398. Landolt states that arbitral tribunals are not bound 
by the recognition requirements set out in the New York Convention; these only apply to state courts 
(LANDOLT, para. 8-15). 
1168 MAYER, Litispendence, connexité et chose jugée dans l’arbitrage international, pp. 202 et seq.  
Transnational Res Judicata Principles for International Arbitral Tribunals 
267 
 
that the prior award will not have effects in a majority of countries, the subsequent 
arbitral tribunal should not afford it res judicata effect1169. In this case the award will not 
be “valid” for res judicata purposes1170. 
802. However, where the prior award was not annulled in its country of origin and 
was refused recognition for one of the grounds listed in Article V (2) NYC, the 
subsequent arbitral tribunal may decide to still give res judicata effect to the prior award. 
Article V (2) NYC entitles the enforcement court to refuse recognition and 
enforcement of an award if the subject matter in the arbitration was not arbitrable 
according to the law of the country where recognition or enforcement is sought, or if 
the award is contrary to the public policy of that country. Because these grounds 
concern only the law of the enforcement country and, hence, local particularities, the 
award may still be recognised and enforced in other Contracting States of the New 
York Convention. This means that the award is not generally deprived of its 
effectiveness, but only in the country where the subsequent arbitral tribunal has its seat. 
Accordingly, where a prior award was refused recognition in the country of the arbitral 
seat for one of the grounds listed in Article V (2) NYC, the subsequent arbitral tribunal 
should make an assessment as to whether the prior award can still be recognised and 
enforced in other countries. If this is the case, it may decide to give res judicata effect to 
the prior award, always making sure that its award will not be set aside for granting res 
judicata effect to an award that is contrary to Article V (2) NYC at the arbitral seat.  
2.4. Conclusion 
803. Awards are generally recognised to have res judicata effects. Applying the 
transnational law method, arbitral tribunals should determine autonomously the type of 
awards capable of operating as a res judicata in subsequent arbitral proceedings. This 
should apply to full and partial awards that finally resolve a specific issue affecting the 
rights and obligations of the parties. These awards can generally be challenged before 
the supervisory courts at the arbitral seat, as well as recognised and enforced under the 
New York Convention.  
                                                 
1169 See BORN, pp. 2924-2929. 
1170 See supra, paras 746 et seq.  
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804. In order to become res judicata, awards must be final, in the sense that they can 
no longer be modified by the tribunal that rendered it. While arbitral tribunals should 
not necessarily have to wait until the award can no longer be challenged to afford it res 
judicata effects, this may be preferable. Finally, all final arbitral awards (full and partial) 
should be considered as “on the merits” for res judicata purposes. While arbitral tribunals 
should generally be entitled to determine their own jurisdiction, affording preclusive 
effects to prior jurisdictional awards will likely be appropriate in most cases.  
805. Arbitral awards that qualify as res judicata may give rise to claim preclusive effects 
in subsequent arbitrations. In general, these claim preclusive effects should not extend 
to the award’s underlying reasoning. Consequently, awards should not give rise to issue 
preclusive effects. Final determinations of specific issues that were essential to the prior 
(full) final award may only have res judicata effects in subsequent arbitration proceedings 
where they were decided in a partial award. While an award’s reasoning generally has no 
res judicata effect, a partial award’s underlying reasoning should be binding on the 
tribunal that rendered it. If an arbitral tribunal should in general not be bound by a 
prior award’s underlying reasoning, it should in any case give due consideration to these 
reasons in order to avoid inconsistent awards.  
806. Furthermore, claims, causes of action and issues that were not raised and 
decided in a prior award should be covered by the award’s res judicata effects, if (and 
only if) the raising of such claim, cause of action or issue in the subsequent arbitration 
would constitute an abuse of process or procedural unfairness.  
807. With regard to the requirements that must be met for an award to operate as a 
res judicata, arbitral tribunals should apply the triple identity test to verify that the prior 
award involved the same parties and issues. Where the prior award has been refused 
recognition or enforcement in the country of the subsequent arbitration for one of the 
grounds listed in Article V (1) NYC, the subsequent arbitral tribunal may prefer not to 
give the award any res judicata effects. 
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3. TRANSNATIONAL RES JUDICATA PRINCIPLES FOR INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS 
808. In light of the above findings, we may now attempt to formulate transnational 
res judicata principles for international arbitrators to help them determine the res judicata 
effects of prior judgments and awards in arbitration proceedings. Using the ILA 
recommendations on res judicata and arbitration as a model, we adapted them in 
accordance with the findings made above.  
809. The res judicata principles with respect to judgments are largely identical to the 
principles concerning awards. However, for reasons of clarity, they are considered 
separately.  
3.1. Transnational Res Judicata Principles with Respect to Prior National 
Court Judgments 
“1. To promote efficiency and finality of international 
commercial arbitration, arbitral awards national court 
judgments should shall have conclusive and preclusive 
effects in further arbitral proceedings. 
Comment: As an exception to the general rule, to strengthen 
the arbitral tribunal’s competence-competence, prior court 
rulings on the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal should not 
have res judicata effect in subsequent arbitration proceedings. 
However, arbitral tribunals shall take such prior jurisdictional 
rulings into consideration to avoid positive or negative 
conflicts of jurisdiction.  
Likewise, a judgment granting interim relief should not be 
binding in the subsequent arbitration on the party that did not 
request the relief. 
2. The conclusive and preclusive effects of arbitral awards 
national court judgments in further arbitral proceedings 
set forth below need not necessarily be governed by 
national law and may should shall be governed by 
transnational rules applicable to international commercial 
arbitration. 
Comment: To ensure that arbitral tribunals will apply 
transnational res judicata principles it is preferable to erase the 
reference to national laws. However, arbitral tribunals may 
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have to consult the law of the country where the judgment was 
rendered to verify the judgment’s res judicata status. This may be 
necessary, in particular, to determine whether the judgment was 
rendered by a judicial court or tribunal and whether it has 
become final and binding for res judicata purposes. National 
laws should be referred to for guidance only.  
3. An arbitral award A national court judgment has 
conclusive and preclusive effects in further arbitral 
proceedings if: 
3.1 it has become final and binding in the country of 
origin and there is no impediment to recognition in the 
country of the place of the subsequent arbitration and was 
rendered in conformity with Article II (3) of the New York 
Convention and due process principles; 
Comment: This refers to the “validity” requirement. Where a 
judgment is capable of recognition in the country of the arbitral 
seat, it will generally also be “valid”. However, the opposite 
may not always be true. It may be preferable to replace the 
requirement of a judgment capable of recognition in the 
country of the arbitral seat by the validity requirement to take 
account of the autonomous nature of international commercial 
arbitration. 
3.2 it has decided on or disposed of a claim for relief 
which is sought or is being reargued in the further 
arbitration proceedings; 
3.3 it is based upon a cause of action which is invoked in 
the further arbitration proceedings or which forms the 
basis for the subsequent arbitral proceedings; and 
3.4 it has been rendered between the same parties. 
4. An arbitral award A national court judgment has 
conclusive and preclusive effects in the further arbitral 
proceedings as to: 
4.1 determinations and relief contained in its dispositive 
part as well as in all reasoning necessary thereto; 
4.2 issues of fact or law which have actually been 
arbitrated and determined by it, provided any such 
determination was essential or fundamental to the 
dispositive part of the arbitral award. 
5. An arbitral award A national court judgment has 
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preclusive effects in the further arbitral proceedings as to 
a claim, cause of action or issue of fact or law, which 
could have been raised, but was not, in the proceedings 
resulting in that award judgment, provided that the 
raising of any such new claim, cause of action or new 
issue of fact or law amounts to procedural unfairness or 
abuse. 
6. The conclusive effects of an arbitral award can be 
invoked in further arbitration proceedings at any time 
permitted under the applicable procedure. 
7. The preclusive effects of an arbitral award need not be 
raised on its own motion by an arbitral tribunal. If not 
waived, such preclusive effects should be raised as soon 
as possible by a party. If not waived, a party shall raise the 
conclusive and preclusive effects of an arbitral award a 
national court judgment as soon as possible. The arbitral 
tribunal must not raise such effects on its own motion. 
Comment: Because it is considered that both the positive and 
negative res judicata effect are fundamentally identical in nature 
and should pertain to procedure, there is no reason to treat 
these effects differently.  
3.2. Transnational Res Judicata Principles with Respect to Prior Arbitral 
Awards 
1. To promote efficiency and finality of international 
commercial arbitration, arbitral awards should shall have 
conclusive and preclusive effects in further arbitral 
proceedings. 
2. The conclusive and preclusive effects of arbitral awards 
in further arbitral proceedings set forth below need not 
necessarily be governed by national law and may should 
shall be governed by transnational rules applicable to 
international commercial arbitration. 
Comment: The res judicata effects of a prior arbitral award 
should be governed by transnational rules. Any reference to 
national laws should be for guidance only. Arbitral tribunals 
may have to consult the lex arbitri of the prior award to 
determine whether it is final for res judicata purposes. 
3. A valid arbitral award has conclusive and preclusive 
effects in further arbitral proceedings if: 
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3.1 it is final and binding in the country of origin and 
there is no impediment to recognition in the country of 
the place of the subsequent arbitration; 
Comment: Mirroring Article V (1)(e) NYC, an award may be 
considered as final if it can no longer be modified in appeal 
proceedings. arbitral tribunals will have to consult the prior 
award’s lex arbitri to determine whether this is the case. 
Likewise, for reasons of coherence and efficiency it may be 
appropriate for arbitral tribunals to grant res judicata effects to 
awards only if they can no longer be challenged at the arbitral 
seat. 
As with regard to judgments, to respect the autonomy of 
international arbitration the validity requirement replaces the 
requirement that the prior award be capable of recognition at 
the place of arbitration of the subsequent arbitral tribunal. An 
award should generally be considered as “valid” if it was not 
annulled by the supervisory courts at the prior arbitral seat and 
if it cannot be refused recognition or enforcement for one of 
the grounds listed in Article V (1) NYC. 
3.2 it has decided on or disposed of a claim for relief 
which is sought or is being reargued in the further 
arbitration proceedings; 
3.3 it is based upon a cause of action which is invoked in 
the further arbitration proceedings or which forms the 
basis for the subsequent arbitral proceedings; and 
3.4 it has been rendered between the same parties. 
4. An arbitral award has conclusive and preclusive effects 
in the further arbitral proceedings as to: 
4.1 determinations and relief contained in its dispositive 
part as well as in all reasoning necessary thereto; 
Comment: As an exception to the general rule, the underlying 
reasoning of a partial award should be covered by the award’s 
res judicata effect before the arbitral tribunal that rendered it. 
4.2 issues of fact or law which have actually been 
arbitrated and determined by it, provided any such 
determination was essential or fundamental to the 
dispositive part of the arbitral award. 
Comment: As an exception to the general rule, final 
determinations of issues of fact or law which were essential to 
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the full final award should only have res judicata effects if 
decided in a partial award. 
5. An arbitral award has preclusive effects in the further 
arbitral proceedings as to a claim, cause of action or issue 
of fact or law, which could have been raised, but was not, 
in the proceedings resulting in that award, provided that 
the raising of any such new claim, cause of action or new 
issue of fact or law amounts to procedural unfairness or 
abuse. 
6. The conclusive effects of an arbitral award can be 
invoked in further arbitration proceedings at any time 
permitted under the applicable procedure. 
7. The preclusive effects of an arbitral award need not be 
raised on its own motion by an arbitral tribunal. If not 
waived, such preclusive effects should be raised as soon 
as possible by a party. If not waived, a party shall raise the 
conclusive and preclusive effects of an arbitral award as 
soon as possible. The arbitral tribunal must not raise such 
effects on its own motion. 
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CONCLUSION 
Conclusion 
 
We are here in a dynamic area of law, 
well able to embrace new situations as 
justice requires.  
(Simon Brown J.) 
810. The doctrine of res judicata as developed in domestic laws prohibits the re-
litigation of a dispute that has finally been adjudged by a judicial court or tribunal. 
Affording finality to judgments, it puts an end to the dispute. The same dispute cannot 
be re-litigated again between the same parties.  
811. The central question that we proposed to investigate in this research was 
whether international commercial arbitral tribunals should apply the traditional res 
judicata doctrine to coordinate their relations with state courts and other arbitral 
tribunals. Should they apply the same res judicata principles as state courts to determine 
the effects of a prior judgment or award in the subsequent arbitration?  
812. The main thesis underlying this research was that international commercial 
arbitral tribunals should develop transnational res judicata principles, i.e. generally 
accepted res judicata principles that respect the nature and objectives of international 
commercial arbitration.  
813. The reasons that justify this thesis may be succinctly summarised as follows:  
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814. In Chapters One and Two of this research we showed that there is no uniform 
res judicata doctrine. Although the res judicata doctrine is recognised as a general principle 
of law inherent to all legal systems, there are several important differences among 
domestic laws with respect to res judicata. These differences are mirrored in public 
international law. While general res judicata principles have been developed in public 
international law, it was seen that there is great uncertainty among international courts 
and tribunals in particular with regards to the scope and requirements of res judicata. By 
contrast, private international law instruments do not contain provisions on res judicata, 
focusing instead on the avoidance of parallel proceedings.  
815. In Chapters Three and Four we saw that judgments and awards may give rise to 
res judicata issues before arbitral tribunals in a myriad of different situations. However, 
international arbitration law contains no rules that go beyond stating the general 
principle that awards have res judicata effects. While the recent ILA recommendations 
on res judicata and arbitration provide useful guidance to international arbitral tribunals, 
they leave many questions open. They also do not cover the situation where an arbitral 
tribunal is faced with a prior national court judgment. Furthermore, save for few 
exceptions, there is no established practice among arbitral tribunals with regard to res 
judicata. This has allowed us to conclude that the way in which international arbitration 
law and practice currently deals with the problem of res judicata is not satisfactory. 
816. In Chapter Five we showed that international arbitral tribunals should not apply 
any particular domestic law to res judicata, but should develop transnational res judicata 
principles. The transnational approach to res judicata in international arbitration is 
appropriate because it best reflects the autonomous and inherently transnational nature 
of international commercial arbitration. It also has the great advantage of providing a 
uniform set of res judicata principles for international arbitral tribunals, which will 
improve legal coherence and certainty. Finally, the transnational approach allows 
arbitral tribunals to adapt traditional res judicata principles to better meet the objectives 
of international commercial arbitration.  
817. Finally, in Chapter Six we determined the content of the transnational res judicata 
principles that international arbitral tribunals should apply to determine the effects of 
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prior judgments and awards in subsequent arbitration proceedings. As a conclusion to 
Chapter Six, we adapted the ILA recommendations on res judicata and arbitration in 
accordance with our findings.  
818. This research on the res judicata doctrine before international arbitral tribunals 
did not aim to close the debate on the topic. This would have been both a 
presumptuous and impossible goal to achieve. It would be presumptuous to pretend to 
have found “final” answers to the complex problems that res judicata raises before 
international arbitral tribunals (it is indeed doubtful whether there is such as thing as a 
“final” answer in legal matters1171). Due to the limited scope of this research, it would 
also have been impossible to suggest solutions to all of the questions that the res judicata 
doctrine poses in international arbitration. For this reason several questions had to be 
left open, such as the standard of interpretation to be given to the triple identity test in 
international arbitration. Some questions could only be raised by not analysed, such as 
the res judicata effect of decisions rendered by supra-national courts and tribunals before 
an international commercial arbitral tribunal. Finally, some questions could not even be 
raised, e.g. whether the same or similar transnational res judicata principles should apply 
in international investment arbitration. 
819. Rather than to close the debate, the aim of this research was to clarify the 
problem of res judicata in international arbitration. It was to show the reality and 
magnitude of the problem and to offer some solutions. This research was intended to 
cast some light on a problem that has given rise to many questions and much 
uncertainty in international arbitration and that, due to the growing complexity of 
international arbitration and litigation, is expected to arise more and more frequently in 
the future.  
820. The question of res judicata in international arbitration is only one aspect of a 
greater problem in international arbitration, which is the coordination of jurisdictions 
between arbitral tribunals and other national, international and supra-national courts 
and (arbitral) tribunals. The parallel coexistence of these courts and tribunals, coupled 
with the increasing complexity of international disputes that involve a multitude of 
                                                 
1171 LALIVE, Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy, para. 2. 
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closely related parties, contracts and issues, will inevitably lead to conflicts of 
jurisdiction. These conflicts not only raise questions of res judicata, but also of the 
applicability of other jurisdiction-regulating mechanisms, such as lis pendens, forum non 
conveniens, as well as consolidation and joinder.  
821. These issues stand witness not only for the increasing complexity of 
international arbitration, but also for its development. International arbitration can no 
longer be considered as a “second-class method”1172 of dispute resolution. It is an 
alternative method that coexists in parallel with other dispute resolution mechanisms. 
They also indicate that because of international arbitration’s expansion, arbitral 
tribunals will constantly face new problems which always raise the same question: 
should the same solutions as those developed in litigation to coordinate the relations 
between domestic courts also apply in international arbitration or do the particularities 
of internatonal arbitration call for different solutions and, if so, which ones. 
                                                 
1172 HANOTIAU, Problems Raised by Complex Arbitrations Involving Multiple Contracts-Parties-Issues, p. 256.  
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